APOLEON III by most political and historical writers is not criticized, but calumniated. If his reign had ended successfully, his personal qualities would have exalted him to the skies; but since his career was destroyed by a reverse of fortune, his faults have been monstrously exaggerated, and few writers have endeavored to remind the world of his public virtues and accomplishments. While, unfortunately, people in general are more inclined to listen to what is said about great men than to see and appreciate what is done by them, it is curious to notice that the purely dramatic and spectacular elements in the lives of the two Napoleons, as persons, have been of such absorbing interest as to make us almost insensible of the importance of the really great constructive works relating to the administration of civil affairs, upon which imperishable foundation the reputation of both, as sovereigns, must ultimately rest.

I have already set forth with some particularity the traits of the Emperor's character that were most strongly impressed upon me during the long period of my personal relations with him; and I shall probably have occasion to refer to them again in the desultory way that reminiscences permit, and as the events and incidents of the narrative may suggest. But I should not feel that I had done justice to Napoleon III. if I failed, in my description of the man, to refer to his merits as a ruler, and made no mention of his work as an upbuilder of the nation. I shall therefore, in this chapter, submit to the reader's consideration a few facts that ought not to be overlooked or forgotten, and which, I trust, will be sufficient to prove that the Emperor not only cherished in his mind noble and generous ideas and purposes, but that he actually did a great deal for the welfare of his people and for the glory of France.

Baron Haussmann, the Prefect of the Seine, when he heard some one express admiration for the magnificent results obtained as the work of reconstructing and embellishing the city of Paris progressed, used to say: "It was the Emperor who marked out all this. I have only been his collaborator."

And if the "Great Baron" recognized the directing mind and the will that created modern Paris, the Emperor himself always most generously acknowledged his obligation to this able and most devoted collaborator.

In 1858, on the occasion of the inauguration of the Boulevard Sebastopol, the Emperor said: "When succeeding generations shall traverse our great city, not only will they acquire a taste for the beautiful, from the spectacle of these works of art, but, in reading the names inscribed upon our bridges and our streets, they will recall to themselves the glory of our armies---from Rivoli to Sebastopol. All these grand results I owe to the cooperation of the Legislative Body, who, renouncing all provincial selfishness, have learned that a country like France should have a capital worthy of itself, and have not hesitated to grant the sums which the Government has solicited. I owe them also to the enlightened cooperation of the Municipal Council. But especially do I owe their prompt and judicious execution to the intelligent magistrate whom I have placed at the head of the Department of the Seine, who, while maintaining in the finances of the city an order worthy of all praise, has been able in so short a time to complete enterprises so numerous, and that in the midst of obstacles incessantly arising from the spirit of routine and disparagement."

M. Maxime du Camp says: "If, by a fairy's wand, the Paris of the time of the Revolution of February could be brought back and exhibited to the modern world, people would wonder how a race which loves luxury so much as the Parisians do, could have lived in such a pestilential and unhealthy city as the French capital was before Napoleon III, with the assistance of his intelligent Prefect Haussmann, changed Paris into the attractive place of residence which it has now become."(15)

The filthy and dangerous lanes of the Montagne Sainte-Genéviève, and the ugly wine-shops near the Arc de Triomphe, were, to use an expression of the author mentioned, "the plague-spots" through which the Emperor drew his pencil, erecting in their place broad streets and handsome boulevards. The whole city was reconstructed upon a grand plan. The special aim of the Emperor was to make the several quarters of his capital beautiful, and at the same time healthy, by changing the general style of the buildings, and by establishing a great number of public gardens and promenades, where the children and the aged and infirm could enjoy the benefit of the fresh air and the sun. For if the West End of Paris had its Bois de Boulogne, to the East Side, the artisan quarter of the capital, was given the Bois de Vincennes, the disposition of whose spacious grounds, with their broad avenues, superb trees, grassy lawns and fountains, and magnificent vistas, compels the admiration of every one. Nor should we forget to mention the Buttes-Chaumont, that exquisite little park opened in Belleville, in the slums of the city, which, as a work of art, is the most beautiful of all the Paris parks, and yet is so seldom seen by the foreign visitor.

For the same purpose the splendid sewers of Paris were constructed, which are the admiration of foreigners as well as of Parisians, and which by their extent alone create astonishment; for even in the year 1869 they were 518 kilometers (over 300 miles) in length.

In the year 1852 the city was not able to distribute more than 105,000 cubic meters of water per day, while under the Empire the water-works were so improved that, in the year 1869, 538,000 cubic meters were furnished daily. But this was not all. As late as the year 1866, the water used by the inhabitants of Paris, even for domestic purposes, was taken almost entirely from the Seine and the river Marne. It was impossible to preserve it from pollution, and consequently typhoid was endemic in the city and the death-rate was high. The serious defects and the absolute inadequacy of the system employed to supply Paris with water, and especially with potable water, were frequently pointed out. But the great majority of Parisians would appear to have accepted as definitive the pronouncement of the hygienist Parmentier, the discoverer of the potato, who declared, in 1787, that "the water of the Seine unites all the qualities which could be desired to make it agreeable to the palate, light in the stomach, and favorable to digestion; and the Parisians are not wrong if they never end their eulogies of the Seine, and if they contend with assurance that its waters are the best of all waters." In the presence of such a prejudice, and in view of the prevailing ignorance with respect to sanitary matters, it is not surprising that practically nothing was done to improve a situation that was becoming constantly more and more dangerous to the public health, until the Emperor took up the subject of supplying Paris with drinking-water from uncontaminated sources. For this special purpose work was begun in 1864, and the aqueduct of the Dhuis was completed in 1866, at a cost of 18,000,000 francs; it was 131 kilometers in length, and brought into the city 25,000 cubic meters of water daily.

But in the meantime the ravages of the cholera, in 1865, had again drawn the attention of hygienists to the insufficiency of the water supply, and two years later the construction of the aqueduct of the Vanne was begun. This great work was finished at a cost of 52,000,000 francs; it was 173 kilometers in length, and provided Paris daily with 120,000 cubic meters of spring-water of excellent quality.

The beauty of several of the public buildings erected by the late Emperor is an attraction and a delight to every visitor of Paris. But few Parisians even have any idea of the very large number of these buildings, or of the number of the great monumental constructions that were built in Paris during his reign; for as far as possible the Government of the Republic has carefully obliterated every name inscribed upon them, and every emblem they bore indicative of their origin. I shall therefore remind the reader that it was Napoleon III who connected the Louvre with the Tuileries, who built the churches of Saint Augustin, La Trinité, Sainte-Clotilde, Saint Joseph, Saint Ambroise, Saint Eugène, Notre Dame-des-Champs, Saint Pierre de Mont Rouge, and many others; that it was he who erected or restored the splendid edifices of the new Palais de Justice, the Tribunal de Commerce, the Hôtel Dieu, the Grand Opéra, the Halles Centrales, and the Temple; that it was he who built the great bridges over the Seine, the Pont Napoléon III, the Pont de Bercy, the Pont d 'Arcola, the Pont Notre Dame, the Pont au Change, the Pont au Double, the Petit Pont, the Pont Louis Philippe, the Pont Saint Michel, the Pont de Solférino, the Pont des Invalides, the Pont d 'Alma, and the Pont d'Auteuil; that it was he who surrounded the parks and the gardens with their gilded railings and erected their great entrance gates, and who adorned the French capital with fountains and statues and a hundred other ornamental structures.

On account of the interest which the Emperor took in the arts and sciences, the collections of the Louvre were quadrupled; the so-called Campagne Galleries were purchased; the "Union Centrale des Beaux-Arts appliqués à l' industrie " was founded; the Musée d'Artillerie received rich additions; in the old Palace of Saint Germain the well-known archæological museum was created; the Musée de Cluny and the Tour Saint Jacques were restored; the Hôtel Carnavelet was changed into a museum for a collection of the antiquities of the city of Paris; the Imperial Library received some very valuable additions; and the Bibliothèque Sainte-Genéviève was thrown open to the public.

In fact, the city of Paris, as it appears to the visitor to-day, was created by Napoleon III.; for whatever public improvements have been made, since 1870, have been executed only to complete the original plan of the Emperor and his famous Prefect of the Seine.(16)

Victor Hugo," says Blanchard Jerrold in his "Life of Napoleon the Third," "dwells in a fashionable quarter of Paris, his beloved city, which had no existence when he went into exile. He tells every foreign visitor who calls on him that there have been three cities of the world---Athens, Rome, Paris; but when he says 'Paris-Urbs,' he forgets the sovereign who made her what she is, and laid the foundation of that matchless city of the future, which, according to him, will have the Are de Triomphe for its center."

It should be remembered, also, that these great public works were constructed not merely during the Imperial régime, but at the suggestion, and frequently by the command, of the Emperor himself; that they were, in a word, something more than the products of the general social demands and industrial activities and forces of the period. It is impossible to deny this. Who has not heard of the "Comptes fantastiques d'Haussmann"? Indeed, the opposition to nearly all these improvements, on the ground of their uselessness and extravagance, was so noisy and so general, while they were being executed, that its echoes are still to be heard whenever questions concerning public works in the city of Paris are under discussion in the Municipal Council or in the Chamber of Deputies.

But while these improvements and embellishments of the capital were being made, the provincial cities, and the picturesque nooks and corners even, of the Empire were not neglected. Lord Malmesbury, writing in 1863, says: "I stopped a day at Carcassonne, an ancient city so famous for the desperate fighting of the Albigeois and the deeds of Simon de Montfort. The Emperor has had the city and fortifications restored exactly to the state they were in at this time; the streets are just wide enough for a cart to pass, and the towers and battlements are what they were in the thirteenth century. In every part of France he is making archæological restorations, and his active mind seems as much interested in this pursuit as it is in politics; but," he adds significantly, "as far as I can observe, the French do not appreciate his efforts as they deserve."

In the meantime the whole country was greatly benefited by works constructed with direct reference to the development of the national resources; and by the establishment or enlargement of public institutions, the creation of technical schools and reformations in the universities.

In order to facilitate communication throughout the Empire, 28,846 kilometers of macadamized roads were made, many rivers were rendered navigable, ports were improved, and the docks of Cherbourg were finished.

The shipping employed in commerce, and especially that portion of it which was engaged in the coasting-trade, was considerably increased in tonnage and greatly improved; while the navy, that had previously consisted of wooden sailing-vessels, was transformed into a fleet of armored steamships.

The railways were extended over the whole of France; and in 1869 the total length of these roads amounted to 23,900 kilometers. The new system of telegraphy was inaugurated and rapidly developed.

In order to free property from the burden of debts and to encourage industry, numerous credit institutions were founded, among them the well-known Crédit Foncier. And when the Government wished to borrow money, it did not address itself simply to the great bankers, but gave a chance of profit to persons having little capital, by raising the loan through public subscriptions. In 1847 the public funds were in the hands of 207,000 persons, two-thirds of whom were living in Paris. In 1854 the number of holders of these funds had increased to 664,000, more than half of whom were living in the Departments. This diffusion among the people of the securities of the State was evidence not only of increasing general prosperity, but of public confidence in the stability of the Government.

In 1860 the commercial treaty with England gave to France the benefits of freer trade; and some years later similar treaties were concluded with other countries, and the commerce of the Empire increased largely.

As the colonies were included in the provisions of these treaties, and the markets of the world were thus opened to them, they were enabled to extend their trade with foreign countries, and to share in the benefits derived by the mother country from the liberal and enlightened commercial policy of the Imperial Government.

Paris, especially, felt the stimulating influence of this policy. Not only was its industrial output enormously increased, but property rose in value on every side. In 1847 the manufactures of the city represented a value of but 1,500,000,000 francs; in 1869 their value was over 6,000,000,000. And while the land within the limits of the city, together with the buildings, in 1851, was taxed on an estimated value of 2,557,000,000 francs, in 1869 it was rated at 5,957,000,000 francs.

In 1851 the revenues of the city amounted to 52,000,000 francs, and already in 1867 they had been increased to 151,000,000 francs.

The improvements affecting trade in general under the Empire were such that the exports and imports, which represented, in 1848, a value of 1,645,000,000 francs, had increased in 1857 to 4,593,000,000 francs, and in 1869 to 6,228,000,000 francs. In 1850 the per capita wealth of the nation was estimated at about 2,500 francs; it had reached nearly double that sum in 1870. In a word, France enjoyed, during a period of eighteen years, unbounded and unbroken industrial prosperity.(17)

Just as the Empress paid especial attention to the needs of the poor and the sick, so the Emperor devoted much time to the consideration of ways and means for ameliorating the situation of the working classes.

The sanitary conditions obtaining in the houses and lodgings of the great majority of laborers and artisans seemed to him to be exceedingly defective. He accordingly caused numerous model lodging-houses, as well as model dwellings for single families, to be constructed, and finally introduced into France the English Building Society system. In the year 1859 he contributed 100,000 francs towards the improvement of houses for workmen in Lille; and similar gifts were made for the same purpose to the municipalities of Amiens, Bayonne, and other cities. In the year 1864 the sum of 1,500,000 francs was expended by the Emperor in building 180 workmen's houses; and in 1867-68 he built 42 model houses for working people at Daumesnil.

Sanitary science, we may unhesitatingly say, was, previous to 1852, scarcely known in France outside of Paris; and nearly all the improvements which have since been made in the sanitary condition of French cities were begun not only under the reign, but at the instance and direction, of Napoleon III. His Government voted, in 1852, the sum of 10,000,000 francs for the purpose of improving the public health of manufacturing towns; and the Emperor seldom visited any of the cities of France without making inquiries with respect to the water supply, drainage, overcrowding, and all those matters that concern the health of the inhabitants of cities, or without impressing upon the municipal authorities the importance, and the necessity even, of having in the construction and the administration of public works a strict regard for the requirements of sanitary science.

But it was not the inhabitants of cities only whose fortunes were improved, whose opportunities were enlarged, and who were benefited in many ways by the care of the French monarch. He paid great attention to agriculture and its improvement, and was always deeply interested in all public measures the object of which was to advance the interests of the tillers of the soil. In the year 1852 he established in every arrondissement agricultural associations; he also encouraged agricultural exhibitions by rich donations. On the 10th of June, 1854, he introduced a law for facilitating the draining of marshes, and a credit of 100,000,000 francs was opened, from which farmers and land-owners could borrow capital to drain their lands, with the privilege of repaying their loans in instalments extending over a period of twenty-five years.

Model farms were erected in many parts of the French Empire; and vast tracts of country, which, previously covered with sand-dunes, had been entirely barren, and moors and fens uninhabited on account of malaria, were transformed into productive forests, healthy territories, rich corn-fields, and beautiful gardens.

The endeavors of Napoleon III to improve the condition of the poor and to help them in their misfortunes, were once known all over France; at present, however, the world seems to have forgotten them. The time he gave to the study of questions concerning the welfare of the masses of the people, and more particularly of the industrial classes, is truly remarkable. It was a subject that was never out of his mind. A paper on the means of relieving the situation of aged and necessitous working men, without having recourse to public charity, written in his own hand, was found at the Tuileries, bearing the date of July 5, 1870. And six years before---in 1864--he gave instructions that the Opera House which was being erected in Paris should not be finished until the Hôtel Dieu, the great central hospital of the city, had been built and its wards opened to the public. The Emperor felt that human life was worth more to the State than the most splendid products of art, and that it was the duty of a sovereign to satisfy the wants and assuage the sufferings of his people before providing for their pleasures and amusements. "Admitting," he says, "that this arrangement has no practical advantage, from a moral point of view I hold it important that the edifice to be devoted to pleasure shall not be raised before the shelter for suffering."

At the time of the disastrous floods that ravaged the valleys of the Loire and the Rhône, invading Orleans, Blois, Tours, Lyons, Aries, Orange, Avignon, and scores of other cities, sweeping away houses, turning the streets into canals, covering the country for miles around with great lakes---a catastrophe involving not only the loss of many lives but the destruction of a vast amount of property---the Emperor came to the relief of his unfortunate people promptly and most generously. Six hundred thousand francs from his own private purse he gave them at once to meet the most pressing individual needs. And this sum was greatly increased by the gifts made in the name of the Empress and the Prince Imperial. Subsequently 2,000,000 francs were granted by the Chambers to assist the sufferers from those inundations.

But the interest of the Emperor in this great calamity was not limited to a benevolent desire to supply the immediate wants of those who had lost everything they possessed. He wished to see for himself just what had taken place, how it had happened, and what could be done to prevent a repetition of the disaster. With this object in view, he visited personally the departments that were the scene of the calamity, wading in the water or being rowed in a boat for miles across the inundated fields. Then he directed that a detailed report of the damage caused by the floods should be prepared, together with plans for the construction of the works necessary to keep the waters of the two rivers between their banks. The letter he wrote from Plombières shortly after, in July, 1856, to his Minister of Public Works, is no less remarkable on account of the extraordinary knowledge it shows the Emperor possessed of the technical details of hydraulic engineering, than for the earnestness with which he urges the minister to set about this particular work at once, on the spot, and not suffer it to end in talk and "luminous reports."

And if now, for more than forty years, no similar disasters have occurred in the valleys of the Loire and the Rhône, it is not because the rains have become less torrential there, but because, in accordance with the wishes, and, I might almost say, under the personal direction of the Emperor, provisions were made and works were constructed at the danger points which have proved sufficient to prevent any considerable overflow of the waters of these rivers.

The Exposition of 1867 was a brilliant, if transient, representation of the work accomplished in France since 1855, in nearly every field of human interest and activity, in the sciences, the arts, in morals, in polities, and in charity. All the nations of the world were invited to participate in this great festival, and by their presence to crown the efforts of labor with the idea of conciliation and peace. Its success was immense and well-deserved. The international exhibitions of later years have been "bigger," but not one of them has been so admirably organized, so proportionate in its several parts, so perfectly fitted to facilitate those comparative studies of the materials, conditions, methods, and products exhibited, which increase the sum of useful knowledge and extend the benefits of civilization to distant communities. Nor has any similar international assembly ever contributed more effectively to establish a feeling of respect for each other, and relations of concord and amity among the rulers of the world. This was the supreme purpose of the Exposition of 1867. It was an impressive manifestation of the Imperial will that the sword was to be no longer the instrument upon which France relied for the maintenance of her prestige and influence among the nations. On the occasion of the distribution of awards on the 1st of July---one of the most magnificent ceremonies which it was ever my privilege to witness---the Emperor closed his address with these words:

"May those who have lived a little while among us carry back with them a just opinion of our country; let them be persuaded that we entertain sentiments of esteem and sympathy for foreign nations, and that we sincerely desire to live in peace with them. This Exposition will mark, I hope, a new era of harmony and progress. Convinced, as I am, that Providence blesses the efforts of all those who wish to do well, as we do, I believe in the definitive triumph of the great principles of morality and justice, which, satisfying all legitimate aspirations, are able alone to consolidate thrones, lift up the people, and ennoble humanity."

It has often been said that the Exposition of 1867 marked the apogee of the Imperial power. All eyes were then turned towards France; never had such a concourse of distinguished visitors, princes, kings, and emperors assembled in the capital of a foreign State to pay homage to its sovereigns. But it marked also, in an extraordinary manner, the progress that had been made by the people under the Empire, materially and socially; for never before had the industrial forces and artistic genius of France been exhibited with such splendor and effect.

But some one may ask: While all these things may have been done by the Emperor, has not the whole period of the Empire often been characterized by contemporary writers as one preeminently devoted to the cultivation of material interests, to inordinate speculation, luxury, and immorality? It certainly has been. And the bill of indictment reads as follows: "The commercial and industrial activity of this epoch, and the over-stimulation which it gives to all the material appetites, have resulted in a frightful competition, the most shocking forms of stock-jobbing, and a love of dollars more impudent and brazen-faced than under the Regency or the Directory. To get money without work, by the shortest cuts, to invent ways of speculating on the credulity of the public, to find dupes; in a word, to transact business, is the sole thought and occupation of the most influential part of the population, of a society brilliant and corrupt, as destitute of belief as of feeling, and that knows only material pleasures and the enjoyments of luxury."

This is the dreadful picture which has been drawn of the decadence and moral corruption that existed under the Empire. No, I am mistaken. These words were used in describing the state of things under the government of Louis Philippe and his austere minister, M. Guizot.(18) And they have been used, or words quite like them have been used, and can be found in every account of the life of a great people since history began to be written. Moreover, they will continue to be used by political moralists so long as civilized society exists; for the more splendid its fruits, the more renowned the victories of peace, so the more conspicuous are likely to be some of their undesirable products and accompaniments. In short, as certain social conditions seem to be inevitable, when the rewards of labor are abundant and wealth accumulates, it follows that some of the most serious charges directed against the domestic policy and the morality of the Imperial Government are in reality only a way of saying what I have endeavored to briefly set forth in the preceding pages---that, under the rule of Napoleon III., the French people enjoyed unusual material prosperity.

But the greatest work of Napoleon III. was in the field of international politics, and was performed for the honor, the glory, and the greater empire of France. This was the destruction of the European coalition that had held, or tried to hold, France in subjection since the overthrow of the First Empire. It was his wisdom in entering into an alliance with England, the prestige gained by the war in the Crimea, strengthened and completed by his successful intervention, in 1859, in behalf of the kingdom of Italy, that restored to France her hegemony on the Continent of Europe. This leadership was lost as one of the consequences of the unfortunate war of 1870-71. But the credit that rightfully belongs to Napoleon III of having won for France the position of political preeminence which it held during his reign among the great Powers, should not be either cynically or complacently ignored by those who have most keenly felt and bitterly bemoaned the loss of this leadership.

n July, 1870, I invited a large number of Americans, together with a few French friends, to a garden-party at my house in the Avenue de l'Impératrice, in order to celebrate with then the anniversary of the establishment of our Government; and we spent the long afternoon of that splendid summer day confraternally, and in grateful remembrance of the virtues of our forefathers.

Although some of us had been living abroad for many years, it was evident that not one of our number had forgotten how much he owed to his native land; that if national prejudices had disappeared, the love of home and the patriotism of all had not diminished. Indeed, many---too many---of my fellow-countrymen have yet to learn that the flag of our Union is never so beautiful or so glorious as when raised on foreign soil, and that no eyes are so quickly moistened, no hearts so deeply moved by the music of our national airs and melodies, as are those of "expatriated" Americans.

The Emperor, who was one of the most observant men of his time, not only fully appreciated the value and significance of our American institutions, but, as I have already had occasion to remark, took a great interest in all matters that related in any way to the United States. Having seen his Majesty a few days previous to the above-mentioned gathering, I told him of my intention to celebrate the 4th of July by inviting to my house those of my countrymen who were residing in or visiting Paris; and he then expressed a wish to learn, after the fête was over, how it went off. I was so greatly pleased, and, indeed, so proud of the extraordinary success of my garden-party, that, mindful of his Majesty's request, I decided to go, on the morning of the 5th, to Saint Cloud, where the Imperial family then resided.

It was between six and seven o'clock when I left my house, but, although the hour was rather unusual for such a visit, I knew the Emperor would be up, for he was an early riser; and, besides, my duties obliged me to return to Paris before a certain hour.

When I arrived at the palace, I looked up at the balcony on which the windows of the Emperor's dressing-room opened, for I expected that I should find the French monarch standing there, as he had the habit of doing, smoking his cigarette and enjoying the morning air. But there was no one upon the balcony; and I was surprised to see the windows of the suite of rooms which the Emperor occupied standing wide open---a sure sign that he was not present in that part of the palace, and that he had left his chambers unusually early.

Hastening up-stairs, I met M. Goutellard, his Majesty's valet de chambre, the expression of whose features confirmed my apprehension that something extraordinary had taken place. On inquiring, I was informed by him that the Emperor had been aroused from his sleep long before daylight, by despatches which had been sent to him from the Foreign Office, and which seemed to have made upon his Majesty a very great impression.

While I was still wondering what could possibly have occurred, the Emperor himself appeared. He saluted me cordially, although his manner betrayed dissatisfaction and annoyance. Seeing my surprise, he directed my attention to the papers which he held in his hand, and told me in a few words their contents. These despatches related to the candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern for the throne of Spain, which had been announced by the Press the day before.

The Duke de Gramont, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, from whom the communications had come, had reported the information received by him in a way that made it seem of very great and probably undue importance, as I judged from the Emperor's extreme gravity of demeanor, which struck me forcibly and left upon my mind a painful impression. I could not help recalling at the time the remark made to me by a statesman of European reputation, on the announcement of the appointment of the Duke de Gramont to the office of Minister for Foreign Affairs. "Believe me, the appointment forebodes a Franco-German war."

This remark was based upon a correct estimate of the character of the man. But, unfortunately, the Emperor placed great confidence in the Duke; and I could easily see, from the conversation which ensued on that eventful morning, that although in the judgment of his Majesty a war with Prussia should be avoided, if possible, the influence of this minister, and of others, was so strong that these rash and ill-advised despatches had their full and intended effect. The Emperor was persuaded that France had really been insulted, although at the moment there was perhaps no sufficient reason for such an interpretation of the Hohenzollern candidature.

The Emperor, while I was still present at the palace, gave orders that a telegram should be sent to Paris, summoning the Duke de Gramont to Saint Cloud; and notwithstanding the early hour, he hastened to the rooms of the Empress to inform her of the communications to which he attributed such great importance. Everything indicated the approach of a crisis; and I left Saint Cloud with many misgivings, because I greatly feared that the bad advisers of the French monarch would lead him to commit mistakes which might have the most serious consequences.

On the same day the Duke de Gramont had, as I heard from good authority, a long conversation with his sovereign, and I felt sure the Duke had used this opportunity to disturb the mind of the Emperor---to insist upon the gravity of the incident, and the necessity of meeting it by a peremptory declaration on the part of the Imperial Government. The result proved that I was not mistaken.

On the evening of this day (July 5th) Prince de Metternich, the Austrian Ambassador, having gone to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was addressed by the Duke de Gramont as follows:

"I am very glad to see you. I have just come from Saint Cloud, and from a very excited meeting of the Council. You know what has happened?" "I suppose," said the Prince, "you refer to the Prussian candidature."

"Ah," replied the Duke, "it is a great affair"; and he added with firmness, and at the same time with emotion: "That will never be; we shall oppose it by every means, even were a war with Prussia the result." (19)

When the news of the candidature of Leopold, Prince of Hohenzollern, first became known to the French people,. few of them considered it to be of any great importance, because almost everybody believed that a diplomatic note to the Government of Spain would be sufficient to induce Marshal Prim to withdraw his offer of the throne to a relative of the Prussian King. Such a solution of the question would have been the most natural.

The journals that had been devoted to the Empire from its foundation, saw no reason for taking offense at an act concerning the propriety of which the Spanish people, in fact, were the sole judges. But the Duke de Gramont, with others, took the matter "au tragique," and in the Legislative Assembly and through the Press he strove to persuade the world that the candidature of a Prussian prince was an insult to France, and that the Government of the King of Prussia should be called upon to disown this nomination, and to order the Prince to withdraw his unauthorized acceptance of it, otherwise war would be unavoidable.

The Cabinet of the Emperor, in view of the difficult situation that had been suddenly created, became immediately divided. The Duke de Gramont, General Lebœuf, Rigault de Genouilly, and Maurice Richard showed an inclination to make this candidature a casus belli; on the other side, Chevandier de Valdrome, Louvet, Segris, and Plichon threatened to lay down their portfolios in case war should be declared; while Olivier, de Parien, and Mège wished to temporize.

The Emperor, personally, was not at all inclined to precipitate a war with Germany. Not but that he recognized the serious character of the situation which had been created---that it would be impossible for his Government to permit Prince Leopold to accept the offer made by Marshal Prim. But he saw no necessity for making a casus belli of an incident which, in his opinion, could be and ought to be disposed of by intelligent diplomacy. "If we can only get this candidature out of the way," said he, " no matter how it is done, there will be no war." And it was with this object in view that, without consulting his ministers, the Emperor requested the King of Belgium to use his personal influence at Sigmaringen to obtain a withdrawal of Prince Leopold's candidature, and thus close the incident and preserve the peace of Europe. When, on the 12th of July, the Emperor heard that Prince Antoine had telegraphed to Marshal Prim announcing the withdrawal in his name of his son's acceptance of the Spanish crown, he sent immediately for Signor Nigra to come to the Tuileries. Greeting the Italian Ambassador most cordially on his arrival, the Emperor told him the news, and said: "This despatch of Prince Antoine means peace. I have requested you to come here telegraph the news to your Government. I have not had time to write to the King. I know very well that public opinion is so excited that it would have preferred war. But this renunciation is a satisfactory solution, and disposes, at least for the present, of every pretext for hostilities."

The same day he said to General Bourbaki, with evident delight, "It will not be necessary for you to get ready your war-gear, for every cause of conflict is now removed."

And meeting a number of officers shortly afterward, he said before them all: "This news is a great relief to me. I am very glad that everything has ended in this way. War is always a big venture."

At one of the very last Cabinet councils, while Marshal Lebœuf continued to assert that "we are now ready," and that, "if we do not strike immediately, we shall lose an opportunity which we shall never have again," the Emperor proposed that the whole subject of the controversy should be submitted to arbitration. And this proposition was accepted---but too late.

Lebœuf had issued his orders for mobilizing the army; and the falsified despatch published that very day in the North German Gazette, by the direction of Count Bismarck, produced its intended effect---in the picturesque language of its author, "the effect of a red flag on the French bull." In a word, peace was no longer possible.(20) Ever since 1866 the Emperor had known only too well the completeness of the German military organization, and the feeling of hostility towards everything French that prevailed at Berlin. General Ducrot, who was in command at Strasbourg, had kept him well informed upon these subjects in letters addressed to him personally. He had read the comprehensive and precise reports of Colonel Stoffel, the very able French military attaché at the Prussian Court. He had listened to what some of the cleverest observers and interpreters of German opinion had to say on these subjects. But even he had been nearly all the while optimistic; for he believed the destiny of France, and his own destiny, to be in his own keeping.

When the Countess de Pourtalès, who had been visiting relatives in Prussia not long before the war, said to him, "If you only knew what is said there, and could only see what is being done on every side to be ready for a war that is imminent!" the Emperor, smiling at what he evidently regarded as an exaggerated portrayal of the actual facts, replied: "Through what clouds have those fine eyes been looking at the future? You forget, my dear Countess, that to have a war requires the consent of two. And I don't wish it! " This was the Emperor's greatest mistake. In July, 1870, his consent was not necessary. The people were then sovereign. When he discovered this, the gravity of the situation began to bear down upon him.

In his reply to M. Schneider, who, immediately after the declaration of war, addressed him on behalf of the Legislative Assembly, and assured his Majesty that he would have the patriotic cooperation of this body, the Emperor said: "The real author of this war is not the one who has declared it, but he who has made it necessary. I have done all that I could to prevent it; but the whole nation by an irresistible impulse has dictated my resolution." And it should not fail to be observed that he justified himself in yielding to this dictation by affirming that the object he hoped to gain was not glory, nor national aggrandisement, but the realization of those humanitarian sentiments and ideals which formed the bedrock of his whole political philosophy---the peace of the world and a general disarmament. "We seek," said he, "a durable peace, and to put a stop to that precarious state in which all the nations are squandering their resources in arming themselves one against the other." (21)

Having frequent occasion to see the Emperor between the 5th and 15th of July, I became convinced that he listened only reluctantly to those who tried to prove to him that a Franco-German conflict had become unavoidable; and I am certain that when he at last yielded, and gave his consent that the Legislative Body should be called upon to "take immediately the necessary measures for the protection of the interests, the security, and the honor of France," it was not done heedlessly, but with a full sense of his own responsibilities, and with a clear understanding of the possible consequences of a war with Germany. He was perfectly aware that he and King William would not engage in a war on equal terms; that the King might lose many battles, and keep his crown; but that for him defeat would be destruction.

The Empress Eugénie also had more than once expressed, in my presence, her opinion that a war with Germany was not by any means desirable; and although the enemies of the Napoleonic dynasty have never ceased to maintain that it was the Empress who was the most insistent in persuading the Emperor to enter upon that disastrous campaign, I believe that she, on the contrary, was not only disposed to do, but as a matter of fact did do, all in her power to preserve peace, so long as peace was possible.(22) What her real opinions were with respect to this war are set forth in the following note which she sent me soon after she arrived in England. It is in her own handwriting, and is now published for the first time.

"It is said that the war was desired and made in a dynastic interest. Common sense only is needed to prove the contrary. The Plebiscitum had given great strength to the Empire; the war could add nothing to it. Were it fortunate, it might give glory, doubtless; but if unfortunate, it might overthrow the dynasty. What man in his senses would stake the existence of his country, and his own life, on a toss-up? No; the war was neither desired nor sought by the Emperor; it was submitted to. After the reforms of the 2d of January, parties acquired in France new power; they urged the Government on to war by manifestations and through the Press. Since 1866 the Opposition had never ceased to say to France that she was humiliated. Then---in 1866---the personal influence of the Emperor alone was able to avoid the conflict. But in 1870 he was overridden (débordé) having no longer the power in his hands."

Unfortunately, at this most critical moment, when prejudice and passion were creating public opinion and determining the national will, the advisers of the Emperor were neither intelligent enough nor conscientious enough to give him such counsel as would have been of service to their country. The Minister of War, especially, Marshal Lebœuf, an impetuous and indiscreet man, was guilty of having greatly deceived not only his sovereign, but the public, and perhaps himself, in regard to the real strength and efficiency of the French army, and its chances of success in case of a contest with Prussia. He told every one who came in contact with him that the French army was in an excellent condition, and that everything was prepared for immediate action. "I am ready," he said. "Never have we been so ready; never shall we be so ready; the war, sooner or later, is inevitable. Let us accept it." An expression of his of a similar kind, namely, "Not even a gaiter-button is wanting," has become known all over Europe. Unfortunately, there were many persons who could not see how exaggerated were these assertions of the Minister, and who therefore believed in their correctness.

Marshal Lebœuf not only gave the Emperor a wrong impression as to the general efficiency of the French army, but he also made averments concerning the armies and military resources of Germany, of which he knew but little, that were entirely erroneous.

Having myself traveled, at various times previous to 1870, in different parts of Prussia, and also in Southern Germany, I had everywhere observed with surprise the large place the army held in the daily life of the people. There was no town, no village, where military exercises could not be witnessed; nor could I fail to remark the splendid physical condition of the German soldier, how perfectly he had been trained, and how admirably prepared he was to face the contingency of war. Indeed, every one who had visited Germany shortly before the war of 1870, and who was not blind to the truth of things, received the same impression as myself and I could not refrain from communicating my views to the Emperor, during some of the conversations which I had with him.

A few days before the declaration of war, while with the Emperor in his cabinet, reference having been made to the Prussian military organization, I ventured to remark that, in my opinion, Germany would prove to be a very formidable antagonist to meet. At the request of his Majesty, I repeated this opinion to Marshal Lebœuf, who just at this moment joined us. The Marshal listened to my words, but seemed to doubt their truth, and gave me to understand that he had quite different views with regard to Germany. I asked him if these views were based upon personal investigation; if he was acquainted with those countries which seemed of so little importance to him, and whether he had been himself in Germany. His answer was that he had been in Germany, but that he had not seen much of it. I could not help retorting courteously, that he had possibly made his studies of Germany in Wiesbaden, Homburg, and Baden-Baden. While laughing at my remark, he acknowledged that, during his sojourns in Germany, he had generally limited his visits to the places mentioned, and to the borders of the Rhine. Of this I was persuaded in advance. Notwithstanding, however, his insufficient information with respect to the actual state of things in the enemy's country, the French Minister of War was foolhardy enough to speak to his sovereign of a march to Berlin and the conquest of Germany, with an assurance which would not admit of any possible doubt.

After having breakfasted at the Palace of Saint Cloud that morning with his Majesty, Marshal Lebœuf, and several other officials of the Empire, the Marshal and I descended the stairs together and passed out into the court, where, before he entered his carriage, an incident happened which I shall never forget, as what the Minister on this occasion said was so characteristic of the hyperbolic expressions used by him when speaking of the French army.

In front of the main entrance of the palace there stood a sentry on guard, who presented arms when the Marshal approached. The latter, evidently not noticing the person of the soldier, but carried away by the sight of the uniform, laid his hand upon the shoulder of the sentry, and, with his usual military enthusiasm, proudly exclaimed: "With such soldiers as this France is invincible!"

How ridiculous the exclamation was, and how difficult it was for me to suppress a smile, one may judge on learning that the sentry thus honored by his general was a young fellow far below the average height, and apparently destitute of every physical quality requisite to make a good soldier.

The day, however, was not far off when the over-confident Marshal had brought home to him the full weight of his personal responsibility for the disasters that overwhelmed his ill-conditioned and insufficiently equipped army. After the war, having retired to his estate in the country, he disappeared from view only to reappear in public as a witness before a parliamentary commission; and again, for the last time, on the 12th of January, 1873, at Chislehurst, when standing before the body of his Emperor, dethroned, and now rigid in death, he fell upon his knees, and sobbing violently, cried out in a voice choked with grief, "Oh, pardon me, Sire! "

With Marshal Lebœuf as Minister of War, and with the Duke de Gramont as Minister for Foreign Affairs, the destinies of France were in the keeping of men altogether incompetent to deal with a dangerous political situation---one from which no successful issue could be found without knowledge and the exercise of wisdom and tact. This was the thought which at that moment crossed my mind; and it is my belief that, in the year 1870, this thought was shared by many unprejudiced persons.

The Duke de Gramont insisted that an excellent opportunity had arrived to avenge France for having been deceived by Prussia after the battle of Sadowa; and the result was that, from the 5th of July until the 15th of that month, there passed no day on which some blunder was not committed by the Foreign Office. Telegram after telegram was sent to M. Benedetti, the French Ambassador at the Prussian Court, urging him, against his own good judgment, to make proposals to the Prussian King which, as could be foreseen, were not likely to be accepted. And the manner in which the Duke de Gramont, unwittingly and passionately playing into the hands of Count Bismarck, who cunningly led the game, finally succeeded in precipitating the rupture between France and Germany, is now well known.

I recognize that it is extremely easy to criticize acts in the light of subsequent events. Had the Duke de Gramont known before the declaration of war what everybody knew very soon after it, his policy would certainly not have been a bellicose one. And it is just as certain that the particular indiscretions of the Duke's policy would have been less remarked, if discovered at all, had the French met with the success they all confidently expected at the beginning of the war, or had the honors of battle been nearly equally divided between the combatants---in a word, had his Government possessed sufficient military strength to support him. He fully supposed---and he had reason to suppose---that the armies of France were not inferior to those of Prussia, or even of any probable German combination. To use his own words: "I resigned myself to the war; I made it (it was my only mistake) with absolute confidence of victory. For twenty years I have represented my country abroad; I believed in its greatness, in its strength, and in its military virtues, with almost as much confidence as I believe in my holy religion. What did I find on coming to Paris'? A confidence equal to my own. The men who were the most competent in the Senate and in the Legislative Assembly believed, all of them, that France was invincible. And if a few solitary voices formulated a doubt or a fear, they failed to do it in season. I do not intend to say by these words that it was a blind confidence in victory that inspired at the last hour the resolution of the Government. No, the war was inevitable; it was declared at Berlin, and in the Prussian determination there entered as its principal element an exact knowledge of the military forces of France and of the military forces of Germany."(23) The confidence of the Duke in the "invincibility" of France was but the natural consequence of the representations and assurances of Marshals Niel and Lebœuf, made without an exact knowledge of the military forces of either France or Germany.

It is but just, moreover, to remember the excited state of public feeling in France at this time, that it had a powerful influence on the Government, and that the action of the Duke was taken in compliance with the demands of the representatives of the people, and expressed the sovereign will of the nation.

Singular as it may seem, the Radical journals from the very beginning exceeded, if possible, in the violence of their language, those attached to the Government.

The Temps said: " Should a Prussian prince be placed upon the throne of Spain, we should be thrown back to the times not of Henry IV, but of Francis I."

The Siècle declared that "France, surrounded on every side by Prussia, or States subject to its influence, would be reduced to that isolated situation which led our ancient monarchy to those long wars with the House of Austria. The situation would be much worse than immediately after the treaties of 1815."

François Victor Hugo cried out in the Rappel: "The Hohenzollerns have reached such audacity that they aspire to dominate Europe. It will be for our time an eternal humiliation that this project has been, we will not say undertaken, but only conceived."

And such things were said before the candidature of Prince Leopold had been officially announced by the Government.

Stirred by these explosive manifestations of popular feeling, pushed on by the wild clamor that arose on every side, the Government, on the 6th of July, declared before the Chamber its intention to oppose the placing of the Spanish crown on the head of a Hohenzollern prince. This announcement of the Government's policy was unanimously approved by the Press.

Perhaps the best evidence of the extraordinary state of exasperation and passion into which Frenchmen managed in the course of a few days to mutually and foolishly excite themselves, is to be found in the effect on the people of the announcement made by M. Ollivier, on the 12th of July, that Prince Antoine of Hohenzollern had, on account of the opposition to the candidature of his son, withdrawn the acceptance given. Foreshadowing, as this act did, a pacific solution of a most difficult and dangerous question, one might presume that it would have been welcomed by the whole nation with intense satisfaction. On the contrary, it was received by the people with jeers, and among the crowds assembled in front of the cafés along the line of the boulevards, "La dépêche du père Antoine was repeated from one to another as the joke of the day, or only to provoke a fresh explosion of rage.

A Government journal having affirmed that "it is all we ask; it is a great victory, which has not cost a tear, not a drop of blood," the Presse answered: "This victory will be for us the worst of humiliations and the last of perils." And the Opinion Nationale wrote: "Since yesterday, all the journals friendly to the Government are eagerly repeating that peace has been made, that the quarrel has come to an end, and that we ought to rejoice. Nevertheless, no one is happy; we are sad, disappointed, and anxious."

The Soir said: "Were war declared to-day, the applause would shake the National Assembly. If war is not declared, it will be something more than a deception---it will be an immense burst of laughter, and the Cabinet will be drowned in its own silence."

The Gaulois wrote: " A great nation is stupefied. Hearts are bursting; the masses, ten, times more intelligent than our rulers, know that this 'pacific victory' will cost France more blood than pitched battles."

The National said: "It is a peace of ill-omen, the peace that has been talked about for the last twenty-four hours."

And M. Emile de Girardin shouted out, in the midst of the general uproar: "If the Prussians refuse to fight, we will force them to cross the Rhine and to clear out from the left bank, by clubbing their backs with the butts of our muskets."

When, finally, on the 15th of July, the Legislative Assembly was asked by the Government whether it should be war or peace, out of 257 votes, 247 were for war and but ten for peace. And this result, on being announced, was followed by indescribable manifestations of enthusiasm.

Nothing could more clearly indicate the general infatuation with respect to the issue of a war between France and Germany than that the very opponents of the Government in the Legislative Chamber expected nothing less than the final triumph of the French arms. Indeed, it was to prevent this, and what seemed to them its inevitable consequence---the consolidation of the Empire---that they refused to be convinced that there was a casus belli; but after having thrown all the responsibility for the situation upon the Government, with few exceptions they voted with the majority for war; for they, too, were unable to withstand the passionate appeals that came from the press and the people.

So deep was the feeling of indignation at the conduct of the Cabinet of Berlin, so universal the demand for vengeance, that Lord Lyons, in a despatch to Lord Granville, said:

"It is doubtful if the Government would have been able to resist the cry raised for the war, even had it been able to announce a decided diplomatic success."

The statement made in the French Legislative Chamber by the Duke de Gramont, on the 15th of July, 1870, was virtually a declaration of war; it then became evident to the world that hostilities between France and Germany had become unavoidable.

Those who were personally interested in the success of either the one or the other nation thought, of course, of little else but the desired victory; but those who, being neither Germans nor Frenchmen, were uninfluenced by patriotic sentiment, or national prepossessions and prejudices, at once foresaw the great sacrifice of life and the fearful suffering which a war would cause both to the victor and the vanquished, and recognized how deplorable, from a humane point of view, this conflict must be. Happily, there were not a few among them who felt it to be a duty to endeavor to mitigate its sad and painful consequences.

It was for this reason that I determined to render assistance, in every way in my power, to the sufferers of both armies, although my heart leaned naturally towards the French; for France had been my home for many years.

I desired also to avail myself of the opportunity which a war would offer of introducing the improved methods of transporting and treating the wounded and taking care of the sick which had been adopted in my own country during the great war of 1861-65, and which I had been laboring for many years to bring to the knowledge of the friends of army medical reform throughout the world.

In the year 1867, during the Exposition Universelle in Paris, I exhibited a number of ambulance wagons, and models of field and post hospitals, together with a collection of the excellent hospital and sanitary appliances which, after careful trial, had been adopted in the United States Army, or been used or approved by the United States Sanitary Commission. To this exhibit was awarded one of the eight grand prizes given at that exhibition. It was the only "Grand Prix" obtained by an American. Indeed, I found that my endeavors to make this apparatus known to European surgeons and army officials, as well as to introduce in camps the new methods used for the hospitalization and treatment of the sick and wounded, were greatly appreciated in military circles. At that time, however, no one imagined how soon there would be an opportunity in Europe to make a practical test of the value of these new appliances and methods.

The Emperor, after a visit to this exhibit, which interested him greatly, said to me that he hoped the day was very far off when they should have occasion in France to make use of these interesting inventions.

Not only had the time now suddenly arrived for organizing assistance in behalf of the victims of war, but there were serious reasons for believing that it would be found necessary, very soon, to provide accommodation for the treatment of the wounded in the capital itself of the French Empire.

I proposed, therefore, to establish an ambulance in Paris, where the wounded could be treated, so far as possible, under conditions similar to those which had been attended with the best results in the United States---in short, to give a practical demonstration of the great advantages to be secured by making extensive use of field hospitals "under canvas," instead of crowding the wounded into churches and public and private buildings, as has been the custom in all armies and in all times.

The apparatus which I had shown during the Exposition, and which I still had in my possession, formed a good basis for the establishment of such an ambulance; but as there was much wanting to complete it, I undertook to procure more tents and additional medical and surgical supplies from the United States.

On the 18th of July a meeting of Americans was held at my office, for the purpose of considering what we, representing the Paris American colony, and also to a certain extent our countrymen at home, ought to do in view of the approaching conflict and its impending and fearful consequences. About twenty-five persons were present.

At this meeting I stated that while, by contributions of money, we might furnish the means of relieving much suffering, and at the same time give expression to our feelings of humanity and international sympathy, it seemed to me that the most effective way in which we could use our money and give our assistance, under the existing circumstances, would be by establishing, in connection with the French and German armies, working examples of the American system of taking care of sick and wounded soldiers; and I insisted that such an addition to the sanitary knowledge of Europe would be far more valuable than any mere donation of material aid to either French or German ambulances, though it were possible to collect thousands of dollars for that purpose.

All of the gentlemen present at that meeting agreed with me, and promised me their cooperation in establishing one or more field-hospitals with the necessary accessories, to be constructed and managed in accordance with those principles which had received the sanction of American experience as being most suitable in war. A committee was thereupon appointed, under my presidency, with full power to carry on the work of "relieving the wants and sufferings of soldiers during the war which is now anticipated between France and Prussia."

I may remark, en passant, that such an ambulance was subsequently established in Paris, and that a large number of wounded were there taken care of during the siege, in the winter of 1870-71, in a way that realized in every respect my intentions and my hopes. It attracted the attention not only of the surgeons connected with the Service de Santé and the military hospitals, but of the principal officers of the army and the members of the Government. The surgical results reported by those in charge of this ambulance were surprising. The Press was filled with commendatory notices concerning its organization and management. Other ambulances were opened in Paris by the French Société de Secours aux Blessés, in which the same system and the same appliances were closely copied. And the Government of the Défense Nationale, at the end of the siege, as an expression of its appreciation of the services rendered by this model American field-hospital, conferred the decoration of the Legion of Honor on no less than seventeen Americans, members of the staff employed in the general direction of the establishment, or in the service of its several departments, and raised me to the rank of Commander in the same order.(24)

While preparations were being made for the execution of my plan for ameliorating the condition of the sick and wounded during the impending war, the political events became from day to day more important and more exciting.

The Declaration of War created the greatest enthusiasm all over France, and the Press was nearly unanimous in applauding the resolution taken by the Government and by the Legislative Assembly. Even the most radical journals proclaimed their approbation of the decision of the Ministry. Some extracts from the papers of the Opposition will be sufficient to prove this assertion.

The Univers said: "The war in which we are about to engage is, on the part of France, neither the work of a party nor an adventure imposed by the sovereign. The nation undertakes it willingly. It is not the Emperor Napoleon III. who of his own accord has declared this war. It is we who have forced his hand."

The Liberté said: "For several days we have not ceased to call for war. We have asked for it in all our prayers. The future, and the near future, will tell whether we have been right or wrong. Our soul and our conscience tell us that, in acting thus and in demanding war, we have obeyed the duty which, outside of all other considerations, the dignity and the honor of France impose upon us."

The Monde wrote: "The Chamber was stupefied when it saw some of its members---let us hasten to say a feeble minority, however---protest by their votes against the war, the most just, the most necessary, and the most opportune . . . . The Keeper of the Seals expressed the sentiment of France when he showed astonishment on account of the long debates on a question which is so clear, and when he called upon the Chamber to pass from words to acts. Yes, this mourning which has already commenced, these tears which are already shed, all this has become a necessary and unavoidable evil.

The Government of the Emperor recognized this political truth when it yielded nobly, admirably, to the inmost desire of France. If the enemy is ready before we are, then the useless and scandalous discussions heard last Friday in the Palais Bourbon have been the cause of its being in advance."

The Opinion Nationale said: "And we Republicans, Democrats, Socialists, citizens of an ideal fatherland, let us return to our real fatherland, and let us sustain it in its struggle, without troubling ourselves about the persons and things that divide us. A truce at this moment to all intestine disputes!"

The Presse had under the heading, "The National War," an article which contained the following words: "The cries of war, which resounded yesterday on our boulevards, will now fill France, and sustain our army in the heroic struggle to which the insolence of Prussia provokes us. The resolutions of war which we are about to take do not emanate from the Government. The Government has been irresolute; it allowed itself, by some of its chiefs, at least, to be drawn into making absurd concessions. These resolves go out from the very soul, so to speak, of the country itself. They are the result of all the irritation of national sentiment against the system of slavery which threatened to weigh down Europe," etc.

Perfectly in accordance with the conclusions and the language of the Paris Press was the feeling of the majority of the nation at that time. "It is now," said M. Émile Ollivier, on receiving Bismarck's falsified despatch, "beyond the power of man to avert this war." The question at issue from that moment ceased to be a diplomatic affair, or a matter that concerned only the Imperial Government. The two nations, Prussia and France, had been thrown in collision, and were immediately in flames. A war of races was now inevitable. When M. Gambetta, on the morning after the publication of this famous despatch, said, in the Chamber of Deputies, "The purpose of this war is to settle forever between the French and Germanic races the question of preponderance," his words only expressed what every Frenchman then felt. To the challenge "Qui vive?" the answer came in a voice of thunder, "La France!" The French capital was seized with irrepressible enthusiasm and wild excitement. Every night, for more than a week, after the resolution of the Government became known, the boulevards were filled by the populace, whose numbers were so great as to make it impossible for carriages to proceed along the roadway. All the people of Paris seemed to be possessed with a species of contagious hysterical insanity. The spectacle presented by these nocturnal demonstrations was most extraordinary. The foreign visitors in Paris looked on from the windows of their hotels, or other stations of vantage, with wonder and astonishment. They were manifestations not so much of patriotic feeling, as of rage and an irrepressible desire for vengeance. The dominant cry, the one that rose above and drowned all others, was "À bas la Prusse!"

But while the populace gathered by night in the streets, marching in columns a thousand strong, and crying "À bas la Prusse!" "A Berlin!" other crowds of people assembled during the day before the windows of the money-changers, in order to read the last quotations. The Bourse, and the square in which it stands, could not hold the enormous number of persons who wished to ascertain as quickly as possible the value of stocks and bonds; from the Rue Vivienne as far as the Boulevard des Capucines, the streets presented that peculiar spectacle, a swaying, surging mass of gesticulating, vociferating humanity, which in times of peace was only to be seen on the floor, or in the perlieus of the Stock Exchange. Nor was the depreciation in value limited to French securities. Stocks and bonds of nearly every description were affected. British consols and United States bonds fell off almost as many points as French rentes. The incalculable consequences of the conflict that was imminent between the two greatest Powers on the Continent of Europe unsettled prices everywhere, and disturbed profoundly the money-markets of the world.

Everywhere were loud voices, wild exclamations, and dense crowds. The omnibuses could not pursue their usual route along the boulevards, but had to take parallel streets, and even there they could proceed only with difficulty.

The Prefect of Police, after the declaration of war, authorized the singing of the "Marseillaise" at the café-concerts, and liberal use was made of this permission.

Even those places where, in times of peace, great ceremony was observed, and where a breach of etiquette would have been regarded as intolerable, became, from the 15th of July, scenes of the most extraordinary manifestations of patriotic feeling.

At the Grand Opera one evening, after the "Marseillaise" had been wildly applauded, some persons gave expression to their desire to hear Alfred de Musset 's long-forgotten "Rhin Allemand."

This desire was seconded at once by the whole audience present in the theater, and loud calls for the "Rhin Allemand" were heard on every side. The Régisseur appeared on the stage and announced that none of the opera-singers knew the words. This, however, did not satisfy the excited crowd; and in order to quiet the tumult, which had become unbearable, M. Faure finally agreed to sing the "Rhin Allemand" from the notes. After that evening, this song, as well as the "Marseillaise" was sung every night at the Opera until the threatening prospect of a siege put an end to the amusement.

Not only the capital, but every city, every village, of France, was seized with military enthusiasm; and there were but few Frenchmen that were not carried away by the popular excitement. Among these was the Emperor.

"Napoleon III.," says a contemporary writer, " had no part in the general intoxication; his enthusiasm was that of a soul inspired by great subjects. He did not know that enthusiasm of the imagination which darkens reason and gives birth to illusions."

The Emperor's heart was full of anxiety, because he had seriously studied the chances of the war. He foresaw the possible consequences to himself, his dynasty, and his country; but he believed in his destiny and had confidence in his army. And if he was mistaken with respect to its ability to promptly and successfully execute the plan of campaign that had been agreed upon, it was largely on account of the incorrect information which he received from his ministers. No monarch, no head of any great institution, can make sure of everything by immediate personal investigation; he must study carefully the reports of those whom he has charged with the examination of the details of his affairs, and do his best to learn their opinion. Napoleon III. did this, and even more.

The Emperor seldom relied exclusively upon the opinion of his ministers, but made himself well acquainted even with many of the details of the administration, and especially with those concerning the military affairs of the country. He was continually instituting inquiries with regard to the condition and serviceableness of the war matériel, and concerning the different kinds of arms in use; and not only spent a great deal of his time in improving the artillery, which in modern wars has become of such great importance, but he also tried to obtain a correct knowledge of the general state and efficiency of the army.

Thus, for instance, in the year 1867, after the trouble with Prussia with respect to the Duchy of Luxembourg, he said to General Lebrun, "We have escaped. But from this moment we ought to think of the future, and in peace to be always ready for war; so that, should an event occur similar to the one we have just had to deal with, we may not be found living in a fool's paradise, and absolutely unprepared to defend ourselves."

And thereupon, in order to obtain a clear insight into the existing military organization as a working mechanism, he himself thoroughly investigated it, and gave particular consideration to plans for the formation of independent armies on French territory; the object being to obtain thereby an organization of the national forces more mobile and effective, and more in accordance with the requirements of modern war. The results of his studies were subsequently (in 1867) published in a memoir which he submitted to Marshal Niel, then Minister of War.

Indeed, the Army was always a special object of interest and solicitude with the Emperor, and nothing that might in any way contribute to the health, comfort, and efficiency of the French soldier ever failed, when brought to his notice, to find in him an earnest advocate.

I have already spoken of the interest taken by the Emperor in the War of the Rebellion of 1861-65, and of my efforts to keep him well informed with respect to its progress. But it was not information relating only to questions of strategy and tactics that he wished to have; he wanted to know all about the organization of the commissariat and the quartermaster's department, and particularly about the kind of food and the quality of the clothing issued to the soldiers. At his request, I sent to the United States for samples of the clothing, the daily rations, and other supplies furnished by the Federal Government to the army while in active service. Many of these articles---such as desiccated vegetables, desiccated eggs, condensed milk, and so forth---were either American inventions or were used in the United States army on a scale vastly greater than had ever before been known. All these things interested his Majesty very much; and I remember now how, after examining with considerable care a specimen of the famous blue overcoats worn by the Federal soldiers, he exclaimed, "C'est très bien." In making his inquiries, no new facts seemed to be too trivial to be disregarded; and he liked to see the facts that he believed to be important stated in writing, if not in print. And while informing himself about the instruments made use of, or the means taken to increase the efficiency of the army in my own country, I observed that he always appreciated these things in proportion to the extent to which he thought they might, perhaps, be adopted or employed with advantage in the French army.

The reports which the military authorities gave to the Emperor just before the war began, in July, 1870, were such that he was forced to believe France was sufficiently prepared to enter into a war with Germany without incurring any extraordinary hazards.

It is true that he was aware there existed a considerable difference in the numerical strength of the armies of the two countries; but this difference was, as the best French strategists maintained, not sufficient to prejudice the success of the French, provided the regiments could be mobilized and concentrated quickly enough to make an immediate attack upon the enemy.

General Charigarnier gave his opinion on the subject of numerical inferiority in war in the following words: "Do not let us try to make the number of our soldiers equal to that of our eventual adversaries; even by exhausting all our resources we should not succeed in doing so, but this should give us no anxiety. It is difficult for 3,000 men to fight successfully against 5,000; but it is not so difficult for 60,000 to fight against 100,000. The more the numbers themselves increase, the less dangerous is a numerical inferiority."(25)

This opinion was shared by most of the French military authorities, among others by the Prince de Joinville, by Admiral Rigault de Genouilly, and by Marshal Lebœuf. But, of course, the conditio sine quâ non was that Marshal Lebœuf's statement in regard to the perfect readiness of the army to move should be correct. And this, as will be seen later, was not the case.

That the Emperor well understood the seriousness of the war which he was forced to undertake, may be seen from the significant reply which he made to the long and optimistic address pronounced by M. Rouher in presence of the Senate, which on the 16th of July had assembled at St. Cloud to express to his Majesty their patriotic sentiments. "We begin," said the Emperor, "a serious struggle. France will need the assistance of all her children."

These words of the Emperor should not be forgotten now, after the apprehensions of Europe have been verified. An impartial mind must recognize the fact that the defeat of the French in the war of 1870 was not due to any neglect on the part of Napoleon III, but that, on the contrary, the Emperor did all in his power to insure the victory to France. Had the people, on their part, not deserted him, after forcing him to declare war, and had they still maintained the character attributed to them by Cæsar, when he wrote, "Nefas more Gallorem est, etiam in extremâ fortunâ deserere patronos" (It is considered shameful by the Gauls to desert their leaders, even in the greatest adversity), it is but fair to suppose that the issue of this war might have been very different from what it was. The strength of Germany lay in its unity, and in the loyalty of its inhabitants; the weakness of France in its want of unity, and in the disloyalty of its citizens at a moment when all party interests and dynastic considerations should have been forgotten. Interior dissensions encourage and strengthen the common enemy; while even with the feeblest government success is possible in case the people unite all their efforts. In the discord which reigned in France in the year 1870, and in the action of certain men who had been, and were then, willing to sacrifice the army, the country, everything, to gratify their political hatred or satisfy their personal ambition, the direct cause of the defeat of the French is to be recognized. France was in need of the assistance of all her children.

The French nation had wished for war, and now the preparations for the contest began. On the 16th of July, at nine o'clock in the morning, a bill containing the following announcement was posted on the walls of the Eastern Railway Station:

"From this date (July 16th) the passenger service upon the lines of the Eastern Railway will be partially suspended. Travelers are requested to apply to the stationmaster for information regarding the departure of trains."

This proved that the advance of the army to the frontier had been decided upon.

On the same day, towards noon, thousands of people hurried to this station in order to witness the departure of the troops. At three o'clock the Ninety-fifth Regiment of the Line, which had been stationed at Fort de Bicêtre, arrived. It was accompanied by a large crowd singing the "Marseillaise" and crying "Vive l'Armée." The number of spectators assembled between the entrance-gates and the station was so large that the soldiers could only proceed with difficulty.

The Eighty-first Regiment arrived at nearly the same time, led by a band playing the "Marseillaise."

The appearance of these soldiers was far from reassuring; and although, under the circumstances, the cries of "A Berlin" and the noisy anticipations of victory were pardonable, and more or less confusion was to be expected, the unprejudiced witness could not fail to be struck with the want of discipline, solidity, and seriousness which was plainly visible in their ranks.

A still greater disappointment was produced by the appearance of the Gardes Mobiles. No real patriot who looked at these young men, some of whom appeared on the street in a partially intoxicated state, accompanied by women in the same condition, could help having grave apprehensions as to the success of the war; and many a face was saddened when companies of these ill-conditioned levies were seen to fill the trains that were leaving Paris.

Darker and darker grew the horizon, and it became plainer from day to day that the tempest of war was approaching.

On the 26th of July the Emperor Napoleon III. began to make his arrangements to leave the Palace of Saint Cloud for the purpose of assuming the command of the army; perhaps the most important of these was the appointment of the Empress, by special decree, Regent of the Empire.

For seventeen years the sovereign who was thus called to represent her country, in the midst of the vicissitudes of a great struggle, had shared the prosperous government of the Emperor; she had adorned the most splendid court in Europe by her intelligence, the brilliancy of her wit, by her grace and her beauty; and her ardent patriotism, and ever-present sympathy for the poor and suffering, justly entitled her to the confidence and love of the people.

Her noble character well qualified her for the position she was now to hold, and her knowledge of the affairs of government which she had obtained through the interest she had always taken in them, and by means of the instruction which she had received, rendered her perfectly competent to govern the country she loved so dearly. She had often taken part in the Cabinet councils during the years of peace, and the Emperor had explained to her the mechanism and initiated her into all the mysteries of State affairs; for he wished that the mother of the Prince Imperial should be able, in case of necessity, to educate her son for the serious tasks which the future might devolve upon him.

That her Majesty fully comprehended her responsibility and well understood her duty, must be acknowledged by all who have studied the history of the Regency; and few would blame her for anything that happened during the short period of her administration, were they to consider under what difficulties it was entered upon and conducted. Even the most excellent qualifications of the Regent could not remedy the organic defect in the Government, which consisted in the restriction of her power at a time when it should have been concentrated in her person alone, and when she should have been subject to no other will or opinion than that of the Emperor and his ministers.

In the year 1859 she was able, as Regent, to discharge her duties easily and successfully, for she was free; while in the year 1870, under the "liberal Empire," her initiative was destroyed, and she was unable to act with any freedom on account of the interference of the Legislative Assembly, which, instead of simply maintaining its place as a coordinate power, tried to usurp the functions of the Executive, and thus hampered all her movements. The most perfect, the most democratic Republics that have ever existed, have concentrated authority in times of war. The Roman Commonwealth, for instance, placed the supreme power, in times of danger, in the hands of one man, a Dictator, while the French nation, although ruled by a constitutional monarch, tried to limit the power of the Regent by establishing an oligarchy that interfered directly and constantly with her duties. If these facts are considered, the results will not be wondered at.

The Emperor decided to leave Saint Cloud on the 28th of July, and I went to the palace on the morning of that day to bid him farewell. Clouds covered the sky, and there was a heaviness in the atmosphere that seemed to forebode evil. The evening before, the Emperor, the Empress, and the Prince Imperial, as I learned, had partaken of the Communion at the hands of Monseigneur Darboy, the venerable Archbishop of Paris, who was assassinated by the Communists a few months later. Soon after I arrived, the Emperor, with the Empress and Prince Imperial, came out of the apartments of her Majesty into the great salon, where those who had come to bid him good-by had gathered together. With a kind word or a pressure of the hand for every one, he passed on. As he took leave of those whom he knew intimately, and of his ministers and the members of the Imperial household who were present on this occasion, it seemed to me that there was an unusual tone of tenderness in his voice, and an expression of sadness on his face such as I had never seen before. To some one saying, " In a fortnight your Majesty will be in Berlin," he replied solemnly, "No, don't expect that, even if we are successful." He doubtless still believed in his destiny; but certainly no longer with assurance in his good fortune. Although apparently perfectly calm, it was evident that he was profoundly agitated. I noticed that he was smoking a cigar, something quite unusual for him to do.

About ten o'clock he got into his carriage to go to the station at the extremity of the park, where he was to take the train; the Empress being at his side, nervous, striving to look cheerful, and holding in her hand the hand of the young Prince, whose eyes had filled with tears at the thought of leaving his mother. The carriage started immediately---the Emperor, after bowing to the people assembled in the Court, looking straight ahead, but seemingly observing nothing.

Together with many others I went to the station, where for the last time the Emperor received us, bidding good-by to those with whom he had not before spoken, until the signal was given for the train to leave. Then, turning to the Empress, he embraced her tenderly, and, after stepping into the carriage reserved for him and his suite, he looked back and waved his hand toward her; while we stood watching, in silence and with deep feeling, this really touching separation of the Imperial family.

As the train moved slowly away, all heads were uncovered, and the cry of "Vive l'Empereur!" rang out, weak in volume but sharp and clear. In a few moments the Emperor and the Prince Imperial were out of sight, and the Empress, struggling to suppress her sobs, was on her way back to the palace, where she had spent so many happy days, where the first weeks of her married life had been passed, and which, beautiful and enduring as it then seemed to be, as if having served the purpose for which it had been created, and associated in some mysterious way with the fortune of the Imperial Government---for here it was, in 1804, that the Empire of Napoleon was proclaimed---a few months later was only a shapeless heap of twisted iron and calcined marble.

I could not fail to be profoundly impressed with the difference there was between the morale of those connected with this departure, whether as principals or witnesses, and that exhibited on the occasion of the Emperor's leaving Paris in 1859, to join the army in Italy. Then, the streets filled with immense crowds, flags everywhere the Emperor left the Tuileries in a carriage driven by postilions, surrounded by the great dignitaries of the Court, officers in brilliant uniforms, and the cuirassiers of the Guard, and was received all along the route to the Lyons Railway Station with the wildest enthusiasm, he himself saluting the vast assemblage, calm and confident. The popular exaltation carried with it a presage and an assurance of victory that gave to that departure the appearance of a triumph. Now, attended by a few members of his Government, his personal staff, and his official household, avoiding the capital, silently, almost secretly, the Emperor goes off to meet his destiny.

In these later years many sayings of the Emperor have been reported revealing his sense of the very doubtful result of the war; but the most conspicuous proof of his full appreciation of the gravity of the situation was the care with which, when leaving for the head-quarters of his army, he avoided the demonstrations of enthusiasm with which he would have been greeted by the people of Paris had he appeared among them, and to which in his own soul he could find no response.

As I returned to Paris, mingled thoughts of fear and hope crossed my mind, but the feeling of anxiety prevailed. To an unprejudiced person, the future of France could look but dark and uncertain, and I was quite prepared to hear that the French army had met with a repulse at the frontier. The campaign, however, proved to be far more disastrous than I had anticipated or even thought possible.

On the evening of the 28th of July, the Emperor, accompanied by the Prince Imperial, arrived at Metz for the purpose of taking the chief command. He had left Saint Cloud, as we have said, troubled with doubts and with sad misgivings. The chief cause of his uneasiness was that he knew his army might have to contend with an enemy superior in numbers, and reported by his own most highly credited agents to possess great military qualities; but he knew also that he had done all he could to make the armies of France efficient, and that, if his country had to suffer on account of not having enough men under arms, or from insufficient preparation for this emergency, the blame could not justly be placed upon him.