EVERYWHERE the Americans were being regarded as the deliverers of France, and the faith placed in this belief was a touching tribute to their valour.(1)
On June 18-the day before the American forces crossed the Marne, preparing their immortal entrance into Château-Thierry some weeks later---I had telegraphed to the State Department:
"I would say on the whole that the morale of the people is all that could be desired. It is indeed incredible that so little alarm should be excited, with a hostile force of not less than one-half a million men massed in one sector, but forty miles away on a restricted battle-front, seeking to break through all barriers to attain the goal---the abandonment of which would allow him to win the war. This calm is explained by the confidence which these people have come to repose in the strategy of General Foch and the bravery of his soldiers, and the growing element of confidence in the splendidly demonstrated valor of our American fighters, used so effectually within the past fortnight to help block the passes to Paris. I am not stating it too strongly when I say that it has come to be a settled conviction that these are the factors in this war against which the Germans can never prevail."
Various aspects of the situation, as concerned American aid, not only to France but to Italy, were touched upon in my correspondence.
Ambassador Sharp to Assistant Secretary Phillips.
Paris, June 12, 1918.
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM PHILLIPS,
Assistant Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY,
As I write, the outlook is more fraught with uncertainty-. and, on that account, with more danger (2)---than at any time since my arrival here at the moment of the nearest approach of the enemy to Paris, nearly four years ago. The point which we would all like to know---and one which the enemy, with his usual secretiveness, has kept well hidden---is how great is his strength in reserve forces. If it is of heavy preponderance in numbers, then manifestly the task before the Allied Armies is to put up a successful defense until their forces are sufficiently augmented by American troops. That would be the best that could be reasonably hoped for under such circumstances.
At this time the situation is so complicated that at best one can only guess at the outcome of the great struggle now going on less than fifty miles to the north-east, but we all have the greatest confidence in the valor of those who are fighting for our cause.
However, there would seem to be one outstanding fact imposed by the present critical situation at the front, involving, as it does, almost uniformly successive gains by the enemy. That is, that before long the Allies must be prepared to launch some great counter-attack, so persistent and effective as to destroy the morale of the foe. I regard such a move as vitally necessary if Paris is to be saved from ultimate bombardment.
With kindest regards,
I am, my dear Mr. Secretary,
Very sincerely yours,
WM. G. SHARP.
Ambassador Sharp to Senator Atlee Pomerene.
Paris, June 17, 1918.
MY DEAR SENATOR:
It is four years ago to-day, if I remember correctly, since on your recommendation the President paid me the high honor of sending my name in to the. Senate for this position. Certainly most surprising as well as most tragic events have occurred since that time. Such events could only have occurred at a period in human history when absolute contempt seems to exist for any regard for reason or precedent. .
Perhaps all that can be said, without fear of challenge or contradiction, is that our own President is to-day placed in a position where none of his predecessors have ever been---that of a world figure. Both his own strength and the very nature of these historic events have forced him into this position. Just how great may be our work of shaping the world's policies and the period of reconstruction afterwards, without at the same time entangling our own future status among the nations of the earth, is a problem which will require the greatest amount of decision and discernment to solve. European politics, where geography, with its mere arbitrary lines separating different nationalities, has for centuries compelled political alliances, naturally differ very radically from the questions of policy that confront America. How to inspire with new and more exalted principles of Government, how to help meet and direct, and how to help maintain and enforce them without being drawn into the fatal vortex of alliances which must always pre-suppose counter-alliances, is a task clearly set before us. I have full confidence in the statesmanship of President Wilson to guide us through those troubled waters which must intervene ere the world's Utopia can be reached. Despite the discouraging example of man's weakness and wickedness, I am sufficiently optimistic to believe that just beyond this fog we are to be permitted to sail nearer its shores than. ever before.
While a legitimate criticism of the conduct of the war should always be tolerated, yet I hope the American people will never be diverted from constantly realizing the 97% or 98% record of achievement under unusual circumstances by the beating of the tom-toms of those who can point only to the 2% or 3% of inefficiency. If those at home could really come to understand with what tremendous measure of appreciation the Allies have welcomed our aid over here, they would all hold their heads a little higher.
With my kindest regards to you both,
I am, believe me,
Very sincerely yours,
WM. G. SHARP.
Senator Pomerene to Ambassador Sharp.
United States Senate Committee
on Privileges and Elections.
July 16, 1918.MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR,
It was very good of you to write me your letter of the 17th ultimo, the date of the fourth anniversary of your appointment as Ambassador to France. At the time we had the pleasure of taking luncheon with Mrs. Sharp at the White House, I heard the President say that when he received a report from you, he knew that he was getting the viewpoint abroad of a real American. I cannot imagine a finer compliment.
One sentiment prevails everywhere, and that is that we must win the war, and no one doubts that we shall win.
Very sincerely,
ATLEE POMERENE.
Ambassador Sharp to Secretary Lansing.
Paris, June 27, 1918.
MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY,
I have thought that a survey of the situation as it exists at this moment might be appreciated by you.
We are now passing through the third stage of the war, well-defined and quite distinctive from the preceding ones.
The first stage, in its shortness of duration as well as in the pyrotechnic display of its force, was as some brilliant meteor flashing across the skies from the border-lands of the Belgian frontier and dying out almost in the very environs of Paris. This stage was ended within six weeks after the declaration of hostilities. Both contending forces, given a momentary respite, then burrowed themselves underground along a line extending from the English Channel to the Swiss frontier. . . .
For nearly four years this second stage---pre-eminently the trench stage---of the war ran its course, with only here and there any material advance. This very method of warfare, characterized by the impregnability of the trenches, and the constant watchfulness of the "men up in the air" to prevent any surprise massing of troops on either side, made such conditions fixed and unchanging.
The third stage----.more important than the preceding ones, because I believe it to be destined to be the final stage of the war---was ushered in by the German attack late in March. It is this stage and the aspects surrounding its advent, in so far as the Paris view is concerned, that just now naturally most seriously engage attention.
All recognize that the attacks now being made constitute Germany's supreme effort to win the war; ---the hurry-up programme of her military chieftains, to strike a mortal blow at the French and English armies before those from America can intervene to save the situation. The universal question as to whether they will be able to carry out such purpose, and, if so, of course to end the war, was asked with the greatest concern at the end of the first ten days of the marked gains made by the enemy along the British Front.
The final checking of that advance was reassuring only in a limited measure. Everybody naturally expected the second attack, but, unfortunately, not in the place where it was finally launched. Again confidence was shaken in the ability of the Allied forces to withstand these onslaughts, for again, as in the preceding attack, a considerable slice of territory, including what must be conceded as an enormous booty in supplies, munitions, guns, and prisoners of war, fell into the hands of the enemy.
But as the wearing away of the surface of a body that has been constantly more and more compressed becomes more difficult and more retarded in its process, so the mass of the defenders of the important passes leading towards Paris, becoming more compact, was finally able to resist any further advances---nay, more than this, to recover in some places the ground already lost and to inflict upon the enemy what is now admitted by him to have been an enormous punishment in loss of men.
Having "gotten their hand in," so to speak, the troops under General Foch have been able, only recently, to hold the enemy in his third successive attack, even though in superior numbers, at a standstill. It is in the last two attacks---particularly in the second one on the sector between Rheims and Soissons---that the American troops first signalled the mighty power upon which, almost in the twinkling of an eye, the weary and discouraged soldiers of the English and French divisions, fighting so desperately all these trying years, have come now to rely so implicitly for deliverance.
The effect upon the people has been magical. To-day America's stock is quoted in the streets of every hamlet, village, and town of France at a high-water mark. Perhaps, excepting that of courage, if I were to signalize the one predominating characteristic---which, after all, is rather generic in its scope---of our American boys in action, it would be that of resourcefulness. It is indeed that one quality which, in my opinion, has been more disconcerting to the enemy than any other one thing, and if I may be pardoned for my conceit---I would rather call it pride---in their achievements, I would say that the German troops are hereafter going to give these boys as wide a berth as possible.
I am only confirmed in the opinion which I expressed in one of my weekly telegraphic reports, that somewhere down the line, before these series of German attacks have ended, the American troops will play a most important part in saving a situation which, without them, would have meant a hopeless defeat. Before this letter reaches you such an opportunity may present itself, though I rather believe that the next attack will be directed against the English forces at a point where not many of our American boys are stationed, and probably with such suddenness as to preclude their effective participation for some days.
While the above résumé has dealt entirely with an account of the military operations, yet, out of certain conditions imposed by them, the status of political affairs now existing in France may be said in a measure to have had its origin.
While having a personal regard for every member of the preceding Ministries, particularly the Premiers and Ministers for Foreign Affairs---for they have all been and are to-day my good friends---yet I believe that Clemenceau, despite some of his alleged shortcomings--- for it must be remembered that he is a man approaching seventy-seven years of age and has received as many blows as he has ever given---is the one man in the public life of France best qualified to meet the present critical situation where the issue, many believe, must be decided on the battlefield. Personally, I do not share this last belief. Courage in dealing with one's friends as well as in facing the enemy is demanded; in addition to this, great energy, determination, and singleness of purpose must be qualities possessed by the man who would dominate the situation presented in France to-day. If I know the man---and I have had the occasion to talk with him rather frequently and study his temperamental "make-up "---I believe Clemenceau possesses all these qualities.
However, while they give him strength with the people, the usual concomitants of resentment and bitter feeling have not failed to manifest themselves toward him from former powerful leaders in the French Government. Our own well-known saying at home, that "politics makes strange bed-fellows," is well exemplified. . . .
It is not strange that under such circumstances the Socialists, who have had no representatives in the present or in the preceding Ministry, have at different times sought by their interpellations as to the conduct of the war to weaken Clemenceau's Ministry; nor that whispered rumors have gained currency from time to time of some unexpected coalition of forces that would restore M. Briand to power.(3)
I know that I may repeat to you in confidence what came to me recently from a very distinguished Frenchman of high military rank and very popular here. He said that President Poincaré had recently deplored the fact that they no longer had a Government in France. The Premier's enemies quite unite in the charge that he is arbitrary, dictatorial, and at times whimsical. Undoubtedly he has strong likes and dislikes, and such a man almost always incurs bitter enmities as well as draws to him the loyal affection of others. The picture of Clemenceau is to-day the picture of the French Government. His chief element of strength lies in the confidence and trust which the army places in him, and it is upon the army that France looks for her protection.
With the enemy in tremendous force but forty miles away, the masses of the people will not look with favor upon the weakening or discrediting of a leader who, by his conduct, has symbolized the national resistance to such an invader, and the politicians dare not do so.
Paradoxical and strange as it may seem, the counsels of President Wilson, and his constructive measures, exert a vastly greater influence upon shaping the thought of the Socialistic mind in France---sometimes of an iconoclastic tendency---than do those of any other leaders of the Allied Powers. The reason, perhaps, is not far to seek; it has confidence in his motives. In my judgment, that influence has been a valuable asset, and far more powerful in restraining the radical actions of this particular group than is generally understood. They have time and again reiterated their own principles as being in full accord with those enunciated by President Wilson, and I would not be at all surprised that coming events should so shape themselves as to give such an unusual situation great weight in harmonizing the discordant elements which will have to be dealt with in making the terms of peace.
If I have allowed my observations to center around M. Clemenceau, it is not alone because of his official position,---for he is both Premier and Minister of War---but because he typifies the martial spirit of the French people.
I would say something, in my concluding sentences, of the attitude exhibited in this crucial moment by the great mass of the people themselves. If anything like fear or panic finds place in their minds, it would be very difficult to discover it. I sometimes find myself wondering what new phase of danger or depredation could seriously disturb the outward calmness of these people. I must chiefly attribute it to the fact that they have had nearly four years of war and have come to accept as a matter of course any kind of conditions that might be imposed by the war. And yet, naturally enough, everybody is intensely concerned over the events now taking place; very few fail to recognize their gravity. Many have indeed quietly left the city as a precaution against any dangers that my come from the expected bombardment.
Last evening I was returning at an early hour from a dinner at the Hotel Crillon, and, strolling along with some friends by the Place de la Madeleine and the Boulevard Haussmann, it was remarked amongst the members of the party how almost completely deserted were the streets. Not for a distance of eight or ten blocks could be seen a half-dozen vehicles or that many people walking along. The crowds that promenade the Champs-Elysées at the most frequented hours have also been greatly thinned out, and I should say that in all probability one-half of the people of Paris have left the city during the past month.(4)
I dislike to express my views as to what would happen in the possible contingency of Paris being eventually taken by the Germans. I have two good reasons for not doing so; first, because I have never believed that they could take the city, and, second, because if they did it would be a matter for the commanding officers of the Allied Armies to consider. If Paris in the gay times of peace was the center jewel in the crown of France, it is certainly, in time of war, her heart. For that and all other reasons which such a loss would involve, I hope that it may be the decree of Providence that no such question will have to be considered.
Stranger things have happened than that to the American boys from across the seas may yet come the lasting glory of saving not only Paris but with it the Allied cause, for if the enemy cannot take Paris he cannot win the war.
I am,
Believe me, dear Mr. Secretary,
Very sincerely yours,
WM. G. SHARP.
My correspondence with my very good friend and colleague, Ambassador Page in Rome, had long since acquainted me with the situation as it presented itself in Italy.
Ambassador Thomas Nelson Page to Ambassador Sharp.
Rome, December 17, 1917.
MY DEAR COLLEAGUE,
Mr. Edward Marshall, who has been in Italy for some time, is returning to Paris and will be able to give you an account of the situation here.
I wish that House could have come to Italy before his return home.
The Italians are making a brave fight against tremendous odds; but what they especially need is grain and other food supplies. In the southern parts of the country the food situation, if not promptly ameliorated, may lead to events of a decidedly serious nature. And I sincerely trust that we may be able to send over the necessary supplies.
Premier Orlando has recently said that even if the Germans push their way down to Sicily, Italy will not give in and Sicily will then be Italy. This seems to be the general sentiment throughout the country; but Italy must be fed or she cannot keep on.
The crucial point in the situation here in Italy is not so much on the fighting line, where the Italian armies are really accomplishing extraordinary deeds and showing a resolution worthy of the best days of any army in the history of warfare, but in the scarcity of the necessities of life for large sections of the people. The best propaganda that our country could possibly employ at this time would be the sending of some grain-ships to Naples where the need is very pressing. Mr. Marshall is fully informed as to the conditions thereon.
There was a most enthusiastic demonstration here a week ago to honor America's declaration of war against Austria, and all Rome turned out. A holiday was granted to all Government officials and all shop-keepers were requested to close their stores at half-past four, in order that they might all join in the procession, which was over a mile in length. It was the greatest demonstration I have ever seen since I arrived in Rome, with the sole exception of that which was made the Sunday before Italy declared war on Austria in 1915.
It was indeed gratifying to see the appreciation shown for America and for Mr. Wilson.
With kindest regards and best wishes for the coming season, I am, my dear Colleague, always,
Sincerely yours,
THOS. NELSON PAGE.
Ambassador Sharp to Ambassador Page.
Paris, December 27, 1917.
MY DEAR COLLEAGUE:
I have heard so much that is corroborative of the distress throughout Italy and her critical situation that I have the gravest concern over the outlook. Only to-day a letter from a lady newspaper correspondent makes a piteous appeal for someone to get busy that 200,000 more men with guns may quickly come to the rescue. I am afraid the picture which she draws is not lacking in accuracy in sizing up an impending crisis.
This all sounds very pessimistic but I must yet believe that it means only a delay for an unknown time of victory, rather than a precursor of defeat. Surely since you were last here things have been also happening in France, though, Heaven knows! her soldiers and her civilian populace have been marvellous through all these trying ordeals. Perhaps it all can be explained in just one word---Russia, which I have found myself sometimes likening to a situation where the whole side of your house has suddenly blown out, leaving no protection from that side against the elements. German machinations and intrigues have accomplished more than the guns could do.(5)
I wish that you might have come to Paris for a few days during Colonel House's stay, as I think it would have put you in a needed touch perhaps with questions of great importance here as well as at home. As it was, I had an opportunity to have several long and uninterrupted talks with him which enlightened me on a number of things.
I am, my dear Colleague,
Very sincerely yours,
WM. G. SHARP.
Ambassador Page to Ambassador Sharp.
Rome, October 22, 1918.
MY DEAR COLLEAGUE,
I am, as you know, sending to Paris copies of all telegrams relating to the situation here, and I propose writing to Colonel House a letter inviting him to come to Italy before settling down to the work which will await him in France, as I am very desirous to have him come and see for himself, and feel for himself, the situation and the atmosphere here in Italy before getting his personal impressions deepened into conviction from those not familiar with the situation.
I know that an invitation to him to come here has been telegraphed to Washington by the Italian Government, and the same has been sent to Paris to meet him there, and I am sending him and Mrs. House an invitation to come on down to Italy as soon as possible, as this will give him the opportunity to talk with and to measure for himself those who will guide Italian opinion at the end.
I hope very much that you will see your way to lending your influence to induce Colonel House to accept my invitation. He has never visited Italy before during the war, and as most of the other Americans who have come over also failed to come to Italy, there is considerable feeling here of being neglected and I do not wish this to deepen into a feeling of being slighted.
We have been of late tremendously to the fore in the appreciation, and I may say the affection, of the Italians especially of the plain people, and although the failure to send American troops to Italy has had somewhat the effect of dampening the ardor which existed a few months ago, it still exists, and I do not want it to be extinguished.
There is beginning to be talk of an offensive here and I rather hope it will take place, because the feeling is growing rapidly that Italy should, on every account, make such an offensive.
In the meantime, don't forget that what I am saying is not only as the Ambassador to Italy, but as the "American" Ambassador to Italy, and that I am speaking for America in the foregoing.
With high regard, I am, always,
Sincerely yours,
THOS. NELSON PAGE.
As conditions bearing on the war developed, I had frequently asked for the benefit of the opinion of Marshal Joffre. He had remained technically a military adviser whom the French Government could consult when it chose, and his office in the magnificent gilded "Salle du Maréchal "at the Ecole Militaire, its great windows overlooking the Champ de Mars, was a meeting place for all the generals who had fought under him from 1914 to 1916, and were eventually to help win the war under Marshal Foch. For it is a fact worthy of note that those who, under the stress of battle, had merited the esteem and confidence of the winner of the first battle of the Marne during the first two years and a half of the war, and many among whom, including Foch, had been temporarily set aside when Joffre's own star came to wane, were the very ones who, recalled sooner or later to command, chronicled their names in history for the 1918 campaign and what has since come to be known familiarly as "the battle of France," beginning with the German drive in March, and culminating in the second battle of the Marne and the collapse of German militarism. To mention only a few names among these illustrious generals, there were Mangin, Maistre, Buat, de Castelnau, Debeney, Degoutte, Gouraud, Fayolle, Franchet d'Esperey, and Foch himself, soon raised to the rank of Marshal. Upon this last occasion, as upon the occasion of the appointment of General Foch as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, letters were exchanged between him and Marshal Joffre testifying to the relations of close comradeship and mutual regard which had never failed to reign between the two illustrious leaders.(6) As copies of these letters were communicated to me at the time, I cannot do better than insert them here.
Marshal Joffre to General Foch,
Paris, April 16, 1918.
M DEAR FRIEND,
I have learned with satisfaction that you have at last been given the powers of Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies,
Your task is a heavy one. The least of things is that you should not be denied any of the means which will enable you to fulfil it.
Whatever may be the difficulties of this task, I am certain that you will conduct it to a happy termination. What you did on the Yser and in Flanders gives assurance for the success of your present operations.
All my best wishes are with you.
Your all-devoted and affectionate J. JOFFRE.
General Foch to Marshal Joffre.
April 21st, 1918.
MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,
I thank you cordially for the compliments and the good wishes you express to me concerning the new functions conferred upon me. As you say, the task is a heavy one, and the mission comes late; first of all, a situation which had been seriously impaired had to be retrieved on a large scale. This has been done. We have brought up reserves, and it is to be expected that the barrier will hold. Afterwards, we shall see. You have frequently pointed out to us the way we should follow, I shall merely make use of it, hoping that it may be with equal good fortune.
Pray accept, Monsieur le Maréchal, the assurance of my respectful attachment.
FOCH.
Marshal Joffre to Marshal Foch,
Paris, August 7th, 1918.
M DEAR FRIEND,
With all my heart, I applaud your well-deserved nomination as Marshal of France.
I am happy to have you as a comrade, and beg you to believe in my sentiments of sincere affection.
Your all devoted, J. JOFFRE.
Marshal Foch to Marshal Joffre.
August 7, 1918.
MONSIEUR LE MARECHAL,
I deeply appreciate your amiable congratulations, and I thank you cordially for them. Your lessons remain ever present in my mind, for transforming days of anxiety into days of happiness. I shall continue to do my best to attain this result, leaving aside all other considerations.
Pray receive, Monsieur le Maréchal, the renewed assurance of my respectful attachment,
FOCH.
When requested by me to give opinions as to the form which American aid was taking, Marshal Joffre was entirely outspoken, as fearless in criticism when he judged it necessary as he was generous in his expressions first of confidence in what we could be expected to do, and then in admiration for the feats of bravery of our soldiers. These views were expressed sometimes in personal conversations with me, and sometimes through Mr. Warrington Dawson of my staff, who enjoyed the Marshal's confidence. The minutes of all these conversations were of utmost value to me, from the summer of 1917 when our army first became a factor to be reckoned with, until after the war was won and the almost equally formidable problems of peace had to be coped with. For Marshal Joffre had one of the most constructive brains I have ever known, as indeed had been demonstrated by his work as an organizer in the early years of the war.
W. D. Memoranda of Conversations with Marshal Joffre.
Confidential.
August 21, 1917.
The Marshal said to me in substance:
"France cannot give more men than she has given and is giving. Nor can England draw on heavier reserves. Our hopes for reserves of soldiers therefore depend upon America.
"With 300,000, or even 200,000, thoroughly trained and experienced American soldiers to begin active operations in March next year, we could probably deal the decisive blow which would turn the military balance definitely in our favour. But this would not mean merely good soldiers hardened to discipline and to army methods. It would mean soldiers who have been tested and have proved their fitness for standing modern conditions of war. Nor is this merely a question of physical courage. French soldiers are fine soldiers, and so are the English, but they have flinched under fire. This is no reflection on them, it is a question of the conditions of war. Our men and the English got hardened gradually. You wish to get hardened quickly. But you cannot take risks on a large scale.
"I have thrown out that figure of say ten or twelve divisions. Some of them are already training in France, others are on their way over. They will soon be accustomed to trench life and will be acclimatized. Their individual training will then for the greater part be done. But how are you going to accustom them to fighting under the new conditions? By throwing them all at once into the fight? The mere fact of being in the trenches for a time, and becoming accustomed to that life, will not prepare men for modern fighting.
"One theory would certainly consist in preparing a big army and then hurling it into the balance. But suppose that army of 200,000 were to flinch? Are those risks which can be accepted? I say most emphatically, NO.
"The wiser and safer method would be to begin as soon as possible putting American troops in contact with the French, in the proportion of one American regiment to a French division, and let them be tried at actual fighting under these conditions.(7) If there is any flinching then, it will not have serious consequences, and these men, becoming seasoned under conditions offering guarantees of safety for themselves, will become magnificent soldiers. Little by little and progressively, all the American army in France would then become veterans, and Spring would find them in perfect fighting trim. Under these conditions, 200,000 men, with reserves behind them, could do magnificent and probably decisive work.
"The American feeling that there is plenty of time, which I sometimes hear maintained, is a very serious matter. So is the feeling in some American circles that the war may be won before American blood is shed,"
W. D.
December 5, 1917.
Marshal Joffre said in substance:
"In Italy, the French and English troops entered into line for the first time two days ago, two divisions of each, but they have not yet done any fighting. Recent Italian resistance along the Piave and the Brenta has been entirely the work of their own troops, and is greatly to their credit. Of course, the feeling of the moral support due to the presence of French and English troops in the rear has been a help to them.
"I consider that it would still be possible to find a partial solution for the Russian problem by sending several divisions of Japanese troops by the Trans-Siberian, to form a front north of Roumania. From what I can hear, in that region of Russia there are still elements of troops which could be utilized. To the north, the Russian army has simply melted away. This Japanese intervention could not be on a large scale and it would be difficult to arrange with Russia. But this is the only method I can conceive for preventing Germany from taking over and colonizing the Russian regions lying along the western borders.
"The question of a unified command is now generally accepted in principle, although difficulties are found as to the application. The chief difficulty seems to come from the question of the amount of the authority which can be given to a General of one nation over generals of other nations.
"To a certain extent, the principle of a General Commander-in-Chief was applied when I commanded the French armies. I made a point of communicating my plans to the heads of other Allied armies, suggesting the desired co-operation that was needed at appropriate times and places. The Russians heeded me most readily, with the means at their disposal, the Italians also heeded as a rule, though rather half-heartedly, and often acting behind time---once two weeks late, but they did what they were asked to do. The English, while independent as a nation and having their own ideas which they have applied ably, would profit by these suggestions which were to the advantage of everybody. At that period, the French Army in the Orient was under my orders and I could assure co-operation there. When I withdrew from the command in France, the command at Saloniki was made independent of the French command. Sarrau was not under Nivelle's orders and is not under Pétain's. So that at present we have not a unified command, even for the French army. We should have to begin by readjusting this.
"Marshal Haig and General Robertson recently called on me and said they agreed on the question of a unified Commander-in-Chief but intimated difficulties with their Government."
W. D.
March 16, 1918.
Marshal Joffre said to me in substance yesterday:
"Secretary Baker's visit has come just at the right moment, not only for him to observe the work now being done by American soldiers in France, so as to apply the results to troops in America, but also for cementing the ties which already exist between France and America but which in the future should be stronger than ever, in the interests of both countries.
"The war will have rendered to France at least the service of making her better known abroad. She was generally liked, and particularly with America a traditional bond of sympathy existed. But she was considered frivolous and decadent, her depth and her qualities of heart were not widely known. The heroism of her soldiers has compelled all the world to respect her to-day. Furthermore, the foreigners, and particularly the Americans, who have come into contact with her life by working on her soil during the war, have learned to know her more thoroughly than ever before.
"It would be difficult to overstate the importance, in this connection, of the war-work done here by America: to begin with, France has deeply appreciated American generosity. But also, America has been placed in a position to observe the simplicity and the qualities of affection which inspire the French. All Americans who correspond with our soldiers, or with orphans, or with the families of orphans they have adopted, know this.
"France has need of America economically to-day, but will need her more and more after the war. Our economic future will depend largely upon what America can do for us. But we can be of service to America economically, and our mutual help and confidence can be all the greater since there is no rivalry of interests between us.
"The lines on which our common economic and industrial future is to develop will be determined only later, by technicians, as conditions present themselves. But it is a great thing for both our countries that the bases should already be laid, and that both countries should recognize the reciprocal ties imposed upon them by their own interests."
W. D.
March 16, 1918.
The Marshal said to me to-day:
"The Germans are still to a certain extent massing troops along the British front. If they are going to attack anywhere, that would be the place for them. But the information we receive about the morale of the German army is very uncertain. The frame of mind prevalent in such divisions as have been brought back from Russia is so bad that they are not allowed on this front. And there have been mutinies among the German troops in Lorraine.
"The Germans are now colonizing the parts of Russia they have occupied. If they are allowed to continue, within six months or one year they will have a formidable organization there. Russia herself is helpless, amorphous. Only outside intervention can do anything towards saving the situation, if it is to be saved. And Japan alone is in a position to attempt it.
"I know some say that using the Japanese would only be throwing the Russians into the arms of the Germans. Notably General Gourko has expressed this opinion to me. But are not the Russians largely in the arms of the Germans already? It would certainly seem so.
"It is also said that the Japanese would be hard to get out of Siberia, if once allowed to get in. But who can keep them out if they want to get in by themselves? They may act alone, if we antagonize them by refusing to grant them what they want. I may even go so far as to state that, in such an event, an understanding between the Japanese and the Germans is not impossible.
"If the Japanese could be induced to give their word that they would not keep Siberia permanently, I think they would stand by what they have said. One of their racial characteristics is to like realities, they want to accomplish things; but they have great amour-propre as a nation, and I personally do not think they would break a word given under such conditions to all the world."
W. D.
April 5, 1918.
The Marshal said in substance:
"There is still much talk about Austria going to pieces and being tired of the war. But the fact remains that she is still fighting, and there are at the present moment 113 Austrian batteries co-operating in the battle. I do not, however, consider them capable of attempting a big offensive against Italy without the assistance of Germany.
"The hope for the future continues to rest exclusively with America. France, England, Germany are all exhausted, while still able to fight and hold on. America alone is fresh and able to make a gigantic new effort. General Pershing's action in putting his army at the disposal of the Allies in this battle was very fine. These two divisions---for he has only two divisions actually ready for fighting---may not accomplish much militarily, but the encouragement and the stimulation for America are of the utmost importance.
"There are only two things America can do for the present: hurry on sending troops and intensify their training. She is doing both, so we have every reason to be content. At the start, much valuable time was lost because there was not a sufficient proportion of French instructors for the American army. It was largely our own fault, the attitude of many of our officers was that the American army should be absorbed into the French army. These officers, instead of seeking only to help the American army, tried to substitute themselves for American officers. But the United States had the feeling that their army must remain the American army, and this was a very proper feeling. Now there is a better understanding, and I personally am glad that the American divisions at the front are under the command of American Generals, keeping in close contact with the French and profiting by any lessons which experience allows the French to give."
W. D.
April 29, 1918.
The Marshal said:
"What France wants from America is principally men, but trained men. You can easily raise an army of 5,000,000 or 6,000,000;(8) but they must first be transformed into regiments, and then into divisions; and then they must grow accustomed to war.
"Then you must bring that army to France. At the present time you cannot bring millions of men over to France, because you have not the necessary tonnage at your disposal.
"There are two other things we need from America, almost as much as trained men. These things are material and food.
"In material, you must supply your own army with all its needs. But you must also supply both our army and our civil administration with many things in the way of material. We need munitions and guns from you. We also need railroad material, cars, and tracks, and we need steel and other material for our own ship-building and railroad building. So that much of what we are doing to help ourselves depends primarily upon what you can bring us.
"As for food, our French population is for the first time beginning to feel the real pinch of restrictions. We shall depend more and more upon your assistance for our food.
"We need a big American army over here as soon as possible. Much time has already been lost. Leaving aside the question as to whether or not more divisions might have been brought over during the year which has passed since America entered the war, it is certain that the divisions which have been brought over ought to have been readier to fight.
"It must be said that there has been great improvement in American methods of training, especially in France, but also at home in America, during the last five or six months. An American army of one million men, if properly trained and officered, would have considerable importance in the conduct of military operations. But the men America can send promptly may serve in with the French and the English. Brigading Americans with French and English troops is a temporary measure imposed by the exigencies of the hour. This will be modified later when a larger and more experienced army is here. But it must be said that this is the quickest method of training.
"It is not possible to say now whether the American army will be in a position to undertake a big offensive before the end of the present year. Too much depends not only upon the number of men, but upon their training, and upon their officers, The American has proved himself to be very good as a soldier, he is strong and vigorous and he has the fighting spirit. But the weak point with your army is the staff.
"The staff is the very soul of the army. The soldiers and the officers under whom they serve at the front do the fighting, but the staff must both direct and foresee everything. Its training depends upon questions not only of technical knowledge, but of experience, of time and thought, and of tradition. In France, we had those traditions going back for many generations, and so we were able to adapt ourselves quickly to the new conditions of modern warfare. The English, although fine soldiers, have not yet a proper staff after nearly four years of war. Their weakness at Cambrai, and in the present battle, lies in their staff. Your trouble is the same and is even greater, since your backwardness is greater than that of the English. But the American soldier will prove to be a more adaptable soldier than the British.
"The best training for a staff officer is to be had in our special staff schools. There are many of these in France, which are open to Americans. Our knowledge and experience are also at your disposal for the organization of your own staff schools. But you must be willing to profit by what we are only too ready to offer you.
"While needing your men in the fighting line, we also need you to continue sending men for organizing your own lines of communication, railroads, highways, etc. In order to help you with this, we should have to take soldiers away from our front, for we are short of men, all our valid men are mobilized. But the French are the best soldiers in the world at the present moment; they have far more value in the fighting line than they could have as workers in the rear. Consequently they cannot be spared for work at the rear, however important that work may be. While waiting for you to come to us in greater numbers, it is for us to hold the enemy back,"
To a question of mine as to the effect which the possible loss of a Channel port would have upon the war, the Marshal answered:
"The question of the importance which the loss of a Channel port might have, in the conduct and the duration of the war, depends upon the port. Early in the war, the Germans captured Ostend, which was regrettable and caused us some trouble, but we have managed very well all the same.
"The fall of Calais would be very serious. Our communications with England would be interfered with, and the English would have to disembark their troops further south, perhaps at Havre, Then German submarines would have a better base for their operations against us, and the German fleet would gain greater freedom of movement. And, of course, the loss of Calais would mean the loss of all Belgium and a retreat of the whole British line south of Calais. Indeed, the fall of Calais would shorten the war by diminishing our means, it would sooner or later compel us to accept peace.
"However, the present situation cannot exactly be compared to the situation before the Marne was fought. If we had lost the Marne, the war would have been lost, for the Germans would have become masters of all our resources. Though Calais were lost, the war would continue, because we have men and material and the other things we need, though the situation would undeniably be a bad one.
"We do not know the exact condition of the German armies to-day. I doubt if they have enough reserves left to attain their end, that is, cutting the British army in two, reaching Calais, and driving the English back to the sea. Germany's efforts are now less considerable than they were. Their effort has been steadily decreasing in intensity since March 21st.
"But we don't yet know just how we ourselves shall be able to withstand the wear of such battles. If we don't commit too many blunders, we ought to be able to hold the Germans back. Only, we do not dispose of enough men to make a big effort in the way of a counter-offensive sufficient to drive the Germans entirely out of France. We may or may not make local counter-offensives on a rather large scale, according as developments occur.
"An inter-Allied Commander-in-Chief is an imperative necessity, though much depends upon the conditions under which he exercises his command.
"It is to America we look for the future. She has already done much for us. Because we know that she firmly intends to do far more, and because we know what we have already done and what we can continue to do while waiting for America's full effort to make itself felt, we look upon the future with confidence."
W. D.
May 8, 1918.
The Marshal said to me to-day:
"The war has rendered to America the service of providing her with a great army. On the day when the Conscription Bill was passed, America had taken the all-important step for protecting and guaranteeing her future. She still labours under the disadvantage of not having an organized staff. But that is coming, and the creation of an American Staff College prepares the way."
W. D.
June 12, 1918.
The Marshal said to me concerning the battle between Compiègne and Noyon:
"The Germans are still eight kilometres from Compiègne. At present we are holding, while waiting for the American forces to arrive in greater numbers. The question is if this policy will suffice, in the face of what the Germans are now doing, and are certainly planning to do in the near future.
"The conduct of the American troops has more than justified the confidence of those among us who already believed in them, and has amazed others who, while not doubting their courage, were sceptical as to their immediate military value. Five American divisions are in the battle, two fighting as divisions, and the equivalent of three other divisions divided up in regiments fighting with the French forces. Now that they have been seen at work, French military authorities are fast coming to the opinion which some, including myself, have held from the start, namely that the American army must enjoy complete autonomy. This view is now held by General Pétain himself."
W. D.
August 5, 1918.
The Marshal said in substance:
"I doubt whether the Germans are in a position to attempt another big movement. During the last few weeks many things have altered for the worse from their point of view.
"On this front they have met with heavy reverses in the course of the Allied offensive, thanks largely to the work done by the American troops, and to the inspiring example the Americans have set by their courage and their dash. The sacrifice of life being made by the Americans is great, but they are right in believing that this is the way to end the war, The Germans cannot hold out indefinitely against such attacks, and our own men, tried as they have been by four years of war, gain a fresh impulse from such contact."
W. D.
September 20, 1918.
In a conversation with me to-day, Marshal Joffre said:
"The American army has not only proved itself to be what it should be, that is, the autonomous army of a great and independent nation, but it has shown that its Generals and field officers possess of themselves all the qualities necessary for successful operations and for eventual victory. Thanks largely to what America has done, but also in a measure to the feats of the French and British armies too, the situation to-day is excellent. Although the war is not ended, since a very great effort must still be made, the end is within sight. However, prophecy is difficult, because of uncertainties in Russia, although it does not appear that Russia is capable of doing much more to help Germany.
"The Germans are prepared to hold out on the Hindenburg line. What the English have taken in the north does not affect the line seriously, and although we have gained a little near St. Quentin, we have not reached its main defences. Up in the north, the enemy has prepared defences behind Cambrai in case of need, but intends to hold the town if possible; and he will certainly try his utmost to retain both Lille and Laon. I myself do not believe that he will voluntarily fall back behind the Hindenburg line, and this for three reasons:
First, tanks have caused a revolution in warfare during the last six months, not only because trenches and wire entanglements are no obstacle for them, but because of their own chief limitation, i.e., inability to cross water-courses, so that even a small river or a canal assumes great strategic importance in selecting a line of defence. The Germans have carefully planned their present positions, taking geographical questions into consideration, and they are not apt to move unless absolutely compelled.
Secondly, the Germans cannot evacuate all or most of occupied France without at the same time evacuating all or most of Belgium; for strategic reasons, they could not hold the Belgian line unless supported on the French line. So such a retreat would be admitting absolute defeat to a people and an army already sorely feeling the weight of war, and affected by depression.
Finally, the Germans have not yet fortified the lines of their old frontier so as to be able to hold them. According to the information we have, they have done some work along there, but will require at least four or five months more to organize a perfect system of defences comparable to that now offered by the Hindenburg Line.
"The German Government knows it is beaten in the war, and that no hope is left, because of America's growing effort which is furthermore a thoroughly organized effort. Therefore attempts to obtain peace, before a complete military defeat can come, will be multiplied. I expect Germany herself to make direct and official peace overtures this winter, but they may be no more sincere, nor reliable, than Austria's.
"Germany's great opportunity would come now, if she were to offer spontaneously to return Alsace and Lorraine to France,(9) The French nation would not admit of peace on other conditions. But if our provinces were offered to us as a solution for the war, and something in the way of an indemnity besides, all those people in France who are heartily weary of war, and ask only for a peace which seems to them to be just, would get together and form a party so large and so powerful that the Government would be placed in a very difficult position. In fact, if, as is highly possible, that party were to assume such proportions as to represent public opinion, the Government could not hold out against it and would have to listen to Germany, arranging as best it might with the Allies. Nothing, consequently, could be more to Germany's advantage than such a move. But I do not believe that Germany will be intelligent enough to make it; I doubt whether she will look beyond the fact that the return of Alsace and Lorraine would mean admitting defeat.
"At the present moment, the French Government is very strong, and Clemenceau is immensely popular both with the army and in the interior. As far as the public is concerned, he has made very clever use of our recent victories, inspiring confidence in the future and drawing popular sentiment together. The impression conveyed is that what has been accomplished is far more considerable than it really is, strategically speaking. For while we have improved the military position so that our victory is now certain, yet the Germans have drawn back their lines to their own chosen positions, where they are prepared and able to defend themselves; and almost everywhere their retreat has been careful and methodical. Even the magnificent victory of the American troops at St. Mihiel came after the Germans had spent three entire days evacuating their men and material. The figures of prisoners and booty taken, impressive when considered alone, are small when compared with all which had been there and had been safely removed.
"There are also other perils facing the Government, rendering its position insecure, strong as it is now.
"For instance, there is the attitude of resolute opposition adopted by the Socialists towards Clemenceau rather than towards the Government itself. They watch his every movement so as to overthrow him if possible. At the present moment, he is spending a great deal of time visiting the army at the front---far more than in attending to Government business. He comes back to Paris after an exhausting trip of five or six hours in motors and in the trenches; and he sets to work in his office signing papers which have been prepared for him and which he has not even the leisure to read. No method could be better for making, sooner or later, the blunder by which a man's political adversaries do not fail to profit when they are on the lookout.
"There is not now any organized party of opposition against the Government, and I do not know of any efforts on the part of any leader to oust Clemenceau. When the trouble comes which will cause his fall, Briand appears to be the most likely successor."
W. D.
The steady flow of American soldiers coming to the aid of the Allies had continued in increasing proportions. The figures will be found in President Wilson's message to Congress, December 2, 1918. Whereas a year before we had sent 145,918 men overseas, we had continued at the rate of 162,542 per month, rising to 245,951 in May, 278,760 in June, and upwards of 300,000 per month in July, August and September. The official report of General Peyton C. March, Chief of Staff, showed that a few days before the Armistice we already had 2,047,667 men turned over for transportation, the total of our Army on October 15, 1918, having been no less than 3,624,774.(10)
The truth about the large numbers of Americans on French soil was already generally known in August. But this did not cause Marshal Foch to reduce the efforts of the French. He maintained the old classes under arms, while preparing to receive the young 1920 class under the colours. I was told at the time on good authority that Marshal Foch had not only resolved that France must continue to make her maximum effort, but expected both England and America to do the same, in order to assure a satisfactory end for the war. A member of the British Staff having approached him to know what reductions he intended to make in the French army because of America's progressive effort, my informant said that Marshal Foch protested that no such idea had entered his head.
The Germans had drawn back slightly, under the pressure of the English, in the north; at other points of the line, they seemed disposed to take up the defensive on positions organized in advance. Premier Clemenceau informed me that the truth as to the situation was that the Germans had only fifteen divisions left, and their fighting morale was at low ebb. He added that he expected no new German offensive on a large scale, and that further counter-offensives would soon be undertaken with great hopes of success.
At the end of July, soon after the victory of our troops in stopping the Germans at Château-Thierry, thereby throwing them back from the Marne at that very dangerous point in the enemy's attempted advance on Paris, M. Clemenceau took occasion to speak in the highest terms of the bravery of our boys, yet said that he feared that they would all have to be cautioned on account of the severe losses sustained by them through a too reckless disregard of all danger. That excess of courage, from the point of view of modern warfare, was the subject of much comment among the French, and indeed the only form of criticism I heard concerning American soldiers. It was feared that imprudence might cost them too heavily, if a resumption of trench warfare became necessary. I believe the consensus of opinion was as expressed by Colonel Jean Fabry, Chief of Cabinet of Marshal Joffre, speaking to a member of my staff on August 15, who called attention to this, but added:
"The method followed until now has been the right one, The American Army jumped into the fray at the very moment when there was a return to open warfare, and this allowed them to reveal their magnificent soldierly qualities."
What stories fell from the lips of Allied brothers in a frenzy of enthusiasm for the valour of our boys at Château-Thierry, in the early days of the third attack of the German hosts While I was prepared to hear almost any account, however exaggerated, of their prowess, yet it remained for General Daugan, head of the Moroccan troops, to tell me at luncheon one day, just as the shadow of the Armistice was being projected over the last desperate battlefields, that it was our American troops who led the way when a saturnalia of death was the penalty paid for facing the murderous machine-gun fire of the enemy. With a sincerity devoid of the rather common practice to indulge in speech that is designed only to please, the General told me how at one time in the engagement he found American regiments placed on each side of his own troops. He said that at the most desperate stage of the attack it was the invincible courage, coupled with the staying qualities of the American troops, that literally inspired the other Allied troops engaged.
The week of September 10 to 18, 1918, was characterized by the advance of General Pershing's men in the sector of St. Mihiel. Anything that might have been needed to popularize the American army in France after the victory of Château-Thierry was then supplied in the events which led to the releasing, for the first time since the commencement of the war, of all the occupied towns in the region of the Moselle.
After that, it became evident that the fall of St. Quentin would mean the lasting retreat of the Germans ; and at about this time also came the peace message from Austria.