THE name of Verdun, through the story of the sacrifices of its heroic defenders, has already become written in large letters in the history of the war. It has indeed been the destiny of this famous fortress, standing guard over the marches of eastern France, to mark more than one era in her annals. Was it not here that the Treaty was signed in 843 dividing the Carolingian Empire? Because not only of its strategic importance, but of the prestige attaching to it as being well nigh impregnable, Verdun had already stood no less than nine sieges since Attila withdrew from it in 450, when the German General Staff decided to make it the central point of its 1916 campaign.

Doubtless more was sought after by the Germans than strategic advantages alone,(1) great as must have been their desire to prevent the French Spring offensive, which General Joffre had had in preparation since early in December, 1915, and about which he had conferred with the British and Russian staffs for the purpose of effecting concerted movements.(2) Other considerations of a different order were of almost equal importance. The German home morale was avowedly beginning to weaken under the protracted strain of a war which, the people had been assured from the highest sources, could be of but short duration. Furthermore, a signal success was needed to restore the military reputation and the general popularity of the Crown Prince, which were considered as necessary features of his position, and which had been affected by his reverses in Eastern France in 1914 and in the Argonne in 1915.(3) Finally, both Grecian and Roumanian neutrality hung in the balance.(4) and Italy, already at war with Austria, was rumoured to be tending towards a complete collaboration with the Allies.(5) It therefore behoved the Central Powers to achieve a swift and crushing victory which, if not an immediate death-blow to the Allied cause, would nevertheless assert before the world the strength of Germany, and serve as warning for any who might be rash enough to stand out against her will.

The beginning of the year had been tranquil in Paris, save for activities in the air. While the submarine situation preoccupied the world, and certain apprehensions were felt about the Balkans and the Eastern Front, there was no advance warning of the magnitude as well as the imminence of the military events now about to occur on the Western Front.

Colonel House had again visited Paris, continuing his efforts of the previous year when I had written concerning him to President Wilson:

"The letter given to Colonel House in helping his noble mission abroad was admirable and will most assuredly bear fruit. While as might be expected none of the nations engaged in the war may at this time think it prudent to let it become known that it is willing to give encouragement to such a plan, yet I am convinced the message is opportune.

"In no better manner could the message be imparted to them, that there might be a way out of these awful conditions which involve such a horrible destruction of life and waste of resources. In my judgment, great good will grow out of the possession of that knowledge thus early communicated. The great respect which the nations engaged in the war have for the power and influence of the United States---and I must believe for its entire sincerity in its advocacy of peace---will command a more thoughtful and therefore a more hopeful consideration than may appear on the surface. I am glad to know that you have taken this step, and through such an efficient medium as I believe Colonel House to be."(6)

The attack upon Verdun on February 21 came after a preparatory bombardment of only a few hours. That some intimation of what was impending had reached the French General Staff is evident, since General Joffre had had time to order the evacuation of most of the civilians.(7) Nevertheless there had been no time to organize an adequate defence against an onslaught of such gigantic proportions as now took place.(8)

All honour to those who held out against the initial charges, General de Langle de Gary who had been in command for only a few weeks, and gallant Colonel Driant, and the men who withstood the first severe shocks until the arrival of General de Castelnau, and then of General Pétain, allowed the first phase of the battle to end in an at least partial check after, however, Fort Douaumont had fallen into German hands.

That was early in March; and the second attack, not on the right bank of the Meuse alone but on both banks, came swiftly after, March 6 to 11, allowing certain further points to be gained by the enemy.

It was, however, only in the course of the third phase of the Verdun battle, the siege war which was protracted from the Spring until August 1, by which time General Nivelle was in command brilliantly seconded by General Mangin with the 5th Division, that Vaux was captured. But strategists asserted that so long as Souville held out, there was good hope to save Verdun.

Ambassador Sharp to the Secretary of State.

Paris, March 17, 1916.

My dear Mr. Secretary,

As I cabled you, I cannot believe that the Germans will succeed in taking Verdun, or, in facts in making any material progress at any point along the line, though, of course, anything is possible in this war.

As a matter of fact, I have refrained in the past from giving to the Department my personal view of the war situation, not only because the American press contains much more war news than we get here, but also for the reason that, ever since the German retreat from the battlefields of the Marne to a line of trenches which have remained nearly stationary for more than eighteen months along a front of about 250 miles, there has never appeared to me any imminency of a breakthrough in those lines, or any material advance by the forces of either side.(9)

Modern warfare, by which aircraft instantly communicate to each of the belligerents the movements of the other, and the trench way of fighting, are, I believe, entirely responsible for this unique situation. Added to this is the fact that probably no war in history has furnished such an example where the contending forces have been so evenly matched in resources and prowess. Unless the unexpected happens in such a manner as to bring an end to the war almost as abruptly as it was commenced, it is entirely possible for it to continue a long time yet.

With high personal regards,                            
Believe me, Mr. Secretary,             
Very truly yours,             
WM. G. SHARP.

 

Ambassador Sharp to Colonel House.

Paris, June 16, 1916.

My dear Mr. House,

I was very glad indeed to receive your welcome letter of recent date, even though it found me in bed slowly convalescing from a severe case of pneumonia which attacked me several weeks ago. I am glad however to say that I expect in a few days to be back at work again.

Fortunately there has been no matter of great moment upon which the Embassy has been called to act since the Sussex affair. Incidentally, I am very glad that I could in that case be of some assistance in furnishing the proofs of as unlawful and unnecessary an act as the German submarine warfare has yet been guilty of. The vigorous action of the President in calling the German Government to account for that act has done much to clear the atmosphere as to our position upon the conduct of submarine warfare. His Note was admirable in every way. Everyone over here feels as they must do at home that it has made travelling on the seas much safer not alone to Americans but to the people of all countries.

As to your kindly reference to your wish that I might be home to counsel with some of the leaders on the political situation, I can assure you that for a number of reasons it would be a great pleasure to be able to get home on a short leave of absence. Possibly if matters run along here as they have for some time past, I may avail myself of Secretary Lansing's kind offer to grant me such a leave and spend two or three weeks in the month of July at home.

*      *      *      *      *      *      *

With kindest regards to both you and Mrs. House in which Mrs. Sharp joins me,

I am,               
                    Sincerely yours,
                                          Wm. G. SHARP.

At the beginning of the year, I had written a personal letter to the Secretary of State inquiring if it would be agreeable to the Department to grant me a short leave of absence, should I wish to return to the United States.

I had certain business reasons, so that I should have appreciated being able to spend about four weeks at home. I was also free to confess that, my work having been continuous and exacting, and I having been absent from my office but a very few days since I had taken over its administration in November, 1914, a certain kind of rest brought by relaxation would have been welcome.

Events developing at the front had, of course, kept me at my post, but I now judged that I might safely absent myself for a short period.

Ambassador Sharp to Secretary Lansing.

Paris, June 30, 1916.

My dear Mr. Secretary,

At this late date I wish to express to you my grateful acknowledgment of your kind wishes for my early recovery, conveyed to me in your cablegram of last month. Though it came at a time when I was in such a condition as to prevent my seeing anybody, yet I can assure you that it was deeply appreciated.

For the past ten days, however, I have been gradually gaining back my strength, and have been able to give a few hours each day to my official duties.

In view of the outlook over here, as it involves the progress of the war, it appears as though the seemingly endless process of renewed efforts now on, to break through the lines of the enemy, followed again by a lull awaiting other similar efforts, without any material advance for at least a number of weeks to come, might at this time permit me to return to the States on a short leave of absence---I would not want a stay of more than three weeks-if it is wholly agreeable and free from any embarrassment to the Department.

A very short time ought to tell if the new offensive action of the British in the North will in any way change the programme which I have herein anticipated. There seems to be a settled conviction here-which I fully share-that the Germans will never be able to make any advance along their present lines in French territory.

In closing, let me attest to the efficiency and fidelity with which the staff of this Embassy have given attention to all matters which have come up for attention during my illness.

With high personal esteem,                                     
Believe me, my dear Mr. Secretary,             
Sincerely yours,             
WM. G. SHARP.

 

Ambassador Sharp to Colonel House.

Elyria, Ohio, Sept. 20, 1916.

My dear Mr. House,

It was my intention to write you from Washington, but every minute of my stay there was taken up by matters which I could not well avoid. Since coming West I have had occasion to visit Detroit twice and to confer with prominent Democrats throughout Northern Ohio, I know you will be greatly pleased to hear that all surface indications point to a very large independent vote for President Wilson. I say "surface" indications, because there has never before been a presidential election in which the silent vote will be such a disturbing factor as to all pre-election calculations as this one.

Indeed, it seems to me that there must be fully half of the voters on which party leaders seem unable to get any line as to their political preference, and practically all changes are toward Wilson.

From the very start---even from reading the American papers in Paris---I became impressed with the conviction that our only cause for concern was from the threatened disaffection of the German vote, and possibly of a Catholic vote here and there. While I still think that there is to a certain extent something to be feared from that source, yet I do not think that as to the German vote, it will be anywhere near as solidly arrayed against President Wilson as appeared at one time. On the other hand, I believe he will carry States in the November election which the most enthusiastic Democrat has not been bold enough to claim for him.

To my mind, the result in the Maine election is highly encouraging to the Democrats---so much so that with an energetic campaign carried on there for the November election, I am one of those who would not be at all surprised to see Wilson carry that State. Certain it is that Mr. Hughes has failed to enthuse the people in his campaign thus far. They have looked for bolder utterances from him, and a more definite statement upon a few vital issues than the stand he has taken. I believe that this is not at all from a lack of ability on his part to know what constitutes the real issues, but a very apparent fear, as it appears to me, least he alienate the German support.

My stay of a week in Washington, where I not only met my former colleagues but got into closer touch with the State Department, having also the great pleasure---through the courtesy of the President---to dine with him and Mrs. Wilson at the White House, was of great value to me in a number of ways.

*      *      *      *      *      *      *

Sincerely yours,         
        WM. G. SHARP.

When leaving for the United States for the personal reasons I have given, it was, of course, my desire also to reach a closer and more intimate understanding of conditions and the general situation at home. I also wished to discuss with the State Department the various issues which were then of paramount importance in our dealings with the Allied countries. There had, however, been no call from the State Department for me to return to this end, and it was by a mere coincidence that, my visit having been postponed because of the military situation at Verdun, I found myself in Washington at the same time as Mr. Walter Hines Page, our Ambassador to England. Rumours to the effect that we had met for the purpose of official conferences were, in consequence, without foundation. In my conversations at the State Departments as well as with the President and Mr. Lansing personally, I learned much that was to be of value to me concerning vital questions of the day. At that time, as indeed at all times, our Government was most anxious to avoid reaching an impasse with the Entente Powers over points of policy; the problem of Polish relief was notably causing much preoccupation, as well as the problem of submarine warfare, not acute as long as the German U-boats remained inactive but nevertheless always containing the gravest potentialities.

After spending about a week in Washington I rejoined Mrs. Sharp in my home town, Elyria, Ohio, where we had the pleasure of seeing our old friends, being the recipients of extensive hospitalities.

I found the people of America thoroughly posted as to the developments of the war. More columns were devoted to war news in our home papers than in the Press abroad. And the information was essentially correct. I was able to reply to all who questioned me that the people of our country were getting the actual happenings of the war, that those who thought the American newspaper reports to be fiction were mistaken. There were, of course, some events which lent themselves to romantic treatment, but I referred to the main developments, the real news of the war.

But there were two points to which I was glad to be able to draw the attention of my fellow-citizens. One was the true and deep-lying cordiality existing between both the Government of France and that of our own country, and the people of France in their daily contact with Americans, concerning which I shall have more to say further on in these pages. The other was the capacity for recovery which France was already showing, even in this dark hour while the battle of Verdun still raged.

I described Paris as a city of mourning, and indeed this was true of the entire country, since there was mourning in perhaps half a million homes. Yet Paris had resumed almost a normal aspect, the cafés were crowded in the afternoons and evenings, and the Boulevards were thronged. In spite of these activities suggestive of peace times, however, full realization of the horrors of war was kept alive by the thousands of women in mourning, the numbers of buildings and auditoriums converted into hospitals, the continual appearance of crippled soldiers, and the marching of troops bound for the battle lines.

The battle of the Somme began on July 1, with a combined action by the French under General Foch, with Generals Fayolle, Micheler, and Humbert, and by the English under Marshal Haig, with Generals Rawlinson, Allenby, and Gough. The plans had been carefully drawn up by General Foch as a consequence of conferences held between the Allied Commanders-in-Chief, since the participation of the British Army, whose direct intervention had not been desired by the French at Verdun, was essential on the Somme.

But the battle, instead of marking the beginning of the year, as had been decided in the Allied Councils held during December, 1915, and January, 1916, had been retarded for various reasons, among these being, I understand, the slowness of preparation of the Russians who were to take the offensive simultaneously on the Eastern front. The battle of Verdun, far from altering the plans for the Somme, had rendered it only the more necessary, in the opinion of French military experts, including General Pétain, in charge of operations at Verdun.

The attack was in this instance prepared by a formidable artillery bombardment, and the battlefield extended across the Picardy plateau, both north and south of the Somme. Before the end of the battle, a new and powerful weapon, the "tank," was introduced to help the infantry.(10)

The attempt to break through the German lines, July 1 to 12, changed gradually into a battle of attrition, after the gallant fighting of the two great Allied Armies had led to a victory which, some people said later, might have been carried further if more had been known about the condition of the Germans.(11)

The Somme had, at all events, served the purpose of relieving Verdun, the fourth phase of which battle opened under improved auspices for France.(12)

On October 24, General Mangin's offensive succeeded in recapturing the Fort of Douaumont. Orders being received from General Joffre to follow up this important feat of arms, Vaux was retaken on November 3. Soon after---December 18 ---the battle of Verdun came to an end after such fighting as the world had in all probability not seen before, and culminating to the glory of France whose watchword had been, "They shall not pass."(13)

In two different visits which I made to this famous old town and its citadel, as the fortified portion is called, I was eventually a witness to the completeness of the destruction wrought as a consequence of the long series of attacks. I will not go here into details which are known to all the world. But I may mention two singularities which particularly impressed me. First, the Cathedral, conspicuously located in the high part of the town, had suffered very little damage in the 1916 bombardments, though badly wrecked the following year. But stranger still, perhaps, the historic landmark known as the Chaussée Gate, a monument reminiscent of feudal Verdun with two great battlemented towers suggesting familiar engravings of the Bastille, escaped virtually undamaged to the very end of the war.(14)

Not many weeks after the enemy had abandoned his attempts in December, 1916, there came into my office at the Chancery a delegation of citizens of Verdun, headed by the Mayor. They came by previous appointment, and their mission was to have the town "adopted" by some benevolently disposed American city. This request was not a strange one, as it had already been announced through the Press, at various times, that the people of this or that American city would engage themselves to restore certain towns in France.

I listened with the greatest interest to the stories these gentlemen told me, corroboration of which I later secured for myself.

"What was the pre-war population of your town, and how many of its people still reside there? " I asked the Mayor.

He answered that 15,000 souls might be considered as the normal population, but at that time, outside of those stationed in the great fortifications of the place, there remained only eight policemen.

"And where did the people go?" I asked, surprised at such a complete evacuation of the town.

The Mayor replied that all those not employed in work of actual defence had been sent away into other parts of France for safety.

However, at that moment I was more interested in plans for rehabilitation. Having a preconceived notion, from my own observation of the ruin of other towns, as to the ultimate plan which must be adopted for their rebuilding, the greater part of my queries were made with a view towards ascertaining the chief needs which must be supplied, for the commencing of a new life when the inhabitants returned.

There would be, of course, school-houses and municipal public buildings to be rebuilt. Then there would be the public utilities, such as gas and water works, to be newly provided since the town had been converted into a mass of ruins. Finally I asked the Mayor how much he would expect the proposed godfather, in the form of some benevolently disposed community, to contribute for this purpose.

After thinking a moment, he replied to me: "A hundred million francs"---some $20,000,000. Staggering as such an amount might seem for the needs of rebuilding a town of but 15,000 inhabitants, yet I am not prepared to say it was an excessive estimate.(15) But it required no intricate calculation to ascertain the probable cost of performing a similar service for the city of Rheims, quite as completely destroyed and having a normal population eight times as great.

My estimate some time later was that the rebuilding of the two cities of Rheims and St. Quentin alone might well swallow up the entire resources of the American Red Cross, though it surpasses any other fund raised for humanitarian purposes known to history.

Manifestly, the way for the rehabilitation of those unhappy towns, so great in number, lay not through the means of private charity. The problem was emphatically a national one, so large in its aspects as to be worthy of a nation's serious consideration. Perhaps the best-directed efforts of all the work of the many relief organizations so humanely conducted was that which tended in the direction of helping others to help themselves. In the afflicted territory this was particularly true where agricultural implements were needed to till the soil, seeds for planting, and animals for the small farms.

But the liability to error was no greater in considering the manner in which to extend financial aid for this purpose of rehabilitation, than it was with another aspect growing out of this problem. I refer to the impression, as I was led to believe, which had been created throughout America that an all but unlimited market for building materials in this work of reconstruction awaited the resumption of export trade from our shores. From time to time articles of a most alluring nature appeared in the magazines and the Press at home, pointing out the necessity on the part of our manufacturers to get ready for this great demand.

I remember reading in one of these magazines a well-written article, which must have involved a good deal of serious work in the compilation of statistics, and emphasizing in glowing terms the opportunities which only the continuation of the war prevented from being placed at the doors of our producers.

Without challenging the laudable motives of the author of the article, nor the conclusions at which he arrived in so far as the amount of destruction was concerned---in fact, in the following two years it became several times greater (16)---yet his observations were the result of but two months of inevitably hasty examination of these conditions. It would have been necessary for him to remain two years. Such a lengthy stay would have caused him to recognize certain customs involving the manner of living born of centuries, instead of decades, which differentiates the type of homes and buildings generally to be found in France, from those so characteristic of America.

French towns are not built along the lines of American towns, far from it. One may travel a hundred miles in any direction through France, passing many villages and towns without seeing a half-dozen frame-houses or shingle roofs. Brick and stone, or more often, in less expensive structures, a sort of concrete plaster over laths nailed to studding, form the great bulk of the material used. The freight alone on such material from America to France would preclude its use, even if it were not to be found much cheaper in France to begin with---which would be almost invariably the case. Comparatively little lumber is used in many of these structures, while the class of hardware to which we are accustomed at home rarely if ever appears in the buildings of France.

In justice, however, to those who from time to time sought to call the attention of American builders to the possibilities of a large foreign trade to supply the needs caused by war losses, there was bound to be a market for machinery to take the place of that destroyed or stolen in many manufacturing plants throughout the devastated regions, and structural steel would be needed for the building of such factories.

The same thing must be said as it applied to the use of this structural steel in railroad stations, hotels, and public buildings in some of the larger cities.

I have sought to call attention only to the unwarranted anticipations of our being called upon to supply the wants of these invaded regions, through a misunderstanding to which I have referred. It is my own opinion that while all these reconstructed towns will have the advantage of being new, with more sanitary precautions taken in the manner of building, yet they will be built along lines quite similar to what they were before. In some places the destruction has been so complete that an entire change in the site of the town would be a positive advantage. It is a melancholy thought that in not a few of them the annihilation is so complete that, out of the mass of débris from the ruins of the former buildings, not sufficient material could be found to prove of any use in the work of reconstruction.

In some instances the towns will never be rebuilt, the reason for their existence in that locality not being sufficient to warrant the building of another town. Not many weeks before my departure from France, on the occasion of a visit to the beautiful city of Lyons, our very efficient Consul at that place, Mr. Carrigan, invited me to visit what nearly two thousand years before had been a Roman town, located some fifteen miles away. Upon reaching that quaint old place, raised high on a prominence, as are many of the towns of great antiquity, I found within its walled space a veritably deserted town. In what had once been substantial and, in a few cases, remarkably beautiful architectural edifices sufficient to accommodate a population of two thousand people, there had now for many years been a normal population not exceeding forty people. As I passed through the narrow winding paved streets under the overlapping tiled roofs, almost meeting above my head, I wondered at the causes for this almost complete desertion of such a picturesquely located town rising, as it did, out of a plain commanding a beautiful view of the country, even to the snow-capped Jura mountains as the outposts of the Alps beyond.

But to-day practically all the houses of Vieux Perouges, as this town is called, are in ruins from the combined action of time and abandonment. One of the finest which Consul Carrigan pointed out to me had been the residence of the Governor of the city in the XVth Century; it had been bought by Mayor Herriot of Lyons for purposes of preservation.

How many other deserted places in France there are I do not know, but from the very fact of the age of the country itself, with its two thousand years behind it, everything there is old. It is this thought which I sought to impress upon my fellow Americans who would have endeavoured to introduce into this older civilization new customs, new manners, new modes of living. Both the old and the new have their advantages, and it may be well wished that the best of both could be made to take the place of the worst of both.

The battle of Verdun had, then, successfully ended, and the battle of the Somme remained in suspense. The plan to resume it early in February, 1917, was not applied, however, because of the change made in December when the French supreme command was withdrawn from Marshal Joffre. If he had continued the battle on the date proposed by him, he would have caught the Germans in the midst of their preparations for retreating on the Arras-Soissons Front, an operation which they were able to carry out successfully in March, 1917.

It is also to be noted as a singular coincidence that when the Germans learned in Berlin, on December 15, 1916, that there was a change in the French supreme command, they seemed less disposed to talk of peace, and more resolved than before to abide by the fate of their arms.

I know of no more appropriate place than at this point to characterize as inane and without foundation in fact a story which has been widely circulated. It was to the effect that peace between France and Germany in the Fall of 1914 was prevented by the assurance from a certain group of Americans then in Paris that if France abstained from making peace, America would take sides with her in a defensive war. The moving events of that crucial period were all against such a possibility. I had myself not only no communication on the subject, directly or indirectly, with any member of the Ministry, from the day of my reaching Paris until three months later at the time of presenting my letter of credence, but I did not hear of such assurance being given by any other American. Even if such assurance had been given, it could not have come from any official source, and at best only a sentimental value could have been attached to it.

Though having a warm admiration for the human and valorous qualities of the French people---what American who has lived among them has not ?---and a sympathy for a cause which America came later to champion, my own position was consistently in accord with the attitude of our Government at Washington in those first weeks of the war, in favouring some honourable and effectual way to bring about an enduring peace between the warring Powers. I had not only publicly expressed this view, but in my first official utterance in my address to President Poincaré at Bordeaux, as has been seen, I had repeated these sentiments.(17) The fact that the efforts of President Wilson failed to stop the war in no way reflects upon the sincerity of his high purpose; a purpose consistently maintained down to the time when, from a decent respect for our own rights as well as for the very cause of liberty and humanity, we were compelled to enter the war. The logic of events, many of which were known only in the sequel, would have shown the futility of such efforts. The cauldron of traditional distrusts, dynastic jealousies and greed of power had been boiling too long to be cooled in a day.

With a full realization of the import of the victory of the Marne, preceded as it was within the week by the declaration of the Triple Entente signed at London,(18) binding together the destinies of the British, French, and Russian Governments so that "no one of the Allies will demand terms of peace without the previous agreement of each of the other Allies," it would be difficult indeed to conceive of a situation whereby France would or could have listened to any call for peace from Germany, except on the terms of an unconditional surrender by that Power. Would Germany have made such a surrender? Certainly not, if Ambassador Gerard, at the time of his leaving Berlin, in the middle of February, 1917 correctly interpreted the German mind upon this question.

Upon the Ambassador's arrival in Paris, during a conversation of absorbing interest to me---for I was listening to a fellow American who had unusual opportunity for sensing the situation in the very centre of Germany's activities---the subject turned upon the possibility of a speedy ending of the war, and he set forth the conditions on which Germany would agree to peace. First, she wanted a part of northern France; second, all her colonies restored ; third, indemnities from all her enemies, sufficient in amount to pay the cost of the war; fourth, she would agree to the restoration of Belgium, but to prevent that Power from becoming too closely allied with England she would demand that Belgian railroads should be administered by the Germans, and that German troops should occupy the fortresses; fifth, Poland should not be made an autonomous state, but united to Russian-Poland and subjected to German authority; sixth, Bulgaria should be given carte blanche to deal with Roumania as she chose!

In my judgment, no situation that presented itself after the invasion of Belgium, characterized by such features as the victory of the Marne, the subsequent alignment of Italy on the side of the Allies, the verdict of Verdun, and finally the deciding factor of America's weight being thrown into the balance, even though the impossible course of Germany be not considered, would have made it probable that a separate peace could have been obtained from any one of the Allied Powers---much less from France. All the public utterances of French statesmen, from the beginning of the declaration of war down to the signing of the Armistice, sustain this view.

Was it not Premier Briand, replying to von Bethmann-Hollweg in a speech before the Chamber of Deputies on December 13, 1916,(19) in a warning against deceptive overtures of peace, who cried "Look out! Take care!" After denouncing the claim of the Germans that their country had been attacked and that they were defending themselves and were the victims of this war, the Premier referred further to the enemy's announced desire for peace, saying: "I cry out, Is it true? Do they dare, after the Marne, after the Yser, after Verdun, to make such an offer to France, erect and glorious."

Indeed, not only negativing the likelihood of any kind of peace agreement between France and Germany, but even denying that it had ever been offered, President Poincaré in a speech delivered at Nancy on May 14, 1916, declared:

"Neither directly nor indirectly have our enemies offered us peace. But we do not wish that they should offer it to us, we wish that they should ask for it; we do not wish to submit to their conditions, we wish to impose ours. We do not desire a peace which would leave Imperial Germany mistress to recommence the war, which would suspend over Europe an eternal menace; we desire a peace which would receive serious guarantees of equilibrium and stability by the re-establishment of right."

Furthermore, an Allied Conference had been held in Paris, March 27 and 28, 1916, attended by representatives of Belgium, England, France, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Russia, and Serbia, at which resolutions were adopted affirming the complete community of views and solidarity of the Allies. Even unity of action in all economic matters had been discussed, as well as the establishment of a permanent Committee of the Allies in Paris.

As far back as April, 1915, my attention had been called by private friends to unsubstantiated rumours then being circulated in Paris, to the effect that conversations were already being held between the two groups of Powers. The very articles supposed to be drafted were mentioned, with the additional proviso that the announcement should be made public on the 27th day of that month, after the way had been paved notably by protests then already appearing in the French Press against German peace propaganda, the purpose of these protests being allegedly to provoke a reaction in the public mind.

Needless to say, the appointed date came and passed without developments, as might have been foreseen. Nevertheless, as a curiosity, and because I have mentioned Germany's ostensible conditions in 1917, I may add that the articles of the peace rumoured by so-called "defeatists" to be possible in Paris in the Spring of 1915 were four in number, briefly as follows : First, France recovers possession of her departments now occupied by Germany, she receives no war indemnity but she pays none, she is freed from the oppressive clauses of the Frankfort Treaty but continues to allow Germany full commercial liberty; second, Belgium recovers her autonomy and territorial independence, Antwerp being restored, but Germany retains privileges for full commercial freedom; third, England comes out best of all, she loses only certain points in the control of the high seas, regarding the right of blockade in case of war; fourth, Japan loses her territorial acquisitions, since all German colonies would have to be restored.(20)

The possibility that, at such a juncture, either side would agree to such terms was an illusion as great as that concerning Germany's own hopes in the way of concessions from the Allies.

Some months later, developments of a more noteworthy nature occurred. I was led to understand that the British Government considered all German overtures through informal neutral sources as representing not proposals of peace or even interchanges of views, but only indications of which a record might be made for future reference. It was judged that Germany would demand indemnities, the mere suggestion of which was regarded as an insult by the Allies: the return of the Colonies would be demanded by Germany; and at that price Belgian liberty would be granted. But the restoration of full Belgian independence, with indemnities to pay for her reparations, was a condition which Great Britain took to be an essential not even open to discussion. Furthermore, the Allies were resolute in their determination for future guarantees of the peace of the world.

So that, impossible as a separate peace appeared to be for any of the Allies, a general peace did not seem to be any more likely at that juncture.(21)

I was naturally greatly interested in all this. But frankly, while being of a rather optimistic temperament, yet the mists ahead of us, in the winter of 1915 to 1916, seemed to be quite as impenetrable as in the previous months---perhaps even more so, since the Balkan States at about that time so thoroughly complicated an already puzzling situation. A more complete entanglement could hardly be imagined than that which confronted all the belligerent Powers.

Adhering to my practice of not going into details in discussing the situation, I abstained generally from expressing my own views, however, as to either the causes of, or the results that would flow from, the conditions depicted. But the guess of any street gamin would have stood a chance to be as nearly correct upon the probable solution of any given problem presented by this war as that of the most learned statesman; so many things, in those days of kaleidoscopic change, would come completely to unstabilize what seemed to be a sure thing the day before.

The sinking of the Lusitania had bordered upon the sinking of the Maine, in some respects, coming as it did at a critical moment. Yet I still hoped that we should not find it necessary to preserve either our rights or our dignity by entering into a war with Germany. Not that I at all sympathised with her in the cruel brutality with which many of her acts in this war seemed to have been characterized, but because I felt it had been near the hearts of those directing affairs at Washington to exemplify their faith in the doctrine of peace by the conduct of our own nation towards the Powers of the world.(22)

It had looked to me for some time past that the outcome as to whether it was to be war or not with Germany would depend solely upon Germany herself; the terms in which her answers were couched certainly did not lessen this probability.

Happily, I could not feel that there was among the leading French officials, and those of influence in civil life, anything but the most generous and tolerant views entertained as to the fairness of the attitude of our Government. Those in authority in France fully understood and appreciated the attitude of President Wilson, and had great confidence in the integrity of his purpose.(23) I had always received personally from all officials evidence of the greatest cordiality and good feeling, and I believe that there was an earnest desire upon the part of the Foreign Office not only to facilitate the work of the Embassy in every way, but to comply with its requests whenever possible.

Sir Francis Bertie, the British Ambassador, told me one day that he was very much in hopes that we would not go to war with Germany, as we could be of very much more assistance to the Allies out of the war than actively in it.(24) The question of just what we could do if we engaged in war had been a matter of curious speculation on the part of many Americans in Paris. My own belief was that it would be in a way typically American, and to the initiated that means very much.

I may, indeed, take this opportunity to say that I never at any time found the slightest foundation for the reports emanating at this time from certain American writers abroad, to the effect that the French had come to hate the Americans. On the contrary, the French people had everywhere given expression to the highest praise for the aid that had come from America to the afflicted. I know that the French Government, in particular, was most grateful for what Americans had done and were doing to relieve distress not only in France but in Belgium.

In general, the tone of the French Press had been up to this time moderate and rarely critical of our policy, though there had always been manifested a keen desire for the championship of the Allied cause by our Government. The impartial attitude maintained by it since the beginning of hostilities had, naturally, caused the Powers engaged on each side of the conflict to wish for a more pronounced recognition of its own particular cause. That very fact furnished the best proof we could have that our Government had succeeded in maintaining its neutrality while securing the protection of its own rights. The French Government had absolute confidence in the fairness of the United States.

While I could not as a rule discuss the war freely, there was nothing in the obligations of neutrality, nor in the etiquette of diplomacy, to prevent me or anybody else from offering such praise as I was capable of voicing of the wonderful French people and their splendid Government.

It irritated me particularly to hear so many people say how wonderful the French have been in this war, how different from what the world supposed them to be. If the world did suppose them to be different, which I doubt, so much the worse for the judgment of the world.(25)

I had by that time seen the French people under fire for two years, but I would talk of them as I would in times of peace, for their great cardinal characteristics are always the same. The qualities which have aroused the admiration of the world are not merely Latin, nor were they even dormant nor in the background before the war. They are French and they are perpetual, not something that came as a miracle out of the sky to tide a people over a crisis. The underlying qualities of the French are their strong spirit of democracy and their solidity of character. Accompanying these, and also essentially French, are the nobility of thought and feeling, the imagination and fancifulness. That is the part that is on the surface. It manifests itself in the life of Paris that the rest of the world goes to see, but the rest of the world makes a great mistake if, after seeing France at play, it goes away again thinking that it has seen all there is of France.

We know there is the saying that in England it is all for the man, in America all for the woman, but in France all for the child. Can any country go far wrong in which each generation lives and works and thinks, not for itself so much as for the generation that is to come after it? Only one Frenchman said: "After us the deluge," but the French people say, "After us, our children. Let us make France better for them." There is the true spirit of the French, something that is never dulled nor tarnished by the customs of the people whom it dominates to enjoy life, in a way that may seem frivolous only to sightseeing visitors who do not understand.

IN a telegram sent to the Department of State on May 31, 1916, I had referred to the adverse comment by the Paris Press on the speeches made by President Wilson before the Washington Press Club and the League to Enforce Peace. Special exception was taken to the statements in the first to the effect that the combatants could not be held to ordinary standards of responsibility, and in the second, that the United States was not concerned in the causes or the objects of this war.

When, in December, 1916, I received in cipher from Washington the text of the American Note to the belligerent States,(1) asking to know their objects of war, with instructions to communicate it at once to the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, I well knew how important it was that French public opinion should perceive the true character of the American suggestion. Questioned by members of the Press to define it for them, I replied to the best of my ability that our Government had decided to ask the belligerent States whether they would make known their purposes of war, or in other words their aspirations, in order to guarantee themselves against a fresh conflict and assure Europe a permanent peace. I concluded

"In taking this initiative, the Government of the United States had a double object. On the one hand, we intend protecting our interests against the dangers which menace them. On the other hand, the United States thus express their desire that an honourable peace should put an end to the war."

It was indeed a well-timed appeal, received with respect in France, and replied to in no uncertain terms on January 12, 1917. What I had particularly observed was that on this occasion America's motives had not been misconstrued.(2)

Shortly after, however, I was witness to the cold reception given in Paris to the President's address before the Senate, January 22, 1917, in which he gave utterance to the famous phrase "Peace without victory." I can testify to the painful impression which it created. It indeed came as a wet blanket thrown over the efforts of those who advocated peace only by a military victory.

But soon after, the German Imperial policy was to bring matters to a head, leading America inevitably into the war.

With reference to the December Note I had written

Ambassador Sharp to President Wilson.

Paris, January 12, 1917.

My dear Mr. President:

Without doubt the most important as well as most interesting event which has occurred since my assuming charge of this mission has been the sending of your recent communication to all the belligerent Powers. I believe it is the greatest duty of the hour to find some way in which a further---and possibly a very long---continuance of this seemingly limitless destruction of life and property may be prevented.

In making this observation, I am only too well aware of the answer which is so persistently made, that only that kind of termination of hostilities must be brought about as will ensure a permanent peace. In full sympathy with that position, I am yet constrained to ask : " Will the still greater sacrifices of more millions of lives, and untold billions of dollars of additional indebtedness, bring the belligerent Powers any nearer to that universally desired end when there will be no more wars?"(3)

I ask this question also, fully aware of the terrible sacrifices that all the belligerent peoples have made-and particularly those of France, who have suffered so much from the havoc wrought by the enemy in their country. The loss of more than one million of her soldiers, and nearly that many more seriously crippled, together with the fact that there are several hundred thousand more languishing in the prison camps of the enemy, all tend to cause great bitterness of feeling toward the Germans in particular. Then, too, among those who remember the days of 1870-71, there is an intense desire to redeem France from what they regard as her humiliation at the hands of the same enemy.

As far as the actual work of destruction to her towns and villages also is concerned, it is probably true that France has suffered the most in this war. A brief trip recently made to the cities of Rheims and Nancy---near the latter of which are located a number of towns fairly typical, in their mass of ruins, of others all along the battle-front---revealed to me more than any written description could possibly do not only the completeness of the destruction wrought, but the sad plight of the inhabitants themselves, many of whom have been forced to abandon their homes entirely and seek shelter and employment elsewhere.

The occasion of this trip was the participation in ceremonies commemorating the beginning of the work of Americans, who are helping in a most practical manner to rebuild some of these destroyed homes.

These very conditions, however, which find their duplicate in so many sections of Europe, along the frontiers where bombardments have taken place, furnish, to my mind, all the stronger argument why an appeal for a return to reason and consequent cessation of hostilities should be heeded.

Sometimes, on account of the very proximity to these horrible scenes, it has seemed to me that I have been looking upon some great painting but, owing to the nearness of its location, I am only permitted to see in detail a very small section of the canvas. The trunk of a tree or the banks of a stream near me alone stand out with any vividness, while it becomes impossible at such a short range of vision to grasp the whole conception of what the picture represents.

Applied to the war situation, the difficulty is even more complicated from receiving the divergent views of so many who, coming from various points in Europe, express widely different opinions born of their own particular environment.

But out of it all, if my judgment is good for aught, comes the settled conviction to me that the very inexorableness of the conditions existing in this war demand---even if the questions affecting humanity itself be put aside---a most thoughtful consideration of your suggestions by all the Powers concerned.

That the answers now in from both sides do not give more hope that your efforts to being about a cessation of hostilities may be successful, will be a disappointment not only to the peoples of the neutral Powers but, I am forced to believe, also to many millions of those likewise of the belligerents, however much the trend of the public Press may be otherwise.

    .     .     .     .     .     .     .(4)

The most deplorable feature of the situation is that not alone does each day add to the bitterness of feeling, but also to the complications which later on must be smoothed out and adjusted.

I believe it all points unmistakably to the conclusion that the Allies, unwilling to let the verdict of the war thus far go down into history as it is, and having a very great faith in their ability to win such victories over the Central Powers as either to crush them or cause them at least to offer very definite and liberal terms of peace, have irrevocably determined to push their offensive with renewed energy.(5) To oppose them, the Central Powers will prosecute their side of the war with a fury and destructiveness both on land and sea such as have not characterized their operations in the past.

Unquestionably, even more as an instrument for encompassing the defeat of the Central Powers than the greatly increased supply of guns and munitions, the Entente Powers consider the growing scarcity of food, both in Germany and Austria. While, undoubtedly, such scarcity exists in many places in those countries, yet how far the radical steps taken to conserve the food supply may account for the rumors of this great need, I must confess I am in doubt.

The reply of the Allies to your communication just recently published has naturally caused a wave of hatred to pass over Germany, but I suppose it is out of the question to expect at this time such answers to be free from invectives and criminations.

Such are the conditions, unhappily, which your message, inspired by such high purposes, must meet. Only can I with truth say at this moment that not only was it received with the greatest respect here in France, but its motives were never questioned. It has most assuredly served the double purpose, at a time which, I must believe, is opportune, not only to acquaint the belligerent Powers with the fact that there is left open a door which may lead to an honorable peace, but also to make manifest that questions affecting the war have suddenly taken on a civil rather than a military character.

Wishing you, my dear Mr. President, abounding success and good health for the coming New Year,

I am, believe me,                             
Most sincerely yours,        
WM. G. SHARP.

During a half-hour conversation held shortly after with Baron Denys Cochin of the Foreign Office, he expressed views to which I attached great weight, because of his prominence in the Government and the deserved confidence reposed by all classes in his integrity and judgment. The cordial relations existing between us since the early days of the war had always invited from him the greatest frankness.(6)

Discussing the recent reply of the Entente Powers to President Wilson's communication, he said that he had understood that Zimmermann had publicly stated that, in behalf of the German Government, he had confided to the President in some form of statement the specific terms on which the Central Powers would agree to peace. He said he greatly hoped this was true, and that they were of such a nature as could be accepted with honour, so as to bring to a close a war which had been so terribly destructive. Declaring that an unprecedentedly vigorous attack by the Entente Powers was imminent, at the same time expressing his settled conviction that the enemy was feeling in its most drastic form the results of the embargo shutting off foodstuffs and certain supplies much needed for explosives, Denys Cochin still earnestly deplored the fact that, unless terms of peace could be quickly agreed upon, the coming months would witness a terrible sacrifice of life on both sides. His clearly implied lack of faith also in the efficiency of a subjugation of the enemy, to guarantee in itself permanency of peace, greatly impressed me.

While these statements could properly be said only to represent his personal views, yet coming from such a source I believed they were representative of a growing sentiment among many of the more thoughtful people. In confirmation of this opinion was the statement made to me at my home by one of the most prominent Senators in the French Parliament, that most serious thought was being given by some of his colleagues to the discussion of the suggestions contained in the President's communication addressed to the belligerent Powers. He expressed to me the earnest hope that these efforts might bear fruit.

I therefore telegraphed to the President in part as follows:

Ambassador Sharp to President Wilson.

In view of what I must believe to be encouraging symptoms of a more receptive public mind towards your recommendations than the various Governments and the Press reflect in their attitude, I am prompted to voice again my belief expressed to you in a former cablegram, that the Central Powers ought to come forward now with definite and generous terms upon which peace may be secured. They should be free from arrogance, boasting, and recriminations. It seems to me, on the eve of the delivery of your great message to the Senate which so effectively brushes aside the cobwebs of barbarous and old-time doctrines, and so clearly pioneers the way to a new international freedom and common brotherhood of nations the time for setting forth these terms has been made psychological. Once the forces again grapple for supremacy with greatly intensified power to destroy, another million lives will have been given up before any pause can be made to heed a further call to peace. Your message is masterly.

SHARP.

Count Bernstorff has not left for conjecture the degree of consternation which the last fateful Note of his Government, dated January 31, 1917, repudiating previous pledges and announcing unrestricted submarine warfare, created at Washington. In reading his own story of this event, My Three Years in America, it is certain that no one was more greatly alarmed at its portent than this same German Ambassador. Foreseeing the dire consequences which would follow from such a challenge, he had sought in every way the modification by Berlin of this harsh note. Receiving it on January 19, twelve days in advance of the time at which he was to deliver it, he tells us:

"On the 19th of January I received official notice that the unrestricted U-boat campaign would begin on February 1 and I was to give the American Government notice accordingly on the evening of the 31st of January. After all that had happened, I could but regard this intimation as a declaration of war against the United States, and one which, in addition, put us in the wrong; because it put an end to the peace overtures made by Mr. Wilson which had been started with our approval. I did my utmost to try to get the Berlin resolution cancelled or at least to obtain a postponement of the date on which it was to come into force."(7)

His telegrams to Berlin at that time fully confirm this statement. How great, indeed, had been the concern with which Count Bernstorff had looked upon his Government's declaration may be understood from the fact that he had even built hopes, late as was the time, upon the message which President Wilson had delivered to the Senate on January 22, three days after he had himself received such notice. It was Mr. Wilson's famous "Peace without Victory" message. This particular phrase of the President kept me busy explaining its proper meaning for the following week to French statesmen.

On this occasion, after having sounded, in the month previous, both the Central as well as the Entente Powers as to the possible terms of peace on which they might agree, President Wilson addressed the Senate. It was a speech well calculated to cause the belligerent Powers to reflect deeply upon the great truths which he had uttered, supported quite as much by the principles of humanity as by those of wisdom and reason. While its effect, regardless of its purpose, was undoubtedly to notify them of those rights which the United States would expect to defend if violated, especially as affecting our rights upon the high seas, yet it was full of good will and counsel. This message was memorable for having singled out Poland, even at that early date, as an example of a country that should be autonomous, with a Government responsive to the will of its people. Of all the epochal war messages delivered by President Wilson----and they all show a remarkable consistency of purpose---this particular message of January 22, 1917, impresses me as taking the very front rank both in the quality of statesmanship and in blazing the pathway for a new order of international relationship. From my location in Paris, too, where were constantly coming and going the leaders of all the Allied peoples---and they represented an overwhelming majority of the earth's inhabitants---I was led to believe that no other message of the President more profoundly impressed them.

Whatever may have been Count Bernstorff's shortcomings down to the time when he took leave of our shores---for he was serving a hard taskmaster---no diplomat endeavoured to render a higher service to his country than when at this critical time he warned his Government in the most solemn manner of the consequences of its fatal Note of January 31. In no uncertain tones he cabled that "whatever people may say to the contrary, the resources of the United States are enormous," a fact that seemed to have impressed itself upon Germany only a year too late to save it from destruction. But the military interests of Germany on land had but increased the importunate demands of those who would carry on an unrestricted sinking of ships, as regardless of their nationality as of the consequences.(8)

Von Tirpitz did not stand alone in championing such a policy of ruthlessness. Though he was its chief exponent, it must have required the backing of a powerful political element in Germany to have permitted its continuance to such an enormous extent. If anything were needed to detail in its most graphic manner the situation which influenced the German Government to take this step, General Ludendorff, in his interesting book, Ludendorff's Own Story, has supplied it in his account of the manner in which this momentous decision was reached. No man in Germany knew better the influences then at work to bring it about. Military interests at the front, as well as an abounding confidence that a few months of such ruthless warfare would decide the war, were the main factors which determined this action.(9)

If, as General Ludendorff asserts, such action was taken only when the promise of success of the peace efforts of President Wilson seemed impossible, I must say that neither he nor his associates knew the President, whose frank message to the Senate, ten days before Germany's formally announced purpose to disregard her promises, showed in its every line a determination to persist in his peace efforts until success should come. And this when he had already been informed by Count Bernstorff of the German Government's forthcoming announcement! The sentiment of the American people was strongly back of the President, with the exception of those political opposition leaders whose approval it would seem no course of action on his part could have secured.(10) Indeed, a few weeks later Mr. Gerard, while in Paris, on his return from Berlin in the middle of February, said to me: " If Germany had been wise and patient and withheld her declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare, President Wilson would have had peace in the world within four months."

At this time there was the greatest agitation among the Allied Powers as to what attitude they should take about permitting Socialist delegates of the Allies to have, places, with Labour representatives, to attend the Stockholm Convention. My Government therefore instructed me to ascertain the position of the French Government in reference thereto.

Charges of German intrigue filled the air, and the loyalty of some of the would-be delegates was even doubted. The probability of German influence at such a convention was looked upon with a great deal of alarm. Above all, what was needed at that particular time was a united front, a solidarity of Allied sentiment, No division must be tolerated, no experiment permitted. It had, of course, been a notorious fact that in some of those countries, particularly in France, the only overt opposition that manifested itself toward the existing Government came from the Socialist element in Parliament. The opposition came from the divergence of political views and anyone knowing French politics would say, as in the natural course of events.

While I found a quite unanimous sentiment, not only from representatives of the Italian Government but also the British, against allowing delegates to attend this convention, perhaps the most pronounced objections came from the Government of France.

Very soon after receiving my instructions, an opportunity for testing this sentiment and of finding out within a short time the consensus of opinion of the Allied Powers presented itself.

Although the United States was not even indirectly participating through any representative, the Allied Governments themselves were at that moment holding an important conference in the city of Paris. As it was customary for the officials of the Government upon the occasion of any such notable meetings to give receptions and luncheons, at the residence of either the President or the Minister for Foreign Affairs, so on that particular afternoon I found myself, though not participating in the conference that had just been held, a guest at luncheon at the Elysée Palace.

Within the salons of the President's mansion were gathered that day all the notable representatives of the French, British, and all the smaller Allied Governments. Here was indeed an unexpected opportunity to send back to the State Department at Washington a very comprehensive report upon the matter, and I lost no time in availing myself of it.

I found a quite unanimous sentiment that, if such a convention was justified at all, the time was inopportune; and, while there was no feeling of antagonism expressed against the freedom of discussion of all the issues that might be involved in Labour controversies, yet it was felt that even to grant permission for the attendance of such delegates might be considered by the enemy as a sign of weakness and division.

It was after I had talked with Signor Sonnino, of the Italian Government, and Mr. Lloyd George of the British---the latter of whom had said to me, even at that early date, that he would welcome the coming to England of Mr. Gompers to confer with Labour leaders---that I spoke to Mr. Balfour, who was also in attendance at the Conference. Asking what he thought of the possible consequences of such a meeting, and what would be the attitude of the British Government in permitting delegates to attend, the subject turned naturally and logically to the attitude of Mr. Arthur Henderson, Member of Parliament and one of the foremost Labour leaders in England.

Turning to me, Mr. Balfour said " I shall never fear the work of one who takes John Wesley for his model in life, as does Mr. Henderson."

Such an answer caused me more surprise than anything that had fallen from the lips of any statesman with whom I had talked at the time. It possessed in my eyes a double significance, for it threw a sidelight upon my distinguished interlocutor himself and his convictions, while telling me in one brief sentence what kind of a man Mr. Henderson was, of whom I had been reading so much. Mr. Balfour might have said, "I trust Henderson because he is a man of long experience, level-headed and prudent," or "I trust him because he is a patriot and has the future of his fellow men at heart." Instead he trusted the great Labour advocate because Mr. Henderson had within him something higher than a mere degree of mentality---a principle that would guide him to duty as unerringly as the mariner's compass would guide the course of his ship, the spiritual element of security which, in a crisis, would prove infallible, and against which the waves of anarchy might beat in vain.

It may not be inappropriate, before closing this chapter, to summarize the results of the submarine activities of the German Navy during the war. The mere announcement from week to week of the loss of so many thousands of tons of shipping conveyed to the lay mind but a hazy conception of its real meaning. Perhaps a better conception would be obtained of its enormity if an attempt were made to visualize the extent of this loss, by imagining a journey in a swiftly-moving passenger train passing in review the resurrected hulks of these lost ships. On such a journey, one would find that if they were linked together end to end in a continuous line, it would require ten hours of constant riding at the rate of forty miles an hour before the last boat had been passed!

To illustrate in another manner: If these sunken craft were to be re-floated upon the waters of Lake Erie, and the eastern end of the line stationed at Buffalo, one would be able to walk from deck to deck until the city of Detroit and Lake St. Clair had been well passed. In size, they ranked all the way from the great Britannic and Lusitania, down to the smallest fishing smack. In many instances the cargo was of more value than the ship itself. The total loss involved, in dollars and cents, would in all probability exceed an amount equal to six times our national debt at the time of our entrance into the war---approximately six billion dollars.

Desiring to know the exact extent of the loss to her shipping which France had suffered during the war, I asked Admiral de Bon(11) if he would kindly supply such information. A few days later I received from him a comprehensive, but very concise, statement of these losses from August 2, 1914, the beginning of the war, to the signing of the Armistice, November 11, 1918. Summarizing the contents of that statement, I may say that a total number of 710 French ships, aggregating 920,000 tons, had been destroyed. All but approximately eight per cent of this loss had been caused by the enemy submarines. The percentage to the actual tonnage which France possessed before the war was so great as to call out frequent comment from the French Press pointing to the rebuilding of a merchant marine as one of the first after-war necessities,

Naturally, Great Britain suffered most of all the Allied Powers. I have seen it stated on good authority that this loss exceeded 8,000,000 tons. This resulted not only from the immense superiority of her shipping tonnage, but also because of the proximity of England's shores to the submarine bases and the facility for reaching them; besides, the demands upon her fleet made by all the Allies including America was tremendous. In meeting the needs in an endless variety of ways for prosecuting the war, England's ships were absolutely necessary for the success of the Allied cause. The loss in Italian shipping, while not great in comparison, was also a heavy one.

But these were belligerent countries. It was the small neutral countries upon which this indiscriminate warfare fell heaviest in proportion. Of all these, Norway sustained the greatest loss. Powerless from her lack of military strength quite as much as from her geographical position, she could utter no more than a feeble protest against the violation of her rights. I am indebted to my esteemed colleague, the Baron de Wedel-Jarlsberg, Norwegian Minister in Paris, for a copy of an attractively bound brochure which sets forth the losses sustained by the merchant marine of Norway during the four years of the war. Its compilation reflects much credit upon the Inspector-General of Navigation of that Government. Setting forth the name of every vessel, and the date of her destruction, from the seventh day of August, 1914, to the end of the war, it gives the tonnage, port of destination, and the kind of cargo, together with its valuation. This comprehensive summary, as a result of more than one hundred pages of such information, shows that during the war a total of 801 Norwegian ships were destroyed, representing a tonnage of 1,224,621; their total value slightly exceeded nine hundred million kroner.

Even Spain, in a much safer position---a country where it was supposed Germany had many sympathizers---was compelled, during the weeks immediately preceding the signing of the Armistice, to utter such a protest to the German Government as to forecast an early severing of diplomatic relations. In fact, I was permitted on several occasions during that trying period to know from my colleague M. Quiñones de Leon, the Spanish Ambassador, how very critical was the situation growing out of Germany's ignoring the rights of Spanish vessels.

During the height of the submarine activities everything was done throughout Germany to inspire the belief that the destruction was so great as soon to cause the Allied Governments actually to retire from the war. One ingenious method used to create this impression in the minds of the people was the publication and wide circulation of a picture headed "England's Plight" ; it represented the boats that had already been destroyed off the coasts of England, Ireland and Scotland. The losses were indicated by an enormous number of little black dots representing the destroyed ships in the waters surrounding those shores. In one corner of the picture was printed in large type : "12 months of Unrestricted U-Boat Warfare in the Northern Theatre of Sea War." But the most significant statement accompanying the picture was that in which it was declared that "No ship destroyed by mine or before February 1, 1917, is included in this map." What stronger evidence of the determination of Germany to carry out her threat in her Note to the American Government of January 31, 1917, than is contained in this, her own shameless boast!

It was quite a common experience, when our American officers had entered German territory after the signing of the Armistice, to be told by the people that they had been misled by such stories into the belief that the losses to American troop ships, through the German submarine, had been so great as practically to prevent their participation in the war. Substantially the same story was told to me at the Embassy as early as the last of April, 1918, by a Scotchman---a thread manufacturer---who, being beyond the age of mobilization, had been permitted to return from Austria after being detained there since the beginning of the war. In addition to narrating to me a graphic story of the harrowing conditions existing there, he told me that the common belief prevailed among the people that America had less than two hundred thousand soldiers on French soil ; that the activities of the German submarines had been so great as practically to shut out any substantial hope to the Allies from America. As we were, at that very time, sending over troops at the rate of one hundred and fifty thousand each month and already had more than a half million of our men actually in France, in cabling to the Department the purport of what had been told to me by this gentleman, I strongly urged the advisability of at once letting the world know the real facts. In my judgment, it was the psychological time to do so, not only to encourage our Allied forces in arms, but to let the German people know the truth.(12) A few days later I was very much pleased to receive the following telegram from the Department

The Department of State to Ambassador Sharp.

Washington, May 4, 1918.

The Department desires to commend your telegram of April 30, 2 P.M., and previous weekly telegraphic reports on the general situation, the information contained in them being of greatest interest and value to this Government. Your recommendation regarding giving out more information as to the actual number of troops arriving each month from America is receiving the careful consideration of the Government.

It is my belief that the official announcement by Secretary Baker within a week thereafter, that fully 500,000 American troops were already on French soil, had more to do in discouraging the enemy than anything that had gone before. It did more than this, for it correspondingly heartened the Allies. The French Press announced with great enthusiasm the accomplishment of this marvellous feat, and rejoiced in the speedy fulfilment of the promise of aid to the war-weary soldiers of France.

Indeed, some weeks before the sending of my telegram to the Department suggesting that such information be given out, M. Clemenceau in a conversation with me at the War Office had deplored the fact that we were only sending over 50,000 men each month when twice that number were not only needed, but had been promised. His tone was one of disappointment, if not of bitterness. I informed him that in fact we were sending more than twice that many, and I did not fail to assure him strongly that I had every reason to believe that our Government at Washington would soon surprise the world with the effectiveness of our efforts in greatly increasing the shipment of troops to France.(13) Yet there was an unmistakable feeling of pessimism existing among the French people as to our ability to do so. At that time, too, the German armies were making their last desperate efforts to reach Paris, and against them the Allies had no assurance except faith in the invincibility of our cause and the forces behind it.

It being a part of the duties of the American Consuls at the ports of France to report to me the facts which came to their knowledge, concerning the sinking of every Allied ship, I had an unusual opportunity to learn from such authoritative sources of these horrors of the sea. Depositions of the survivors were taken in all cases. Some of the stories related by them were harrowing in the extreme. They all told of suffering and of heroic sacrifice of the strong to help the weak in the face of death. Not a few among the witnesses came later to Paris to tell me in person of their experiences. Even in those times of tragedy, some of them were not without humour.

So frequent and alarming became these attacks, in not a few cases upon American vessels, that soon after our entrance into the war I sent a cablegram, May 14, to the State Department, strongly urging the employment of a great number of hydroplanes, as well as small but powerful motor-boats, to patrol the coasts of France. In my telegram, I compared the situation then existing to the kind of protection which a lone policeman might afford to some good-sized American city. The cases were frequent where running duels lasting several hours occurred between armed merchantmen and the submarines, the latter coming boldly to the surface to make their work more certain. Too often, unfortunately, their prey was entirely unarmed.

It was this latter situation, which had increased to an alarming frequency, that prompted me to cable, July 18, to the President himself, advising against permitting any American vessel to sail for European ports without being fully armed. My telegram to the President was in part as follows:

Ambassador Sharp to President Wilson.

The numerous reports coming to the Embassy from the Consuls at seaports in France of the attacks upon and sinking of unarmed American vessels by German submarines lead me to suggest to you the urgent necessity of taking such steps as will compel all such vessels to go adequately armed. Within the past three or four weeks reports of seven such instances have come to my attention, though there are doubtless others within that time not yet reported. A striking illustration of the need of some drastic measures---both for conservation of foodstuffs and war materials as well as for the protection of lives---may be found in the case of the -------- attacked, though not sunk, on June ---th, and reported by Consul Osborne in his despatches to the Department. There were involved in that case the lives of thirty-seven men and a property value of ship and cargo of six million dollars. The Consul stated to me in a letter that the Captain had informed him that upon his request to a representative of his company in New York to arm the boat, he received the response that it was not necessary. . . However, the six other American vessels known to be unarmed were less fortunate and they were all sunk. Despite the destructiveness of these submarines, many reports of their attacks show that by the very fact that their intended victims were able to keep up a running fire, the submarines were compelled to submerge or abandon the quest. Under conditions existing on this side of the Atlantic, it seems little less than criminal in shipowners to permit their ships to sail for ports in Europe without being armed to the fullest extent feasible. With a record conservatively estimated by me, from my own observations of reports as well as through other sources of information, to approximate three thousand ships sunk by submarines since the beginning of the war and a monthly average of not less than two hundred and fifty ships so destroyed since the commencement of the present year, while duly recognizing the activities of our Government, I trust I may be pardoned for calling attention again to my despatch No.------ of May 14. Conditions are so threatening, not alone to our merchant vessels but to transport ships, that every possible effort is justified in sending over all protection that is available for both the convoy and patrol service.

SHARP.

As for the work performed by the American Navy Admiral Jellicoe on one occasion, while at a conference in Paris, expressed to me his great admiration and warm appreciation for the manner in which it had helped to rid British waters of this menace.

The increasing activity of the submarines, after the adoption of the unrestricted methods of warfare, called out a great deal of controversy as to the best means for combating them. The appearance of American ships of war in European waters accentuated this discussion.

Shortly before Admiral Sims left the United States to assume command of our Naval operations in Europe, where he rendered such distinguished service, I had read in home papers an account of a banquet speech which he had delivered in which, confidently expressing his reliance in the battleship and Dreadnought, he had characterized as greatly exaggerated the destructive power of the submarine in naval warfare. In almost daily receipt, as I was at the time, of reports showing the enormous losses which were being inflicted upon the Allied shipping by this undersea craft, I knew that the Admiral had either been misquoted or else was wholly misinformed as to the true situation ; I assumed of course the former to be the case. Soon after his arrival in England he came over to Paris, and calling on me to pay his respects he told me what he had heard while in London of these losses; it was a story of intense interest, and coming from one who spoke with authority it only corroborated the reports which I had received.

"Mr. Ambassador, I was astounded at the stories that I heard of the tremendous losses to shipping caused by the German submarines!" was one of his declarations. "A situation has been created which has given the greatest concern to the British Admiralty." His manner of speaking as well as what he told me clearly indicated that he was little prepared for the news which had been given him.

On a subsequent visit to Paris, the Admiral, who had become as deservedly popular in the French as in the English capital, in a talk with me concerning this subject took a very strong position against any attempt of the Allied fleet to attack the German boats in their own waters. Soon after his return to London I received the following letter from him:

Admiral Sims to Ambassador Sharp.

Office Vice-Admiral, Commanding     
U.S. Naval Forces, European Waters,     
London, July 31, 1917.

M DEAR MR. SHARP:

I am sure you will be interested to read the enclosed article. It is an explanation of the errors made in the criticisms of those who advocate "digging the rats out of their holes or stopping up the hole in the wasps' nest instead of trying to catch the wasps after they are out. The writer of the article, Mr. Hislam, is a very well-known naval writer.

Very sincerely yours
                             WM. S. SIMS

Accompanying the letter came Mr. Hislam's article to which the Admiral referred. Though more plausible than convincing, reasons were given against attempting to "dig" out the German High Sea Fleet, yet to a layman the long delay in successfully "stopping up the hole in the wasps' nest," at Zeebrugge and at Ostend, as was done nearly a year later, seemed inexplicable.(14) Indeed, in the following May, when telegraphing to the Department the satisfaction which had just been occasioned in Paris over the closing of the Channel at Ostend by the sinking of the Vindictive near the point of entrance---similar in degree to that which had followed the work of the British Fleet at Zeebrugge---I closed my message by adding:

"While one is filled with admiration at the boldness of these efforts, so useful in their result, yet the question must involuntarily come to many, Why was not such a method carried out long ago?"

An interesting sidelight upon this whole question of adequately combating the submarine menace was given in a cable message from President Wilson to Admiral Sims under date of July 5, 1917. The President declared:

"From the beginning of the war, I have been greatly surprised at the failure of the British Admiralty to use Great Britain's great Naval superiority in an effective way. In the presence of the present submarine emergency they are helpless to the point of panic. Every plan we suggest they reject for some reason of prudence. In my views, this is not a time for prudence but for boldness even at the cost of great losses." The President's impatience over the delay of the British Admiralty in furnishing adequate protection by convoys for shipping craft was pointedly shown when he added in his telegram to the Admiral "The absence of craft or convoy is even more apparent on the French coast than on the English coast and in the Channel. I do not see how the necessary military supplies and supplies of food and fuel oil are to be delivered at British ports in any other way within the next few months than under adequate convoy. There will presently not be ships or tanks enough and our shipbuilding plans may not begin to yield important results in less than eighteen months."

That the President greatly differed from Admiral Sims over the policy of dealing with the "wasps' nest" of the submarines, may be plainly seen in his address which he delivered to the officers of the Atlantic Fleet on August 11, 1917, when he stated he was willing to sacrifice for this purpose if necessary, half the Navy Great Britain and we together have."

A perusal of this address in full plainly indicates that President Wilson had at no time minimized the importance of a method of warfare, which in a score of telegrams to Washington I had sought to emphasize.(15)

From a number of talks which I had with Admiral Benson, whose wise counsel must have been of inestimable value to his associates in the Naval conferences in London and Paris, I know that he advised the employment of every possible resource against the aggressions of the submarines. It had seemed to him incredible that more effective measures had not been taken to prevent their so audaciously going in and out of the English Channel. I recall a most interesting talk which I had with the Admiral while, one day, going from Paris on a visit to the headquarters of General Pershing at Chaumont.

On that occasion quite a number of distinguished Americans had also joined the party on the invitation of the General. Colonel and Mrs. House and Lord Northcliffe, stopping at the time for a few days in Paris, were also of the party. As we sat by ourselves, in one of the compartments of the car that morning, the Admiral detailed the talks which he had recently had in England with Admiral Jellicoe and others of authority in the British Navy. He told me how he had suggested to Admiral Jellicoe the blocking of the English Channel in some such manner as had already been accomplished in Chesapeake Bay, across the entire entrance of which piles had been driven to prevent the passing of submarines. To this suggestion Admiral Jellicoe had replied that such a thing in the English Channel would be impossible, on account of the strong currents caused by the tides. To meet such a problem, however, Admiral Benson expressed the belief that large blocks of cement, in which heavy steel spikes had been fixed, would sufficiently anchor them at the bottom of the sea. He expressed the belief also that England had overlooked the vital point, in the very early days of the war, of destroying the forts at Ostend and Zeebrugge, instead of permitting them to be fortified.(16)

Rising above all questions of reparation for such enormous loss of property must be the unhappy reflection that for the greatest loss, because so much more precious---the human life exacted by such murderous methods of warfare---there never can be compensation. If the lesson taught by such experiences has any value, it is that, regardless of whatever steps may be taken hereafter to limit the size of armament, having in view the ultimate disarmament of nations except that sufficient for the exercise of police protection, the building or operation of armed submarine ships should never again be permitted. Their demonstrated power of destructiveness, in violation of every dictate of humanity, should make them an outlawed relic of barbarism, no longer to be tolerated by civilized nations.