I AM persuaded that neither a reincarnated Danton of the Revolutionary days, nor a Gambetta of the early years of the Third Republic, would find his oratory availing if opposed to the present temper of the French people. The assaults of the most forceful and hostile of the Socialist orators failed to disturb it. It likewise remained unmoved in the face of grave political events---for they were essentially political rather than otherwise---like the Malvy and Caillaux cases.(1)
As a matter of fact, even the phlegmatic German, though of a mentality less keen, is hardly more calm or stoical than the typical Frenchmen to be met with in almost any vocation. Imbued with a high sense of accountability, industrious, thrifty, and provident beyond any people I know, coupled with an inherent love of country, they showed a poise and stability which were a bulwark of strength to the nation in its greatest crisis.
In a conversation with the eminent Dr. Carrel, held in the Summer of 1913, he said to me that while this or that particular Ministry might arrogate to itself the credit for successfully meeting the difficulties imposed by the war, yet after all it was the people of France to whom the credit was due. He said that his countrymen were, as a whole, patriotic and liberty-loving, and endowed with a lot of common sense. It was the force of that influence exerted upon Ministries which compelled them to act in harmony and be responsive thereto.
Patriotism and devotion to ideals are not monopolized by any sect, creed, or party in France. That such a spirit must have a powerful influence in helping to shape the new order of things growing out of the needs of governmental reforms, even the ordinary observer of events would affirm. The salient characteristics of what may be termed the moral qualities of France are her best guarantees of stability and safety. They constitute the fundamentals of all progressive national development.
Unfortunately, there are concomitant qualities not so praiseworthy,---more intensive, perhaps, as one proceeds to the higher official circles,---which I may term the temperamental qualities, as distinguished from the moral, to which I have been referring. What part personal jealousies have played in some of the most important events of history no one can tell, but I have seen that trait do more to bring about the downfall of French Ministries than all other causes combined. It was also the mainspring in the movement to discredit others in high places.
Gabriel Hanotaux, former Minister for Foreign Affairs and noted historian, in explaining to me the fall of one of those Ministries, said "Oh yes, the plotters stand in the corridors of the Chamber, making their plans for the fall of Ministries even as they pass by."
But as a common military danger at its most imminent crisis late in March 1918 compelled a unity of command of the Allied forces, so a common danger in the civil affairs of France, coupled with an undeniable patriotism and devotion to principle, rendered impotent the plots and intrigues of politicians. Then, too, despite the criminations and recriminations of partisan groups, the fact still remains that neither the patriotism nor the loyalty, nor the integrity of such men as Viviani, Delcassé, Briand, Ribot, or Painlevé of the past Ministries had been questioned, any more than those of Clemenceau and Pichon in the Ministry which followed. I have heard them all, both in public and private, proclaim the highest ideals and greatest devotion to country. Providentially, able and patriotic men governed the destinies of France from the very beginning of the war.
However, in forecasting what might happen, no one familiar with the past history of France could blindly ignore the influence which might suddenly be exerted upon the masses by some unexpected and untoward incident, when the restraining power of the common danger to their country should be no longer felt.
Perhaps no one has understood his own people better than the writer Gustave Le Bon who, thirty years ago, wrote his clever book The Crowd---A Study of the Popular Mind. One knowing the French people and reading his analysis, so epigrammatic in its style, of the psychology of the acts of crowds, can hardly escape the belief that he was drawing a faithful picture of the French mind. Asserting that "the crowd demands a god before everything else," the author says that sentiment has never been vanquished in its eternal conflict with reason.
France is still sentimental. Though common sense and patriotism might prevent "the crowd" from becoming a devotee of "a god before everything else " during the war, yet the power of its influence, in my judgment, particularly with the encouragement which military successes bring, would have to be reckoned with during the days succeeding the final Allied victory.
In a conversation with Madame Poincaré at the Embassy residence in 1916, she spoke with much intensity of the humiliation which Germany had inflicted upon France in the 1870 war. One familiar with the French mind could not help but believe that it was somewhat in such a spirit that the demand for the restoration of Alsace and Lorraine was made, quite as much as a measure of sheer reparation. And it was quite natural that it should be so.
I took occasion, during one of my calls on M. Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, in June or July, 1918, to refer to a speech made by the headmaster of a French college, on a public occasion prior to the memorable series of victories for the Allied arms, boldly proclaiming that as a result of this great war the eastern front of France should hereafter be the Rhine, a limit traced by nature and by history. Such utterances had been challenged by at least the Socialist element in L'Humanité. I asked M. Pichon what support he thought the French people would give them.
He said that the views expressed did not represent those of the French Government, which was strongly opposed to the doctrine of territorial extension as the price of the war.(2) His words made a deep impression on me. Referring to the doctrines enunciated by President Wilson in his message of January 8, 1918, he said that he could assure me that the French Government was in entire accord with them.
"France," he said, "has such confidence in the wisdom and the motives of President Wilson, that I can say to you that she will absolutely agree to follow the course he advocates. She will conform to the principles which he has declared to be so vital in this war."
I believe that M. Pichon in that declaration correctly reflected the overwhelming sentiment of the French people. I know, from frequent talks with men like Ribot and Briand, when they were Prime Ministers, that the views of President Wilson were looked upon by them as voicing the views of France. Indeed, it was Madame Ribot who once told me that her husband had directed his son to paste in his ready referencebook the message of the President on April 2, that it might serve him for guidance in his own acts as Premier.
Only upon one point did I find that a few in the Government itself---and I believed I might include Premier Clemenceau---raised a question: as to agreeing to the establishment of a League of Nations.(3) I had good reason to know Clemenceau was sceptical as to the practicability of forming such a League which would be able to meet satisfactorily the purposes of its creation, though in principle he thought such a solution for settling future international difficulties was much to be desired.
It was Louis XIV who, at the zenith of his power, said: "I am the State." For a year M. Clemenceau, as Premier of the French Republic, was able to say for all practical purposes "I am the Government." In my telegrams to the Department at different times, I had frequent occasion to refer to his courage, determination, and popularity with both the soldiers and the civilians.(4)
Seventy-six years old when he again came to power on November 17, 1917, having already been Premier from 1906 to 1909, Georges Clemenceau, prominent in the days attending the birth of the Third Republic nearly fifty years before, remained seemingly as vigorous, physically and mentally, as a man in middle life. Forceful in his speech, inspiring confidence in his ability to do all that he undertook to do, there has been no man in France so idealized since the days of Boulanger as Clemenceau came to be at this period. A powerful orator endowed with a trenchant wit and fearless in attack, M. Clemenceau had been feared as much as admired in Parliament, where he had repeatedly overthrown a Cabinet by his sudden and irresistible interventions. He was the sole survivor of those who at the National Assembly, following the defeat of France in 1870, had protested against the cession of Alsace and Lorraine to Germany. His caustic editorial pen--- possessing all the qualities of his oratory---had since shown that as far as Germany was concerned he had never disarmed.
Whether he at all times exercised his influence without prejudice and solely from the dictates of principle, or whether he used that influence not unmindful of an ulterior purpose to discredit his foes in former Ministries, is a question which would be variously answered. Certainly his enemies would not answer it in the same manner as his admirers.
While it may be said that undoubtedly he is a man of intense prejudices, yet there is no doubt in my mind but that he patriotically used every particle of energy in his being for the protection of the interests of his country. No other man in France could have inspired such confidence in that belief, nor have been so successful in the accomplishment of such a task. More cynical and sceptical, however, of high ideals as applied to European politics, and more uncompromising in his attitude, he lacked the idealism of a Ribot and the conciliatory spirit which would characterize a Briand. But withal he was needed as the man of the hour to meet the crises imposed by military defeats, intriguing and corrupt propagandas, and serious labour troubles. He had also the confidence of the Army, which is ever distrustful of the encroachments of civil authority.
Although not attempting here to describe all the prominent figures in the moving forces of French politics, many of them being mentioned in some detail in other portions of this book, there is one distinguished personage to whom I must make a reference---President Poincaré.
In my own opinion and conception of the part he has filled in the affairs of the French nation, when the history of this war is written and the achievements of the actors therein get their just dues, President Poincaré will be looked upon as a wise, patriotic, and safe executive at a time when such a man was needed. Altogether lacking the aggressiveness, dash, and personal magnetism of a Clemenceau, the amiability of a Briand, or the brilliancy of a Viviani, he may not have filled the public mind with that conception of the heroic ideal which it craved. But if this was true, he on the other hand was free from the dangers of that kind of pyrotechnic statesmanship which, while lacking nothing of the spectacular, possessed nothing of the poise and good judgment needed in meeting the many trying situations which the problems of the war imposed. But I have never seen anything in his acts or his public utterances that was not characterized by sincerity, fairness, and, withal, a dignity compatible with his position; a position, by the way, in itself limited through the prescriptions with which the laws and the constitution of France have hedged in its powers, and the extreme use which Parliament makes of its authority.
My old and good friend M. Ribot had experienced difficulties with the Socialists ever since the Spring of 1917, over the proposed calling of a Socialist Congress at Stockholm, where Allied and neutral Socialists were to meet to discuss the war aims of both groups of belligerents.
The promptness with which this proposal had been accepted in Germany caused the Allied and Associated Powers to examine it with circumspection, only Russia being disposed to acquiesce. France and England both eventually judged it necessary to refuse passports to those desiring to go to Stockholm for the purpose.
On April 26, 1917, the French Socialist Party met and decided not to appoint delegates, but in May the Socialist Minority element held a separate meeting at which the invitation to Stockholm was accepted, this action being approved by the majority of the important Socialist Federation of the Seine Department. In June and again in August there were agitated sessions at the Chamber, Premier Ribot securing each time a majority to support his refusal of passports, and justifying himself against charges of "imperialism."
Nevertheless, the Socialist Group remained on the alert for any occasion to provoke his downfall.
This was found in connection with the "defeatist" wave then noted in some quarters, and the accusations being brought openly in the Press against men in high places such as the Minister of the Interior, M. Malvy, and former Premier Caillaux, as well as against obscure individuals such as Bolo Pasha, Almereyda, Duval, Landau, Goldsky, and others, whose names then for the first time became known to the general public. Finding himself unable to govern against the systematic Socialist opposition, M. Ribot resigned as President of the Council on September 7, but consented to remain as Minister for Foreign Affairs in the new Cabinet formed by M. Paul Painlevé, Eventually, however, M. Ribot withdrew completely, being replaced at the Foreign Office by M. Louis Barthou.(5)
The Painlevé Ministry, in turn, tendered its resignation on November 16, finding itself opposed by a majority of ninety-one votes in the Chamber of Deputies. Such a result had been freely predicted since the beginning of the month, its consummation being delayed only by the adjournment of Parliament until M. Painlevé returned from the War Conference held at Rome. The opposition to the Ministry, which had started with practically the entire Socialist group of Deputies, had gained strength from various other elements, which for one reason or another had become dissatisfied. Undoubtedly, the failure of the Cabinet to take a clear stand in the matter of the, above-mentioned scandals, and particularly the case of the notorious Bolo Pasha, accounts of which filled many columns in the Paris Press, made the Cabinet very unpopular, this sentiment increasing after the resignation of M. Ribot.
It was over a request he made for an adjournment of interpellations on this subject that M. Painlevé was overthrown. Among the names prominently mentioned for the position of Premier were Viviani, Clemenceau, Léon Bourgeois, and Louis Barthou. It was to M. Georges Clemenceau that the confidence of Parliament went, with the full support of the French public as a whole, only the Socialist group at the Chamber opposing him but finding in him an adversary who asked no better than to fight them at every turn.
The keynote of his policy as Prime Minister and Minister of War was struck in his initial address to the Chamber immediately upon the formation of his Cabinet.
"I shall make you no promises," he said. " I shall wage war. That is all."
For eleven months and three weeks he continued unremittingly to wage war---his words bringing inspiration to both soldiers and civilians, like the already famous Verdun watchword: "They shall not pass."
The qualities and the methods of M. Clemenceau's statesmanship were not long in appearing. It had been alleged by some that he "would not dare" to allow prosecutions in high places, even where the charge was intelligence with the enemy. He lost no time in showing that he asked first of all for clear light to be cast upon all doubtful questions, and that he would not allow considerations of either personal friendship or political influence to have the slightest weight where the vital interests of France were involved. He had said that his policy both at home and abroad would consist exclusively in waging war.
No word spoken by any statesman was ever more faithfully kept.
In a personal letter addressed early in the year to Secretary Lansing, I reviewed the general situation, in part as follows:
Ambassador Sharp to Secretary Lansing.
Paris, February 20, 1918.
MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY,
As stated in my last weekly telegraphic report of the 18th instant, certain complications other than what may be termed strictly political have come to exert no little influence upon public opinion. Their effect strengthens and at the same time weakens the present Government.
Undoubtedly the prosecution and conviction of Bolo Pasha, whose name for the past six months has stood as a synonym for corrupt intrigues and treason, have greatly popularized Clemenceau, and, for a time, the arrest of M. Caillaux---involving charges devoid of financial corruption---added to his strength. But, apparently, reconstructing their lines of offensive, the friends of the latter, comprising substantially the whole of the Socialist Party, as well as certain other strong influences whose identity seems to remain in the background, are said to be at the present moment very active in their efforts to overthrow the Clemenceau Ministry.
Concerning the carrying out of such plans, as I intimated in my above-mentioned telegram, one hears now very frequently of threatened labor troubles involving strikes in munition plants, predicted to begin in the near future. A very prominent member of the Chamber of Deputies, at the head of a great Paris newspaper, told me yesterday that such strikes were scheduled to take place on next Wednesday, the 27th instant. You have doubtless been an interested reader of the proceedings of the Interallied Labor Conferences now being held in London.
The Deputy above-quoted informed me that everybody was afraid of Clemenceau, and that his opponents in the Chamber, figuratively speaking, mentioned his name only in whispers. It would seem that the sobriquet given to him of "The Tiger" is not so inappropriate.
A humorous story was told by the same gentleman that even President Poincaré waved aside two envoys---Frenchmen ---who came recently up from the Queen-Mother of Spain---herself Austrian by descent but bitterly anti-German---to talk of a peace proposition. The President, with no little haste and embarrassment, referred these messengers to the Government. Later Clemenceau, hearing of the incident, had the men arrested and put under watch near the front.
* * * * * * * I am, my dear Mr. Lansing,
Very sincerely yours,
WM. G. SHARP.
I sent on April I, 1918, a long résumé telegram to the President upon the general phases of the war, which I concluded by saying:
"It would seem that the prompt action in bringing to the front additional English troops in considerable number and reinforcement, at the weakest points of the line, by the stationed fighting troops of France, has come into play more quickly and more effectually than the enemy had counted upon. There is no question that the very much superior aerial activity of the British and the French airmen, through the dropping of many tons of bombs, and the daring use of machine-guns at low altitudes on the advancing columns of the enemy, proved the most disconcerting and deadly forces used against them. Two whole advancing German divisions were stopped and literally put to flight by such an attack by French air machines. If this new arm of warfare could be sufficiently developed in quick enough time by the Allies, it might well become the determining factor in winning the war. It has been the only means by which a real sense of fear has been carried far over the lines to the German people."
I then mentioned the fact that Clemenceau was spending much time among the French troops to give them encouragement by his presence, and that he had greatly sustained the morale of the people.
Letter from Ambassador Sharp to Secretary Lansing.
Paris, April 11, 1918.
MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:
While the unexpected happenings which have characterized the conduct of the war since its beginning have prevented anything like forecasts based on reason being made, yet it would seem beyond all question that the great conflict now raging in the North, involving practically the entire British Front and the northern extremity of that of the French, portends a decision exceeding, in the importance of its results, anything since the repulse of the enemy at the Marne. It is my judgment that Germany has determined to stake the issues of the entire war upon the success or failure of this offensive. How long it will last will depend wholly upon the ability of the Allies on the one side to defend themselves and, on the other, of the enemy, in the face of his terrible losses, to continue. Only the certainty of the marked predominance in the number of the enemy's troops makes the situation very grave for the Allies. Man for man, the French would prove, as they have in the past, the masters of the Germans, while the English just as brave but without the strategy of the French, would be able to hold their own. But the internal conditions of Germany involving the long period of hunger and deprivation of the people, on the one hand, and the boastful confidence of the military power, on the other, have forced Germany to stake all on this offensive. A failure would have a most demoralizing and disastrous effect on the Germans and would probably be the prelude to overtures for peace which would save that country from a collapse.
Out of the struggle that is going on these days, veritably marking the deathlike grip of the opposing forces, I wish I might confidently predict a victory for the Allied Armies, but until the American troops can bring effectively to bear at the front a strength of not less than a half million fighting men, the most optimistic could hardly hope for more than being able to check any further considerable advance of the enemy.
From my own observations growing out of the conduct of this war, characterized by methods so unique, I would rather have 50,000 experienced pilots with 50,000 bombing airmachines with which to attack the enemy than ten times that number of men placed in the trenches. Not even the shells from our biggest guns have been so disconcerting to the advancing forces of the enemy as the attacks in the air.
M. Cambon this morning went so far as to tell me that he feared the employment by the enemy on the Western Front of Russian troops from Ukraine and other sections of Russia. Frequently one hears rumors of at least a quarter of a million Austrian troops being held back of the enemy lines. A hopeful feature may be found in the claim that the French have a splendid reserve upon which they can rely in extreme emergency, and, after all, I feel that it is to their strategy and their operations characterized by so much system that we must look for stemming the tide of German advance. Only the other day a Frenchman, prominent in civil life but holding a kind of liaison position with the Government, told me that there was the greatest concern manifested lest the Germans would succeed in advancing far enough to take possession of the coalfields about Béthune, from which they are only now distant seven or eight miles---so near, in fact, that the mines are operated exclusively at night so as not to betray their position to the guns of the enemy. Early in the war the extensive coal mines at Lens were captured by the Germans, and if those of the Béthune district fell into their hands, there would remain only a potential annual output of 10,000,000 tons located in Central France, as against a normal pre-war output of 40,000,000 tons.
In writing you of these conditions, I am aware that long before this letter reaches you a very acute crisis may be reached which would even accentuate the importance of some of the things that I have mentioned; or, on the other hand-though it does not seem likely---a lull may follow the intensive offensive and there may be a process of re-alignment of the forces for some time to come. I would rather look for the former situation to arise.
In any event, I am pleased to assure you that the morale of the Government, as well as of the Army and people, is in every way admirable. It is indeed not too much to say that after nearly four years since the verdict of the Marne, their courage and determination are as indomitable as they were then. I am sure that when the history of this great war shall have been faithfully written, its outstanding feature will be the magnificent record which France has made in her heroic devotion to the call of national duty and individual sacrifice.
I was recently asked, in a telegram from the Department, to send over the bad as well as the good news. Perhaps I can epitomize in just one sentence all that might be characterized as bad news---that is, the strength of the enemy.
In conclusion, I feel that I should say to you that in all my telegrams---for this is a day calling for telegraphic information rather than the slower process of writing despatches---I have sought to avoid freighting them down with an account of mere rumors of this thing or that. Most of these have no foundation in fact, and only give way to a new crop of other rumors the following day almost diametrically opposed to them. Such are the rumors: secret plottings for revolts against the Government, hostility towards the British or American forces and widespread distrust of their motives, and, I might add, with a good deal of truth, the exaggerated importance of the necessity for American propaganda in France showing our achievements, integrity of our motives, etc. The widely known presence of our own troops in considerable numbers at the front, coupled with the widely read utterances of President Wilson, have furnished the best evidence of our earnestness. I am sure that no American in France has any reason to doubt the full confidence and even affection which the French people have for our country.
I am, believe me, my dear Mr. Secretary,
Very sincerely yours,
WM. G. SHARP.
In appreciation of the gravity of the period, the General Confederation of Labour unanimously resolved, on April 18th, to call on all its members to refrain from the slightest attempt to declare on the First of May the general strike which had been expected as a labour demonstration. Nevertheless partial strikes continued, causing some concern as they affected industries of vital importance. This situation was settled by a compromise in which M. Clemenceau imposed his will, when a delegation of strikers called upon him on May 18.
The Press published only few details, but according to the information received by the Embassy, the demands made by the delegation were as follows : (1) the recall of the order sending mobilized workmen to the front; (2) an increase in the scale of wages ; (3) clear explanations as to the reasons for which France was still fighting and what hopes there might be for an early peace.
M. Clemenceau replied: (1) The order sending mobilized workmen to the front could not very well be recalled, since such an action would have an unpatriotic appearance, especially at the present moment: but the order could be applied so as to take into account such cases as really deserved to be considered as exceptional; (2) the question of higher wages would be examined and satisfaction given; (3) France had never yet received official peace overtures offering any guarantee whatsoever; but no genuine opening for peace would be neglected when it should come; meanwhile, the country had no choice but to fight on.
These replies were taken by the delegation as giving sufficient satisfaction for the time being. Several divisions of cavalry had been under orders to go to various industrial centres in case these negotiations failed, so threatening had some aspects of the situation become.
The reference made to conversations bearing upon peace, a question brought up by the strikers' delegates and to which M. Clemenceau had replied to their satisfaction, corresponded with a preoccupation becoming general at that time, although no responsible person felt any doubt about the necessity of continuing the war until satisfactory terms should be assured. Prior to the great German offensive, the matter had been brought to public attention by Lord Lansdowne's second letter, extracts from which appeared in the Paris Press of March 6 and 7, the comment upon it being adverse.
Strangely enough, only a few days before I had presented my views of this problem in a letter to President Wilson:
Letter from Ambassador Sharp to President Wilson.
Paris, March 4, 1918.
MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
At a time when, as it appears to me, a situation more tense ---more portentous of far-reaching results not only upon the future state of the war but also upon the peace to follow---than at any period since the beginning of the war confronts all the belligerent peoples, I have felt that I ought to bare my own thoughts before you as I view the situation. To be perfectly candid, I have hesitated not a little in coming to this conclusion, because I am not sure that they are in harmony with your own, neither am I certain that they will be very helpful. Besides, the changes of to-morrow may greatly alter the views of to-day.
But I am reassured in writing you as I do, because of the attitude of fairness with which my opinion will be considered, and the justice that will be accorded in conceding to me the best of purpose. Indeed, I believe it to be my highest duty as a witness of its unspoken need, after these long three years and a-half of the world's travail.
To my mind, in the progress of this war, the point of the parting of the ways is not far off. One of those ways leads to the conclusion of the war by diplomatic ends, the other by the test, imposed in feudal times, of trial by battle. I believe the desired goal can be not only much more expeditiously attained but with more lasting and beneficial results by the former route. I make no reference to the terrible toll exacted in travelling the other road, only because that should hardly be considered in the safeguarding of human liberty.
Lest the views that follow be misconstrued, I wish at the outset to affirm that with mind and heart I have approved every step that has been taken by our Government in this war. I do not see how those steps could have been avoided, neither can I see how they could have been more wisely directed, and I have great confidence in the wisdom of our future policy. More than this, it was but the one honorable and consistent course for us to follow---and it must be pursued until the very end with the greatest possible vigor. We must be fully prepared to win by that old feudal test, so unhappily brought down to the civilization of the Twentieth Century, if the road to the victory of right by diplomacy cannot be travelled.
It is because I believe that the events of the past few weeks---discouraging though they may appear from a purely military standpoint---by again setting in motion the forces of reason, have made rifts in the clouds of men's hate and mad ambitions, that I feel that the road at the fork in the highway which leads to peace through diplomacy is the right one to take. Through those rifts, widened by your inspired message, has been shed on the bloodstained fields of war-wrecked Europe the light of a new hope. Contrary to the professed belief of almost a universal Press, I believe that hope, gaining substance and nourished by your words, has found a lodgment in the hearts of millions of suffering humanity. May God speed the day of the acceptance of these words!
But, as the old saw has it that "it takes two to make a bargain," so it takes the common will of two contending forces to settle their differences. Is this possible? At the expense of being regarded as a visionary, an optimist, but most assuredly not a "défaitiste," I believe it is possible. It is true that Herding's words lack much in candor, and, unfortunately, exhibit a bravado which has made the name of the German Government so justly abhorrent in this great struggle, but there is in them not only much less of arrogant abuse of the Allied Powers than formerly, but, most encouraging of all, an apparently frank avowal of a desire for peace, even going so far as to express substantial acquiescence in the four principles enunciated in your last message to Congress.(6) There is every reason to believe that a powerful peace element in Germany forced him to go that far, despite the strength of the spirit of the militarists led by Hindenburg. It needs but encouragement from the Allies for it to grow much stronger. I hope the awaited reply of Count Czernin may go farther.
But can they be trusted? Someday inevitably they must be, if peace is again to come to earth.
But, again, is the peace talk of the enemy a mere camouflage hiding more wicked and artful designs of the German Government? If one reads the English Press, decidedly yes. Practically all the French papers, except those edited by the Socialists, take nearly the same view. Unfortunately, some of our great New York dailies give voice to much the same sentiments.
But thanks to your patience and forbearance, coupled with a rare wisdom in setting forth our contentions, and all inspired by a purpose which only the blind must fail to see or trust, substantial advancement has been made in getting together. My prayer has been that before a resumption of general hostilities, bound to be more frightful even than those of the past, all such efforts to establish a just, honorable, and defendable peace might come to a fruitful conclusion.
The difficulty of bringing about such a result will be very greatly increased after these hostilities have again begun. The intense slaughter will be revived, and, undoubtedly, new conditions will rise out of the possible occupation of other territory and the also possible added complications of other Powers being drawn into the conflict.
The superiority in the number of the Allied adherents over that of the enemy has been alike a source of weakness as well as strength. Briefly writing Colonel House the other day, transmitting a letter from Professor Herron, I made the comparison of the position of the Allies with that of the juggler who is compelled to keep a dozen balls constantly up in the air, lest one falling should explode and put him out of business. While the task of the enemy is similar, yet he has fewer balls to watch.
May I now consider another phase of the question, as it concerns the part which our Government is bound to play in determining peace conditions, and that, whether through the issue of the force of arms or of diplomacy. In endeavoring to analyse the problems which the events of this war, particularly those of the last few months, have signalled, I have been led to some conclusions, amounting to convictions, as they affect our own position with reference to the Allies as well as to the enemy. The accumulating force of certain manifest signs will not permit me to divest my mind of these convictions.
If I read those signs aright, the influence of our Government will be much stronger in bringing about the realization of the high ideals which you have so forcefully advocated by negotiating a peace through diplomatic channels than by the decisive results of victories on the battlefield. With the influence of centuries shaping the aspirations of the different European Powers, and the fixedness of their conceptions of moral obligations, embittered by many reprisals in the past, they will submit to our wishes only as the necessity therefor exists.
As a concrete evidence of the truth of this statement, in so far as it indicates the divergence of views between America and Europe, M. Cambon, within the past weeks, said to me that notwithstanding that he was a warm friend and admirer of the United States, he considered that our Government did not understand European politics, which were decidedly different from the American. He thought our purposes too idealistic to be practically applied to European conditions. Only the fact that he has always been very frank with me in our exchange of views was responsible for his making this broad statement.
However, in spite of the divergence of views on the ultimate aims of the war, our influence to-day is most potent in bringing a just peace to Europe. It is for the reason that the cause of the Allies is irretrievably lost without us. Under such conditions the counsel of the President of the United States is not only given the greatest consideration, but every day the sentiment over here becomes more favorable to accept his leadership.
But in that very acceptance of leadership a danger may lurk---indeed, I have already noticed a trace of this effect upon the political leaders of the Allied Powers, particularly of France. I believe the same is true of England. The Socialists have espoused the principles enunciated by our Government almost as the articles of a religious faith. It was more than a casual observation made by M. Pichon the other day, though said in good nature, when he told me that the Socialists---in opposition to whom the present French Government is so bitterly arrayed---were using the words of your message against the Government. He added, however, that it was a happy circumstance that everybody in France seemed to endorse the message. With personal ambitions and jealousies of prestige among Party leaders, and questions of national import running athwart the high-minded and thoroughly unselfish principles which America advocates and which she insists must be recognized, only the power which she can exert in saving her Allies from defeat will enforce the harmony of action and the adherence to these principles.
The strength of our position is thus not alone in the confidence which the mass of the people have in the unselfishness and appraisement of our aims, but in the realization particularly of the heads of the Government of the fact that we are needed to win the war.
Granted there is a sincere disposition on the part of the respective Governments of the opposing forces to settle the war through peace negotiations, the one question transcending all others in its importance is the manner to be selected for their consideration. The question is no more important than it is delicate and dangerous. Soon after the declaration of Lord Lansdowne,(7) and while the criticism from certain quarters was as yet unabated, a noted English writer observed that undoubtedly it required great courage to continue the war but it required a still greater and higher courage to stop it. Indeed, he who would essay this latter rôle must possess the confidence of the people not only in his undoubted courage but in his wisdom and integrity of purpose.
In studying the various notes issued just preceding the declaration of war as contained in the books of the different Governments, I came to the conviction that one of the greatest obstacles that stood in the way of preventing such an outcome had been the fact that no two representatives of those Governments, even those of the Allied Powers, were enabled to get actually together in personal contact to discuss the momentous questions which were raised. Telegrams issued from the capitals of each of the countries, crossing each other in their course, seemed rather to aggravate the situation than otherwise.
Most assuredly if peace is finally to come by an exchange of views between the Allied Governments and those of the Central Powers, some day and somewhere those responsible for them must meet. The arrangement of such a programme is extremely delicate. While we may not with prudence propose it ourselves at this time, yet it seems to me that a grave responsibility would follow the refusal to consider such a proposal if made by the other side. After the terrible sacrifices, and in the face of impending ones which may be still greater, I would lose faith in humanity did I not believe that a rapprochement could be established.
In expressing this belief, I do not ignore the seemingly impossible contentions, as well as the apparent antagonistic character, of the enemy's aspirations. The arrogant and foolish talk of the Kaiser has been one of the most discouraging things in considering the success of such a course. The forcible taking of Russian provinces, the harsh and exacting terms of peace now being imposed upon distressed Roumania, do not, on their face, augur well for the reaching of a common agreement consistent with your own exalted conditions which must precede---in substance if not in form---the establishment of any peace. Just to what extent the military spirit of Germany is now dominant, I do not know, but that there is a very strong sentiment existing throughout that Empire for an early peace, I have not the slightest doubt. Austria would declare for it to-morrow on generous terms, if she could be assured of future safe relations with her powerful ally. Her segregation through peace negotiations would quickly end the war.
It is my belief that probably but a single condition advanced by the Allies would render it impossible to come to an agreement with Germany. That condition is the contention raised by France for the return of Alsace and Lorraine. Though, God knows, if I could so arrange it and not disturb the future peace of Europe thereby, I would give to France not only Alsace and Lorraine but an indemnity equal to the billion dollars extracted from her by Germany nearly fifty years ago, together with interest from that date to the present, yet I believe that von Kuhlmann's "never,"(8) uttered in answer to such contention, can be revoked only by a decisive victory by arms. However, if von Kuhlmann's "never" is unyielding, the position of France upon that question seems to be equally so. The demand for the return of these lost provinces has become her slogan in this war---a veritable Shibboleth. But, most assuredly, if their recession is the price of peace, no ransom paid in blood or gold in the history of the world will have been so great. To give them separate autonomy or cede Lorraine alone to France, or in any other manner to arrive at a satisfactory arrangement as it affects the future of these provinces, is one of the most difficult problems to be considered.
But in following the route to peace by diplomacy, I have journeyed far from that other way which, at the fork of the roads, leads to peace through victory by battle. Not being a military man I leave the discussion of that question to those who should know, far better than I, the probability of being able to reach the goal by that method. I remember writing you---I think it was many months before our own entrance into the war---of the three factors, two of them heretofore practically unknown, which would tend indefinitely to prolong the war, namely: the apparently evenly matched strength of the opposing forces, the trench system of fighting, and the use of the aeroplane.(9) These factors are still the dominating ones, and their equilibrium since then has been but little disturbed. True, on the face of things, the first-named seems to be seriously affected by the melting away of Russia, yet this can only prolong the struggle. Discouraging as such a situation may seem for an early conclusion of the war, our own entrance into it has made it impossible, in my judgment, for Germany and her Allies to win. However, if the factors which I have mentioned prevent Germany from winning, they are equally obdurate in auguring a victory for the Allies. It is my judgment, born of long observation, that there are especially two ways in which such a victory can be brought about, if the result is to be decided by force of arms. The first is : we must as soon as possible gain an overwhelming mastery in the air---a bare supremacy will not do---which will enable us literally, as well as figuratively, to carry the war into Germany. In this way, the most stubborn of all barriers---the trench---will be practically eliminated. The second lies in the possible upheaval of internal conditions in Germany. A pronounced success of the first method would contribute to the other in bringing home to the German people the real severity of war.
In passing, I feel I must pay the tribute which truth demands to the magnificent courage---as great as ever---which the British and French soldiers on this front have shown through such an unparalleled test. Indeed, the faith which France---and I believe England as well---places in the ability of America to save the cause is as inspiring to the pride of every American as it is pathetic to those who know her need and suffering. The splendid appearance and behavior of our soldier boys over here, together with the demonstration of our country's remarkable preparations to back them up, are equally inspiring.
With high personal respect,
I am, believe me, my dear Mr. President,
Very sincerely yours,
WM. G. SHARP.
Little more than a month later came the greatest sensation which had yet been recorded in connection with conversations pointing towards peace. This was the publication by Premier Clemenceau of a letter written by Emperor Charles to his brother-in-law, Prince Sixte de Bourbon, and asking him to deliver a message of a possible conciliation to President Poincaré.
The fact that the letter had been written the year before, and kept secret by the French Government, came to the public as an astounding revelation. While it was true that in the late days of M. Ribot's premiership he had made brief reference, in the course of a statement in Parliament, to certain peace overtures coming from Austria, yet his remarks were but vague. I had at the time been advised from a confidential source that the French Government had been approached. The emissaries, described for purposes of secrecy as "two Belgians of great importance," were none other than Princes Sixte and Xavier de Bourbon, brothers of Empress Zita, and officers in the Belgian Army because, as members of a royal family having once reigned in France, they were barred by law from serving under the French flag. They had proposed a peace arranged on the basis of returning Alsace and Lorraine to France. This attempt at negotiations had failed, because of the scepticism felt by the French Government as to the sincerity of these propositions.
The act of Premier Clemenceau, in publishing the text of the letter to Prince Sixte, created all the more surprise since it had been intended as a message for President Poincaré. While the Paris Press stood almost unanimously behind M. Clemenceau in giving publicity to this now famous letter, yet there was a feeling in some quarters that a great mistake had been made. Such an incident at any other time would have been the occasion of violent interpellations at the Chamber of Deputies. As it was, the Socialist Party seized upon the incident to renew their criticisms of what they termed secret diplomacy, while others not politically allied with them deplored the publication. A Committee composed of such men as Baron Denys Cochin, Albert Thomas the Socialist leader, and Marcel Cachin belonging to the most advanced wing of the Socialist Party, held a conference with the Prime Minister on the subject.
As a matter of fact, President Poincaré had very properly shown the letter to M. Ribot, then his Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, and it was natural for M. Ribot to take Mr. Lloyd George and M. Sonnino into his confidence. As a man of good faith, he could not have attempted action without consulting his Allies, but it might have been expected that the affair would end there if no action were judged advisable, the letter remaining as a record for future negotiations if occasion arose. It was therefore felt in many quarters that M. Clemenceau, who was not Foreign Minister, by publishing the letter for his personal defence to prove his own case, had wasted a weapon which, if held in reserve and used opportunely, would have had great weight. Instead of this, all hope for a peace through Austria had vanished, the interests of Austria and Germany being indeed knitted more closely together than before by this indiscretion.(10)
In the talk that was current about possible efforts to overthrow M. Clemenceau on the strength of all this, it was said that advice had been given to President Poincaré to form a new Cabinet made up of so-called "extra-Parliamentary Members," a thing which, it was claimed, he had a right to do, since custom alone had bound the selection of Cabinets down to Members of Parliament. But it was well known that M. Poincaré, always a lover of established methods, would be very reluctant to follow such advice.
I cabled to the Department in this connection:
Ambassador Sharp to the State Department.
Paris, April 1, 1918.
On Wednesday M. Clemenceau is scheduled to give an explanation of his action and the causes leading up to it before the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber; there is renewed talk of the likelihood of the overthrow of the Ministry growing out of M. Clemenceau's action, and it would seem quite possible that Deputies heretofore of rather divergent views might desire and even work in common for such results. It is my opinion, however, that especially during the great stress of the momentous events hinging upon the success of the enemy's attack, the Clemenceau Ministry would not fail to receive a vote of confidence in the Chamber if that issue were to be raised now.
There is no intimation that the soldiery is not back of him and military considerations just at this crisis will dominate every political situation that may arise until it is over. It is under such conditions that the courage and bold aggressiveness of Clemenceau will most likely guarantee his retention of power.
While one hears something of renewed labor agitation in connection with increasing secret activities of the Socialist opposition to the Government as being more than a mere rumor, and I have heard that factory labor has been strongly organized throughout France to act in concert with the Socialist elements, yet I believe that only a series of decisive military defeats greatly endangering the Allied forces could enable such a combination to exert any considerable influence or come into being as a factor of power. I do not believe the enemy can administer such defeats.
SHARP.
The arrival, in May, of the American Labour Commission with Samuel Gompers created a most lively interest, the Press giving much space to accounts of its doings. In a cable to the Department dated May 12, I said:
"There is no question but that the impression created by the coming of these men, and particularly by the words uttered by their leaders, has been most favorable. Attending a number of receptions accorded to the members of the Commission, I am able to give full praise to the wisdom and patriotism of the messages they brought. Many members of the French Government, among them M. Clemenceau and M. Pichon, have expressed to me their greatest satisfaction over the helpful influence which these talks have exercised among the Labor elements in France."
In this same telegram I referred to the visit to the Embassy Offices of General Niessel, head of the French Military Mission to Russia. On the occasion of another visit he paid to me, he informed me that he had the authority of M. Clemenceau himself to state that he reflected the attitude of the French Government.
For nearly an hour he gave me a most interesting account of the conditions existing in Russia, which country he had left about the middle of March after spending seven months there. He had had an opportunity to study Trotzky, whom he described as a man of ability and cunning, but so lacking in political sense and judgment as to render impossible anything like the constructive work such as all Russia now needed most, while the more conservative people opposed to his domination yet lacked the power to bring about his fall. Chaos reigned everywhere, with nothing like a national unity of spirit around which to rally the great movement for constructive reform in government. In many places the working man, while being regularly paid, refused to perform any work. The small farms would not sell their produce, and the lands of the former large proprietors were not being cultivated, because there was no money to meet the expenses. Such conditions necessarily increased the prospects of famine.
General Niessel pointed out that there was a possibility of the Russian people in desperation finally turning to Germany to bring order out of chaos, and with it safety from anarchy. He said that already many who opposed the authority of the Bolsheviks would welcome German intervention as preferable to experiences under the despotic power of the former. This led him to state that Japanese intervention was necessary if Russia was finally to be saved from German control. He said many in the Chamber of Deputies who heretofore opposed such intervention would now look with favour upon it.
Some two weeks later, this subject was brought up by M. Clemenceau himself in conversation with me, calling my attention to an exhaustive report just made by M. Albert Lévy as a result of numerous conversations with prominent Russian people, mostly in Government circles, arriving from Russia while he was recently stationed in Scandinavia. All this tended to show the strengthening of the sentiment in favour of Japanese intervention.
In my telegram dated May 27 in which I reported upon this, I added:
"As confirming my statement in last week's report as to the important part played by Allied bombing air machines on various scenes back of the enemy lines, M. Loucheur, Minister of Armaments, told me on Saturday that such operations had had a most demoralizing effect on the concentration of the enemy forces and the carrying out of their plans. No opportunity either by day or night, for that matter, has been allowed them to prepare their attack. He stated that according to the information at hand, the British and French forces now possessed as many aeroplanes as the Germans,"
I reported as follows upon the situation as it stood a week later:
Telegram from Ambassador Sharp to the Secretary of State.
Paris, June 3, 5 P.M.
Simultaneously with the great attack extending on a line reaching from Rheims to Soissons, long range guns placed in new positions commenced sending over into the city their great shells of a heavier caliber than heretofore, this time covering a much wider range of territory than the shells previously fired. While these were falling through the day with considerable frequency, every night has witnessed air raids well calculated to arouse terror in the hearts of the people. All of this added to the report of the successes of the first few days of the rapid advance across the Aisne has served to cause a considerable exodus of those who can leave the city. The wider range of fire of the newly placed long range guns brings a much more restricted immunity to any section of the city from danger.
A striking illustration of the possibility of a slaughter that might well follow from the falling of one of these shells was reported on Memorial Day. But a few hours after the Knights of Columbus had held their solemn services in the great church of the Madeleine, a shell struck the end of the structure at a point not more than one hundred feet from where I had sat in attendance with members of the Embassy staff. A position much nearer to where the shell struck was that which had been occupied by Cardinal Amette and others of the most distinguished Catholic clergy in Paris. Had the shell fallen directly on the roof during those services, a repetition of the Good Friday horror at the church of Saint Gervais would have inevitably followed. Up to the hour of dictating this telegram late in the afternoon, for the first time during the past week there have been no shells fired from the long range guns. It is possible that the efforts which M. Pichon told me, at the Foreign Office yesterday afternoon, were to be made to destroy these guns, the location of which had been definitely ascertained, may have succeeded, as is now known it was done in the case of the first guns. There is not the slightest evidence of a panic to be observed among the people.
Unfortunately, however, the situation at the front brought so near to Paris within the past week possesses a much greater cause for alarm. Anything like a detailed account of the great battle is lacking in the official communiqués but it would seem that within the past twenty-four hours by a hurried reinforcement of very much needed reserves the French troops have for a time at least checked the advance of the enemy. M. Pichon told me yesterday that both Generals Foch and Pétain had expressed confidence in their Allies to stop the advance permanently, and the general hope is expressed that a counter move may soon be made to regain some of the lost ground. It is expected that the superiority of our bombing aeroplanes will become the same important factor as it was in repelling the March attack. The Foreign Minister also told me that the appearance of a considerable number of American troops in the midst of the battle on the Somme had produced a most cheering effect. The growing favor in which our boys are regarded for their dash and bravery has placed the stock of America in the war at a very high level. One hears on all sides the most enthusiastic praise from the French people. At a great manifestation last week in the Sorbonne in honor of the British Navy the presiding officer, M. Paul Deschanel, President of the Chamber of Deputies, paid a glowing tribute in his speech to the bravery of our boys. He had only a day or two before told me in person that officers returning from the front were full of praise over their behavior. The general impression is that the greatest danger in the present attack grows out of the possibility of the enemy being able at last to eliminate trench warfare and fight above ground. In such a case the advance might be very rapid as the trench warfare for nearly four years in the past has made it quite impossible for either side to make any material progress. The outcome may revolve around the question of the relative strength of the reserves which each side may be able to call into action. Man for man the Allies would be, as they have been uniformly in the past, the masters of the Germans. The surprising secrecy with which the enemy has made and carried out his operations coupled with their dash have been the most disconcerting thing to the Allies. One involuntarily comes to look for new blows to be delivered from the most unexpected quarters. All this added to the unknown extent of his reserves and the superiority of his forces in the present attack contribute to make the situation exceedingly grave. I must still record my own faith in the invincibility of the Allied forces.
SHARP.
Telegraphing to the Department on June 9, I reported that like the first great offensive projected on the Northern Front late in March, so the second offensive launched nearly two weeks before, extending against the French lines from Soissons to Rheims, had been gradually checked, but only after an advance such that in the two offensives something like twenty to twenty-five miles had been gained by the enemy in the greatest bulge, although the average width along the entire line of the offensive would be much less. The prevailing opinion seemed to be that the enemy planned to keep on making attacks with sufficient gains each time to enable him to plant a number of big guns within easy shelling distance of the city.
I concluded this telegram by saying:
Ambassador Sharp to the State Department.
June 9, 1918.
Colonel Fabry tells me that it is from the third offensive that the greatest danger might come.
M. Clemenceau told me to-day, having returned late last night from the front, that the attack in the neighborhood of Montdidier had been futile. He told me with much confidence that the Allied troops were fully prepared to meet such attacks. It was here that a great many American troops were stationed. It all makes one proud to be an American.
As the timely arrival of Blucher's Army to join Wellington upon the historic battlefield of Waterloo rendered impossible the triumph of Napoleon, so to-day Hindenburg, with his mighty army behind him, is anxiously scanning the western horizon, watching the arrival on the shores of France of the only force which can possibly defeat him. Waterloo---it was a matter of a few hours; to-day the anxiety may possibly continue a few weeks; to strike hard, to throw overwhelming masses across the most vulnerable portions of the lines, and to reach the two great objectives which would render the Allies nearly helpless at his feet, that of Paris and Calais, before the arrival of the American Bluchers, is the dogged and indeed now the frantic purpose of this German General with the united power of the greatest military nation on earth back of him, numbering in troops, I have been told on good authority, at least a half million more than the Allies are able to muster on this Western Front. He has met with a resistance certainly beyond anything he had expected. Each day's delay in the accomplishment of his purpose must exercise a very depressing influence at home.
Personally I have great confidence that the American troops are very soon to play a part of the most heroic proportions in stemming the tide of the enemy's progress.
SHARP.
The Socialists now again seized upon the opportunity to raise trouble in the Chamber of Deputies. M. Clemenceau retorted with vigour that this was no time to criticize the acts of generals to whose valour he paid great compliments. A, vote of confidence in the Government was passed by 377 to 110, there being upwards of two score abstentions.
It was in this speech that the Premier, undoubtedly fatigued and over-concerned at the gravity of the situation, made some statements descriptive of conditions at the front which perhaps it might have been better not to have mentioned. His blunt admissions as to the desperate situation confronting the Allied forces and the superior numbers against them seemed to have been wrung from one who had been forced to realize serious perils.
M. Clemenceau closed his speech replying to the Socialists with words giving unmistakable evidence of the dependence placed in the coming of American troops to win the war.
One thing I noticed particularly as the summer advanced. It could be safely asserted that at no other time, at least since the beginning of the war, had such a factor as the Social Revolutionary been so negligible.(11) Events had rapidly brought about this situation. Indeed, a remarkable transformation had occurred since eighteen months before, when the first agitation for the Stockholm Socialist Conference was taking form, at which time M. Cambon told me that the Socialists were so strong in France as to demand conciliatory treatment. Several causes had contributed to this result.
First and above all, the example of a Socialist régime in Russia, with all its exhibition of weakness, inability to govern, and excesses of the despotic power of a few leaders, did very much to discredit the doctrines of Socialism the world over.
All the friends of the Allies had pictured Russia as the bulwark of the Allies on the East, and as is known there was a moment when the Cossacks, rushing in with invincible attacks, swept everything before them. It was von Hindenburg himself who, in the early days of his prestige, pointed out to his troops the ruin and failure of their cause which would attend the yielding by them of a foot of ground to this advancing horde of Cossacks. The reports of those days show that, even though the forces of Austria were augmented by the addition of many divisions of German troops, the advance seemed to be unchecked until it looked almost as though the heart of Germany would be invaded by that terrible force; and yet, as suddenly as it came into being, it passed out of sight, and the next time Russia appeared prominently on the stage, it was in that strange and fantastic revolution which, deposing a régime of more than two centuries of absolutism, established a democratic form of government, which was almost immediately to disappear from the face of the earth into areign of terror and anarchy. And yet men, and the sentiments expressed in the Press of that day amply proved it, affected at least to acclaim with enthusiasm the overthrow of the Russian Empire.
One day while awaiting my turn at the Foreign Office, talking with one of the most brilliant French journalists a day or two following this strange turn of events, I asked him what he thought would be the outcome of the movement. Reflecting exactly what I had in my own mind at the time, he replied: "Possibly of great benefit if it does not go too far." And yet it was but a few months later when everybody recognized that from that time on the great Eastern Ally had dropped out of the game in its most hopeful phase; while another phase might be its final coalition with Germany, through whose intrigues everything like government and order had been destroyed.
The advocates of Social Revolution in France did not escape the opprobrium consequent upon these events, though by no means could they be classed along with the Social Revolutionaries in Russia, in so far as either character or intelligence was concerned.
The Socialist Revolutionary spirit in France might have thrived with a series of failures at the front. In fact, when Paris was so seriously threatened in the Spring and early Summer of 1918 after the German offensive involving big advances, it was everywhere said---though, of course, under breath---that another reign of Communism might occur in Paris, should the French armies be forced to evacuate the city. Even in such an event, however, I have too much confidence in the staid common sense and patriotism of what I may term the "new French people" to believe that the Government would not have endured. Nearly half a century had elapsed since the days of the Commune of '70 and '71. Since that time many of the developments of French life which I have endeavoured briefly to emphasize had taken form. It would have been inconceivable to me that the French Republic should not emerge from the war stronger than when it had entered it.