THE BATTLE FOR NORTH AFRICA

1940-43

by

W. G. F. Jackson

WITH MAPS BY CAROLINE METCALFE-GIBSON

But it was in North Africa that a really great opportunity was missed owing to the failure of our highest authorities to appreciate the strategic possibilities of the African theatre.

ROMMEL

f

MASON / CHARTER
NEW YORK

1975

CONTENTS

List of Maps
 List of Sketch Maps
 List of Illustrations
 Preface

PART 1---BRITISH IMPERIALISM

Chapter 1 ---The Price of British Idealism
Chapter 2 ---The Hollowness of the Italian Challenge
Chapter 3 ---The British Commonwealth's Reply
Chapter 4 ---The British Fashion of War
Chapter 5 ---British Strategic Misjudgments

PART 2---GERMAN PROFESSIONALISM

Chapter 6 ---Gathering the Fruits of British Strategic Misjudgments
Chapter 7 ---British Tactical Mistakes
Chapter 8 ---The Shadows of 'Barbarossa' and Lend-Lease
Chapter 9 ---Buying Battle Experience
Chapter 10 ---The Shadow of Pearl Harbour and the Spur of Malta
Chapter 11--- The High Water of German Professionalism

PART 3---AMERICAN MATERIALISM

Chapter 12 ---The Rising American Tide
Chapter 13 ---Command and Material Superiority at Last
Chapter 14 ---Unequal Battle Experience
Chapter 15 ---The Sword is Forged

Bibliography

PREFACE

The army (British and American) then in England lacked battle experience and had tended to become theoretical rather than practical. Officers did not understand those tricks of the battlefield which mean so much to junior officers and which save so many lives.'

Montgomery describing the armies in England before 'Overlord' (Memoirs: page 717).

Military academies, staff colleges and students of war on both sides of the Atlantic will always be interested in Eisenhower's 'Overlord' invasion of Europe, but the North African Campaign, which made 'Overlord' possible, will receive less attention than it deserves because the connection between the two is not immediately obvious. The Allied sword, which Eisenhower wielded so successfully in June 1944, was forged and tempered in the long three year struggle in the deserts, mountains and jungles of Africa north and east of the Sahara. In these operations, British and American servicemen gained battle experience; staffs learnt their business; equipment was proved; and battle-winning tactics were evolved. The final phases of the North African fighting also provided the essential dress-rehearsal for 'Overlord' without which the American Chiefs of Staff, particularly General George Marshall, would not have appreciated how outclassed the American forces and their British colleagues would have been if they had tried to land in Northern France in late 1942 or early 1943 as Marshall advocated. And there is another and deeper reason for connecting the North African Campaign with 'Overlord'. Western-type democracies can rarely be ready for war. In the 1930s Britain and America were no exceptions and were forced to buy time in which to rebuild their neglected military establishments in the face of Nazi, Fascist and Japanese aggression. The narrowness of the English Channel compelled Britain to fight for time; the broad sweep of the Atlantic allowed America to buy time initially by diplomatic means. The 'Battle of Britain' fought in the air, the 'Battle of the Atlantic' fought at sea, and the 'Battle of North Africa' fought at sea, on land and in the air, were Britain's contribution to the Western World's strategic delaying action. It is just as important to study the failures---and there were more failures than successes---of British and American servicemen in Northern Africa, when they were fighting against odds, as it is to concentrate upon the halcyon days of 'Overlord' when experience and resources had been accumulated and victory was assured.

The 'North African Campaign' is the study of human endeavour as men fought with inadequate resources to make good British and American military neglect. The story falls into three distinct periods. In the first, entitled 'British Imperialism', the forces of the British Commonwealth and Empire clashed with Mussolini's 'Roman' legions and all but destroyed the Italian African Empire before the Germans could intervene. In the second period, 'German Professionalism', Rommel came almost as near to destroying the British position in the Middle East. And in the third period, 'American Materialism', American equipment and supplies and the eventual arrival of American forces in French North Africa brought the long campaign to an end with the surrender of quarter of a million Axis soldiers in Tunisia in May 1943.

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