JUST as France was the real battleground of the war, so Paris became a Mecca for every leading figure in the tragedy. The subsequent selection of that city as the seat of the Peace Conference but emphasized the fact. This prominence, added to the conspicuous place which the United States occupied among her sister nations, gave to the American Embassy in Paris a position of unusual interest.
Taking a retrospective view of the events which crowded into every hour of those years, I have wondered if it fell to the lot of anyone else to have seen and talked with so many men of world-wide reputation. As I look back at those who figured in the chief rôles which the war imposed upon the representative men of the Allied and neutral Powers, I do not recall one I did not meet. There seemed but one thing in which there was a marked homogeneity: all came with great earnestness of purpose to achieve the task set before them. The very seriousness of the situation, at no time free from menace, made this necessary. But in methods and mannerisms, in dominant characteristics, how different they were! Each left indelibly impressed upon my mind something strongly indicative of the man himself.
In this mélange of distinguished visitors to Paris were kings, queens, princes, premiers, statesmen, philosophers, generals, and admirals. Of these I have had, or shall have, occasion to speak frequently throughout this book. Last to come, and one whose visit attracted the greatest attention, was our own President Wilson.
I have here referred to the visitors at my Embassy residence. My diplomatic colleagues I most commonly met at official functions, when they were not in my home or I in theirs. But the visitors at the Chancery ran the whole gamut of human character. Pathos and humour came in and went out, cheek by jowl. The meeting and disposing of their wants constituted no small part of the Embassy's duties.
I soon found that the requests of American citizens were not the only ones to be considered; others in great numbers found their way to No, 5 rue de Chaillot. This was especially true during the period of our neutrality, when the citizens or subjects of Allied nations could communicate with their sons, fathers, or brothers, often prisoners in enemy camps, only through American intermediation. Time and again, I was asked to call upon my American colleagues in Berlin, Vienna, or Constantinople, and occasionally far-off Petrograd, in behalf of anxiety-laden hearts of wives and mothers who besought my aid. Even Cabinet members of the French Government used the good offices of the American Embassy to relieve their concern over the conditions of those most precious to them. In one instance, the wife(1) of a former Premier must know the fate of her soldier son, from whom she had not heard for many months. In another, the treatment accorded to the son of a Foreign Minister(2) imprisoned in Germany must needs be investigated.
It was General Townshend's(3) wife, who, coming to see me one day with her aged father, told me that not for a long time had she been able to get word from her distinguished husband. He was held prisoner by the Turks at Constantinople, after the memorable siege of Kut ; she greatly feared for his safety. Promising to do what I could for her, I telegraphed to my esteemed colleague Ambassador Elkus, at that distant capital, of my desire that he make inquiry and, if possible, see the General in person. With that ability and initiative which characterized his services all through those trying times, he wired back within forty-eight hours the desired information that he had seen the General, who was in good health and being well cared for. When I communicated this news to Lady Townshend, she paid my country a tribute by saying that all her efforts in other directions to get such information had failed. Though she was French by birth and by her marriage a British subject, it had taken American diplomacy to get even a word of news from her husband.
Even in Berlin, similar requests were respected on a number of occasions. Within the very week of the brutal execution of Edith Cavell, I received a hurried telephone call at my home one evening, after I had returned from my office. It came from Madame Waldeck-Rousseau, the widow of the famous French statesman of twenty years ago. In the greatest concern she supplemented a request which had been made to me late that afternoon by M. de Margerie(4) of the Foreign Office, that I communicate with my Government at Washington asking President Wilson to use his good offices with the Emperor of Germany to prevent the execution by the military authorities of two young French ladies then residing in Belgium. The Minister had already cabled to Ambassador Jusserand at Washington, asking him to intercede with our Government.
In her appeal to me, Madame Waldeck-Rousseau stated that these young ladies, one of whom was related to her, had been sentenced to death and the execution of the sentence was but a matter of forty-eight hours.(5) She said that while the King of Spain and the Pope had been asked to use their good offices in preventing the sentence from being carried out, yet she wished to appeal to me as the representative of America. Late as was the hour, I at once sent off an urgent cablegram to Washington embodying this request and emphasizing the extreme gravity of the situation.
The swiftness with which events moved in this stirring drama with its scenes laid in Paris, Washington, and Berlin may be better realized by the reader if I set out paraphrased copies of the telegrams which had meant life or death to two helpless women.
Telegram from Ambassador Sharp
to the Secretary of State.Paris, October 16,
11 P.M., 1915.Secretary of State,
Washington.Two French ladies, Mrs. Thuilliez, a teacher at the college of Liège, and Miss Jeanne de Belleville, it is reported, will be executed at Brussels next Monday, the 18th instant. They will be executed on the charge of aiding the escape of their own countrymen. There is no charge of spying. Much concern is manifested here over the report, and their relatives, among whom is Madame Waldeck-Rousseau, the widow of a former distinguished French Premier, have earnestly besought the Embassy to call the attention of the Department of State to their plight in the hope that the Government of the United States might feel moved to endeavour to have the penalty mitigated. The Pope, I understand, has also been approached to intervene in their behalf.
SHARP.
The State Department to Ambassador Sharp.
Washington, October 18, 6 P.M.
American Embassy,
Paris.Referring to your telegram No. -------, of October 16th, the following telegram has been sent to the American Embassy at Berlin on October -----:
The French Ambassador has stated that Jeanne de Belleville at Brussels and Madame Thuilliez at Liege have been sentenced by German authorities to be executed Monday eighteenth. President hopes that it will be possible for you to use your good offices to have sentence commuted. You will use your discretion as to propriety of making request after learning nature of the cases.
LANSING.
Washington, October 21, 1915.
American Embassy,
Paris.Your -----, October 16th, from Berlin: Jeanne de Belleville and Madame Thuilliez will probably be reprieved. Their case has been laid before the Emperor with statement of President's interest.
LANSING.
Thus was averted the commission of a crime which had very much the same stage setting as the tragedy which, at that moment, was stirring the world's compassion in the case of poor Edith Cavell.(6)
Answering my letter to Madame Waldeck-Rousseau, communicating the good news and briefly reciting the steps that had been taken by the Government at Washington in bringing about such a happy result, she wrote me:
Madame Waldeck-Rousseau to Ambassador Sharp.
October 23, 1915.
Mr. Ambassador,
I am very grateful to you for your efficacious intervention and for the good news which you give me. I am full of hope now---1 have passed through cruel days. What an abomination,---and we are in the Twentieth Century!
Kindly receive, Mr. Ambassador, the assurance of my deep gratitude and of my high consideration.
M. WALDECK-ROUSSEAU.
Upon writing a letter of similar import to M. de Margerie, I received a reply from him expressing his deep appreciation:
M. de Margerie to Ambassador Sharp.
Ministry for
Foreign Affairs.République Française,
Paris, October 25, 1915.My dear Ambassador,
I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the personal letter which you were good enough to address to me on the 23rd instant, informing me that, according to a telegram from the Department of State, President Wilson had warmly intervened with the German Emperor to save the life of Countess Jeanne de Belleville and of Madame Thuilliez, condemned to death by the German military authorities in Brussels.
I beg to assure you, my dear Ambassador, that we are particularly touched by the zeal with which you, acting for a charitable and humanitarian purpose, were so kind as to second our efforts to save the lives of those two unfortunate ladies.
It was with great relief that we learned that this result had doubtless been definitely attained. I wish furthermore to express to you our deep gratitude for your efficacious intervention. We have already requested M. Jusserand to convey to President Wilson the expression of our very great gratitude.
Pray believe me, my dear Ambassador, etc., etc.
P. DE MARGERIE.
The details of one other story I shall always remember. It was in the month of August, 1917, while spending a few hours at Havre en route to Houlgate-on-the-Sea, where my family were located for a time. I was told by Consul Osborne of the culmination of the case of a young American hailing from San Francisco, who without some intervention would be shot on the following day by order of a court-martial. The charge was desertion from the Australian Army, and he had already been tried and convicted. While questions affecting his case had been brought to the attention of the Embassy some time before, yet I had not known of the final decision until this word came from the Consul.
The story of this unfortunate young man excited first my curiosity and then my compassion. Upon learning that the prisoner was to be taken that afternoon to the Consul's office where he was to make a last statement, I arranged to be present, but requested that for the time my identity be not made known either to the prisoner or to the military guards who conducted him there.
Within a few minutes after I had reached the Consulate, the prisoner was led up the winding stone steps, between two officers, to the little front office on the second floor, where we were waiting. Showing no signs of fear, yet very pale, with drops of perspiration standing out on his forehead, the man was evidently labouring under a great mental strain. Asked by the officer if he had any statement to make, he told how he had gone to Australia some years before. Upon the breaking out of war he had enlisted with the Australian troops and had later come over the seas with his company to France. While in the camp awaiting orders to go to the front, an antagonism between him and his comrades had sprung up; he had resented what he termed as the insulting attitude of some of them toward his country.
After hearing his straightforward story, I became convinced that notwithstanding his admission that he had had a wayward career, separating from his wife and leaving behind him a little son, he was at heart a brave and patriotic man. Upon the Consul's request that I be permitted to ask the prisoner some questions, I learned the name of his father, and other facts connected with his life in a Far Western city. It was the story of a wanderer who had not yet found himself, nor come to feel the sense of his responsibility to others.
Realizing that no time was to be lost if his life were to be saved, I immediately called into requisition the long distance telephone, communicating with my office at Paris. Having first written out the cablegram which I wished to send to Washington, I telephoned the message to Mr. Bliss with the request that it be forwarded immediately, so that the Department might verify as soon as possible the statements made by the condemned soldier. Through Mr. Osborne, I let it be known to General Nicholson, commanding the British Base at Havre, that I was personally interested in the case of this young man. In the interest of justice and mercy, I asked if he would not suspend execution of the sentence until his statements could be verified, and perhaps some request for clemency be forthcoming from my Government. This humane officer informed the Consul that the sentence had been submitted to higher authority for consideration, and assured him that under the circumstances there was no immediate danger of execution.
A day or two later, I received corrobation from the Secretary of State of the truth of the statements made by the prisoner. With the reply came the direction to intercede in so far as the facts warranted. The sentence was commuted to five years' penal servitude, and this was further suspended in order that he be sent to the front. He was given the opportunity by gallant conduct to make amends for his offence and wipe out the sentence. I learned eventually that he had communicated with his family and had returned to Australia a free man.
Possessing as I do a fairly accurate knowledge of the various steps early taken in this young man's case, requiring so much of promptness and initiative, I cannot speak too highly of the important part which Consul Osborne played in bringing it to such a successful conclusion.
Two other cases I recall as being of interest were those of M. Halot, a prominent member of the Belgian Senate, who was a prisoner of war in Germany for nearly two years, and M. Théodore, head of the Belgian Bar, They came into the Chancery in April, 1918, to thank me for having interceded to help get them both out of German prisons. M. Halot confirmed what I had heard, that the people of Germany were then everywhere praying for Peace.
While even in the distress of a great war, comparatively few requests made upon the Embassy involved a possible tragedy, yet in many of them the element of deepest human interest predominated.
It is doubtful whether there was anything in the category of requests which the human mind could evolve that did not at one time or another come up for consideration by the Embassy. For practically everything that pertained to human endeavour, except in the purely domestic matters in the home, this intercession was sought by the person in trouble. But withal, far from being an annoyance, the opportunity was furnished me very many times, even at slight trouble, of being of the greatest service to those who knew not where else to turn.
On one occasion, a poor French mother came to the wife of my concierge with whom she was acquainted. She humbly asked if I would intercede in the interest of mercy, to secure mitigation of a sentence which the police authorities had passed upon her son. He was a boy perhaps fourteen or fifteen years of age. With one or two companions he had taken some cakes of trifling value from the store consigned to American troops. I let it be known to the judge having the consideration of their cases that while appreciating the desire which the French officers had shown to protect the property of the American Army, yet I was sure that no American officer would want a severe sentence imposed on these boys who were in part the support of their mothers. As a result, the sentence of many months in a reformatory was mitigated to a few days, with a warning to the young culprits to be better behaved in the future.
Were these properly a part of the duties of an American Ambassador to France? I take it that the distress which prevailed on every side had a right to expect and demand the intervention of any power which might soften its rigour.
In such times everybody, regardless of title or position, seemed to be levelled to the common plane of just ordinary human beings. Neither geographical lines of residence nor difference in nationality were bars to such an appeal. To give official sanction to a word which, addressed to the proper authorities, would remove suspicion directed against some poor human being who already had sufficient burdens to carry ---such cases were not few; to write letters of introduction which would pave the way for merited courtesies; to obtain news of the last hours and burial-place of some soldier boy, to be sent to the American father and mother across the sea to direct some charitable work in the channel where it was most needed; to encourage, by name and presence, the inauguration of some humane effort; finally, to be a sort of clearing-house for the settlement of all difficulties in which the power of the Embassy could be invoked---these became in part the regularly accepted and matter-of-course duties of the American Embassy in Paris. They gave to the service of the Embassy that unique character which differentiated it from what had ever before been experienced.
While the Foreign Office was usually very obliging in complying with my many requests, yet there was one class of cases which, particularly before our own entrance into the war, without exception met the most obdurate lack of sympathy. In fact I do not recall a single instance where any such request was granted. I refer to the cases of those unfortunates who, having been placed on the suspect list, were ordered to be deported from France. Once this order had been made, no representation, even on the part of the Washington Government, prevented its execution. While the number of cases of Americans actually deported was not large, yet the names of those of all nationalities and all degrees of respectability on the suspect list were legion. Nevertheless, in comparatively few cases were there substantial grounds for suspecting disloyalty.
I remember, on one occasion, an American lady of eminent respectability had called to see me at the Embassy, to discuss various topics relating to charitable effort. During the conversation she remarked that she had heard that a certain lady, whom she mentioned, was on the suspect list. Poor woman, she little knew that at that very time her name too was on that same list! But it was in the days when suspicion and distrust were rife. It took the courage of M. Stephen Pichon, then editor of Le Petit Journal, though later Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Clemenceau Ministry, to denounce the wholesale practice of levelling suspicion indiscriminately against the citizens of the Republic. In one of his contributed articles published on November 1, 1917, under the title "Prosecutions vs. X," he not only pointed out the dangers which might follow from such a campaign of distrust, but he called for such a restoration of mutual confidence as would put an end to this practice.
Discovery of plots in unexpected quarters had, in fact, created an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion against which the highest position seemed to give no immunity. During the days of the Bob trial,(7) followed by that of some of high position in the Government, under the charge of treasonable conduct, announcements in the Press each morning brought to light new names of those who had been summoned before Captain Bouchardon. The atmosphere was so charged with this suspicion of almost everybody that it did not seem a far cry to the scenes that must have been witnessed when the excesses of the French Revolution were at their height. Only a common danger from without and that strong conservatism beneath the surface, which, kept in its full original power, will ever prevent France from turning Bolshevik or revolutionary, sustained the confidence of the masses in their Government under such trials. In some cases, even conditions in themselves wholly free from any taint of guilt exasperatingly contributed to draw down the suspicion of those engaged in the secret service work.
Many stories could be told of persons of wealth and high social position who found it necessary to enlist the good offices of the Embassy and explain some circumstance which had caused their names to be placed on the suspect list. In one instance, one of my most esteemed colleagues, Baron Wedel-Jarlsberg, the Norwegian Minister, found it necessary to appeal to me, protesting in the most emphatic manner against the refusal of the authorities to allow one of his countrymen to leave France for America. In vain he offered to vouch personally for the loyalty and good standing of this young man. Courtesy to a colleague, and to the Government which he represented, warranted me in making his representations known to the Department of State. But even then it was with the greatest difficulty that this name was removed from the list under suspicion. The cases of others connected in such a way as to create, if known, a veritable international scandal were brought to the Embassy to smooth out. Publicity would only have whetted the appetite of the sensation-monger and brought unmerited sorrow to others entirely innocent. By no means, however, should it be assumed that all suspicions were groundless.
On one occasion I had received advices from Washington that a certain woman of foreign descent, supposed to be stopping for the time in Paris, was the mother of an American citizen residing in a Western city, who had vouched for her loyalty and respectable character. A few days after she had departed for Switzerland, I received communication from the French Government that she was considered to be the most dangerous spy in Europe and would be shot if apprehended. At another time, through a spy getting possession of an American passport, German experts had had it so cleverly forged that only the different shading of the tail feathers of the American eagle engraved on it betrayed the forgery.(8) I am sure, from that time on, no picture of the American eagle, especially of his tail feathers, ever received more careful scrutiny than it did from our passport bureau. The passports of others had been stolen and the owners impersonated by the thieves while crossing into Switzerland. In one such case, however, the thief on being stopped at the Swiss frontier gave solemn assurance that he was the person therein mentioned. His conduct being judged suspicious, a telegram of inquiry as to his identity was sent to me by the authorities detaining him. Prompt investigation disclosed the fact that the real owner of the passport, an American newspaper correspondent, was at that moment in the capital of another country five hundred miles distant, and that his original passport had been stolen from him.
The number of this class of cases involving either applications for my intercession by suspected persons, or the request for the Embassy's activities in new directions of investigation of persons suspected, increased greatly until the close of the war. My experiences in considering them became a veritable school for the studying of human nature. The necessity for prompt action in considering cases where worthy people, entitled to the full protection of American citizenship, found it necessary to visit other countries, resulted in the Department's giving to me more and more discretion in the issuing of emergency passports. Often the exigencies of the case were such that there was not sufficient time to receive specific instructions from Washington. Not infrequently American soldiers, being granted a brief furlough in Paris, desired to visit England to see some distant relative of the family back home, who might be seriously ill or have some other cause perfectly justifying such permission.
Where the passport bureau was in doubt, on more than one occasion I requested to see the applicant but for a moment. "Show him in," became my stereotyped order to Mr. Benjamin Thaw, Jr., our capable passport expert on such occasions. To see the person's face and to study his demeanour became the most certain guide by which to judge him. Quite invariably his appearance, and his answers to a few questions which I asked, satisfied me fully as to the genuineness of his reasons. In all my experience of cases covering every variety and kind, I recall but one or two deceptions being practised, or my confidence imposed upon.
But I am sure the most annoying type of individual who came to seek the good offices of the Embassy was the man who persistently refused to recognize the restraints imposed by the war. Such people could not see why the war should make any difference in their plans, nor why restrictions should be placed upon their movements. While most of this class consisted of those who had come over ostensibly on some relief work, and had later become inspired by a curiosity to see what was going on at the front, yet there were also those who were engaged in private business enterprises of one kind or another.
Of the latter, I remember one young man who, representing large manufacturing interests in America, desired to make a hurried trip to London. Coming to my office late one afternoon, he informed me that he wished to leave on the following day; that after spending the Saturday in that city attending to his business, he desired very much to return on Sunday by a certain route across the Channel. He knew, as I did, that this route was used, on Sundays, exclusively in the service of carrying important official communications, and only those employed in governmental positions could avail themselves of the privilege of that crossing.
Surprised at his desire to return so promptly, after telling him the difficulties in the way of getting such permission for him, I asked why he did not return on Monday. He made the surprising reply that he must return on Sunday in order not to lose a day in his business in Paris. Upon hearing such a reason, I declined to make any request of the Government for a departure from its rules. I also expressed my surprise that he should so strongly object to losing a day in his business at a time when that of those around him had been all but destroyed, and the very lives of thousands of men were being sacrificed every day in order that he might be permitted to reside safely in Paris and carry on any business at all!
But I am persuaded that even the stern restrictions imposed by war should not always intervene to prevent freedom of action where romance holds its sway. It would be hard indeed to refuse a request involving apparently so much happiness to two young people as the letter which I received from a young American girl, sojourning in Paris would indicate. First informing me as to the nature of her war work---highly creditable---she expressed a most earnest desire to go to England as soon as possible. Supplied with excellent letters of introduction and recommendation, she was still held back by the British Consul. She wrote:
"I do not want to wait a long time, Mr. Sharp, before proceeding to my work in England, I want to see my fiancé, who is a Major of the ------, and whom I could marry if I could only get to England. He is a Mons man and has been right through the war from the beginning of August, 1914, and I am all he has got---no father, mother, or sisters. He leaves for Saloniki and this is our only chance to see each other and arrange for our marriage. We have been through so much, Mr. Sharp. If you will only help me to get over quickly, I will see Major ----- , my fiancé, and after he leaves for Saloniki, I shall proceed directly to ------, and do my work. Oh, Mr. Sharp, will you help us! A few days and I may miss Harry altogether . . . Please forgive this hurried letter but both my fiancé and myself felt it would be terrible to miss each other when he is going way down to Saloniki."
I thought so too.
But outclassing, in so far as frequency was concerned, all requests made by my compatriots for favours, that of securing permission to go to the front by far predominated. The guise under which this favour was asked by some, and the circumlocution indulged in by others leading up to such a request, furnished a most enlightening means of gauging human character. Some of its phases were as humorous as they were remarkable for the display of the quality called "nerve." While such requests---and I respected them whenever they seemed justified---could hardly be termed unnatural, yet in not a few cases the morbid curiosity to get into the first line trenches, where their every footstep would be in the way of all those to whom stern duty alone gave the right to be there, was beyond my understanding. One of these whose business in Paris, wholly private, had not the remotest connection with military operations, came into my office one day to announce that having now finished his work, he was about to return home. After beating about the bush for some minutes, he expressed a very earnest desire to go right into the front trenches where men were wounded and bleeding; he wanted to tell his friends that he had had that experience
It would have been impossible without the valuable assistance of my staff to give attention to all the demands on the Embassy. In particular when receiving callers, Mr. Bliss and Mr. Frazier were of great aid.
While I was compelled to adopt the rule of meeting many of my callers by appointment, yet I found it a most difficult task on occasions to divide my time so that, giving them audience, my purely official duties should in no wise be neglected. But toleration was one of the virtues of these times, and the indulgent patience shown me by those to whom I could give but briefest time, or perhaps be compelled to ask them to call again, was something more appreciated by me than they could know. At times, however, the best system of apportioning my daily routine of labour, which commenced shortly after nine in the morning and with usually but a short hour of intermission for luncheon, continued often until seven o'clock in the evening, was not sufficient guarantee of keeping all my engagements.
On one occasion the Grand Duke Alexander, a cousin of the Tsar of Russia, had sent in a request for an audience with me ; he desired to acquaint me with the conditions, then very much disturbed, in his own country. Having made an appointment with him at an early hour in the afternoon, I found that on account of an unexpected visit from Mr. Bartholoni, my landlord, I could not return to the Chancery in time to keep my engagement. Telephoning this fact to my office to ask my distinguished caller if he would excuse my delay, I found to my regret that he had already called and left.
The next day I received a letter from him which, though expressed in the politest language, plainly indicated his displeasure and concluded with a statement that in all his life he had never before been so treated. The fact that it had been entirely my fault prevented me from having the slightest feeling of resentment over the tone of his letter. There being but one thing for me to do, I at once dispatched a note to him expressing my deep regret at my failure to keep the appointment, explaining to him the reason and assuring him at the same time that I would feel most honoured if, pardoning my action, he would call to see me at the Embassy residence at any time most convenient to him.
The generous answer which he returned proved him to be the big man which I found him to be on meeting him. Of fine presence, somewhat under the middle age of life, thoroughly democratic in manner, he yet had those inherent attributes of a distinguished lineage which would impress all who met him. Indeed, I found in him not only a most charming gentleman, but one who was exceedingly well posted upon the conditions of his country. Under the circumstances, I felt it a duty quite as much as a pleasure to give to my visitor all the time he wished. Our conversation that afternoon lasted for a full hour, during which he gave to me an intensely interesting résumé of the danger with which, from his viewpoint, Bolshevism threatened the world's security. I well recall the dramatic manner in which he exclaimed : "Great as has been the moral support which America has given to Russia, her aid has come too late to save the situation of my country. The condition of our people is hopeless, all is chaos."(9)
There were finally callers at the Chancery who, wanting nothing themselves, gave that kind of information which often enabled me to cable most valuable reports to the Department. Yesterday, perhaps, a returning Special Agent from Constantinople; to-day, a Secretary from Berlin; to-morrow, an impartial observer from some other distant point, none of them so far removed, however, from the scenes of actual warfare, but that they had formed most interesting and intimate impressions of the conditions about them.
Of all my callers, however, I would say that the one who most differed from the others was Herbert Hoover. One day in the early part of the war, when his great mission for the relief of Belgium had brought him to France, his card was sent up to my office; a few minutes later he was ushered in. Taking a seat near my desk, after greeting me most pleasantly and hardly looking me in the face, he told me, in short, quick sentences, a story of fascinating interest. The privileged position which his mission had given him, coupled with the fact that our country was not only still a neutral, but actually representing German interests in hostile countries, gave him an entrée into the very inner circles of German military officialdom. Concentration in conversation upon the subject of his call---for there always seems with him to be a definite object---must impress one from the start. To think of his wasting time by making a merely social call during business hours would be something unimaginable; neither is there ever anything indirect in his manner, such as the exchange of comments about the weather and conditions in general, in acquainting you with the object of his call. He impresses you as some automatic machine perfectly adjusted in all its bearings, and capable of turning out a vast amount of work.
Particularly one thing which he told me that day remained fixed in my mind all through the war: " The war will result in a stalemate."(10) I was listening to the only man---at least the only American---who had been privileged to know first hand the mind of the representatives of German militarism as it came to him through chats in cafés, consultations as to his plans for relief, and I presume some social amenities. At that time, and indeed for nearly four years thereafter, a veritable Chinese wall shut out from the Allies all authoritative information as to the real thoughts which moved the German mind.
In properly assessing the values which should be attached to this declaration, one must primarily consider the period at which it was made. The three intensive years of warfare which followed would modify, I am sure, one's opinion as to the weight to be given it. I am sure, too, that the keen perception of Mr. Hoover compelled him, before many months after his statement to me, to change his opinion that the war would result in a stalemate. After the collapse of Russia, nothing prevented a German victory but the opportune---the necessary---entrance of the United States into the war on the side of the Allies.
ON the afternoon of the twenty-fifth day of March, 1916, occurred an incident which at once assumed the gravest importance in its bearing upon the war. It peculiarly concerned the Government of the United States, because it involved a very serious menace to the lives of American citizens. I refer to the case of the steamer Sussex. This was a small cross-Channel passenger boat, plying between Dieppe and Folkestone, which, on that afternoon, had been all but sunk by a torpedo from a German submarine. Even as it was, approximately one hundred and fifty people lost their lives, either directly from the explosion or else from the capsizing of lifeboats or jumping into the water in a panic of fear.
Many of my readers will remember this as one of the numerous incidents of the submarine warfare which for so long a time seriously threatened the ability of the Allied Powers to continue the war. But I am sure that few, if any, know the interesting manner in which the responsibility for this new horror was finally fixed. The story is replete with those elements with which a Conan Doyle might thrill his readers.
In some respects, the case of the Sussex presented features more atrocious in their character than those of the Lusitania or the Arabic.(1) The Sussex was well known to be employed exclusively in carrying passengers and mail back and forth across the English Channel ; it carried no munitions of war, nor was it defended by even the smallest guns.
Nearly a year before, the world had been horrified by the sinking of the Lusitania with its great loss of human life. The death of more than one hundred Americans at that time had already done much to start the tide of war in America. This was followed, three months later, by the torpedoing of the Arabic, some forty-eight passengers being lost, including two more American lives sacrificed by this wickedly ruthless method of warfare, the very nature of which rendered it impossible to discriminate between women and children, and armed troops of war, as its victims.
Neither of these incidents proved sufficient to precipitate our country into the war. As yet, the sentiment at home seemed not ripe for it----most certainly not to the degree which, a year later, was attained with unanimity. But the Sussex case brought our Government measurably nearer to the brink of war. It served, too, the purpose, paradoxical as it may seem, of staying our participation in the war for another year. The latter result was due to the virile message of President Wilson, addressed to the Imperial Government of Germany, which voiced in unmistakable terms the determination to permit no longer such outrages involving American rights upon the high seas. Indeed, so important a bearing in the mind of Count Bernstorff, at the time Germany's Ambassador to the United States,(2) had this whole incident of the Sussex upon America's subsequent entrance into the war, that in his book My Three Years in America, he has written:(3)
"It is my firm conviction that had it not been for this ultimatum (President Wilson's Note of the 18th of April to the German Government), diplomatic relations would not have been broken off immediately, even in 1917. In the increased tension of the situation resulting from the exchange of Notes on the subject of the Sussex, I see, therefore, one of the immediate germs of the war with America."
No one was in a better position than this German diplomat to appreciate the gravity of a situation which the entire submarine method of warfare had created at Washington. And no one better than he understood the cataclysm toward which his country was hastening, through its " half-hearted concessions," w use his own language, which his Government had from time to time been compelled to make. He has added: "In my opinion it was essential for us to strive for a complete understanding with America, if we were not prepared to carry on the submarine campaign without regard to consequences." In deploring the fact that no attention was paid to his suggestions in Berlin at the time of this incident, a fateful story is told of cross-currents at home preventing his Government from giving heed to the advice of one whose position at Washington, above all other diplomatic missions, rendered it most needful.
It will be recalled that to oppose the natural inference that the boat had been torpedoed, the claim had been made by the German Government that a sunken mine was the cause of the disaster. Unfortunate, indeed, it was for this contention that the Sussex did not actually sink and with her carry the evidence which was later to produce such an overwhelming refutation. As it was, she bore into port that day, amidst the débris in her shattered hulk, mute evidence which was soon to be as living words, telling of the instrument of her attempted destruction.
The first knowledge that came to me of this new disaster was through Mr. Fairbanks, our acting Consul at Dieppe. On March 25th he had telegraphed me:
Telegram from Consul Fairbanks to Ambassador Sharp.
Cross-channel steamer Sussex coming to Dieppe torpedoed four-thirty this afternoon, six maritime miles off Berck. Three hundred eighty-six passengers and fifty-five crew. Wireless help calls received for ten minutes. Torpedo boat has arrived on scene disaster. Further details lacking.
FAIRBANKS, Consular Agent.
Later, Mr. Fairbanks telephoned me that the Sussex had been towed to Boulogne, after two hundred and fifty passengers had been landed,(4) He had understood that between sixty and eighty passengers had been wounded or killed by explosion, but did not know the names of any of the American passengers. The rumours quickly flying about Paris that a number of Americans were on board, coupled with the definite information that the loss of life was considerable, created much anxiety among those who had friends or relatives expected back in France at about that time. The knowledge that Mr. Bliss, then Secretary, but later Counsellor of the Embassy, accompanied by Mrs. Bliss on their return from America, was expected to cross the Channel that day, gave a deep personal concern to all the Embassy staff. Fortunately, they had decided to take another route, and came over later in the week by way of Southampton.
It was soon definitely learned that Professor J. Mark Baldwin, together with Mrs. Baldwin and their daughter, had taken passage on the Sussex. My inability to hear from him for some little time after the disaster led me to believe that he was one of the victims. Additional reason for this belief was furnished by rather positive statements that he had been one of those last seen on the forward part of the ship when the explosion occurred. After vainly trying to get into communication with those near the scene of the disaster who might know definitely of Mr. Baldwin's fate, I was greatly relieved to receive the following letter from him:(5)
Professor James Mark Baldwin to Ambassador Sharp.
Sussex Hotel,
Wimereux
(Près Boulogne s/mer),
Sunday, March 26.Dear Mr. Sharp
I am writing to tell you that we were all rescued (wife, daughter and I) at midnight after the torpedoing of the channel boat Sussex, and landed at Boulogne. Our daughter Elizabeth is very much bruised and stupefied but we hope that it is only contusion and shock. We are staying here while she is in the hospital for treatment.. I shall be glad if you could reassure those of our friends who inquire about us.
There were two young Americans who crossed on the New York with my family and took the Sussex; both were standing with my daughter when the explosion tore away the fore part of the boat just beside them. Neither of the young men was seen afterwards---unless possibly in one of the small boats. I fear they are both lost. They are: a Mr. Crocker of Boston (Harvard) coming to drive an ambulance for the Norton-Harjes unit; I think it might be well to inform the Morgan firm.
The other is a Mr. Penfield, a Rhodes scholar at Oxford---a Princeton graduate. I do not know anything further of him.(6)
I should be grateful if you could send me some sort of a note to the military authorities here---it is in the war zone, you know---which would facilitate my passing between Paris and Boulogne, as I shall have to come and go if Elizabeth's stay in the hospital is prolonged. I have saved my own passports, American and French, but my wife and daughter have lost theirs in their handbags.
My wife joins me in kind messages to you all. She is still weak from the harrowing sights and fearful anxiety about Elizabeth but is otherwise well.
Yours sincerely,
J. MARK BALDWIN.
While, providentially, all the Americans on board were saved from death---and there were upwards of a score of them ---not all escaped injury. As may be gathered from Professor Baldwin's letter, his daughter was very seriously injured and for some time her life hung in the balance. She had received dangerous wounds in the head from flying fragments following the explosion, and remained unconscious and without the power of speech for many days. The story told me by Professor Baldwin upon his return to Paris, of his fears and his anxiety while watching over the inanimate body of his daughter lying at the bottom of one of the drifting life-boats, was most harrowing. Although predictions had been freely made that some day one of these cross-Channel passenger boats would be attacked by a submarine, yet the immunity thus far enjoyed by them seemed to have resulted in very little discouragement to travel. The fact that the schedule of daily trips had been changed, owing to the exigencies of the war, to passages on each alternate day, only seemed to crowd them to their limit. In fact, the Sussex, upon her fateful voyage, had a passenger list of nearly four hundred, exclusive of the crew, and including not only subjects of the Allied Powers, but neutrals as well.
Promptly upon receipt of the news from our Consul of the attack on the Sussex, I directed Lieutenant Bernard L. Smith, U.S. Marine Corps and Assistant Naval Attaché at the Embassy, Major Logan, doing special work for the War Department, and Mr. Hastings Morse, of the staff of the Embassy, to proceed at once to Boulogne and there gather all possible information as to the cause of the disaster. I also directed them to place their services at the disposal of any Americans whose distress the Embassy might alleviate, The French port authorities, through my request to the Government at Paris, were notified of their coming and instructed to extend to them any aid that might be needed to facilitate their investigation.
The Sussex had reached Boulogne at two o'clock in the afternoon of March 26; within twenty-four hours thereafter Major Logan and Lieutenant Smith had arrived on the scene. During their absence, additional reports came in to the Embassy giving further particulars as to the extent of the disaster. It was indeed a miracle that this little ship of scarcely fourteen hundred tons had remained afloat. Only the staunchness of her bulkheads, and particularly the calmness of the seas, prevented her sinking. Notwithstanding these favourable conditions, the danger was considerably increased from the fact that there was no other vessel in sight at the time the boat was attacked. Through an error in computing her location, report of which was sent by wireless immediately after the explosion, the relief vessels sent out to find the Sussex were unable to do so for many hours. The suspense of the surviving passengers on the wrecked boat can well be imagined. Only a bulkhead,(7) pulsating with every motion of the ship, separated them from death by drowning like so many rats in a trap.
Mr. Edward Marshall, a well-known newspaper correspondent, and a hero of the Spanish-American War, who had left a leg on the Cuban battlefield, was one of the American passengers on that eventful voyage. Visiting Paris some weeks later-for he was one of those who had been landed on the English coast instead of at Boulogne---he told me a thrilling story of his experiences. At different times during these hours of suspense, in the blackness of the night, he and some of his fellow-passengers would inspect the bulkhead, pressing their ears to its sides that they might more accurately gauge the probability of its withstanding the strain. He told me that, in the little dining-room of the boat, shortly after the diners had left the room, a gentleman with whom he had been conversing sat at the table just opposite him. All at once, with great suddenness as a result of the explosion of the torpedo, the chair in which this man was sitting was thrown upward, and, carrying him with it, struck the ceiling with tremendous force. He was instantly killed, while Mr. Marshall, sitting but a few feet away, was unharmed.
Just outside of the intervening bulkhead, located at the forward end of the ship, a scene of horrible carnage was everywhere manifest. Nearly thirty feet of the bow of the boat, extending well back to the Captain's bridge, had been blown off; all the superstructure had been destroyed. Just what toll of human lives was taken, due directly to the explosion, will never be known. From the stories of those who saw their fellow-passengers standing on the deck, which an instant later was so completely wrecked, the number must have been large. But the greatest loss of life resulted from the panic which seized many of the passengers after the explosion. Seemingly beside themselves, men and women rushed frantically to the side of the ship. Before any boats could be lowered, they leaped out into the water, only to drown in a few moments, in plain view of those who remained on deck. In one case a mother threw her infant child overboard and followed it into the water herself.
Among those unfortunates who lost their lives in this manner were Señor Enrique Granados, the noted Spanish composer, and his wife, who had just returned from America after seeing the successful presentation of one of his operas. Apparently unable to swim after they found themselves in the water, they were seen to sink out of sight clasped in each other's arms.
The mishaps in lowering the life-boats, so common in accidents at sea, resulted also in the capsizing of a number of them. The extent of the loss of life from this cause was considerable. It was all the more deplorable, from the fact that none of these persons would have been drowned had they remained on the steamer, which, on the following day, was towed safely, though in a seriously damaged condition, into port at Boulogne. Indeed, all of those who had taken to the life-boats, after spending a considerable time on the water unable to make any headway, and observing that the Sussex was not sinking, rowed back to re-embark on her.
Fourteen of the American survivors---there were twenty-six in all---upon landing at Boulogne, came directly to Paris. A number of them lost no time in coming to the Embassy to tell their stories ; others I sent for. I asked Mr. Frazier, First Secretary of the Embassy, to take their depositions ; at the same time I cabled Washington the salient points of their testimony. They represented a variety of vocations, a majority being on one kind or another of business mission.
In my experience in the early days of my career as a trial lawyer, I had never examined any witnesses whose veracity I would place on a higher plane than that of those who gave their story to the Embassy. Straightforward, free from prejudice, with a manifest desire to be accurate in all their statements, at the end of forty-eight hours after their reaching Paris, they gave me such a complete story of all that occurred during those eventful moments, that scarcely a detail was lacking. Coming from sources so widely different in opportunity to see all that took place on the ship, both before and after the explosion, each piece of evidence fitted into the whole in such a way as to leave no contradiction or inconsistency. Truth never contradicts itself, and they told the truth. It was only when some of these witnesses commenced to express to me their opinion as to what caused the explosions that there was any divergence in their views.
Naturally, most of those who gave their testimony could only hazard a guess as to the cause. However, with daily reports of many boats being destroyed by submarines, and with some degree of frequency by mines, there was a general agreement that one or the other of these agencies was the cause of the disaster.
The theory that it was caused by the explosion of a mine was later clearly demonstrated to have been without any possibility of support. The investigations which I set on foot established that the tides at the time and place where the Sussex was torpedoed were twenty-five feet above the level at which contact with a mine might be made. The evidence showed that the Sussex was drawing about eleven feet of water when she left Folkestone. Thus was furnished irrefutable proof that the explosion could not have been caused by contact with a fixed mine. After detailing with great exactness the location of the ship in latitude and longitude when it was struck, Commander Sayles and Lieutenant Smith reported:
"At mean low water at this position there is a depth of thirty-one metres. The official time of the accident was one hour and thirteen minutes after high water. The height of the tide at this time was about 7.60 metres. The depth of the water at the time of the accident was therefore 38.60 metres. The maximum draft of the ship at the time of the accident is reported to have been 3.20 metres. From the foregoing facts the assumption may be drawn that the Sussex did not come in contact with an anchored mine,"
There were three witnesses who positively declared that but an instant before the explosion they had seen the well-defined wake of a torpedo rushing toward the ship at an angle in the direction of her course. One of these, a gentleman of unimpeachable character, exclaimed to his wife at that moment: "Look, here comes a torpedo!" A second later it had struck the forward part of the ship. There was another person whose eyes were also scanning the smooth waters at that moment, and who saw the coming of the deadly missile. It was Captain Mouffet. With a promptness which undoubtedly saved the boat from being struck at a vital point, he gave orders to change her course so as to cause the torpedo to strike at such an angle as to do the least possible damage. The engine was also immediately stopped.
Much of the evidence which I have thus related came from witnesses of the catastrophe with whom I had personally talked. But confirmatory of the cause of the disaster as was the account given by these witnesses, there was in existence other evidence which was to be as convincing as it was immutable in character. Depending not upon the possibility of the intervening frailties of memory, prejudice, or lack of truthfulness, it fixed unerringly the responsibility for the crime. It did more, for it exerted a powerful influence upon the conduct of submarine warfare for many months to follow.
With most commendable promptness, Major Logan and Lieutenant Smith had commenced a thorough inspection of the disabled hulk, which had been beached on the sands at Boulogne. In keeping with the custom of the French authorities, whether of high or low degree, in responding to all of my requests, every facility was afforded for this purpose. Owing to the celerity with which action in the matter had been taken, no work had been commenced for clearing away the débris, which still covered, to a depth of several feet, the larger portion of what remained of the shattered bow of the ship.
Gruesome enough became this task. In delving into the mass of wreckage at the very outset was found the dismembered body of one of the victims of the explosion. A portion of a man's leg with a shoe on the foot had been uncovered in the presence of the two officers. A further search was soon rewarded with the finding of various parts, fragments of metal, which, by their peculiar composition and shape, differentiated them from anything that might have belonged to the construction of the ship. Some of these pieces were found firmly imbedded in timbers, showing the tremendous force with which they had been driven. After an exhaustive search in this closely-packed mass of wreckage, fifteen of such fragments were collected by Major Logan and Lieutenant Smith; to these was added a piece found by one of the officers of the port.(8)
With what they quickly divined to be fragments of a torpedo, they returned to Paris to report their findings to me. Upon their arrival, they at once came to my office and laid these fragments before me on my desk. At such a moment it might well seem as though the hands of those whose lives had been sacrificed in this awful tragedy were held out, pointing to this mute accusing evidence as proof of the instrument of their murder. With the greatest interest, I examined the torn and jagged pieces. Two of them---the broken and half-fused screw-heads, which had been a part of the construction of either the mine or the torpedo responsible for the disaster---instantly riveted my attention. I had observed upon one of the four faces of the head of each one of the bolts the capital letter " K," and on the opposite side a number. I turned to the officers, and pointing to these bolts, said:
"In these two fragments you will find the tell-tale evidence which will show the cause of the explosion. Where can we make comparison with other torpedoes of admitted German, French, and English manufacture?"
Through the Minister of the Marine, I learned that every known variety of torpedoes could be found at the Naval Station at Toulon on the Mediterranean.
Arranging for Commander William R. Sayles, the Naval Attaché of the Embassy, to accompany Major Logan and Lieutenant Smith, I instructed them to proceed that night to Toulon. They carried with them all the fragments which they had found on the Sussex, that these might be compared with disassembled parts of the different kinds of torpedoes. The customary courtesies to these officers being assured by those in charge of the Naval Station at Toulon, a stay of only a day enabled them to return with startlingly corroborative evidence of the fact that it was a torpedo of German make that had struck the Sussex. They brought with them several specimens of screw-heads which they found in the torpedoes of German, French, and English manufacture. On making an examination of these specimens, I saw that while neither of the two latter makes had any letters or numbers upon them, those taken from the German torpedo had the letter " K and also a number. Moreover, those from the German torpedo were identical in size and shape with those found on the Sussex.(9)
Lieutenant Smith had already drawn a representation of the "war head"---so-called---of the German torpedo as it existed in the specimen found at Toulon. Ingeniously, he had represented in their proper places, in red ink, all of the sixteen fragments found in the débris of the Sussex. This drawing, representing as it did a reconstructed torpedo, was a feature not lacking in dramatic qualities. It was worthy of being recorded in the investigation, carried on at a time when ingenious stories were being fabricated to show that no torpedo fired by a submarine could have caused the wreck of the Sussex. It was this display of ingenuity and ability of Lieutenant Smith, coupled with his most efficient record, which caused me to recommend, in a personal telegram to Secretary Daniels, his employment in Washington in a larger and more helpful sphere of usefulness. Upon his return to America after our entrance into the war, his services became of the greatest use to our Navy.
While keeping the State Department informed of the development of the investigation, including the sending of copious extracts from the testimony of the passengers, I yet realized the importance of fixing, beyond doubt or possible dispute, the cause of the disaster. The need for action, when events of such international concern were moving so swiftly, was too great to await specific instructions from Washington. The initiative must be mine. In carrying out this purpose, I directed these same officers of my staff to proceed to Portsmouth, England, where were to be found newer types of torpedoes of German make, as well as French and English. Upon their arrival, they received every courtesy from the English naval officers, which enabled them to carry on their investigation. As at Toulon, so here they were permitted to examine, not only the parts of the mines of the different Navies, but also the torpedoes. They also obtained abundant corroborative evidence that the fragments which they had found on board the Sussex came from a German torpedo and formed no part of the construction of a mine.
A curious aid in arriving at this conclusion came to them in a most unexpected manner. Armed with letters of credentials, they secured permission from the Director of Torpedoes of the Royal Navy to visit H.M.S. Vernon. There they found drawings and descriptions of a German torpedo taken from the Emden.
It will be recalled that this cruiser, before its destruction by the British, had a most remarkable career. The boldness and resourcefulness of her captain in his piratical exploits had challenged the admiration of even his foes.(10) Emphasizing the regard in which this captain and his cruiser were held, we have the statement of no less a personage than General Ludendorff, in his book reciting his part in the war, that on one occasion, when he went to consult with the Kaiser, he found, as one of the birthday presents scattered about the room, a fine picture of the Emden.(11) Oddly enough, the General's visit to the Emperor, that day, was to arrive at the momentous decision by which the German Government was to repudiate all the pledges that had been made as the result of President Wilson's protest over the attempted sinking of the Sussex.
From these drawings and the other proofs at hand, the officers were again able to identify positively every fragment which they had carried with them as having belonged to a German torpedo. A report of their Portsmouth findings was at once given to my esteemed colleague, the late Honourable Walter Hines Page, then American Ambassador at London.(12) Upon receiving full written reports from the officers whom I had dispatched to Portsmouth, I immediately cabled to the State Department their substance. I cannot too strongly commend either their zeal in carrying out their task, or the thoroughness with which it was accomplished. Whenever their conclusions were not entirely warranted by the facts, they were so labelled.
The State Department at Washington was equally determined to take nothing for granted that had not been first demonstrated as quite axiomatic. Thus far, the incident had differed but very little from securing evidence upon which a criminal indictment might be predicated. The crime charged was, in effect, the deliberate killing in broad daylight, without the slightest warning, of approximately one hundred and fifty innocent people.
Who was responsible for the crime? Neutral as well as belligerent Powers were vitally interested in the verdict. Subjects and citizens of many nationalities had lost their lives or been grievously injured. The very nature of the crime had shown that henceforth no ship sailing the high seas would be immune from a deliberate attempt to sink her. But unless the proofs at hand were sufficient to point out beyond a reasonable doubt---nay more, even to a certainty--- the guilt of the party charged, the American Government could not lend itself to preferring such a charge against any of the belligerent Powers. The extreme gravity of the case made both my responsibility, and that of the Government at Washington, very great.
Consistent with that wisdom which had guided the State Department at Washington in its consideration of the grave questions involved in the war, there was to be no mistake made in dealing with the case of the Sussex. If patience in studying such problems had been one of the dominant characteristics of its attitude, that of being just in its dealings with the German Government had been equally so. There had not been lacking those Americans, both at home and abroad, who had already shown marked dissatisfaction over the former quality and a lack of sympathy with the latter. By them it was believed that, in view of the atrocities already committed by the submarine---so inhuman in their very nature ---patience had ceased to be a virtue. As for being just, in their opinion, the perpetrators had put themselves outside of the pale. But at such a time an unfounded accusation would strengthen the hand of the accused; it would correspondingly weaken the confidence placed in those who were at war with them. Under such circumstances, our Government must have a case supported by facts, free from any flaw or doubt.
It was unquestionably with such a purpose in mind that, after substantially all of the evidence to which I have referred had been telegraphed to him, Secretary Lansing, in a telegram to me under date of the twelfth of April, posed four questions. Their conciseness was only equalled by the insight displayed as to the vital elements in the case. The Secretary wanted to know: first, how long a time had elapsed after the Sussex was beached at Boulogne before Major Logan and Lieutenant Smith made their examination; second, what opportunity had other persons previously to visit the ship or to place fragments of metal among the débris; third, was there, in the opinion of the officers making the examination, a likelihood of an imposition being practised in placing the pieces of metal where found; fourth, were the screw-heads, to which I have before referred as in my judgment constituting proofs, damaged by the explosion, and in what manner?
The evidence in my possession, fortunately, was so conclusive in answer to all these questions as to leave no possibility of doubt.
In my cabled reply, I informed Mr. Lansing that these representatives of the Embassy had reached Boulogne on the day after the arrival of the Sussex, the examination continuing over the following three days; that while it was true that the vessel had been accessible to the crew and certain authorized persons, yet the report of the examining officers showed that the likelihood of imposition being practised in the placing of the fragments of metal on the hulk was quite impossible.
Quoting from the reports of Logan and Smith---for the pouch bearing them had not yet reached Washington---I set out the fact that the most convincing evidence that such pieces of metal had not been placed for the purpose of deception, was that both officers were present during the clearing out of the undisturbed mass of débris among which the fragments had been found. This work had been commenced with the double purpose of cleaning the ship and searching for the dead that might yet be there. I pointed out in my telegram that this débris on the saloon deck was some three or four feet deep, closely packed by the action of the water when the ship was afloat. The whole mass bore convincing indications of not having been touched since the explosion. Some of the metal fragments were uncovered from below the débris in the officers' presence ; their position was such that they could not have been placed there after the explosion had occurred. A number of the pieces were found so firmly imbedded in the wood as to show the impossibility of having been purposely placed there. But it was again the screwheads that furnished unmistakable evidence refuting any thought of deception. The report of the officers showed that they bore every evidence of having been in an extremely heavy explosion, which caused the distinct fusing of portions of the metal. This force had been sufficient to bend them slightly and to give the appearance also of their having been twisted.
"It would be practically impossible," their report said, "to fake artificially all of these injuries to a screw bolt of this character." To the liberal quotations made from the officers' reports, I added in my telegram that it was my own conviction that they had not been mistaken in their conclusions. I also informed the Department that I was forwarding in the outgoing pouch all of the fragments, together with screw bolts from German, French, and English torpedoes, for the purpose of comparison. But I knew that in all probability drastic action would be taken before their arrival. The temper of those critical times would not brook the delay of ocean mails.
Thus far I had, in the main, cabled to the Department the evidence supplied to me by those whom I had directed to make the investigations. In addition, I had briefly quoted by cable the important features of the testimony of fourteen witnesses, all American passengers on the Sussex, who had given their sworn evidence before the Embassy. I had, at the same time, taken occasion to point out the importance of some of the evidence thus adduced. But I felt the portent of an important decision which might be taken at any moment by our Government. Three weeks had elapsed since the Sussex had been attacked. During that time indignation had continued to grow. The lives of too many people of too many nationalities had been sacrificed; those of neutral countries had been no more respected than those of hostile belligerents. The Allied Press, eagerly watching every act of the Washington Government as possessing the utmost significance, had not minimized the importance of this new horror. The alibi put out by the German Government was as weak as it was audacious. But no one had actually seen a German submarine in that vicinity at that time. The identity of the criminal seemed to be as immune from discovery as that of an assassin who, from outside, in the blackness of the night, had fired through the window of a lighted room. The world believed in the guilt of Germany, but it had not been proven.
The State Department was more than three thousand miles away from the scene of action. The advantage, which one gets from seeing the witnesses face to face was wholly lacking. Even their sworn statements in their entirety had not yet reached the Department; nor could the fragments be personally inspected at Washington for some time to come, Should I not now, at this crucial moment, cable my personal opinion of the whole case? I had seen and talked with the witnesses, I was in a position to judge of the reliability of the opinions of the Attachés whom I had sent out from the Embassy; I had personally inspected the metal fragments ; and I was, in fact, from my position, in the very centre of the atmosphere which surrounded the entire case. The nature of the questions asked by Mr. Lansing unmistakably indicated the need of an expression of my personal views. It was my duty to give them. In the discharge of the duties of my mission I had not before faced a responsibility so grave. I felt that war with Germany was very near and that my words to our Government would probably precipitate it. The sequel showed that only her prompt acknowledgment of guilt and promise to change her policy of submarine warfare prevented it. Within forty-eight hours after I had cabled to the Department the answer to which I have referred, I sent to Mr. Lansing, at 6 p.m. on April 15, the following telegram:
Ambassador Sharp to the State Department.
For Mr. Lansing:
In view of the nature of the inquiries contained in your No. ----- I supplement my No. ----- by briefly giving for your information my impressions of the reliability of the evidence which has been sent over by me concerning the case of the Sussex. It is my belief, based upon having personally interrogated twelve of the fourteen American witnesses whose depositions have been sent to the Department, that their statements can be depended upon as being absolutely truthful. These witnesses are evidently of good character and of better than the average intelligence. The positive statements of Mrs. Warren and Mr. Samuel Bemis, corroborated by that of Mr. Henry S. Beer, made at St. Gall, to the effect that they saw the wake of a torpedo coming toward the ship, almost immediately followed by the explosion, fully convinced me as to the cause. The subsequent finding of the metal fragments in the débris of the wreckage of the Sussex by Smith and Logan, later compared with parts of torpedoes, and so identified, furnishes a strong additional confirmation of this opinion. Two of these fragments, consisting of screw bolts, are marked on different faces of their heads with a number and the capital letter "K," and are so remarkably similar in that respect to those taken by Sayles and Smith at Toulon and Portsmouth from torpedoes of known German make, and with which I made comparison, that there is no doubt in my mind as to their common origin.
SHARP.
I was not mistaken in my belief that action of far-reaching importance on the part of the Government at Washington was imminent. On April 19, within forty-eight hours after the receipt and deciphering of my telegram, President Wilson went before Congress and, at a joint session of the Senate and House of Representatives, delivered an address reviewing the submarine controversy in such a manner as to cause the world to sit up and rub its eyes. Even in the midst of big happenings of almost daily occurrence, I doubt if any declaration made during the war up to that time---and certainly not by our own Government---had created such a sensation as the address of the President on that afternoon. Its substance was at once cabled to the American Embassies and Legations throughout Europe. The message not only reflected the attitude of the Washington Government at that time upon the whole question of the submarine warfare, but most certainly had a determining influence in immediately modifying Germany's previous ruthless method of conducting it.
What a different story might have been written of the great war, had the German Government consistently and faithfully adhered to its promises then made! How freighted with disaster was its repudiation a year later, in such a manner as to make the continuance of peaceful relations between the two countries impossible!
The President's words, as splendid as they were bold, electrified all Europe. Their importance may be understood when it is known that the Allies had already come to realize that the help of the United States was necessary to win the war. To the Central Powers it came as a warning which might well cause even a von Tirpitz to "Stop, look, and listen." What a crushing refutation and brushing aside of the camouflage defence of an alibi which, only a few days before, the German Government had endeavoured to use in its Note replying to the Government at Washington, in which a report was made on the torpedoing of the Sussex! The alibi served instead, in a singular manner, to form a new link in the chain of evidence which had been so strongly forged by the facts which I have related.
It was asserted in the German Note of April 10, delivered to Ambassador Gerard, that, according to a statement made by the commanding officer of one of the submarines, he had torpedoed a boat on the very day and hour stated and in the very same locality where the Sussex had been attacked. In describing the result of the explosion, it was even mentioned that the whole of the ship forward to the bridge broke away. Down to this point, it tallied with the time, place, and manner of the disaster which had overtaken the Sussex.(13)
In the instance, however, referred to in the German Note, it was claimed that there had been a great explosion when the boat was struck, which indicated that it was in all probability a mine-layer. The Captain of the submarine was led to this conviction, to use the words of the German Note, by the flush deck of the ship; by the shape of the stern which sloped outwards; by the paintwork which was that of a ship of war; by the high speed of about eighteen knots which the ship developed. It was pointed out also as an additional reason that the ship was not traversing another course from that usually taken by merchant shipping. "Consequently," it said, " the submarine fired a torpedo at 3.55 p.m. Central European time, one and one-half knots south-east of the Bull Rock." It was added that "the unusually heavy explosion leaves no doubt that there were large stores of ammunition on board." Then followed what in the light of the truth must appear as highly humorous, a story to the effect that the German Captain having prepared a sketch of the ship which he attacked and comparison being made with pictures of the Sussex, which had later appeared in the London Daily Graphic, it was clearly seen that there was no similarity whatever between the two boats. It was further added that no other attack was made by the German submarine upon any boat plying between Folkestone and Dieppe at the time of the Sussex incident. Then the sage conclusion was drawn that "from this the German Government are obliged to assume that the sinking of the Sussex is to be set down to other causes than attack by a German submarine."
But the evidence in my possession enabled me to send quite another story to our Government. When the facts I had gathered were laid before the German Government, and only then, did it throw up its hands. Surely never before was such a cock and bull story, which only the tragedy involved saved from being grotesquely humorous, more thoroughly discredited.
I might add that so little of the real truth had dawned upon the mind of the German Government as to the case which had already been made out against it by the Paris Embassy, that in commenting upon this incident Ambassador Gerard has stated that before the delivery of this Note of the tenth of April, he had been assured again and again that the Sussex had not been torpedoed by a German submarine.(14)
The Paris Press joined in enthusiastic praise of the President's message ; in fact, it was quite generally regarded as the throwing down of the gauntlet. Germany must yield or be compelled to face a new and powerful opponent. I have sometimes wondered whether at that particular time the answer of Germany gave the most of disappointment or of satisfaction to the Allied Powers. If she had answered defiantly, declining to modify her methods of submarine warfare, America, by the sheer force of such a situation, would have become almost automatically an active belligerent on the side of the Allies---a thing which, despite assertions to the contrary emanating from time to time from some of their political leaders, others wished most to happen.
The prompt assurance of the German Government to respect thereafter, under certain conditions, the rights of American citizens and American property on the seas, was soon given as the result of the firm attitude shown by President Wilson. An acute crisis had been passed. On May 4, Mr. Gerard at Berlin was given a Note by the Imperial Government, which, though seeking justification, and particularly charging Great Britain with violation of international law and with commencing this practice, concluded, however, with the statement that it had notified the Government of the United States that the German naval forces had received in substance the following orders
"In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and destruction of merchant vessels recognized by international law, such vessels, both within and without the area declared as the naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives, unless these ships attempt to escape or offer resistance."
Even in thus yielding to the contention of our Government, the Note of the German Government was most ambiguous in its reply as to what conditions might cause a change in its policy. Indeed, its terms were so uncertain that the Department of State, in a Note under date of May 8, after having stated that it would rely upon the scrupulous execution of the promise of Germany thus to alter henceforth its submarine policy, yet felt constrained to say: "In order, however, to avoid any possible misunderstanding, the Government of the United States notifies the Imperial Government that it cannot for a moment entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion that respect by German naval authorities for the rights of citizens of the United States upon the high seas should in any way or in the slightest degree be made contingent upon the conduct of any other Government affecting the rights of neutrals and non-combatants. Responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; absolute, not relative."
At the request of the Department, I repeated, by telegram, the substance of this Note to our Embassies and Legations at Rome, Madrid, Berne, Lisbon, and Athens.
While serious losses by submarines continued, there was, nevertheless, as a result of this action a greater sense of security upon the part, at least, of neutral vessels. It would seem to be more than a coincidence that, while during the nine months following this promise by Germany and until its repudiation, neutral Norway lost but 215 ships, yet for the same period immediately following the declaration of a ruthless policy on the part of Germany, 343 of her ships had been sunk by submarine attacks. In so far as American interests were concerned, there was no serious breach of the pledge made to our Government as a result of the Sussex remonstrance, until the German Government in its declaration of January 31, 1917, repudiated all its pledges covering the conduct of its submarine warfare. But during that intervening time, the tenseness which had been created by this incident was such as to forecast the consequences which ultimately followed.(15) The submarine, though its methods of operation had been placed under certain restraint, became more and more an outlaw to civilized warfare, if warfare is ever civilized.