IN 1929 Franklin Roosevelt and I were colleagues on the Board of Trustees of Vassar College. One day in the spring of that year after a meeting of the Board Mrs. Roosevelt, who had been waiting for the close of the meeting, asked whether she might give a lift in her auto to any member of the Board who was going in the direction of New York City. I wanted to make a visit at Scarsdale, about twenty miles from the city, and gladly availed myself of the offer. On the way down we discussed Mr. Roosevelt's chances of success in becoming the Democratic nominee for the Presidency, a development I earnestly wished. We had not gone many miles before we stopped at the estate of Henry Morgenthau, Jr., to have afternoon tea. Henry Morgenthau, Sr. had been a trustee of the Institute of International Education for many years but I had never happened to meet his son. I saw at once the intimate friendship that existed between the Roosevelts and the Morgenthaus, which was obviously of long standing.
At that time I lived in an apartment house in Sixty-fifth Street, three doors from the Roosevelt home. Sometime afterward Mr. Roosevelt invited me over for a talk. We discussed the campaign for the nomination briefly, and then Mr. Roosevelt asked, "Do you know Sumner Welles?" I answered, "No," but stated that I had read Mr. Welles' book, Naboth's Vineyard, and found it very worth while. "If I am nominated for the Presidency and am elected, I shall rely largely upon Sumner Welles as my adviser on foreign policy," said Mr. Roosevelt. From that day to this Mr. Roosevelt has to a great extent relied upon Sumner Welles for advice upon foreign affairs. I afterward became acquainted with both Mr. Hull and Mr. Welles and have greatly admired their ability.
I had long been aware of the suspicion and distrust of the United States maintained throughout Latin America. My visit to the countries of South America in 1931 confirmed my belief. I regard the pronouncement and implementation of the Good Neighbor policy as one of the outstanding successes of American diplomacy. The three men, Roosevelt, Hull, and Welles, who have been the builders of that policy deserve unstinted gratitude from their fellow countrymen. One can readily imagine what might have happened in this war period had the former attitude of resentment toward and mistrust of the United States prevailed in Latin America.
From the standpoint of foreign policy it is also most fortunate that the Roosevelt administration has been retained for three successive terms, because ever since 1933 many influential Latin Americans have wondered whether the Good Neighbor policy was fully supported by the North American people as well as by President Roosevelt's administration. Most of them now realize that this program has received the active endorsement of leaders in both major political parties in this country, and has really become an established policy of the United States.
The Seventh Pan American Conference was due to be held at Montevideo in 1933. President Roosevelt established the setting for the success of the conference through a speech made two months after his inauguration. In that speech he eschewed intervention by the United States in the internal affairs of any Latin American country. The Latin American peoples have always regarded that principle as a sine qua non for harmonious relations with the United States. At the conference the modesty, urbanity, and obvious sincerity of Mr. Hull moderated the suspicion with which some bitter representatives of the Latin American countries viewed the United States. He did not adhere rigidly to formalities. Unlike the procedure at former Pan American conferences, Mr. Hull did not expect the chairmen of other delegations to wait for the chairman of the United States delegation. He visited the others first. The American delegation went to Montevideo determined to sense the attitude of the Latin Americans toward the problems which concerned the nations of the hemisphere as a whole. For the first time in many years the United States delegation was cordially received by the Latin American delegates.
One day while preparations for the conference were being made, Mr. Hull, with whom I was discussing another matter, said to me, "What do you think we ought to do with the Platt Amendment?" "Repeal it," I answered. "I am glad to hear you say so. That's my view." "What attitude do you think we ought to take with reference to the Monroe Doctrine?" "Make it a basis for collective rather than unilateral action," I answered. Again Mr. Hull stated that that was also his view. Now I knew that my name had been mentioned as a possible delegate to the Conference and because of the way in which my views on two of the major topics that might be considered conformed to those of Mr. Hull, I was hopeful of being selected. Mr. Hull had told me that there would be but six delegates and all but the sixth were of necessity predetermined, namely, himself as Chairman of the delegation, the American Ambassadors at Montevideo and Buenos Aires, an authority on economic relations with Latin America, and a distinguished Republican. Before a final decision could be made, the embattled cohorts of the various women's organizations marched upon Washington with a demand that one representative be a woman. Miss Sophonisba Breckenridge of Kentucky, who had always been deeply interested in Latin American affairs, displaced my chance, if there had ever been one, of going to Montevideo as an official delegate.
As described in Chapter II, the Institute of International Education was founded as a private organization without any governmental affiliations. This fact secured for it a great deal of the respect and confidence with which it has been regarded in foreign countries, especially in the so-called "backward" countries. It was generally conceded that its activities were carried on without any political or nationalistic motives and for cultural purposes only. Our State Department had always looked with favor upon this attitude of the Institute because it conformed with its own policy of refraining from propaganda of any kind in foreign countries. However, this policy placed the United States at a disadvantage in making its civilization and culture known in foreign lands. In the Latin American countries, for example, France, Germany, Italy and, to a less extent, Great Britain repeatedly---in some cases annually---sent distinguished scholars to lecture in the universities. After Hitler had been in control of the German government for three years, the Germans developed a regular program of sending Nazi professors to the Latin American countries and inviting groups of Latin American students to study in Germany at German-government expense. Americans finally waked up to the wisdom of having in their Department of State a division similar to that maintained in the foreign offices of other major powers, which would give general oversight to our educational and cultural relations with other nations.
In 1938 I was invited by the State Department to attend a conference of some fifteen persons to consider the formation of a Division of Cultural Relations within the Department. Mr. Hull opened the meeting to explain the general purpose of the new division, after which the conference was turned over to Mr. Welles who presided during the consideration of the agenda. Both gentlemen emphasized the point that although the new division was to consider our cultural relations with all countries, nevertheless because we had hitherto neglected developing those relations with the Latin American peoples as against the European, and also because the German drive in Latin America was developing more and more into an anti-American movement, the new Division would devote its attention at first to our cultural relations with the Latin American republics. Dr. Leo Rowe, the Director of the Pan American Union, was naturally the first person from whom Mr. Welles asked an opinion. It was very gratifying to me to hear Dr. Rowe state that no organization in our country had done more than the Institute of International Education to further our cultural and educational relations with Latin America, especially in the exchange of students and teachers, and to listen to Mr. Welles reply that the State Department was deeply appreciative of what the Institute had already accomplished in the republics to the south of us.
At first the new Division followed the policy that had hitherto been maintained of merely giving moral support to private agencies engaged in cultural activities with the Latin American nations. But at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace held at Buenos Aires in December 1936, a convention had been adopted, Article VIII of which provided for the annual interchange of one professor and two graduate students between the various republics of the Western Hemisphere that ratified the convention. The Directors of the three great scholarly organizations, the National Research Council, the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies, and the Director of the Guggenheim Foundation were invited to become members of a committee to implement Article VIII of the Buenos Aires Pact. The Department added the Professor of Latin American History at Goucher College, who also represented women, and the Professor of Political Science at Bryn Mawr, who had been one of the American delegates at the Buenos Aires conference. Mr. Hull appointed me as chairman of the committee. At all the meetings of the committee representatives of the Division of Cultural Relations and of the Office of Education were present to advise. Thus the first step in governmental support of cultural relations with foreign countries was undertaken.
At the Havana conference of Foreign Ministers in July 1940, the information presented by delegates from some of the Latin American countries showed that German propaganda in those countries was not only very anti-United States but deliberately directed to attacking the democratic ideal of social organization, and to fostering totalitarian ideology. Hence, although we were not at the time participants in the war, our government with the approval of all Americans---isolationists and interventionists---determined to undertake measures to uphold our influence in the Latin American countries and defend the democratic against the totalitarian way of life. Therefore President Roosevelt on August 16, 1940, appointed Nelson Rockefeller Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics. His title was afterward, on July 30, 1941, changed to the more appropriate one of "Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs". That Mr. Rockefeller should have been appointed coordinator of commercial affairs is wholly understandable. He had become a very successful young executive and administrator in New York City, and his experience in business could be expected to enable him to grasp quickly our commercial and financial relations with the Latin American countries. But he was practically unknown in the field of educational and scholarly affairs. Moreover, only two years had passed since the State Department had organized the new Division of Cultural Relations with the particular aim of developing those relations with the Latin American countries. It is true that the new Division had not accomplished much outside the United States and had exerted only a moral influence within the United States. But this was almost wholly because it had been provided with practically no funds, whereas the Coordinator received an allotment of a substantial amount from the President's emergency fund. Nevertheless, the Division of Cultural Relations and the Coordinator's Office at once cooperated in the most friendly and helpful manner and in 1941 both organizations were adequately provided with funds by Congress to carry on their activities. Mr. Rockefeller, with whom I had a slight acquaintance before his appointment, proved to be not merely an efficient administrator but a man endowed with imagination who was very desirous to learn the various fields of his difficult assignment and to obtain advice from specialists in those fields.
In October 1938 Mr. Hull had appointed an Advisory Committee to the State Department on Cultural Relations with Latin America, and I was included. The committee met several times a year to plan ways and means of making the United States better understood among the Latin American peoples and the Latin American republics better known to our people. Every agency that might help to accomplish the purpose was considered: the radio, moving pictures, newspapers, libraries, translations, visits of distinguished states men and men of affairs, and interchange of artists, musicians, scientists and technicians. I was the adviser on the extension of the program of the interchange of students and teachers.
Immediately after his appointment as Coordinator, Mr. Rockefeller attended a meeting of the Advisory Committee to explain his objectives and the methods whereby he hoped to accomplish them. In essence these were to use every legitimate device to promote the integration of the American republics into a unity that would be a solid support for hemisphere security against the propaganda of the Fascist powers. There were so many similarities between the programs of the two organizations that several of Mr. Rockefeller's aides were invited to attend the meetings of the Advisory Committee and participate in its discussions. They did attend regularly and it was largely the decisions which were made at those meetings that were afterward implemented. To those meetings experts in all the fields pertinent to the purposes of the Committee were invited to give the latest available information.
Because of the more than twenty years' experience of the Institute of International Education in the field of student and teacher exchange, it was natural that the Coordinator should select the Institute to be his agency in the administration of that part of his program. I found Mr. Wallace Harrison, Mr. Rockefeller's right-hand man in carrying out the cultural activities of the Coordinator's Office, and his associate, Kenneth Holland, to be men of broad vision and human qualities. They have been very successful in realizing the cultural objectives of the Coordinator's program. This success is largely due to the happy and cooperative relations that existed between them and Mr. Charles Thomson, Chief of the Division of Cultural Relations of the State Department.
It was natural that Mr. Rockefeller, a young man of thirty-three, should select for his chief aides other young men with many of whom he had become acquainted at college or in business. Most of them were wide awake, loyal, devoted to the job---and inexperienced. It was this inexperience which explains some ventures of the Coordinator's Office which brought it into conflict with other agencies of the government or resulted in its undertaking enterprises in Latin American countries which did not at first add to the prestige of the Office. Many self-seekers who wished to attach themselves to the Coordinator's Office---some with and some wholly without any experience in Latin American affairs---presented wild schemes of a wholly unrealizable nature. Few were accepted, and with the passage of time and greater experience most obstacles were overcome. I regard the work of the Coordinator's Office as of unusual merit in helping to advance hemisphere solidarity.
Vice President Wallace was added to the Advisory Committee in the fall of 1941. I had already become acquainted with Mr. Wallace and awaited with interest his attendance at the first meeting after his appointment. He was asked to give his views and said, "This is a committee on cultural relations. Perhaps you will not include what I am going to say in the category of cultural relations, but I believe that to teach the poor women of Latin America how better to take care of their babies and to give them some knowledge of good diet and personal hygiene is a form of culture." His entire talk was devoted to practical suggestions concerning such things as improved methods of farming and technical training looking to better standards of living. He was very emphatic in insisting that the spread of democratic ideas should not be overlooked. It was a discourse that would naturally come from a farmer statesman from our agrarian West. Though the Advisory Committee had not conceived of its work in Mr. Wallace's terms, his statement appealed to its members.
The money allotted to the Institute by the Coordinator's Office and the Division of Cultural Relations of the State Department, to expand the interchange of students and teachers with the Latin American countries, was distributed in the form of scholarships secured competitively on the basis of merit. It enabled bright and ambitious young men and women of the middle and underprivileged classes in Latin America to study in our institutions of higher education. Without this assistance, financial restriction would have prevented most of these students from coming to the United States. It unquestionably had a real influence in helping to spread the democratic spirit in the Latin American countries. My own experiences with the élite in those countries had not given me the impression that they were deeply interested in the spread of democracy among their people. They were among the class in control and, generally speaking, did not favor sharing that control. However, as mentioned before, the visits to the United States made by some of them upon invitations given by the Division of Cultural Relations of the State Department and by the Coordinator's Office had a great influence in removing from their minds the belief that had hitherto prevailed among many of them that ours was a mechanized and materialistic civilization devoid of spiritual elements.
In Latin America as everywhere the future belongs to youth, and now when it seeks education abroad Latin American youth is turning by preference to the United States, realizing that today it is probably the most wealthy, most powerful, and most influential nation on earth. The present war has intensified this conviction. Latin American youth, both most friendly toward and most critical of the United States, recognizes also that to a great extent the United States will set the standard and pace of social evolution in the next generation. We are interested in Latin American youths not because they are already well disposed toward the United States, but because they hold the key to the whole future of Latin America and hence of Western Hemisphere solidarity. Our universities, foundations, and educational organizations should be interested in the opportunity to select from the fine, earnest, mature students who because of economic considerations could come here only upon fellowships. Everywhere are to be found returned graduate students teaching in the institutions of Latin America, enthusiastic over their studies in our universities and strong advocates of a better understanding with the people of the United States. This is equally true of the few professors and scholars who have lectured in our universities.
In recent years, and especially during the present war, United States civilization has rivaled the French and is now rapidly becoming the dominant foreign influence in Latin America. Our language and our attitude toward life follow in the wake of our business, our movies, our newspapers and magazines. In several of the South American countries English has already supplanted French as the required foreign language in the secondary schools. Repeatedly in the home of a cultured family the father would state that he, his wife and his elder children had been educated in France but that he was sending his younger children to universities in the United States. "The immediate future is yours," he would say, "the more distant future is ours. We must learn what has made you strong and great." I do not wish by any means to imply that no Latin American students are going to French universities. Although the movement has now been stopped of necessity by the war, the advent of peace will doubtless again be a signal for Latin American students to renew their work in France. But the number is and will be small compared to the more than two thousand Latin American students who studied in United States colleges and universities in 1942-1943.
Administering the exchange scholarships was not without difficulties. The scholarships allotted under the Buenos Aires pact provided that the holders should know the language of the country to which they were to go. The knowledge of English upon the part of the students chosen by some of the Latin American governments was very inadequate. Some knew practically no English; others had evidently received the scholarships as the result of political or social influence. In certain cases governments were very dilatory in sending the lists of applicants from whom the successful candidates were to be chosen. The result was that students were sometimes unable to arrive in the United States until after the beginning of the academic term, a tardiness which handicapped their progress and sometimes disturbed the administration of the host colleges and universities. Few of these difficulties arose in the administration of the scholarships provided by the Division of Cultural Relations and the Coordinator's Office. I believe that this was due primarily to the fact that the work was carried on by unofficial agencies in our own and the Latin American countries.
On the United States side the difficulties usually resulted from an excess of zeal. All our institutions of higher education favored the movement to develop closer cultural ties with the Latin American countries and cooperated admirably in making the exchange a success. Many of them provided tuition scholarships for Latin American students. Some organized special courses at their summer sessions designed to acquaint the Latin American students with United States civilization. Practically all of our first-class colleges offered courses on Latin American history and institutions and expanded the teaching of Spanish and Portuguese. Some, however, organized programs of studies which were far beyond the means at the disposal of the Division of Cultural Relations and the Coordinator's Office. A few offered schemes of a grandiose character which it would have been difficult to realize under any conditions.
One difficulty that arose had been wholly unforeseen by the Institute of International Education. For more than twenty years it had been administering exchange scholarships with foreign countries without encountering any religious question. Shortly after the establishment of the Coordinator's Office, however, a German-born Roman Catholic educator, who had spent several years in Latin American countries, visited the Institute to discuss the possibility of the establishment of United States schools in the Latin American countries with money provided by our government. He presented a carefully worked out program which had attached to it the names of some prominent United States Catholic educators. I thought the method of organization and administration of the proposed schools admirable until I read the following paragraph:
"The schools are non-denominational: this means that the schools are not under the rule or control of any Church and that students of all religious denominations may attend the North American schools. However, the schools will also seek the approval and moral support of the local Church authorities, which are the Catholic Bishops. For, as an exponent of cultural rapprochement the organization is well aware of the fact that cultural activities have a predominantly spiritual content, which in the case of the Latin American culture means the Catholic religion. Any approach to cultural relations with Latin America which would ignore this religious link, would be doomed to failure, whereas any approach by way of the common bond of the same faith, provides not only the basis of a ready understanding of the cultural background of Latin America, but it also eliminates the danger of being met with skepticism, suspicion or even open antagonism. For this reason, the guidance, direction and majority of personnel will always have to be Catholic, i.e., Americans belonging to the Catholic faith."
Considering that there is a strong anti-clerical movement in some of the Latin American countries, I could readily imagine the resentment its adherents would have to an apparent attempt to take sides in a domestic issue were the United States government to establish schools in those countries under clerical control---even though the people of Latin America are overwhelmingly Roman Catholic. Considering, moreover, that the Roman Catholics number only one-sixth of the population of the United States, I could also imagine the resentment among the non-Catholic population at the use of public funds supplied by all the people were they to be devoted to such sectarian purpose.
The Catholic educator asked for my approval for his program. I told him that as presented I disapproved. He later returned with a modified scheme which provided for nonsectarian control of the proposed United States schools. It is a question whether the United States government ought to engage in such an enterprise despite the fact that nearly all the other great powers have established their own schools in Latin American countries. There are already a large number of private schools in Latin American countries under the auspices of United States citizens. Many of them are not of high standard. Some are very good but in almost every instance these are under denominational auspices. The logical thing for our government to do would be to subsidize the good schools. But to do so would almost certainly introduce sectarian controversy. If our government is to undertake to establish United States schools in Latin American countries, the only wise plan to follow is to establish an impartial committee made up of well known educators and able administrators to control and supervise the work of the schools.
The anxiety caused by the visit just described was not lessened by the later activities of one of those whose names were attached to the memorandum as sponsors for the plan, namely, Father Joseph Thorning. Father Thorning suggested upon several occasions that Catholic institutions in the United States were largely ignored in the placement of Latin American scholarship holders coming to the United States for purposes of study. This charge appeared at times in the press and might readily have misled its readers as to the real facts of the situation. As I was the responsible head of the organization that administered the exchange of students and teachers between the United States and the Latin American countries, I wrote the following letter to the New York Times of April 12, 1942, in order to give wide publicity to the facts:
TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:
There has been belatedly brought to my attention a statement in THE NEW YORK TIMES of March 8, made by Father Thorning, based upon a complete misconception of the activity carried on by the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs in the matter of the exchange of students between the United States and the Latin American republics. Father Thorning implies that there has been discrimination against Catholics and Catholic institutions in the selection and placement of students under the Inter-American cultural exchange program. This is wholly contrary to the facts.
Let me first give a preparatory word: Since its foundation in 1919 the Institute of International Education, of which I am Director, has brought almost 2,500 students on scholarships from European countries and sent a similar number from the United States to those countries. It developed a modus operandi founded upon scholarships, personality, linguistic ability and adjustability which produced results highly satisfactory to university authorities in our own and the foreign countries. By the time the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs was established in 1940 the Institute had also brought some 300 Latin American students upon scholarships to our country.
It was not unnatural, therefore, when the coordinator undertook to expand the student exchange between the United States and the Latin American countries, to request the Institute to be the agency administering the exchange. The Coordinator acted upon precedent in that the State Department had already requested the Director of the Institute to be the chairman of a committee to administer the exchange of students and professors under the Buenos Aires pact of 1936.
The selection of the Latin American students to receive scholarships is made by a committee of selection in each country, organized usually by the rector of the local university or by a distinguished scholar, but always with the approval of the American Minister or Ambassador. The committee, whose chairman and secretary are nationals, usually numbers not more than seven, of whom two are Americans to insure that in each case some members are familiar with the American system of higher education. The Institute of International Education has absolutely nothing to do in the choice of the personnel of the committee. The committee makes the preliminary choice among applications for scholarships and sends only the few best to the Institute, which makes the final choice solely upon the basis of the credentials presented.
In the placement of Latin Americans, as of all foreign students in our institutions, the Institute's first consideration is the field of study of the student. The Latin Americans have for long regarded our country as the best place to study scientific, technical and practical subjects. We may wish the desire were more widely diffused among other fields of study, but we must undertake to fulfill, if possible, the requests of the students. Agriculture, engineering, medicine, journalism, library science and architecture' have been the fields in increasing demand by Latin American students. Of the 222 Latin American students brought to this country by the Institute this year fifty-eight were students in those fields. It happens that there are very few schools or departments' specializing in these branches among our Catholic institutions. I think that the availability of institutions as a chief consideration is shown by the fact that of the fourteen students wishing to study our methods of social service six were placed in schools of social service attached to Catholic institutions.
The second consideration in placing a student is the preference for study in a particular institution expressed in his or her application. In a number of cases, however, it is not possible to satisfy this preference, because many applications are made for the few institutions well known in Latin America. Unless the institution is of obvious inadequacy in the field of study---a very unusual occurrence---we do not interfere with such choice. We are always glad, however, to serve with information or advice when we are asked for it.
The third consideration is the degree of cooperation upon the part of the various institutions. For the purpose of student exchange, the Institute of International Education is only an administrative agency. It established the practice twenty years ago of requesting our colleges and universities to provide scholarships for foreign students in exchange for scholarships provided in the foreign countries. Our institutions responded admirably and in the year before the war there were almost 100 on the accredited list of the Association of American Colleges that made such provision. In January of each year we distribute a questionnaire to all colleges and universities on the accredited list requesting:
1. Whether the institution will provide one or more scholarships for the ensuing academic year.
2. Whether it will be a full scholarship covering tuition and maintenance or a partial one.
3. Whether the college has any preference as to the nationality of the student.
4. If the college has no preference as to nationality, whether it will permit the Institute to make the choice. This we do in order to give opportunity to students from as many countries as possible to become acquainted with American civilization.
The Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs provides a full scholarship only for the Roosevelt scholars coming from each of the twenty Latin American republics and for the twenty United States Roosevelt scholars going to the Latin American countries this year. The Coordinator provides only maintenance for some of the other students. The Division of Cultural Relations of the State Department provides travel grants for some of the students. In order to relieve the government of some of the financial burden, but especially in order to retain the fine spirit of cooperation developed among our institutions of higher education, the Institute gives preference in placing all foreign students, including Latin Americans, to institutions providing at least a partial scholarship. This seems to us to be a very fair arrangement.
The selection of United States graduate students and professors for exchange with the Latin American countries under the Buenos Aires pact is made by a very able and efficient committee of five, of whom I happen to know that at least one is a Catholic. Moreover, the State Department is represented at each meeting of the committee by one of its staff who is also a Catholic. Either of those gentlemen will bear witness that the question of religious faith has never entered into the discussions of the Committee. The choice was always made solely on the basis of merit.
The same thing is true of the choice of the United States Roosevelt scholars. The country has been divided into ten geographical areas, from which two students are chosen by committees of selection on the basis of scholarship, personality, language ability and adjustability. The partial scholarships provided by the Coordinator are allotted by another committee consisting of five members. I do not know the religious faith of all the members. I do happen to know that one of them is a Catholic.
In the case of all scholarships administered by the Institute of International Education the application blank contains a question as to the religious faith of the applicant. This has been put in because embarrassment sometimes, though seldom, arose in sending a religious misfit to an institution. Of the sixty United States scholars chosen to go to the Latin American countries this year, eight did not answer the question. Of the remainder, thirteen---or 25 per cent-stated they were Catholics. This ratio of Catholic to non-Catholic students selected is higher than the ratio of Catholic to non-Catholic elements in the United States population as revealed in the 1940 census, and is also greater than the ratio of Catholic to non-Catholic institutions of higher learning on the accredited list.
It is possible that Father Thorning is anxious that the faith of the students from Latin America brought here on scholarships should be properly safeguarded. If that is true, his anxiety is not only belated but unnecessary. During the past twenty years we have sent hundreds of scholarship holders from such Catholic countries as France, Italy, Hungary and Czechoslovakia to our institutions of higher learning and we have yet to hear of any with whose faith there has been any attempt to tamper. I feel confident that the same condition holds with the Latin American students brought here on scholarships now provided by the Coordinator and the State Department. -
Because of the difficulties of transportation and the activities of enemy submarines, it is probable that there will be a smaller exchange with the Latin American countries during the next few years. In any event, I am anxious that all our people, of whatever faith, may be assured that this student exchange activity is carried on with fairness and without discrimination. If Father Thorning or any one else can indicate a way whereby greater impartiality and objectivity may be obtained, he can be assured it will receive most careful consideration.
STEPHEN DUGGAN.
New York, April 6, 1942.
The recent emphasis which has been put on Catholicism in inter-American relations has underscored several significant differences between Latin and Anglo-Saxon America. Every nation reflects the interplay of the two forces of geography and history. These forces are so different in Latin America and the United States as to give rise to difficulties in integrating the nations of the Western Hemisphere in a common attitude toward hemisphere solidarity.
The United States was founded by rebels---by men who rebelled against religious persecution or economic discrimination in Europe. Puritans in New England, French Huguenots in New York and South Carolina, German Lutherans from the Palatinate in Pennsylvania, English Catholics in Maryland, all sought religious freedom in the New World. They were later joined by Ulster Presbyterians outraged by the destruction of their industries in the north of Ireland as the result of a deliberate policy of the British government to favor English agriculture and industry. Moreover, there was a steady infiltration of Catholic Irish from the south of Ireland, whose feelings toward Great Britain were those of extremist rebels. The population from which a new civilization was to be developed in the United States was made up of people of a variety of races and beliefs, not the kind of population that would readily submit to coercion from without or agree to the establishment of a state church. Diversity was the dominating characteristic. As has been stated in Chapter IV, in the seventeenth century, the mother country was the scene of a great struggle between King and Parliament, which was not concluded until the Revolution of 1688 gave the supremacy to Parliament. This had hardly been accomplished when Great Britain engaged in a second Hundred Years' War with France for colonial and maritime supremacy. During these two centuries the mother country could not give continuous and unremitting attention to the colonies and the colonists developed their own self-governing institutions and were able to consolidate their control of their own affairs.
Geography smiled upon the English colonies. They were almost all situated in the temperate zone where the climate was bracing and invited vigorous activity. The natives, who were hunters and fishermen, retreated before the colonists or were killed off. The colonists brought their women with them and did not intermarry with the natives. As their numbers increased their children moved west and built homesteads in the free land. When the Revolution took place, the United States was inhabited to a large extent by an independent, vigorous and self-respecting yeomanry. After the Revolution, the attempt on the part of the Hamiltonian plutocracy to develop an aristocratic caste system of society in the new republic was prevented outside the slave states by the political sagacity and strategy of Jefferson and was finally destroyed by the victory at the polls of the Jacksonian democracy. Successive generations thereafter saw a moving frontier, peopled by pioneers, all equal because all were working out their own salvation. Necessity compelled them to administer their own affairs and democracy became their form of political organization.
In all these respects, the story of the settlement of Latin America was entirely different. For several centuries previous to the discovery of America, Spain had been the scene of a religious war between Christians and Moslems. The war was characterized by religious fanaticism, personal bravery, and relentless cruelty. During its prosecution national and religious uniformity was considered essential to success, and the men who came out of the long struggle as the Spanish nation's honored and trusted leaders were the warrior and the priest. The war ended in the very year that Columbus discovered America. The marvelous tales that soon came back from the new lands concerning their people and their wealth induced the hardy warrior seeking riches and glory and the priest seeking the salvation of souls, to sail west in considerable numbers. Not primarily farmers seeking homes in a new land but, after the conquest of Mexico by Cortes, military adventurers looking for gold and silver; not peoples from a half-dozen countries speaking different tongues and observing different customs but all Spaniards speaking but one tongue; not a diversity of religious sects fleeing from persecution but all devoted to one faith---such were the people who founded the Spanish colonies in the new world---all Spaniards, all Catholics, all obedient subjects of one form of government, absolutism. Uniformity, not diversity, was the dominating characteristic. And what was true of the Spaniards was true only to a slightly less extent of the Portuguese.
From the standpoint of location, geography was not kind to Latin America. Three-quarters of Latin America is in the tropics. The colonists in the Caribbean area and Brazil had not only to withstand the extreme heat, the humidity, and the venomous insects of the tropics but their vitality was reduced by the existence of such tropical diseases as malaria, yellow fever, dysentery, and hookworm. After the Indians of those regions had been killed off by disease and excessive work, the colonists imported Negroes from Africa and built their civilization upon the institution of Negro slavery, as did the planters in the southern colonies of the United States. On the West Coast of the hemisphere from the Rio Grande to Cape Horn altitude provided a climate that permitted the establishment of a flourishing white man's civilization. But the Spaniards found there Indian agricultural civilizations whose people were not nomadic but settled upon the soil. These they conquered and enslaved. They appropriated ownership of the soil and as elsewhere were relieved of the necessity to work.
Moreover, after the conquest of Mexico in 1520, the early discoverers and explorers from Spain and Portugal were conquistadores, not settlers but conquerors, who brought practically no women with them. They cohabited freely with the native Indian women and later with imported Negro women. The consequence was that the resulting population and civilization were respectively mestizo, the product of the union of red and white people, or mulatto. The pure white population increased but little because comparatively few new settlers came from Europe. In a mestizo civilization everywhere, manual labor has been regarded as the badge of the inferior, the mestizo imitating the white man in that respect. The result in Latin America has been that an aristocratic caste civilization grew up, with the Indian and Negro ignorant, despised, and exploited, at the bottom of the scale; the average mestizo everywhere was little better off, but the successful mestizo shared rulership and the professions with the white man and scorned to be considered either Indian or Negro. Even in the southern regions of South America where the population is wholly or predominantly white, partly as the result of Spanish heritage, partly because of the distribution of land in great estates, society is aristocratically organized.
In the United States geography and history determined that the independent colonies would form a united country despite the diversities that existed. The thirteen states were all situated east of the Alleghenies and though communication by land was slow and difficult, water communication was frequent and fairly rapid. No colony was isolated from the others and business relations among the colonies were well developed. The long experience in self-government had developed a political ability that surmounted the obstacles to unity with comparative ease. The United States began its national career as a real republic and with all the elements present for the development of a vigorous democracy. Its history since is the story of increasing national independence, individual liberty and equality, self-government and democracy.
These factors were non-existent in Latin America. The colonies there covered an enormous area and were separated from one another by mountain chains, jungles, and deserts. There was no business interchange of any importance between the vice-royalties of Mexico and Peru. Despite their unity in language, religion, and customs, the colonies separated into states upon the basis of the administrative divisions that had existed under Spain, and as the boundaries of these divisions were vague, wars between the states were at first frequent. Inexperienced in administering their own affairs, familiar only with government from above, these states naturally became dictatorships, whose ruling personnel changed frequently as the result of civil wars. Despite the efforts of patriots in their struggle for freedom, of writers and of idealistic men of action like Bolivar, the Latin American countries began as republics in name only and the elements of democracy were practically non-existent.
Hence the political organization of the Latin American states has always been dictatorship or at best oligarchy, and that is what it remains today. It is nowhere a democracy in our sense of the word---with the possible exception of stalwart little Costa Rica, which has long taken pride in the fact that it has more teachers than soldiers, and more recently Colombia, Chile, and Uruguay. Democracy to the average Latin American means a republican form of government. Democracy is essentially a middle-class institution dependent upon the existence of public opinion. In the United States anyone below the middle class hopes to advance into it and public opinion is largely secured by the existence of the public school. In few Latin American countries does a middle class exist. Neither does public opinion, as we understand it, for public opinion is largely a matter of literacy, and illiteracy prevails to a very large extent in most of the Latin American countries. Dictatorship in Latin America means control of the political life of the country by one man and his adherents. It does not mean control of all aspects of the life of the people such as exists under totalitarian governments. There are strong groups in some of the Latin American republics that believe in totalitarianism, but it is doubtful that they could secure sufficient power to make that form of social organization a permanent condition.
Economically, hemisphere solidarity is confronted with great difficulties. The economy of the United States is of a varied nature. Though primarily industrial it is also extractive, i.e., agricultural and mineral. The economy of the Latin American countries is almost wholly agricultural and mineral, usually limited to only one or two major products. In favorable years there is a great surplus. The chief source of income of Cuba is the export of sugar; of Brazil the export of coffee; of Uruguay and Argentina the export of grain and meat; of Chile the export of copper and nitrates. The economy of the United States and that of the Caribbean countries of Latin America are complementary. They send us sugar, coffee, bananas, oil; we send them in return manufactured goods and processed food products. But the economy of the United States and those of the countries of the temperate zone of South America, viz., Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile are competitive, and the resultant economic antagonism has sometimes made it difficult to achieve full harmony between those countries and the United States. There is no market in the United States for their meats and grain because they compete with our own. Therefore, until recently Argentine meat has enjoyed no sale in the United States. During the present war, moreover, inter-American shipping difficulties have seriously complicated the bringing to the United States of many products from all the southern countries of South America.
Often Americans complain of the lukewarmness toward hemisphere solidarity shown by the Argentine government. But many Argentines have not been convinced that Hitler will lose the war. If he does not lose, and continues to control continental Europe, they have no desire to offend their best customer. It may fairly be assumed that hemisphere solidarity would not survive a Nazi victory, and that unless some better international economic organization is established for the postwar world than now exists, it may not survive even a Nazi defeat.
Germany was one of the largest customers for products of the southern South American countries. As these countries are not highly industrialized they gladly accepted German manufactured articles in return. It soon appeared that by the use of the same devices as Germany used in the case of the Danubian and Balkan countries, namely, exchange controls, quotas and blocked marks, Germany might be able to dominate some of the Latin American countries economically and in all probability begin attempts at indirect political control. Then the words of the Monroe Doctrine, finally transformed in 1940 at Havana into a multilateral pact, would be rendered futile: "The political system of the allied powers (the Holy Alliance) is essentially different from that of America.
We should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." Nazi totalitarianism as a political system is a far more deadly danger to the nations of this hemisphere than were the anti-republican principles of the Holy Alliance in 1823. The safety and security of all the nations of the entire hemisphere depend upon their unity and solidarity, not only militarily during the present war but as far as possible economically after the war.
When we were building up our industries after the Civil War we borrowed immense sums from Englishmen and Frenchmen and other Europeans. But it was American individuals and corporations that did the borrowing, not the United States government. When in the spendthrift days of the 1920's, the Latin Americans started to develop their resources, it was not usually Latin American individuals who borrowed in Wall Street but Latin American governments. In the world depression which took place in 1929 most of those governments discontinued payment of the interest on the loans. They said they could not pay, and they were right. Moreover, they did not understand why they should be asked to pay back the millions they borrowed from the United States when Great Britain, France, and Italy did not pay back the billions they borrowed from the United States.
American corporations have invested immense sums of money in Latin American utilities of many kinds such as electric lighting, telephone plants, street railways, and harbor improvements. At first this was done in a form of unquestioned exploitation. That period has fortunately passed away. But when a patriotic Peruvian student learns that the principal railroads of his country are the property of and operated by British interests, that the electricity, light and power system in Lima and Callao is owned by Italian interests; that the largest petroleum company is Canadian, that the mines are in the hands of Americans, and that the great sugar interests are German, he naturally asks himself, "What do we own in our country?" Hence the desire on the part of extremists to expropriate foreign properties, a desire already realized in the case of oil in Mexico and Bolivia. Thoughtful Latin Americans realize that if they are to develop the resources of their countries the necessary capital must come largely from foreign sources. But thoughtful people in any country, even if in the majority, do not always make decisions contrary to the desires of a militant minority.
Under the stress of the war conditions of today, however, industrial activity has been greatly augmented in Latin America, particularly in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. The United States has been buying in those countries immense quantities of materials needed for the military effort. The Latin Americans cannot use the increased exchange for the purchase of needed consumers' goods because the United States is not producing enough of these for its own people. The result has been that those countries have themselves turned to the production of consumers' goods in greatly increasing quantities so that they bid fair by the end of the war not only to supply the needs of their own people but also the needs of neighboring nations. Inter-American trade among the Latin American republics has been almost non-existent in the past. What worries Latin American statesmen is whether the new industries can be maintained after the war in competition with the United States and the European countries, when the latter cease manufacturing for war purposes and turn to the production of consumers' goods.
As Bismarck once remarked, it is the imponderables that sometimes count most. If we are actually to realize the Good Neighbor policy we must understand the civilization and culture of the Latin American peoples. Every civilization is organized into institutions: the family, the school, the church, the government, and others. What is the nature of these institutions in the Latin American countries and how do the Latin Americans regard our institutions?
The Family---In our civilization marriage is based upon romantic love and the man and wife meet upon a basis of equality, certainly theoretically. Latin American civilization is a man-made civilization in which the woman has an inferior status. Until marriage she is under her father's control and after marriage under her husband's. In the family she has a high and honored position but as a mother, not as a woman. In our civilization the individual is the unit. In Latin America it is the family, and the family is a very closely knit and exclusive unit. With us the son or daughter leaves home to seek his or her own fortune. Not so in the Latin American home. There separation takes place with difficulty and usually in sorrow, though the growth of apartment life in large cities has a tendency to lessen control by parents. Chaperonage here is practically dead; in Latin America it is a very real institution. Divorce here is easy and frequent. Divorce in Latin America is difficult and infrequent and the Latin Americans wonder at the place enjoyed by the divorcée in our society. American movies picturing the night club life of our cities, in which unchaperoned young women play a part, fill Latin American conservatives with alarm. They fear our influence will help to disintegrate the family.
The School---Our civilization has a fundamental social ideal: equality of opportunity. Our school system is founded upon that ideal. All children must go to school and the elementary school is the favored part of the educational system. The Latin Americans do not have that ideal and the ruling classes do not want it. They believe society should be organized to put control not in the masses of the people but in the social and intellectual élite. Hence, the favored institution is not the elementary school for the masses; it is the liceo, the secondary school, the school for the socially elect. Except in a few progressive countries like Mexico, and especially in a number of the large cities, little has been done in the elementary school to make it attractive to the masses. Health education, manual training, and vocational courses have received little attention. The children of the workers usually leave school very early. Even in an educationally advanced country like Argentina which has the lowest percentage of illiteracy among all the countries of Latin America, namely, 20 per cent, only 11 per cent of the pupils who enter the first primary grade go on to the sixth grade and in the rural areas many do not go to school at all. The causes of this unfortunate situation are poverty and a social system in which manual labor is held in low esteem. The educational conditions in the cities of Argentina are much better.
The liceo in most of the Latin American countries is conservatively organized' and administered. It has a rigid curriculum with few modern subjects, its methods of teaching are old fashioned, and extra-curricular activities are practically unknown. To pass the examination and secure the bachillerato is the chief aim, memoriter work is the chief method, and the percentage of failures is very high. Obviously the liceo is not a strong agency in the development of a middle class, the necessary foundation of democracy.
The Church---The great mass of people in the United States is of the Protestant religion; an even greater percentage of the people of Latin America is Roman Catholic. True Christianity consists in a proper balance between faith and works. In the United States the emphasis is increasingly upon works, and Protestantism is characterized by a reduced emphasis upon faith. In Latin America there is no such attitude, unquestioning faith is the desideratum and a belief in the miraculous prevails almost everywhere. The Higher Criticism has no place in Latin America and the loss of religious faith in the United States following the researches of the Higher Criticism makes the Catholic Church in Latin America very distrustful of Protestant influence. Enormous philanthropy is practiced in the United States but it is largely in the form of social agencies of various kinds not necessarily connected with the Church and it has the aim of making the underprivileged self-supporting. Charity in the form of actual almsgiving plays a very minor rôle. In Latin America that form of charity is considered a virtue and the agencies of social amelioration are practically always agencies of the Church. In short, the Church in Latin America regards Protestantism with distrust as a disintegrating influence upon Latin American culture, in which religion plays so large a part. The Church in some countries is state supported, is a bulwark of the status quo, and has seldom favored democratizing influences. Among the conservative classes Americanism is identified with those influences. In some countries, therefore, the Church is anti-democratic and anti-American.
Generally speaking, the Latin Americans on the whole do not regard us as simpático. Our philosophy of life is that of the pragmatist. We ask of an idea, "Does it work?" Their philosophy is that of the traditionalist. They ask, "Does it conform to our ways of doing things?" If not, then "Why change those ways?"
The international relations of the United States with the Lain American countries after the Mexican War of 1846-1848 became increasingly bad and were not relieved until the advent of the Good Neighbor policy, begun in the Hoover administration, and expanded and transformed by Mr. Roosevelt. It cannot be expected that ten years of the Good Neighbor policy will remove from the minds of the skeptical in Latin America the impression made by unfriendly acts in the past. This is particularly so when German agents have used all kinds of measures to organize Fifth Columns among people of their own race and among Latin Americans who are opposed to United States policy.
Pan Hispanism is one of the strongest obstacles to good relations between the United States and Latin America. The name antedates World War I but the movement at that time had few adherents in the Latin American countries outside the most conservative intellectual circles. In fact it had little vitality until Spain fell under the control of the Franco regime. Then nationalist fervor in Spain demanded a renascence of Spanish prestige and culture in the lands which were once Spanish colonies, that is, in Latin America and the Philippines. Large sums of money were allotted by the Franco government to Falangists, who began a strong propaganda in the Latin American countries. The Falangists are anti-democratic and anti-American. Spain has as yet remained neutral in the war and has taken charge of the affairs of Germany, Italy, and Japan in the Latin American countries that have severed diplomatic relations with the Axis powers. The result has. been that Spanish embassies and legations in the Latin American countries have become to a great extent centers of intrigue against the principle of hemisphere solidarity. In spite of this, Pan Hispanism has not made great headway in Latin America. Brazil, with half the population of South America within its borders, looks askance at it. Most of the Spanish American countries, especially the stronger ones, are very nationalistic and patriotic, and proud of their national cultures. They have no more desire to be under the cultural domination of Spain than have the people of the United States to be under the cultural domination of England.
The military obstacle to hemisphere solidarity is a most serious one. When President Monroe proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, George Canning, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, issued a similar declaration. It must frankly be admitted that the tacit acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine by European countries depended more upon the existence of the British fleet than upon our Declaration. Community of interest upon the part of Great Britain and the United States in maintaining an open door in the Latin American countries for freedom of trade binds them together today to prevent domination of the southern continent by the Axis powers.
The doubt of the Argentine government as to the ability of the United States to guarantee both its economic and military security is perhaps sufficient justification for its noncooperative attitude toward hemisphere solidarity. However, no one can read the proceedings of the successive Pan American conferences and of the more recent emergency meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the American republics without a feeling that many Argentines are not enthusiastic about hemisphere solidarity anyhow. Hemisphere solidarity means the enhancement of the prestige of the United States, the greatest exponent of that policy. Argentina has looked forward to being regarded as the spokesman of Latin America vis-à-vis Anglo-Saxon America. Few other Latin American republics regard her as such, and she naturally does not view with a happy eye their granting the United States the use of air fields and naval bases even for use only during the war.
Hemisphere solidarity has not yet been realized. It may not be realized during the war. Can it be realized after the war? The statesmen who will construct the peace must consider in the light of experience, reason, and common sense what is practicable politically, economically, and psychologically. The trend of international thinking at present is largely in the direction of the establishment of regional federations with some kind of limited control by a superior organization to prevent conflict. No single pattern of organization can be expected to apply to all regional federations. What would be wise for a European federation would not necessarily be best for a regional federation of the Western Hemisphere. In Europe there are five great powers and a large number of smaller powers. In the Western Hemisphere there is one great power, whose military and economic strength is much greater than that of all the other nations of the hemisphere combined. In Europe, whether there be one general European federation or more than one regional federation, each will probably be fairly closely organized and the central organ may have considerable power of control. Europe will finally put an end to the liberum veto. That bad principle of allowing the adverse vote of a single member of the Polish Diet to prevent the adoption of an absolutely essential action was the primary cause of the destruction of Poland in the latter part of the eighteenth century. The liberum veto, which allowed even a weak and backward state to prevent unanimous action in the Assembly of the League of Nations, was a subsidiary cause of the failure of the League.
The overpowering position of the United States in the Western Hemisphere will probably prevent the organization of a regional federation similar to those projected for Europe. Little is read today in Latin American publications about the Colossus of the North. That does not mean that the fear of the immense power of the United States has been removed in the Latin American countries. It exists in every Latin American nation, not only in Argentina. It is shown in the hesitancy of even friendly nations to permit United States soldiers in association with national troops to man naval bases and airfields that are constructed by American funds awarded under the lend-lease program. The United States has shown a scrupulous regard for its commitments under the Good Neighbor policy. It is providing badly needed aircraft and munitions to strengthen the military defenses of nearly all the Latin American countries. It is undertaking well-planned economic measures not only to help those countries tide over the loss of their markets in Europe during the war but also to build up their industries for the post-war period. The great majority of the Latin American nations, as a quid pro quo, have responded admirably to the need of the United States for products necessary to the conduct of the war and which they can supply.
The United States is admittedly looking after its own security as well as the security of the Latin American countries. All this cooperation would be futile were it to cease at the end of the war. If the new world order is to be organized upon a basis of regional federations, it is likely that the Western Hemisphere would be generally regarded as one of the federations. The necessities of the situation will require that it be a looser form of regional federation than that of Europe. It may be that the growing practice of consultation among the governments of the Western Hemisphere on matters of major policy might suffice. It would not suffice if the practice of unanimity is followed as it was attempted at Rio de Janeiro in January 1942. If even a loosely constructed regional federation is to be viable, no one member can expect to possess a liberum veto. It has repeatedly happened at conferences of representatives of the American republics that agreements receiving the approval of all the other states have had to be whittled down before being accepted by Argentina. And this unanimity has been sought despite the regulation that decisions should be made by majority vote. Majority rule would not affect the autonomy of states nor justify interference in the domestic affairs of states. The conventions agreed upon at the Pan American conferences are not always implemented and they will not be implemented unless the democratic principle of majority rule is followed. So far, much good has been accomplished at these conferences by conventions and resolutions bearing on the common interests of the American republics and it may be that experience will show that a closer form of regional federation would be undesirable or unnecessary. But Rio de Janeiro was an impressive lesson of the weakness of the "inter-American system" when confronted by a world emergency.
Thus far attention has been directed to the relations between the United States and the Latin American nations. The status of Canada in hemisphere solidarity has been omitted. Canada is not a member of the Pan American Union and thus far has never indicated a desire to become a member.
It is a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations and is very loyal to Great Britain as was manifested by its voluntary declaration of war against Germany. Hemisphere solidarity is not possible without Canada's cooperation. If the postwar world order provides a regional federation for the Western Hemisphere, Canada must be included. Her orientation in recent years has been increasingly toward cooperation with the United States, despite the Ottawa Agreement. During these war years it has been made entirely evident that her security depends upon military collaboration with the United States and that has been given unstintedly. It must be equally obvious that in the post-war world economic considerations will direct her to increased cooperation with the United States. In the post-war world there would be no difficulty in her becoming a member of the Pan American Union and sharing the responsibility in the attempts that are being made to organize the Western Hemisphere. There would be no reason why she should not remain a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations. It is entirely likely that in the new world order a country may of necessity be a member of more than one regional federation. Despite her geographical position in one hemisphere and her political affiliation in another, Canada presents a lesser obstacle to hemisphere solidarity than does Argentina.
There remains one matter for consideration. Can hemisphere solidarity, or rather hemisphere security, be realized if non-American countries retain colonies in the Western Hemisphere in the post-war world? Where is the security of the Western Hemisphere most likely to be endangered? The Canal Zone is the weakest link in the system of defense. One cause of its weakness is the existence of some of the strategic European colonies in the Caribbean. The French island of Martinique has been causing us anxiety in the present war. Hemisphere security will not be fully assured until strategic places in the possessions of European powers in the Caribbean are transferred by purchase to the inchoate federation of American republics or to the United States. This does not mean that the United States should take over entire islands where the people are deeply attached to the British or French or Dutch connection and would dislike the change because of what they believe to be our unfair attitude toward Negroes. Furthermore most of them present distressing economic problems and can exist economically only because they have access to highly protected markets in the mother countries. With our already existing obligations to Cuba and Puerto Rico it would be much more difficult for us to give them tariff preferences. The suggestion is only that points of real strategic importance should be purchased, such as the small area on the island of Antigua yielded to the United States for ninety-nine years.
One source of danger in the Caribbean was removed during World War I by the purchase of the Virgin Islands from Denmark, now "protected" by Germany. The action suggested above is therefore in conformity with precedent. More. over, when Britain signed the Kellogg Pact she stated, "there are certain regions of the world the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety . . . . Interference with these regions cannot be suffered." She meant Gibraltar, Malta, and Suez, protecting her life line to India and the Far East. Britain has recognized the special interests of the United States in the Caribbean in various ways. It is time for us now permanently to safeguard those vital interests in cooperation with the other nations of the New World by realizing the policy suggested.
THUS far this book has undertaken but little conjecture. In this final chapter there must of necessity be conjecture because it is concerned with the future and no one can foretell what will happen even in the immediate future. We are in the midst of war and the war has compelled the United States and its allies to engage in cooperative activities of immense importance and with excellent results. It can be hoped that the pattern may be carried over into the post-war world and that the experience will indicate methods of cooperation of equal value in a time of peace. In any event the United States will probably participate in making decisions concerning concepts like sovereignty and activities such as preventing aggression. Common sense would dictate that a study of those concepts and activities be made now in the light of our traditions and historical experience and while the feeling of the need for unity among the United Nations is strong. It ought not be left to the exigencies of the situation at the close of the war.
The terrible destruction of life and property and the mounting hatred of Germans resulting from the plundering and bestial treatment of the defeated nations by the Nazi government can hardly have other effect than a condition of chaos in the world generally, but in Europe especially, when the Axis nations lay down their arms. The demand for revenge upon the German people by the outraged nations of Central and Eastern Europe caused by the activities of the Gestapo is entirely understandable and will be difficult to control. But to permit mass murder of Germans because of the terrible crimes of the Nazis would not only be futile but repulsive to Americans. Nor is it necessary in the interest of justice. The people of every subjugated nation know who the Nazi terrorists and murderers in their midst have been. There would be little difficulty in bringing them to trial and punishment immediately upon the establishment of the armistice.
The first consideration in realizing a proper program of control by the United Nations would be the restoration and maintenance of order. This must be accomplished at first by the Armies of Occupation. In some cases such as Norway, Belgium, and the Netherlands the responsibility could be transferred to the governments in exile. In others, greater difficulty would be encountered. In the case of Germany and Italy there are no governments in exile. It is a question how returned political refugees would be regarded by the people of those countries. The refugees will have been in exile for several years---in some instances as much as a decade---and out of touch with the course of events at home. Those who have been compelled to remain at home and endure the terrors of Nazi and Fascist control might resent refugee participation in national or even local government. Some persons among the resident population will probably have won the confidence of the people generally and might be regarded by them as their natural leaders. When the Nazi and Fascist regimes have been destroyed by the occupation, and complete disarmament of Germany and Italy accomplished by the United Nations, the occupying powers would naturally turn to those persons for advice and assistance. But for a considerable time administrative control would have to remain with the occupying powers.
The United States has already undertaken to train temporary administrators in the language, history, and national psychology of each country and in the changes in the form of administration that will probably be essential. As described in Chapter II, a splendid opportunity presents itself here to utilize some of the several thousand exchange students from the European countries who have studied in the United States during the past quarter century under the auspices of the Institute of International Education and have become familiar with the English language and our way of meeting difficult situations. Of even greater importance are the more than two thousand American students who have studied in the European countries and who have learned the languages and attitude toward life of their peoples.
Unquestionably the most exigent problem that will confront the administration in every country is the problem of relief, of providing food, clothing and shelter for starving people. Relief will require trained workers such as nurses and social workers with a knowledge of nutrition, and experienced teachers because the school will have to be the situs of most relief activities. The British have already had a remarkable experience in undertaking activities of this nature at home. In all probability relief agencies will everywhere be welcomed and it can be hoped that the aid will be extended in a spirit of humanity and not of charity, of service and not of condescension. It ought, moreover, to be done without political motive. The contrast between methods of conducting necessary activities by totalitarian and democratic regimes will probably be enough to strengthen the latter in the good will of the people. And as control by the democratic powers will be accompanied by a considerable degree of free speech, a free press, and a free radio, popular respect for democracy will in all probability be strengthened.
The most difficult problem to solve is the re-education of the Nazi mind, especially the minds of the young who have been subjected for a decade to an education thoroughly corrupt in its spirit, objectives and methods. For the first time they will have other and fairer sources of information, and with intelligent and considerate teachers from among nationals, and to a much less extent from the ranks of the democracies, it can reasonably be expected that they will take a truer view of the Nazi and a fairer view of the democratic regimes. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that re-education in Germany must be under the leadership of German anti-Nazis and not enemy aliens however forbearing and moderate. The rôle of the latter should be to provide sympathetic advice and assistance. The rôle of education---and especially international education---in the post-war world can hardly be over-emphasized. If, as the spokesmen of the democracies reiterate, this war has as one of its principal objectives the exaltation of the "common man" in life rather than the state, education for world citizenship to enable him to exercise a more direct influence on international affairs is essential. Since educational institutions in many European countries have been destroyed or have degenerated, the responsibility of the United States for assisting in the training of foreign leaders for post-war reconstruction---for our own "peace and safety"---is obvious.
The countries upon whose financial resources the call must chiefly be made to carry on the work of relief and rehabilitation are the United States and Great Britain, particularly the former. However, many other nations can share in the effort ---Argentina and Brazil, for example, can contribute much grain and meat. The citizens of the United States and Great Britain have been compelled to bear staggering burdens of taxation for destructive purposes during the war. Will they be willing to continue to do so for constructive purposes after the war? Certainly humanitarianism would suggest an affirmative answer. But so will every instinct of prudence. The productive machines of both countries are now geared to the greatest extent to manufacturing instruments of war. At the moment of the armistice that ceases. Factories will become idle and men unemployed unless machinery is at once converted and workers directed to the production of goods needed to keep men alive instead of putting them to death. Lend-lease is one of the most important agencies in enabling us to win the war. It can be as potent an instrument in organizing markets among the destitute millions in all quarters of the globe for the goods they need and we can produce.
If there has been any lingering belief that an important happening in any part of the world can fail to have repercussions over the entire world, the events of the present war ought to remove it. Today there are but few states in the whole world not included among the combatants. The day of localized war between major powers, as illustrated in the Franco-Prussian War of seventy years ago, is probably gone for good. This war is global not only in its battles but in its consequences. The export trade of neutral Argentina was temporarily ruined. The industrial life of neutral Sweden was brought almost to a standstill. The people of neutral Spain are still starving. To understand this war one must study a globe, not merely a map.
Unless the peace is to be merely an armistice between wars, during which both sides will feverishly continue to rearm, the peace must also be global. It will decidedly not be global unless it is planned now by men who really know the fundamental causes of war, who are sufficiently objective to work for their removal, and who have vision enough to foresee at least some of the probable obstacles to a durable peace. There are few such men in any country and there is of course no certainty that they will be the architects of the peace. With the continuance of the war there comes the increased hatred and desire for vengeance fatefully reminiscent of Versailles. Wisdom would dictate that the armistice be made for a long enough period, possibly four or five years, to enable the world to become stabilized and reconstruction undertaken before calling a peace conference. Such an intermission would enable passions to cool and reason to reassert itself.
It would be futile to attempt today to draw a detailed blueprint of such a world order. But there are certain aspects of life that must be safeguarded if any new world order is to meet the needs of mankind. Men must be permitted to live their daily lives in peace and not be dragged from their homes and families to fight and possibly die for causes in which they have no reasonable interest and to which they may even be bitterly opposed as is true in some European countries today. Men in one part of the globe must be able to carry on their business with men in another part of the globe without interference. Mankind must be guaranteed protection of the characteristics that distinguish it from the lower forms of life: the right to speak and write and do and believe what one chooses so long as the practice does not interfere with the possession and practice of the same rights in others. And it must be understood that these rights are the heritage of mankind simply as men-not merely of advanced as against primitive men. The new world order of the democratic nations must banish the imperialisms that have hitherto exploited primitive mankind.
The form the new world order may take will be determined largely by the events and the outcome of the war. It may be a union of all peoples similar to the League of Nations but an improvement upon the League. It may be in the nature of regional federations or councils with a superior council to prevent conflicts among them. It may take other forms. The peace and the new world order will depend to a great extent upon the amount of preparation undertaken by scholars, publicists, and statesmen of the United Nations in the solution of the long-term problems that are outstanding and of a relatively permanent nature. Some of them are briefly considered in this chapter. Of even greater importance is the morale of peoples at the end of the war. If their first consideration is a hasty return to "normalcy", or if they have become utterly war worn and apathetic, there will be little hope of a wisely planned world order. But if they are determined that not national-mindedness as at Versailles but world-consciousness is to prevail in the building of the new world order, mankind may look forward with hope to an era of peace and understanding. It will require a great and continuous educational campaign to make world-mindedness prevail over national-mindedness, because the spirit of nationalism is deeply rooted in all countries.
The theory of sovereignty predicates the absolute freedom of the state to control its internal affairs and to determine its external relations with other states. In Western civilization the theory, though not formulated at the time, was practically realized in the Roman Empire. With the dissolution of the Empire all evidences of the modern concept of sovereignty disappeared. During the Middle Ages two powers, the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire, struggled for supremacy in Europe, but because of the rise of feudalism the authority and control of each were vague, ill defined, and not generally acknowledged save in words. The theory of sovereignty as understood today had its origin in the Renaissance with the gradual establishment of such nation states as France, Spain, and Great Britain. With the publication of Grotius' De jure belli ac pacis in 1625, sovereignty in the modern sense became a definitely established principle of international law. The sound principles formulated by Grotius were repeatedly violated by monarchs like Louis XIV and Frederick the Great and particularly by Napoleon, who ignored the principle of the equality of states and destroyed the independence of those states that interfered with his organization of Europe into something similar to the Roman Empire.
The overthrow of Napoleon restored the practice of basing the relation of states upon treaties which recognized their independence and equality regardless of size and strength. The unification of Germany and Italy and the revival of national states in the Balkan peninsula placed increased emphasis upon the idea of the absolutely independent state. That idea reached its apogee in the peace treaties at the close of World War I, which revived some dormant nation states and established others with the same attributes as the states already in existence. The organization of a League of Nations with some slight limitations upon the sovereignty of its members failed among other reasons because, except in a few matters of procedure, decisions required unanimous consent. A decision of vital importance might thus be prevented by the vote of a weak, backward state. Sovereignty might thereby be reduced to an absurdity. The situation resulting from the failure of the League provided aggressor states with the opportunity to attain their unlawful objectives and brought about the present war. Certainly any new world order will require greater restriction on the sovereignty of states than existed under the League of Nations.
The Atlantic Charter to which the United Nations are officially committed states that "They wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them." There can be hardly any doubt that the smaller states look forward to regaining their prewar status in which their "sovereign rights" enabled them to exist as theoretical equals of all countries---but in actuality only upon the sufferance of their great and powerful neighbors. This may be a hopeless dream, because whether Briand's ideal of a United States of Europe will be realized or a federation of regional European areas will result, an incessant campaign must be maintained if the small states are not to be confined to mere formal independence and autonomy in internal affairs. The trend of international thinking today is largely in the direction of the establishment of regional federations with some kind of limited control by a superior organization to prevent conflict. What those regional federations will consist of will be determined by the course of events, but it must be assumed that federations will vary in organization to meet the requirements of different local conditions and backgrounds. All these problems are still in the domain of speculation, but it is wise at least to realize their existence before the need of actually attempting to solve them arises.
It does not seem likely that mankind will submit to another blood bath with its accompanying destruction of human, natural, and industrial resources. But the problem of sovereignty must be faced realistically. The nation state is the unit of political organization today and it will unquestionably survive this war. The relations between nation states will no doubt remain on a treaty basis as they have been in the past, but the future treaties will probably be enforced. The limitations on sovereignty will be those which experience has shown to be the minimum essential to a regime of peace, security, and justice. Such a regime cannot exist if a sovereign state can judge its own controversies and go to war to enforce its judgments; it cannot exist if each nation can determine its tariffs and economic policy generally without regard to the effect of its policy upon other nations; it cannot exist if minority populations and even its own citizens are denied ordinary human rights. To be assured of the maintenance of a new regime where these conditions will be observed will require modifications in the existing international order that will be very difficult to attain: an adequate world police force to prevent aggression and secure the observance of treaties, a body to obtain modifications in outmoded treaties and laws whose existence causes antagonism and conflict, a carefully organized non-partisan international court with judges having sufficiently long tenure and compulsory jurisdiction in clearly defined types of disputes.
Fortunately, mankind has had almost a generation of experience with the League of Nations. Some of its organs, such as the International Labor Organization and its non-political committees, attained great success and served mankind admirably. They should be retained and other organs be reconstructed so as to meet the needs of new world conditions. All these changes will make a great demand upon the abilities and statesmanship of the leaders of nations. Mankind looks forward with hope that a long-term view of the necessary limitations upon sovereignty will be taken and that action will not be determined by emergency needs and by aroused passions.
Whatever form of world order may result from the present conflict, keeping the peace among the constituent nation states will probably be its most difficult problem. In the evolution of humanity from families to tribes, from tribes to city states, and from city states to national states, the problem of keeping the peace had to be faced and solved. The query naturally arises, will there be unusual difficulty in keeping the peace in the event of a development of national states into regional federations such as have been envisaged?
In the evolution of humanity mentioned above there existed undoubted loyalty to family, tribe, and city state respectively, but that loyalty is as nothing compared with the loyalty to the nation state of today. In the long progress from primitive life there have slowly developed standards of conduct for the individual which are not accepted as applying to the state. Hence whereas the citizen within a national state accepts as a matter of course the state's police power as the instrument which is to prevent conflict between individuals, he is hostile to any attempt on the part of a supra-national organization to exercise police control over his state. Even when his country is clearly in the wrong, his leaders find little difficulty in convincing him of the necessity of rallying to the national standard.
The ideal solution of the police problem would be to place control in the hands of a power which had the confidence of the regional members and the necessary strength and capacity to enforce law and order. However, it can be assumed that this ideal solution will not be realized. National mistrust, jealousy, and fear are too great obstacles. There will have to be some form of voluntary pooling of forces and of control, and this is an undoubted weakness, as is almost every kind of condominium. But it is not necessarily a fatal weakness. The fatal weakness is lack of will as was shown repeatedly by the League of Nations.
Now we must be realistic. When the war ceases it will be a tremendous task to bring order out of the chaotic situation that will probably prevail. The states that have succeeded in maintaining freedom in the world---Great Britain, the United States, Soviet Russia, and China---will be the states that have the will and strength and ability to carry through that task. It seems obvious what their first step must be: to disarm Germany and her allies so thoroughly and to exercise such a degree of control over them that there can be no possibility of another secret rearmament such as took place in Germany after the last war. The task of policing the world, which must be prolonged until stability has been secured, will not only take time but will be very costly to the taxpayers of the United Nations, particularly of Great Britain and the United States, who probably would alone have the resources to finance the work. The taxpayers of those two countries would be no more willing to have their governments play the part of policemen indefinitely than other states would be to have them do so. Hence the importance of having some associating contingents from other states in the police work at the earliest practicable moment.
When the armistice period has come to a close the four states will have to organize a peace conference as promptly as conditions permit to undertake the Herculean task of organizing the new world order in such a manner as to justify men's belief that it will inaugurate a period of peace, security, and justice. This can be accomplished only if the disarmed Axis powers participate in the movement. As a practical matter the maintenance of peace would probably fail unless provision were made for the continuance of the inter-Allied war machinery into the peace situation.
It seems equally obvious that the four states mentioned above must eventually undertake measures to disarm themselves as promised in the Atlantic Charter. One of the fatal misfortunes of the period after 1919 was the development of a conviction among the defeated powers that France and the Little Entente had no intention to keep the promise of a reduction of armaments. The disarmament should be slow enough, however, to be consistent with the maintenance of control by the four leading allies. No state should be deprived of the right to use the force which is now the only means of securing justice for itself unless other means are provided of assuring justice for it. In other words provision must be made for "peaceful change". It is obvious how immensely difficult and complicated the problem of policing the world will be and how far removed from this speculation the reality may be.
In time of peace the United States consumes more rubber than all the rest of the world together. Its economy demands an adequate and continuous supply. As up to the present it could not produce rubber it had to secure its supply from abroad---almost wholly from the plantations of British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. During the Coolidge administration, the President made a vigorous protest against the British attempt in Malaya to limit drastically the production of rubber so as to raise the price to the consumer. This British attempt at regulation failed because the Dutch plantations in the Netherlands Indies increased their production to take advantage of the increased price. Rubber is here used to illustrate the anarchy resulting from monopoly control of a commodity of international need coupled with the power of a sovereign state to determine the amount of supply. Cotton might have illustrated the evil equally well. The reduction of cotton-raising acreage by the United States stimulated the increase of acreage devoted to cotton production by Brazil, Peru and other countries, some of which were not so favored by nature for producing this crop as is the United States. Americans have long been convinced of the need of national regulation of unfair trade practices and have laws to prevent them in the domestic market. Similarly a sound economic world organization will require some degree of control of international economic competition.
Despite Mr. Coolidge's protest the United States would probably have paid the higher price of rubber had the British plantation owners' scheme succeeded---at least until our own entrepreneurs could develop new sources of raw rubber. The United States was rich enough to afford the increase and it is a nation that believes in law and order in international affairs. But there were and are other nations not so complaisant. All the so-called "Have Not" nations, afterward transformed into the Axis, came late upon the international scene as economic competitors with states that earlier had secured control of essential raw materials denied by geography to the Have Nots. The latter were determined to have a share of those natural resources, if not by peaceful means, then by measures of force. In fact the raw materials were wanted in anticipation of a war effort.
Nor was the problem of raw materials all. The Axis powers maintained that in order to stifle competition, access to markets was denied them. Tariffs prevented such access to a certain extent but tariffs were imposed by practically all countries. They themselves imposed tariffs upon imports. They insisted that what was outrageous was for some colonies of European countries to be administered as closed preserves of the mother countries. It was certainly true that the French colonies were regarded almost as extensions of the mother country from which foreign economic penetration was practically excluded. But even in more liberally administered colonies, such as those of Great Britain, the use of the coinage and banking system of the mother country, the purchases for government services and public works, and the indirect methods of favoring business with the homeland put the Axis states, they maintained, at an unfair disadvantage. It is true that the Japanese in Korea and the Italians in Libya followed the same practices, as had also the Germans in their former African colonies. But these facts were disregarded in the propaganda program. That it was possible for great powers to he excluded from the enormous colonial domains of such disdained little countries as Belgium, Portugal, and the Netherlands, filled with natural resources which they ardently coveted, seemed to the Axis wholly inadmissible.
Economic "penetration" was the method first adopted to accomplish the desired change. For example, with countries whose products found a ready market in Germany, such as the nations of the Danubian area and the Balkans, barter arrangements were made. Those countries sent their agricultural and mineral products to Germany and took in return manufactured goods. The deal was mutually satisfactory at first, because in most cases the German market was the most profitable for the countries indicated and Germany was greatly assisted in securing the necessary raw materials to carry on her covert rearmament. But gradually such totalitarian devices as exchange controls, blocked marks and quotas were introduced and enabled Germany to dictate prices and quantities. The Danubian and Balkan countries gradually found themselves in a condition of economic semi-slavery, unable because of their commitments to Germany to sell in free markets and often compelled to accept goods from Germany which they did not want. It was but a step from economic semi-slavery to political interference and final domination. The previous chapter described the attempt of the Germans to realize a similar program with the Latin American countries. These methods will continue after the war unless we can bring economic as well as military war under control. Otherwise each state will be forced by the danger of war into totalitarianism. Indeed, it is a question how far inevitable centralization of governmental powers during this war is going to carry us anyhow toward totalitarianism.
The illustrations of economic maladjustments reviewed in the preceding paragraphs emphasize the lesson that the welfare of nations depends very largely upon their economic cooperation. Self-determination and self-sufficiency must have a lesser rôle in the post-war world. Given the creation of a World Trade Commission to secure such cooperation, its decisions would be valueless unless they could be implemented by a body having sufficient authority and strength to command obedience. The corollary to that conclusion is the need for some restriction upon the sovereignty of states. Debasing the currency in one nation to undersell competing nations can result only in economic deterioration in all nations. The imposition of a tariff by a sovereign state regardless of its effect upon others has sometimes resulted in the destruction of an industry in one of them. The effect of an international situation where such action can be taken is to drive the victim nations to search for Lebensraum in order to secure control of raw materials and of markets. The almost inevitable result is physical conflict.
Economic cooperation even under the aegis of a supranational body would be immensely difficult. But just as progressive countries have learned that national welfare demands proper provision for citizens who have been made underprivileged largely by their environment, similarly world society must be so organized that nations made underprivileged by geographic factors shall receive necessary assistance if the international organization is to be one of peace, security, and justice.
A colony in the modern meaning of the term is an area in one region of the world under the control of a state situated elsewhere. The primary motive for the control has always been trade profit, but the spread of religion has been an important reason for the extension of colonial dominion. At first colonies were regarded as sources of tribute and later of trade. At all times the chief function of the administration of a colony has been the maintenance of order to facilitate economic exploitation. The native has always been subjected to the needs and wishes of the governing element. When it was felt that colonies did not "pay", as was the view of many Liberal statesmen in England in the middle of the nineteenth century, the wish was often expressed that the mother country rid herself of her colonies. That attitude, however, did not survive the program of the imperialists led by Joseph Chamberlain, Cecil Rhodes, and Rudyard Kipling toward the end of the century. Nor has it since been held by any Power having colonies.
Colonies were considered profitable for a great variety of reasons. They were sources of raw materials for the industries of the mother country and were markets for her manufactured goods. They were places for the investment of surplus capital. As mentioned before, the use of the monetary system of the mother country, the placing in the metropolis of orders for equipment for road building, port improvement, transportation systems and the thousand and one requirements of governmental administration were of great benefit to the citizens at home. Colonies offered careers for "younger sons" and others in both civilian and military fields. Colonies provided Lebensraum for surplus population---a thesis of doubtful validity. More recently the importance of colonies to furnish bases for land, naval, and air forces needed for the protection of lines of commerce and for the extension of the power and prestige of the mother country has been emphasized. Some American military and naval officers have expressed the view during the war that the defeat of Japan should result in the acquisition by the United States of Japanese Mandates in the Pacific.
It can be readily understood, therefore, why Powers without colonies should regard with envy those who have them. It can be even more readily appreciated why Germany should so deeply resent the expropriation of her colonies by the victorious Allies in 1918. It would have been inconsistent with the idealistic promises made during the war by the Allies for them simply to have divided up the German colonies among themselves. Hence there was invented the principle of mandates, a principle up to that time unknown to international law.
When one of the Allies was granted a mandate for a former German colony, the mandatory power did not acquire sovereignty over the mandate. It has ever since been a moot question where the sovereignty over the mandate resides. The administration of the mandate was placed wholly in the mandatory but the mandatory was committed to making an annual report to the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, which had the right to question the representative of the mandatory. Moreover, all the members of the League of Nations were put upon an equality with the mandatory as regards trade and commerce. Article 22, section 5 of the League Covenant prohibits the training of natives for other than police purposes and the defense of the mandate. Obviously, all these commitments of the mandatory are legal limitations upon its sovereignty so far as concerns its mandates.
The mandate system reflects the weakness of the League itself, namely, the inability to implement decisions. The Mandates Commission was not given power to make independent investigation of the statements in the mandatory's report, probably a difficulty inherent in the circumstances. But the result has been that the sole means at the disposal of the League for compelling the proper execution of the mandate is the force of public opinion. The British mandatory has observed its commitments best, the Japanese worst. The Japanese have tried to exclude foreigners from their mandates and have observed great secrecy in their administration. In the meantime they have fortified them to the greatest possible extent.
What will be the probable attitude of the United Nations toward colonies and mandates when the war is finally won? The mandate system is so distinctly an improvement over the colonial system that many political scientists advocate the extension of its principles to all colonies. They would place the supervision over colonies as well as mandates in the central agency of the new world order that is to be organized, with the addition of direct power of investigation and sanctions for breach of trust. That would mean practically the transfer of the colonies to the new collective organization---something that is not likely to take place. The reasons given above for having colonies will hold in the post-war world as strongly as they did in the pre-war world. Moreover, to shift the actual administration from the experienced officials now in control would be a serious risk. If the new world order would establish agencies that could secure equitable distribution of raw materials and access to markets, the demand for colonies on the part of the Have Not powers would be largely met. It would be a forward step in the removal of international jealousy were vacancies in the civil service in mandates to be filled by examination open to peoples of every nationality. This is a policy not likely to be adopted by any state entrusted with mandates, however, unless powers with no desire to administer foreign territory---such as the United States, which refused to accept a mandate over Armenia after the first World War---recognize their responsibility to become mandatories as executors of a public international trust.
According to the Covenant of the League of Nations, the mandate system has for its objective "the well-being and development" of the peoples of the mandates. That ought to be the objective for colonies also. The intent repeatedly expressed at League meetings was unquestionably that the natives of mandates should be trained in self-government and that the economy of the territory should be gradually brought under their control. That is a big order. Vested interests in the meantime will have been formed in the mandates and it will not be easy to secure agreement upon the part of the mandatory's civil service to prepare native people to take over their jobs. Success will depend upon the will really to achieve the aim. Similar aims have been realized by the British in Egypt and in the former mandate of Iraq. It is noticeable that with the approach of victory for the United Nations idealistic statements about colonies and mandates are less frequently heard from people within states possessing them. These people emphasize that the experiment in self-government by the Filipino people was a success because of the continued political and economic connection with the United States. A similar connection will probably be necessary between the Netherlands and her Indies colonies and between Burma and Great Britain if success in those areas is to be attained. But a greater degree of control by the native populations must be assured.
Almost every advanced national system provides for the right of the individual to use violence in self-defense and also establishes laws, courts, and administrative agencies to protect him in the exercise of that right if investigation shows that he was justified. One of the evidences of wishful thinking in recent international affairs was the movement to "outlaw" war, incarnated in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which provided no mechanism to do for states what national governments do for individuals. Moreover, practically all nations recognize that the law of life is change, and therefore they have made laws to rid themselves of conditions which if unchanged will lead to revolution. Similarly, if no provision is made for changing outworn treaties and unfair conditions in international affairs, war is inevitable.
The new world order may be a federation of regional federations and its control limited to what is absolutely necessary to maintain peace, order and justice throughout the world. The American federal Constitution specifies a minimum of powers to be granted to the central union government, while all the rest are to be exercised by the states. As the world order and the regional federations which may be set up will in all probability be very loose associations as the result of compromise, it is not likely that any central authority will be entrusted with as strong powers as is true in the American system. Nevertheless, with the passage of time they will require interpretation and modification which in turn means courts and legislatures.
In order that the views of the people of each state should have a more direct bearing upon regional decisions, the legislature of each state should be associated with the executive in selecting the representatives to the regional legislative body. Provision would have to be made to prevent the swamping of the legislative body by the number of representatives elected from a single great state or from a few states on a proportional basis. If there should be established a regional European federation, Germany should not have as many representatives as France and Great Britain combined simply because she has as large a population. Elements other than mere numbers must be taken into consideration, including recent history. It is the United Nations who must decide what the organization and composition of the legislative assembly shall be but, it can be hoped, with a due regard for fairness.
One of the advantages of regional federations is that their existence would avoid the intrusion of problems of an intimately regional nature into the discussions of a world council constituted for the purpose of regulating and administering interests which transcend regional boundaries. One of the defects of the League of Nations was that, though theoretically universal, it was primarily a European organization devoted to attempting to solve European problems. The representation of the various regional federations in a world council presents unquestioned difficulties. It could not be on the basis of population. Other factors, such as the maturity of political development, the richness of industrial activity, the progress of social welfare and education, would have to be considered. In these respects a Far Eastern regional federation could not compare with a European federation. The determination of numbers of representatives would again be a matter of compromise, and the method of appointment would almost of necessity be left to the regional federation. The important matter would be to emphasize the objective, namely, unity and cohesion of the regional federations.
Disputes between nations can be settled by law or by force, by an appeal to reason or by a test of physical power. Disputes settled according to law may render justice to the small as well as to the large nation. In an appeal to force, the small nation can hope for little or no justice. To the individual, law means a command of the sovereign power, disobedience to which may bring painful consequences. To the nation, this is not true because there is no world sovereignty to issue commands. The law controlling the relations among nations, international law, consists primarily of custom and agreements voluntarily entered into by the various nations. These are binding upon the parties at the time of their acceptance and may eventually become binding on other nations by general acquiescence. International law may in part be incorporated into municipal law. This has happened in the United States to the extent of incorporating treaties into the Constitution as "the law of the land". In the history of most countries there have been times when municipal law has been partially or wholly ignored, as was true in our South during Reconstruction. So there have been times in the history of the relations between nations when international law has been partially or wholly ignored. The past decade has been such a period. A time of chaos within a country or among countries has always been followed by the reassertion of law. That can be expected to be the case after the prevailing period of chaos.
To the individual the term law immediately suggests a concept court, a body set up to decide disputes between individuals. In international law the persons corresponding to individuals in municipal law are nations, and until the formation of the League of Nations there had never existed an international court except the Central American Court of justice, which was of only eight years' duration, 1908 to 1916. If world reorganization after this war is to take the form of a federation of regional federations, then each regional federation would require its own supreme court. The present World Court, i.e., the Permanent Court of International justice, would then be relieved of considering purely European controversies and would devote itself to deciding controversies between the federations or between countries in different federations. Its almost exclusive attention in the past to European controversies militated against its supposedly universal character.
The United States has been throughout its history one of the strongest advocates of the judicial settlement of international disputes, but because of the Senate's insistence upon its prerogative to pass upon every treaty the United States has never yet ratified a treaty of compulsory arbitration. Though the United States did not join the League of Nations, provision has since been made for its adherence to the World Court upon an equality with the members of the League. Since the establishment of the Court every President and every Secretary of State has urged upon Congress our adherence to the Court. In the light of the increasing need for international cooperation in all fields of human activity, it can hardly be doubted that the United States will become a member of a revived World Court.
Humanity in its long uphill climb from barbarism has developed different civilizations and cultures which for centuries were isolated from one another by various geographic factors. The different races among men developed views of life usually based upon a theory of the superiority of themselves over all others. One race considered itself "chosen" of God; another maintained that it was the "celestial" kingdom ruled by the Son of Heaven. With the very slow and gradual growth of understanding the sharpness of those differences tended to fade. But until modern science, through improvements in transportation and communication, had reduced the world to physical unity, the belief in the spiritual unity of mankind received very little attention. The Christian teaching of the brotherhood of man did not prevent Christians themselves from assuming that they were the holders of religious views superior to those of any other people. As nearly all Christians were white people, this belief easily led to the conviction that white peoples were superior to colored peoples. The transition to the exploitation of colored peoples, the acceptance of the "white man's burden", and the adoption of the philosophy of imperialism formed a natural sequence. That was the pattern of social thought in our world when the first World War began in 1914, and it had been only slightly modified by the time the second World War broke out.
It is generally assumed that revolutionary views are today in process of formation and acceptance almost everywhere. But it is as possible for revolutionary changes, in fact any changes, to be retrogressive as well as progressive. The acceptance of the doctrine of race superiority in Germany is a case in point. So is totalitarianism. Both are opposed to the objective of the present revolutionary movement: economic security with freedom for the individual. The first activity in the international education of today, therefore, is to make that fact clear as the primary distinction between the totalitarian and democratic conceptions of life. The corollary to that thesis is inescapable. A true humanism cannot admit discrimination founded upon race, color, or religion. The victory of the democracies ought to mean that within a nation equality of opportunity should prevail and that in the competition of individuals advancement ought to depend only upon merit and ability. To that end not only in the educational but also in the economic field men of good will should try to remove obstacles to the realization of human welfare and security for the common man. And a similar principle holds true in the field of international relations. A world organization founded upon the maintenance of peace and justice must guarantee the independence, economic opportunity, and cultural autonomy of all nations regardless of size and stage of development. In the international as in the national field, to the principle of self-help ought to be added the principle of service to the deserving.
Americans like to think---and with some justification---that they exemplify these principles better than most other nations. Their great Declaration of 1776 is the embodiment of those views and was proclaimed for all mankind. It states, "When in the course of human events..." It affirms, "the inalienable rights of man"---of all men. It was made necessary out of "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind." So strong was the feeling of the new nation that it was dedicated to the welfare of human beings that the Declaration was soon followed by the adoption of a Bill of Rights guaranteeing freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, and of worship---of the things that make for the dignity of man. And the content of education in the schools and colleges of the early period of our history was devoted to a consideration of the nature, accomplishment, and destiny of the human being as embodied in literature, ethics, religion, and history, in other words, in the humanities.
Later American experience justified the faith in the principles of the Declaration. The almost forty millions of immigrants who have come to our shores since the organization of our government in 1789 have been absorbed with only little difficulty, have learned to live together in peace and generally have assimilated the democratic attitude toward life. We held and they learned from us that the essential meaning of life is to be found in the ideas that unite men, and not in those which divide them. The Civil War was fought to maintain the union of the states and naturally resulted in a strong emphasis upon the nation as being first in the affection and loyalty of our citizens. As the years passed nationalism as a cult was exalted to the same high position that it had attained in Europe. It reached its apogee in World War I. Thereafter democracy was no longer interpreted in the humanist spirit of the Declaration but in the nationalist spirit of Americanism. One might be in reality very undemocratic provided he was not "un-American".
The movement away from humanism and toward materialism was greatly strengthened by the important part played by science in the civilization of the nineteenth century and by technology in the twentieth. Science deals primarily with matter, not persons; with facts, not moral judgments; and its method is essentially that of analysis. Its achievement was remarkable in discoveries and inventions which provided materials to increase the welfare of all mankind. Because of the maldistribution of these materials, however, the increase was comparatively small---out of all proportion to the possibilities. The growth of the influence of science and its methods upon men's thinking was amazing. In the course of a short time it was difficult for a new subject to obtain a hearing unless it was dubbed "scientific". The method of rigid scientific analysis was taken over in the study of the humanities and social sciences which thereby lost their moral fervor. One cannot apply the technique of laboratory experimentation to the life of a human being, as to a guinea pig, without endangering human values. The evils of the world demand the passing of judgments upon them if the "inalienable rights of man" are to be preserved. The totalitarians mocked moral judgments. The disillusionment and cynicism resulting from the first World War have caused many to fear that the democracies have lost a measure of faith in the principles of the Declaration which required moral judgments. The absence of them is partial explanation of the chaos in which we live today.
Americans are sometimes accused of regarding education as the panacea for all ills. That charge is an exaggeration, but it is true that they are thoroughly devoted to education as the best basis for a civilized life within a nation and among nations. They had shared the hope that the International Commission of Intellectual Cooperation of the League of Nations would provide the vision and leadership for a program of education and culture among the nations. And they hoped that this education and culture in turn would provide for the spiritual welfare of individuals and peoples in a way similar to that by which the International Labor Organization provided for their material needs. That hope failed. But forward-looking men and women in the United States and in some other countries of the United Nations are now insisting that any world order-if that should fortunately become a reality---having for its objectives the freedom of the individual and the autonomy of nations will fail unless an International Education Organization is provided to spread a knowledge of the ideals and cultures of the different nations among one another and an understanding of their problems and difficulties.
The third chapter of this book was devoted to a consideration of foreign contributions to American culture and education, and to the influence of Americans upon foreign cultures. Americans are ready to admit the deficiencies of their civilization, but they believe that the basic ideals of that civilization are the hope of the world. No organization such as the Institute of International Education can devote itself to a nobler work than to spread a knowledge of these ideals, not by means of propaganda but by cultural association and cooperation. It is to that end that the Institute of International Education has labored, and labored as a pioneer.