WHEN the historic news of the signing of the Armistice was received in Paris, on the morning of November 11, 1918, it was as if some long-imprisoned bird had been given freedom. Yet throughout the celebration, which was not marked by any disorderly scenes, there seemed to be a subdued feeling in spite of the universal joy of the people. This was caused by the memory of the tremendous loss in man-power and a realization of the cost of victory.

On the 28th day of September, 1918, Bulgaria had asked the Allied Governments for an armistice. It at once became clear to my own mind that the great war structure, which the Central Powers had built up under the masterly direction of Germany, was crumbling. The very geography of the situation, without regard to other factors, made this inevitable. With Bulgaria out of the war, Turkey became detached in a geographical sense from her allied associates. Dependent for assistance as she always had been upon them, and particularly upon Germany, she too would have to follow suit.

Indeed, as far back as the middle of September, M. Take Jonesco, the very prominent former President of the Council of Roumania, had predicted to me the weakening and final fall of Bulgaria.

I was so impressed with the judgment voiced by him, that I cabled an account of this incident in one of my reports to the State Department.

Telegrams from Ambassador Sharp to the State Department.

Paris, September 21, 1918

SECRETARY OF STATE,
        Washington.

What it is hoped may be a prophetic sign of the weakening of Bulgaria was voiced to me yesterday (September 20th) by M. Take Jonesco, formerly President of the Council of Roumania, who left his country less than three months ago. He told me that M. Pachitch, the Serbian statesman, now in Paris, had just received a telegram from a private source at Saloniki, which had not yet been made public. It said that the impression of a number of prisoners was that the demoralization of the Bulgarian troops was serious, M. Jonesco said that five years ago, when Bulgaria was pining for peace in her war with Turkey, one of her leading Generals had come to him and told him that the morale of the Bulgarian army was so low that they had positively refused to fight any longer and that peace must be secured to save his country. M. Jonesco felt that a similar situation might exist today in the Bulgarian army, as many of the troops must be the same as those who were engaged in the war but five years ago.

SHARP.

 

Paris, September 29, 1918.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
        Washington.

The news from Bulgaria transcends in importance in the public mind all other happenings during the past week. Within the hour, M. Vesnitch, my Serbian colleague, has telephoned me that news has just come to him of the unconditional surrender of Bulgaria with speedy evacuation of Serbia. The sign of this defection in its logical effect on the Turkish situation has caused unequalled exultation .

A curious reason for this sudden surrender of Bulgaria was given to me yesterday by M. Franklin-Bouillon, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies. He said that General Allenby's Palestine victories had hurried on Bulgaria to sue for peace before her old enemy Turkey could first do so.

Lord Derby told me at luncheon that he had heard through a private telegram that a great riot had broken out in Vienna, German troops being hurried there to take possession of the city . .

I foresee the imminent fall of Cambrai and St. Quentin.

SHARP.

The Russian Grand Duke Alexander expressed himself pessimistically, and to my thinking too much so, because of the immediate effects which the troubled situation already evident in Germany would have upon developments to be expected in Russia, with consequent reactions against the world at large. But in all justice, I should add that the Russian Ambassador in Paris, M. Maklakoff, appointed by Kerensky and consequently not on friendly terms with the Grand Duke, called on me about the middle of October to tell me similarly that the fall of the Imperial dynasty in Germany would, he feared, greatly strengthen and encourage the Bolsheviks among his people.

Yet the general sympathy of the world was by this time overwhelmingly turned against that dynasty. It was in October that M. Suizer, the Swiss Minister at Washington, on his way through Paris returning from Switzerland to his post, spoke to me about the great effect which he believed the President's message would have, by appealing directly to the German people to separate them from the Emperor.

The feeling in military circles, about the middle of August, had been that another "peace offensive" from Germany was bound to come before the winter closed in, possibly some time in October; but it would be difficult to say how these propositions would be made and of what they might consist. It was noticeable that the French press did much talking at that time concerning these hypothetical conditions. The strongest sentiment expressed turned upon the restoration of Alsace and Lorraine. This question remained the banner around which statesmen rallied their followers. The general view I heard expressed was that the war would have to be continued if necessary for the sake of Alsace and Lorraine alone.

One particularly distinguished French army officer, with whom a member of my own staff had occasion to converse on August 22, made some remarks on which subsequent events cast an interesting light.

W. D. Memorandum of a Conversation.

August 22, 1918.

Confidential.

B---- declared that as a result of the recent victories all shades of public opinion had been crystallized in two extreme forms. There were those who would have a peace imposed by force of arms, guaranteeing not only France's frontiers and the return of Alsace and Lorraine but also her economic future; and then there were those who were so weary of the war, and were so conscious of the sacrifices made, that they would want peace as soon as possible and would not be very particular as to the terms. The second party was, however, small as compared with the first; and it was bound to grow smaller as France's victory extended and she recovered more and more of her territory. The very ones who were now ready to accept whatever they could get would then be the loudest to cry for all sorts of concessions, reparations and guarantees. He added:

"There is no sign at present that Germany is prepared to make an equitable peace. For peace to be made while Russia remains in her present condition would mean that a new war would come in a few years. France could not face this. She has suffered too much. For her to attempt bearing a greater military burden in the future would mean her absolute death. America is generous, America does not want France to die. Therefore America can be trusted not to accept a peace which would kill us as a nation.

"The keystone of the question is Alsace and Lorraine. The French themselves will feel that they have got back something for their pains. The Germans will have acknowledged themselves beaten. The economic concessions we shall demand will be of greater importance, but they could be covered over with formulas so that the German people themselves might not realize that their Government has failed in all it undertook to do. For this reason, if for this reason only, we must have Alsace and Lorraine.

"As for the Left Bank of the Rhine, based on strategic considerations, that is a question which few people understand or stop to think about, so while it has its partisans they are not numerous and can scarcely be taken into account when dealing with public opinion and the feeling among soldiers. If the question of annexing more than Alsace and Lorraine is raised at all, it must be by the negotiators at the Peace Conference, and not by public opinion.

"A serious discussion of peace before we have Germany completely beaten would be the greatest misfortune that could happen to the world. But I do not believe there is the slightest possibility of this. We are now in a position to make this the world's last war, if only we keep on. But if we stop prematurely in order to accept terms agreeable to Germany, whether sincere or not, since there cannot now be adequate guarantees behind them---then this will not be the last war. It can be, provided only we beat Germany before negotiating."

W.D.

I should here remark that uncertainty as to the immediate future prevailed in the best-informed circles of France, military as well as political,(1) while agreement was absolute on the single fact that subsequent to America's intervention, and particularly after the Second Battle of the Marne, eventual victory was assured.

As an example among many of the opinions expressed by highly competent persons in July and August when envisaging the months to follow, I would mention the views of Marshal Joffre as stated by him, and as further explained to me in person by his chief of cabinet, Lieutenant-Colonel Jean Fabry, both of which opinions I transmitted to the State Department.

W. D. Memorandum of a Conversation.

July 27, 1918.

Confidential.

Marshal Joffre said to me in substance:

The Germans are still holding their fresh reserve divisions massed in the North, and they would be able to attempt an offensive against the English at any time, probably south of Arras and at Kemmel. Nevertheless, I have heard nothing definite to show that this offensive is imminent. It is probable that difficulties in means of communication are hampering the Germans. I should not be surprised if this same reason had prevented them from following up their advantages in their earlier offensives this year.

"The English have completely reorganized and re-formed their forces, they have done fine work in this respect, and they appear to be in good condition to resist a shock.

"I very much doubt whether any conclusive military result can now be obtained by either ourselves or our enemies this year. It looks as though we would both continue until the end of the season, scrapping at various points along the line and reverting to a war of exhaustion carried on more or less in the open, after the war of exhaustion waged in the trenches.

"Our losses on the Soissons---Chateau-Thierry Front, and along the Marne, have been exceedingly heavy for the past five or six days. On the first day of Mangin's offensive, we advanced eight or nine kilometers, losing scarcely a man. But the price must be paid afterwards in such affairs, and the Germans now have their batteries in position against us, and have brought up the reserves they need,"

W. D.

 

Telegram from Ambassador Sharp to the State Department.

Paris, August 10, 1918.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

Lieutenant-Colonel Fabry, who has been for a long time Aide-de-camp to Marshal Joffre, came into the Embassy this morning at my request, to tell me of the reasons which the Marshal had in mind when he mentioned to Mr. Dawson his opinion which I transmitted to the Department in my despatch of July 29th. They are two-fold:

First, the lack of effectives, owing to which the German Army finds itself very hard pressed for reserves and unable to make any more officers. The French counter-offensive between the Marne and the Aisne exhausted 70 to 72 divisions, which finally crossed the Vesle, greatly weakened in numbers and strength. It is known that the battalions of these divisions had far from their full complement of men. The Crown Prince of Bavaria, having sent a part of his reserves to the armies of the Crown Prince of Prussia, has at the present time only about 25 fresh divisions. The German class of 1920 will not be called into depots until the 31st of this month, and it is very improbable that the Germans will immediately send this class to the front, as they are the last reinforcements which they may hope for this year. The demobilizing of still more of the German reserves is the result of the Franco-British attack in front of Amiens. Already ten or twelve German divisions of the armies of the Crown Prince of Bavaria have been used there, and it is probable that even more than the whole number of 25 will be needed. This in turn exhausts the reserves of the German armies in the North, where a big offensive might have been made.

The second reason is the bad morale prevailing among the German troops. After the great effort which has been demanded of them during the past three months by their chiefs, and with the promises of victory not realized, quite the contrary, their armies having been pushed back in many places, further effort cannot be obtained from them. The armies of the Crown Prince of Prussia will require from two to three months to recuperate. It might be that the lowest estimate possible would be a month and a half, provided the Allies remain inactive. However, the attack in front of Amiens shows that this is not the intention of the Allied chiefs.

The low morale of the German troops is clearly evident by the interrogation of prisoners and documents found on wounded and dead soldiers.

While it is true that the French armies are equally fatigued from the losses sustained and from the hardships that they have had to bear, yet they are spurred on by their victories. An army of 400,000 men which has lost 200,000 would not be worth anything in a retreat, but in an advance their enthusiasm carries them through.

The Colonel added that it was the opinion of the Marshal that the recent Allied victories could not have been achieved so easily, notwithstanding the ability and wise decision of Marshal Foch, and the great courage of the Allied troops, had it not been for a great weakening among the Germans. That is the chief explanation of the relative facility with which advances are now made by the Allies.

These two reasons have made Marshal Joffre believe that an offensive on a great scale could hardly be again attempted by the Germans this year. Of course if they are hard pressed they might possibly risk launching another big offensive as a last resource. If this should take place, the Germans would have even less chance of success than they have had up to the present time because the forces of the Allies, due to the arrival of the Americans, are constantly on the increase. Furthermore, the morale of the Allied troops is excellent.

The Colonel said that of course some local offensive might be made by the Germans at some given point along the line.

SHARP.

Early in the month of October, I found events were happening in such swift succession that contrary to my habit I jotted down a few day-to-day notes about occurrences. I was prevented from continuing, through the constant pressure of my work, with callers coming in ever-increasing numbers, my many visits, official and otherwise, to be made, and the steady flow of telegrams to be addressed to the Department in addition to written despatches (though the importance of writing as compared with cabling became less and less in such strenuous times). Yet it may be of interest to give here just a few lines as recorded by me:

Wednesday, October 2, 1918. Saw M. Trumbitch, member of Austrian Parliament,(2) Yugoslav, who berated treaty of London (May, 1917), giving to Italy the east coast Adriatic, Albania, etc. Wanted United States to land troops, promising uprising of his people against Austria in such event. He worked all night on report to leave with me. Prince of Monaco dined with us, spending three hours in most interesting talk discussing Emperor William, Crown Prince, possible antagonism of Bavarian Catholics to Prussian Government. Spoke of Emperor William's aversion to Hague Conventions; also of Empress's dislike of French; gave chocolate from Paris to her servants; he thought her a good mother, but not brilliant. Always played the part. Crown Prince weak. He told interesting story of King Ferdinand of Bulgaria visiting Monte Carlo with uniformed staff, his vanity, etc.

 

October 3. Secretary Baker called this A.M. Will leave for America tomorrow noon. General discussion over outlook. Agreed with me that not necessary to march into Berlin in order to win a lasting victory, but be masters and dictate terms.(3) Indemnities, of course.

 

Friday, October 4. Count Zarnowski of Polish Commission called to discuss Polish questions, leaving memo, for transmission to Department. He told me an interesting story of Emperor Charles of Austria and a Minister of Railroads in Russia. Minister was asked by the Emperor how long it had taken him to rise from a station-master to his present position.(4) Thought Emperor was not strong with his people. Empress not at all liked. A million Austrian soldiers deserters.

 

October 5, Saturday. Luncheon with Capt. Jackson at Interallié Club. Late in the afternoon learned of Central Powers' peace proposal. In the evening attended dinner to Vesnitch, Serbian Minister, at Cercle Volney. Minister Leygues spoke, also self, briefly.

 

Sunday, October 6. Went out to James Hazen Hyde's at Versailles for luncheon, George with me. Day very beautiful as we returned. News of enemy proposals for peace creating great interest and secret rejoicing as I believe.

 

Monday, October 7. George, Mr. Dawson, and I went out to St. Quentin with Military officers.(5)

 

Wednesday, October 9th. President Wilson's reply to Germany's note published. Everybody pleased as it was at once seen that the Germans had their powder burned by the questions proposed by the President. No political capital for home consumption left to them; the answer awaited with much interest. In the evening attended dinner at Cercle Interallié. Mr. Vanderbilt given Medal Legion of Honor by French Government. A number spoke, among them Viviani. The dinner was to American "Escadrille Lafayette."

 

Concerning the prospects of Peace, I advised the Department as follows:

Telegram from Ambassador Sharp to the State Department.

Paris, October 8, 1918.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

In a talk with M. Pichon at the Foreign Office this evening he said that the representatives of the Allied Powers, now holding conference at Versailles, were awaiting with much interest the answer of President Wilson to the peace note of the Central Powers. He said that having full confidence in the President's answer the Allies would offer no suggestions. Speaking for France he said that he was sure the reply would meet with full approval. However, I found him very cautious when it came to saying what France would wish to have stipulated. The French press is likewise vague in setting out or advocating any definite course of action. All unite in stating that there should be demanded the fullest reparation backed by the strongest kind of guarantees before any discussion. As fairly indicating the general tone of such comments the noted political writer and Deputy Maurice Barrès writing in L'Echo de Paris this morning says, "France, Belgium and the other free nations have by fifty months of trials and sacrifices without limit merited the integral reparation of their damages of yesterday and today and the guarantee of their security in the future." A well-known military critic writing in Le Petit Journal, formerly M. Pichon's paper, is a little more definite as to the purposes to be obtained, in giving expression to the following comment: "There is no doubt but that our High Command, whom the affair concerns, would demand as a fundamental condition of the armistice the evacuation not only of our Departments, of Belgium, and of Luxembourg, but also of Alsace and Lorraine, which we would ourselves occupy. Then, yes, we would commence to talk."

Apropos of first imposing the condition of evacuation and as bearing upon the last paragraph of my No. of yesterday, I should add that in a conversation today with General Mangin, one of the most noted French army officers, he said to me that from a military standpoint the German armies might be secretly glad of the opportunity to evacuate the invaded territory free and unmolested in the process, as their armies would be left intact to fight again on German soil if necessary; that as a matter of fact the German commanders were endeavoring to retreat to their frontier with as little loss as possible, and that in his opinion it lies in the power of the Allied forces to destroy the enemy's armies before they could reach the frontier. He was opposed to allowing them to evacuate unless they left on French soil all their arms and munitions.

Whatever may be the real opinion of the public mind upon the question of at all considering an armistice, it is certain that the French press, notwithstanding its hostile comments, does not go to the lengths which the American papers have gone in unconditional opposition to it, quotations from which appear today in all the French papers. However, the reading of ill-timed boasts and threats of the German papers in case of rejection has put the public in no patient frame of mind in considering it.

Yesterday a deputation from the National Socialist Congress which had been in session in Paris called to inform me that they would tomorrow leave with me a copy of the resolutions adopted by the Congress concerning the peace offer of the Central Powers. They at the same time stated that M. Pichon had promised to forward to the President a copy of these resolutions which however have appeared in all the papers of yesterday. The resolutions express high appreciation of the President's attitude upon the question of peace and profess to see in the present proposition of the enemy Powers an earnest effort to bring about peace, the overture for which they hope will not be hastily repulsed by the Allied Powers without discussion. Satisfaction at the same time is expressed in the change of attitude of Germany, which finally recognizes that the subject of Alsace and Lorraine is one of international law.

Yesterday General Debeney commanding the French Army in the St. Quentin sector said to me that an early answer to the proposal of the Central Powers was desirable on account of the effect a delay might have on the fighting morale of the Allied troops. This I learned tonight is also the view of another French General with headquarters at Rheims.

SHARP.

In dealing with the subject of "France Devastated" I mentioned my conversation with General Mangin at his headquarters near Soissons, saying I would revert to it when I came to the Days of the Armistice. It was noteworthy that this famous General, while admitting the possibility of peace in the near future, still reckoned as late as October 8 with the chances of a prolonged war, giving his attention particularly to this military aspect of the situation.

Speaking first of our share in the war, General Mangin said that America not only should have but did have a right to an autonomous army of her own, but it would be well also to have some of our troops serve with the French so as to profit by the French staffs and officer-organization as they existed in a state of high perfection among the French, whereas our own staffs were, he remarked, still inexperienced. He, like General Debeney, urged the sending of great quantities of material, especially aeroplanes.

In regard to the military situation and the possibilities of an armistice, General Mangin next said that it might serve Germany's interests, as she was now in the bad situation of being confronted with heavy losses if a general retreat were to become necessary. He explained that Germany disposed of about 200 divisions, in addition to her new 1920 class, about 500,000 men; and some 400,000, wounded in the Spring fighting, who would soon again be fit for action; in all about 3,000,000 men. If left unmolested, they might attack in the Spring of 1919, and according to his theory of war it was what they should do. He considered that another German offensive if attempted immediately would be deplorable. He mentioned incidentally that according to information he had received the Germans were preparing a defensive line behind Laon and possibly another before the Meuse.

W. D. Memoranda of Conversations.

October 12, 1918.

Confidential.

Conversing at his Headquarters, on October 8th, General Mangin, in command of the French Tenth Army (Soissons Sector) said in my presence:

"There are several ways in which America could help us even more than she is doing.

"First of all we need men. The autonomous American army was necessary, for the sake of America's prestige and also for the morale of the Allies and for the depression of Germany. But you have over here at the present moment far more men than you can possibly manage with your existing officer organisations and this will continue to be true as your army develops. Company officers can be formed in a relatively short time, as you have brilliantly proved, and you have many fine Field officers also, but you have not a sufficient number of the latter and you cannot turn them out quickly and in large numbers. Why not, then, allow us to use in our divisions the men whom you are unable to utilize in your autonomous army? I was for a time in command of three American Divisions, and saw for myself how fine they are; but they were taken away almost immediately for service on an American Front; and all the hundreds of thousands of Americans not needed for that service remained unused at the rear while we were short of men for our great offensive.(6) I may go so far as to say that but for this policy the war could have been ended this year. And unless it is altered so that one division in every three in the French army is composed of Americans, we shall be compelled to reduce our divisions next year.

"But we do not need only men from America. We need material for our own use, besides that sent for the use of the American army itself. In the way of material, we need principally shells. Great as is the output of our factories, it does not quite suffice. Then we need horses; one of the reasons for which we are now short of horses is because we had to supply the American army with them at the start. Many of those horses had originally come from the United States; but we gave them up again ; and now they are needed by us. Furthermore, we are short of motor transports, also partly for the reason that for a while we supplied the American army with them. A distribution of tonnage enabling you to bring us these three things in large quantities, without stopping the transportation of men, would be of the very greatest value to us. As for aeroplanes, I believe in them for bombing and observing, and also for the moral effect; but not for real military results, where only armies can do the work,

"The whole of war is a question of a projectile and an armorplate; however strong the armor, you will always find a projectile which will pierce it in time. Therefore I believe in the offensive method, and in continual hammering. I could now take Laon within three days(7) if ordered to do it. But the difficulty is in getting the order. I had the same trouble about my July offensive, which was easy to execute once I secured the order, but for a long while I could not get the permission to attack.

"We now have all the crops in this region, they were harvested not by the Germans but by our troops, because we attacked and drove the enemy out, instead of allowing him to organize a retreat, to destroy or remove crops, or even to save his material. My army alone captured 900 cannon, more than 1,000,000 shells of various calibers, and ambulances and hospital supplies to the value of more than a million francs.

"The Germans may now be prepared to evacuate all of invaded France and Belgium in order to save their soldiers and lay waste the country behind them. But it would be a mistake to overlook the fact that they are resisting stubbornly on their positions, and that the soldiers we see and the prisoners we take are fine physical specimens of men. You have only to look at the prisoners working all round here, to judge for yourself. I estimate Germany will have in all something under a million men to add to the rough 3,000,000 already on the Western Front. I do not believe that the Austrian Germans will consent to be incorporated, as Germany hopes, against us on this front; so that Germany's armies opposed to us next year will not exceed 4,000,000.

Her only remaining hope to win the war lies in trying to divide the Allies. That was the object of her peace move. She hoped to make use of President Wilson, but she is dealing with a man of character. She is paying the price now for her mistake in not allowing Hindenburg to carry out his plans. I hold on reliable authority that Hindenburg wanted to attack in the North with a view to taking Calais,(8) where he might have succeeded, but the Crown Prince insisted upon an attempt against Paris, which Hindenburg declared to be entirely too ambitious. Rather than assume such a responsibility, Hindenburg turned over his command to Ludendorff, who obeyed the Crown Prince with the results we all know."

I have since asked Marshal Joffre's opinion as to General Mangin's suggestions concerning America's aid. The Marshal said:

"We certainly need horses and motor-trucks from America for the use of our army, but I do not agree that we need ammunition. Our own factories can more than supply our demands.

As for utilizing American soldiers under French officers in French divisions, I think Mangin makes a mistake in psychology. Not only must America have her own autonomous army, for the reasons he states, but all American soldiers should serve under American officers because they will do their best work under American officers. There should, however, be a number of French officers as advisers with each American army, and even with each American division, the American officers retaining active command of the men. And then, America must have the courage to eliminate ruthlessly all officers whose work proves them not to be good. This is a lesson we have had to learn, as every country must learn it in time of war; and the sooner it is learned, the better for, the army and the nation. Of the 100,000 officers, roughly speaking, America has formed so far, most are entirely fitted for their duties, Field officers as well as subordinates."

W. D.

Following shortly after Bulgaria's formal request for an armistice, rumours became rife in Paris that Austria had served notice on Germany that a similar action would be taken by her alone, unless a joint effort could be addressed to the Allied Powers in view of a general armistice. While not much credence was placed as a rule in such rumours, yet for once they appeared to have a real foundation. Subsequent developments proved that some such representations had certainly been made.

If events had in a way cast before them the shadow of what was impending, the opening of negotiations for an armistice begun by Germany,(9) and so adroitly answered by President Wilson, left no room for doubt of an early cessation of the war. If President Wilson had heretofore exhibited a matchless power of expressing the vital issues at stake and of appealing to the people of the world in support of them, it remained for him, now that the fruit of that necessary effort had been realized, to outmatch the greatest minds of Germany in such a manner as to render the morale of her armies impotent for further struggle. With a complete frankness and withal a remarkable adroitness in shaping the course of discussion following Germany's appeal for an armistice, he won recognition for one of the greatest principles for which he had contended---that of the expression of the voice of the German people rather than of the oligarchy which had misrepresented them. But he did more than this; by his insistence he forced those who spoke for Germany to reveal her intense desire for a cessation of hostilities and a substantial agreement to conditions, some of which were afterwards in principle embodied in the terms of the armistice.(10)

By these negotiations, even though something might intervene to prevent their immediate consummation, the morale of the German army had suffered irreparable loss of prestige. The loss was not even as great in the eyes of the world as it was in their own ranks. The hope which animated those ranks for an early peace would not be baulked. Their leaders dared not so do. The thought that the morrow would mark a cessation of hostilities could not but bring with it a lack of the fighting spirit which had characterized the remarkable charges in the great advance of German troops. Men who had borne the brunt of battle for many months on the danger line would not to-day willingly offer themselves as a sacrifice for a cause which to-morrow would be surrendered. The logic of the situation, so clearly exposed by President Wilson, left those in authority in Germany to pursue no other course than that which followed---to agree to the terms of an armistice imposed by Marshal Foch.

I myself had become convinced that the war was fast nearing its end. I had lost no time in studying the question of the armistice conditions which might be acceptable, for the dual purpose of putting the promptest possible cessation to this prolonged slaughter of the world's best young manhood, and of assuring a peaceful future safeguarded against further unprovoked onslaughts of militaristic imperialism.

I think I can say that there was no man of distinction on the Allied side, with whom I could possibly get in touch, whose views I did not endeavour to sound at that period which was of supreme importance to the world.

The ultimate aims as well as the immediate viewpoint of the American Government were of course well known to me, from my constant contact not only with the President and Colonel House and the Secretary of State, but with Secretary Baker and Secretary Daniels, and with the wise and distinguished Generals and Admirals in whose hands the fortunes of our arms were placed.

With General John J. Pershing in particular I had enjoyed the friendliest relations, there being between us an unfailing sympathy in our exchanges of opinions upon matters concerning the war.

I had, from the very outset, been inspired by the natural desire to place the services of the Paris Embassy at his disposal in every helpful way. But I found furthermore that I greatly enjoyed meeting him on numerous occasions during the prosecution of the war which called for a free, frank, and cordial collaboration between us, characterized by a complete mutuality of good sentiments. Nothing that I could possibly have done for him would have been more than his due. The great victory of St. Mihiel in September, 1918, had scarcely been needed to show to every American the value of Pershing's valiant army, although the news came as a veritable inspiration, and Americans, in common with their Allied brothers, rejoiced in this achievement. We could not but experience great satisfaction that our brave boys should so signally have contributed their help to the final task of ridding French soil of the invader. Then the closing weeks of the war followed swiftly, cast in a heroic mould and measuring the joint victories of the magnificent French, British, and American soldiers, presaging the prompt defeat of the enemy.

By that time, the value of Pershing's men had come to be indelibly impressed upon all the people of Europe. Surpassing everything known in the history of previous wars, it made one more proud than ever to be American. The people of France in particular, having ample opportunity both to admire and to love America, came to have the highest regard for our boys as soldiers and as men, and for the gallant Chief, who, having at heart the best interests of the country he so ably served and of the valiant men under his command, put himself and his Army at the disposal of the French in their hour of utmost tragic need while ever safeguarding the sacred liberty of America's Army under the American flag.(11)

General Tasker H. Bliss, our eminent Military Representative on the Supreme War Council and eventually a Member of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, was also repeatedly in conference with me and would invariably leave with me the feeling of the accord which reigned between us. Too high a tribute could not be paid to his wisdom in counsel. He would come preferably to my residence at some hour chosen by himself because he knew I would he at home. It was understood between us that my other occupations would immediately cease and I would be at his absolute disposal for the time required, occasionally a matter of hours. Similarly with General Peyton C. March, our Chief of Staff, who had had the distinction of being the American Military Attaché with the Japanese Army during the Russo-Japanese War, I had frequent conferences, recognizing in him an officer possessed with the supreme genius of a born organizer. Then there was General Bullard, the great Commander of the glorious First Division of the A.E.F. in its operations against the Germans from December, 1917, to October, 1918; Brigadier-General W. W. Harts, the Chief of our Mission to the British General Headquarters and later in command of the American District in Paris; Colonel Cabot Ward, who conducted with such remarkable success the services of the American Intelligence Section at the rear with headquarters in Paris; and many others whom I had the occasion to sound, deriving benefit from their views and retaining the conviction that no opinion of my own had been expressed in vain.

In Navy circles my talks were principally with Admiral W. S. Sims, the President of the Naval War College who commanded the American Naval operations in European Waters from April, 1917, to the end of the war; Admiral H. T. Mayo, who as Commander-in-Chief of the American Atlantic Fleet in 1914 had demanded the salute of 21 guns to the United States flag from the Mexican Commander at Tampico, in amends for the arrest of a Navy paymaster, and who was Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Fleet during the entire period of the war; Admiral W. S. Benson, who had been a member of the Commission appointed to confer with the Allied Powers in Europe in 1917 and had returned as a Member of the Special Mission Abroad in October, 1918 ; and Rear-Admiral Andrew T. Long, for a time my Naval Attaché in Paris and American Staff Representative there in 1918.

But these talks, in the weeks preceding the Armistice, were not limited to Army and Navy officers, nor indeed to my own fellow-countrymen. Among my American diplomatic colleagues whom I had occasion to see I would mention particularly my good friends Mr. Thomas Nelson Page, American Ambassador in Rome, and Mr. Joseph E. Willard, the Ambassador in Madrid, the latter notably being a frequent visitor in Paris and both being always highly welcome guests at my house; not very long before, there had been Ambassador A. I. Elkus, returning from Turkey; and there was also Mr. John W. Davis, selected by the President for the London Embassy to succeed Mr. Walter H. Page, with whom I had exchanged a number of letters. There were also my colleagues among American Ministers passing through Paris and my foreign colleagues of the Diplomatic Corps, most of whom I have already had occasion to mention by name; and in addition to scores of distinguished Frenchmen in all prominent callings of life there were such Englishmen of note as Arthur Balfour, Lloyd George, and Lord Northcliffe,

Among the inquiries I made, one was of Marshal Joffre, asking for a free expression of his views, as I knew that he was a man of great forethought. As Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies he had elaborated his own plan for an armistice, so as not to risk being taken by surprise after the victory on which he counted eventually. Furthermore he had had a care to remain in constant touch with later developments of the war, so that his counsel was always highly valuable.

I may mention here that at various times, when examining reports handed in to me on opinions expressed by him at my desire, I was constantly impressed by the scope of the information he would either have at his command or could secure for me at brief notice. This sometimes included even economic questions of a sort excluded from all former conceptions of strategy, but now imposed by the force of circumstances upon the high commanding officers in the course of the World War. The great army organizations which had become necessary could not do their work at the front unless supported at the rear by a complete and gigantic system, covering transportation as well as fabrication and all the multiple resources of a practical economic and financial nature demanded thereby.

W. D. Memoranda of Conversations with Marshal Joffre.

October 12, 1918.

Marshal Joffre said to me:

"I consider that we are very near the end of the war. Germany is at the point of collapse, and it may come at any moment. Her Government is shaken, and her people have suffered greatly. Not only the Government, but the people themselves realize the full gravity of their position to-day. Furthermore, Turkey and Austria are about to withdraw from the war, and without them Germany is helpless.

"President Wilson's reply to the German Note was exactly what it should be, saying that evacuation must come first. Only, it would be a grave mistake on the part of the Allies to let Germany know that they consider her resistance at an end. We should continue all precautions as if the war were going on indefinitely; we must force her to feel that she is beaten and lies in our hand. Then her collapse will be complete and she will have to accept all our conditions."

I asked the Marshal whether by the expression "all our conditions" he meant not only evacuation of all occupied territory in Europe and indemnities for damages done, but also the giving up of Germany's colonies, upon which condition I understood that both England and Japan were prepared to insist although France and America might care less.

After a long silence, the Marshal said:

"That question is a grave one. There is also that of the mastery of the seas. We must hope that Germany's collapse will be so complete that she will have to comply with whatever we demand."

 

CONDITIONS TO BE PROPOSED FOR THE ARMISTICE

(As sketched out and communicated to me by Marshal Joffre at the request of the Ambassador, October 12, 1918.)

I. Prior to any Discussion.

(a) The establishment of a government responsible before the German people and being alone qualified to discuss either war or peace.

(b) The evacuation of territories and withdrawal to a line to be determined by the military command.

(c) Prohibition of creating any new military organization in a zone to be determined.

(d) Cession or immobilization of material and munitions (both Army and Navy).(12)

II. Points whose Advisability might be Considered.

(a) Manner of applying those points of the Wilson Programme which are immediately applicable.

(b) The re-victualling of civilian populations in Germany (food and raw materials).

(c) The fate of interned ships in neutral ports (they must be kept there).

III. Inspection of the Conditions for the Armistice,

Superintendence of the bridges over the Rhine and of railroads by an Inter-Allied Commission.

 

Commenting upon the "Conditions to be proposed for the Armistice" which he had prepared in writing, Marshal Joffre elucidated certain points for me as follows:

"The first group of points, 'Prior to any Discussion,' I consider absolutely necessary as safeguards in the application of an armistice. The second group might be considered as possibly advisable. The third is an essential condition for the fulfilment of the conditions to be applied.

(a) "In Group One, by a 'responsible Government' I mean a body directly empowered or appointed by the German people to speak for them. This body might be either the existing Reichstag or a specially elected Parliament. The former would probably be the better, since it is already constituted; but it would have to speak independently of all autocratic Hohenzollern influence, that is, the Emperor, the Crown Prince and Eitel must be excluded, and it would have to be specially authorized by the German people to treat in their name for peace or for war. The alternative of a specially elected body would manifestly be difficult to arrange and would mean a considerable delay.

(b) "As for the evacuation of territories and the line to be observed, the opinion of the military command is necessary and nothing should be done before this opinion has been given.

(c) " While all new works in the way of military organization must be prohibited, existing works, trenches, dug-outs, etc., may be allowed to remain.

(d) "The next point (d) is particularly delicate while being of vital importance. We cannot allow the enemy to remove all his guns and munitions and keep them as a threat against us. At the same time he may raise a similar objection against leaving them in our hands. The solution would be the destruction of his guns and material. The question of the German Navy is even more delicate and equally important. As long as his warships are in the Kiel Canal and his submarines at their bases, we must absolutely be protected against his enterprises by sea as well as by land,

"In Group Two, I suggest a study of points in the Wilson Programme which may be immediately applicable. I am in hearty accord with the Wilson Principles, and think it would be well for a commission to examine them carefully, and as soon as possible.

"As for supplying food and raw materials to the German people during the armistice, this might be the strongest card in the hand of the Allies, should the German Governmental body attempt obstruction against our peace conditions. The German people are suffering physically from food shortage, and while not pitying them for their deserved condition, I know that they will be grateful to those who feed them.

"The study of the interned ships question in neutral ports will probably be necessary also.

"The question of demanding hostages might be raised, but I consider that this would be a mistake. It would be vexatious, it would be lacking in the nobility which has characterized all of President Wilson's decisions so far, and it might risk causing the failure of the peace negotiations.

"Group Three, finally, lays down an essential condition, the superintendence of German railroads and Rhine bridges by the Allies so that the Germans may not mobilize or regroup their armed forces in any way whatsoever or at any point of their territory during the armistice.

W. D.

October 13th, 1918.

This afternoon, Marshal Joffre dictated to me, at the Ambassador's request, the following statement of his opinion for President Wilson, asking only that it be treated confidentially, since he did not wish to appear as doing more than give his personal views to the President in whose wisdom, sound judgment, and loyalty he reposes utmost confidence:

"I believe that everyone has had enough of war, for all have suffered heavily. In consequence, it will be a boon for humanity to stop the war. But there must be guarantees so that it may be not only the end of this war but the end of wars for decades and decades to come. We can attain this result only by being very strict in our demands.

"Germany is, I think, reduced to extremity, but her desire for an armistice may be only a ruse of war. In this case, her bad faith would become evident during a respite of one or two months allowing her to reconstitute her strength. But we ourselves could do much more than she during this time. Therefore the situation would not be to her advantage. There may be people in Germany who have such hopes from the armistice. But there are certainly others who know better. Germany is not a unit, there are divergences of opinion within her borders as elsewhere.

"The armistice will be long, several months or perhaps more. I doubt if peace can come for a year yet, and the armistice should not end entirely until peace is signed. The armistice might be a matter of intervals, renewed and running one into the other. The first might be for one month, after which our military precautions and effort might be reduced, if Germany's good faith were then established. That month will enable us to know.

"Certain Governments of the Entente have not yet decided upon all the measures which must be taken with a view to the armistice and to peace.

"Although Germany as a whole desires peace, and we desire peace, yet we have the upper hand, thanks especially to America, and we must have a logical and rational peace. Above all, we must suppress the German Governmental system. It has already been done away with in other directions, even in Austria, and in Germany itself many small States would be happy to detach themselves from Prussia. I entirely agree with President Wilson that this present system must disappear, or it will be a permanent menace to peace."

W. D.

 

October 30th, 1918.

Marshal Joffre said to me to-day:

Austria-Hungary should be dealt with for an armistice as soon as possible, and separately if Germany also does not immediately ask to treat under conditions entirely acceptable to the Entente. Such a decision may come from Germany at any moment; but we cannot yet be sure of her sincerity when saying she accepts Mr. Wilson's principles. She is certainly not sincere in alleging that she now has a government qualified to negotiate on the lines laid down by Mr. Wilson.

"We may consider Austria as being out of the fight. By this, Germany's fate, which had been precipitated and rendered inevitable when Bulgaria withdrew from the war after America had entered it, becomes more imminent than ever. Austria's defection is not only a serious blow to Germany. An armistice, compelling Austria to accept conditions similar to those imposed upon Bulgaria, would open her railways to the Allies who, within a few weeks, could attack on the southern Bavarian frontier, where Germany has no defences and has not even any divisions.

On the other hand, Germany has continued fortifying her original pre-war frontier and the line along the Rhine, while present negotiations have been in progress. Definite information to this effect has been received. We can only conclude that Germany is preparing to defend her soil, should certain eventualities occur.

Germany is reduced very low indeed. She cannot increase her effective forces, she has lost much of her artillery and material, her population has suffered severely, and her morale is bad generally. But up to the present, it is the German nation which has been beaten rather than the army---an immense result attained, but one imposing circumspection militarily. The army is now fighting stubbornly on the positions it holds; the Allies meet with organized resistance wherever they launch an attack. This shows that the German army is still far from collapsing, though it is badly shaken and the nation behind it is shaken still more deeply. One reason for this is that the people have long lacked food whereas the army has had food.

"The next move for an armistice or for peace must, of course, come from Germany. We cannot make overtures of any sort. But if we can possibly secure a safe peace swiftly, whether by dealing with both Germany and Austria or by beginning with Austria alone, we should not miss the opportunity, and we should be quick about it.

Our army is impregnated with the idea that the war is virtually over. There has been so much peace talk that officers and men can almost fancy themselves at home once more. If Germany could manage to hold out for a while longer, our armies, forced to a winter campaign which they now judge impossible, would feel a disappointment whose results might be extremely serious. The French army has accomplished such prodigies of valor and of self-sacrifice during more than four years, that I do not like to think it would refuse to fight on until Spring if ordered to do so. But such a possibility does exist, owing to the spirit of peace now impregnating the air, and to the fact that the French people themselves have suffered almost as much as they are capable of suffering. The English think they have suffered as much as we, but they have not. It is consequently our duty to secure peace as soon as we can, provided it be a sound peace.

"I find nothing to add, from a military point of view, to the armistice conditions for Germany which I suggested on October 12th; nor do I think any of those conditions should be omitted. But I think that, in view of developments in Austria, the armistice should now be more than purely military; it ought to foreshadow peace. There should be at least a clause stating that it is to prepare a sound peace for the future, The Wilson Propositions should be included in it, or at least those of the propositions which are immediately applicable.

"Events are showing more and more that President Wilson is right, and that his Fourteen Points are necessary for the world. I do not know the attitude of our Government towards them, Indeed, I have never heard of M. Clemenceau's having expressed his real opinion of them. I sometimes doubt whether he has considered them sufficiently to form any clear opinion. Therefore it is not possible to say what sort of peace he wants---even if he himself yet knows. He is a man of impulse, his policy consists in hitting out, and it is never possible to say in advance where or how he will be prompted to hit at the last moment.

"I think it would be a very grave mistake for us to demand the annexation of the Left Bank of the Rhine. It is not likely that the population there would care to come to us, at least for the present; and such a move on our part, contrary to the will of the people, would he denying not only Wilsonism but our own history for the past fifty years. At the same time, it is undeniable that the Rhine lying between Germany and ourselves would afford the safest of frontiers for the future.

"Two years ago, when I was still Commander-in-Chief, and when general conditions were different, I mapped out the broad lines for possible peace. One suggestion I made was that the territory on the Left Bank of the Rhine should be neutralized as a buffer state for a certain number of years, after which it would be given the choice, by popular vote, between French and German nationality. After some years, the people would not only know their will but would feel free to express it. A plebiscite now would be manifestly impossible.

"The future of both Germany and Austria, especially Austria, is difficult to foresee because of the complexities already existing and promising to increase. It is almost a pity that Austria should break up so soon and so completely. Various parts of her territory will apparently join on to neighbouring states, with the Czechoslovaks perhaps remaining independent in their midst. This creates a very dangerous situation. German Austria may very possibly join Bavaria, which would then become the dominating factor in the Germanic Confederation. The two big influences in the Germany of to-day are Prussia and Bavaria. The latter is the more liberal of the two, and is more in keeping with Wilsonian principles. Were it to be the center of the new Germanic States, organized on the system of the United States, we might hope to avoid many of the complications with which Central Europe is now filled.

Russia remains a grave problem in our dealings with Germany. General Lavergne, who was our military attaché and has just returned to France, told me a few days ago that Bolshevism is more powerful than ever in Russia, though operating under the name of the Labour Party. The influence of Lenin and Trotzky has never been so absolute. But they are not working for Germany, they work exclusively for the Russian Revolution."

W. D.

On October 20, I had been invited to attend a great fête in the public square before the Hotel de Ville, an event which I particularly remembered as it was the last military review I saw before the ending of the war. Having with me my friend President King of Oberlin College, I witnessed the review of the young 1920 class by the President of the Republic. In the presence of a vast multitude, these new recruits marched splendidly, preceded by the troops of all the Allied nations and being greeted with utmost enthusiasm. But there was an aspect which even at the time impressed me far more than the military one, splendid as was the showing made by these young men. I could read in the faces of all those near me, and of hundreds in the crowds beyond, that many like myself were breathing an involuntary prayer that day, because of the sadness of all the suffering endured and the sacrifices made since the beginning of August, 1914.

This sentiment also prevailed in my mind, as in the minds of others, when I attended the impressive scene at the Chamber on November 11, to hear M. Clemenceau announce the signing of the Armistice and read its conditions. The entrance of the Premier was a signal for prolonged cheering and there was frantic applause.

For the German people had subscribed to the stern terms of President Wilson's noble reply of October 14, 1918.(13)

Within the Chamber, as among the vast throngs forming processions in the streets, there was great satisfaction, but. with reverence for the memory of those who had died. In every gesture there was joy, but there were also dignity and poise among the people. Posters on the walls bade all to celebrate the occasion while recalling the sacrifices made. A proclamation of the Paris Municipal Council invited Paris to lay aside, in this hour of "triumphant victory," the proud reserve which had won for her the admiration of the world and to testify the infinite gratitude of France to her soldiers.

A few days in answer to a letter which I had sent him, Marshal Foch wrote to me:

Marshal Foch to Ambassador Sharp.

G.Q.G.A. November 27, 1918.

MR. AMBASSADOR,

The sentiment which inspired the terms of your letter touches me profoundly as well as your congratulations. I thank you very deeply for them.

Pray accept, Mr. Ambassador, the assurance of my high consideration.

F. FOCH.

Nor were Pershing's men forgotten in this great hour. High praise of their valour and of their conduct was heard on all sides, and I took an early occasion to visit some of our boys in their quarters at what a few days before had been the front.

Telegram from Ambassador Sharp to the State Department.

Paris, November 20, 1918.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
    Washington.

I spent Sunday and Monday visiting the more important points which the American troops had taken during the days preceding the Armistice, having accepted an invitation from General Bliss to go to the American Headquarters with him last Saturday.

*      *      *      *      *      *      *

I believe every effort possible should be made to have troops immediately returned to America, although this is purely a military question and I hesitate to make recommendation on that account. The return home of all our young men with equal speed, except in numbers absolutely necessary to remain here, would be an act of great wisdom and would be an achievement complementary to the wonder with which the world witnessed the sending over of such enormous numbers of our American soldiers during the past six months. There is unanimous desire among our soldiers to get back to America as soon as possible, after having placed themselves at the top in the esteem of the French people over all other troops for their general good behavior.

SHARP.

Among the ceremonies which I witnessed, or in which I was called upon to participate at this period, particularly significant, coming just one week before the date on which arms were to be laid aside, was the unveiling of the monument erected at Béthelémont, in memory of the first three American soldiers fallen in battle on November 3, 1917, upon the French territory of Lorraine. Going to Nancy on this occasion, accompanied by my Naval Attaché, Captain Jackson, and being the guest of my friend M, Mirman, the Prefect, in the course of my dedication speech of this monument, constructed of stone from local quarries, I said :

"Added to the appreciation which my countrymen will feel for this touching manifestation of your sympathy for these heroes who have fallen in our common cause, and the expression of your gratitude for their help, comes a personal pride to me from the fact that my county of residence in America was named by its founder a hundred years ago, after your beautiful Lorraine. There is a further satisfaction also in the knowledge that many of the sons of the new Lorraine across the water are now on French soil, fighting for the freedom of the old ....

"In his eloquent speech, your distinguished Prefect, whom I have known as a personal friend from my early coming to France, has called attention to the fact that the first contingents of General Pershing to cross the Atlantic were instructed in Lorraine, and in that very part of this province which has gained world-wide fame as the birth-place of Jeanne d'Arc. In the life and noble mission of this sainted martyr to the cause of liberty, has not the world seen the spirit of France fully symbolized, during this mighty conflict in which this soil has been the storm-centre of battle?

"As we turn our footsteps away from all that is mortal of those whose sacrifice the ceremony of to-day commemorates, what greater tribute can we accord to their memory, and what greater honour pay to their fathers and mothers dwelling in my own distant land, than thus publicly to acknowledge the debts which humanity, freed from the menace of military domination, will ever owe to them?"

In the following April, immediately before leaving Paris, I visited a portion of the battlefields in which our boys had participated, and notably one of the many cemeteries where American soldiers alone are buried, between Villers-Cotterets and Soissons. It was a beautiful sentiment, as though the dying soldier had himself expressed his wish to be buried near where he fell. In all directions I could still see the mute evidences of the struggle in which the men of both sides had given up their lives, spilling their blood as freely as water. The tree-trunks blown from the highways, splintered and shattered all to pieces; the myriad of shell-holes making of the countryside a ravaged waste; the thoroughly wrecked buildings of the little towns through which we passed: and not many miles beyond the ruins of what had been one of the proudest towns of France---Soissons---were as eloquent as the cries of battle, but infinitely more impressive in their silence,