Race Problems that Had to be Solved---Fear of the Southern Whites that Trouble would Follow the Training of Negro Troops in the South---Situation Complicated by the Houston Riot---Protest of the Governor of South Carolina---Dr. Scott Called to Spartanburg, S. C., to Allay Trouble There---How the Negro Soldier Finally Won the Respect and Confidence of the South.

Secretary Baker would not brook discrimination against colored soldiers. It is of official record that at no time during the war period did the Secretary of War give countenance to the practice of discrimination against colored soldiers because of their race. On the contrary, there are many instances which may be cited to prove that he was sincerely and vigorously opposed to any exhibition of race prejudice, and that officers and men have met with severe and condign punishment for acts in contravention of justice to the colored defenders of the flag.

It will be remembered that just after the Houston riot in Texas, during the month of August, 1917, there was a common feeling throughout the South that no more colored troops should be stationed on Southern soil. Many problems, therefore, had to be solved in connection with sending the Negro soldiers into the various camps. There was the fear, ill concealed in the North as well as in the South, that if Negro soldiers, in large numbers, were sent into any particular camp they would be a menace to the surrounding population and to peace and order.

When the time came to call colored troops under the draft, so strongly did some of the Southern States feel on this subject that officials and citizens visited Washington to protest against such troops being sent into their States for training. This was notably true of South Carolina, a visit to Washington being made by Governor Manning, who most strongly conveyed to the War Department the feeling of the citizens of that commonwealth. The War Department, however, adhered to its policy of sending colored units of National Guard organizations to the camps where such National Guard Divisions were to be trained, whether it happened to be in the North or the South.

Under this program it so happened that the 8th Illinois Regiment, colored, was sent with the remainder of the Illinois National Guard to Camp Logan, Houston, Texas, where the riot, just referred to, had occurred in August of the same year. The 8th Illinois was commanded from Colonel to corporal by colored officers, Col. Franklin A. Denison being in command. The old fires of resentment were rekindled and it was difficult to predict what would follow. Col. Denison, himself a native of Texas and an attorney who had won wide prestige as Assistant City Prosecuting Attorney, and afterwards Assistant Corporation Counsel of Chicago, handled his men wisely and well, and no outbreaks occurred between the white citizens of the town and these colored soldiers who were being trained for service overseas. Week by week during the course of the training Col. Denison and his men won the confidence of the best white and colored citizenship of the town. He asked for a "square deal" for his men, and he resolved that they should not suffer because of the former riot, with which they had nothing to do, although at several places en route to Houston from Illinois they were jeered at along the way, stoned in one or two places, and a riot was barely averted at a way station in Texas.

The Ninth Ohio was sent to Camp Sheridan, Montgomery, Alabama, the capital of the Confederacy, along with the Ohio National Guard Division. Organizations of colored citizens under the leadership of Mr. Victor H. Tulane, a trustee of Tuskegee Institute and friend and counselor of the late Booker T. Washington, took charge of the matter of bringing the colored and white people of the city into agreement so that there should be no untoward incident while the Ohio battalion was at Montgomery. A change as to sentiment soon followed among the citizens of various cities throughout the South where National Guard Camps, or National Army Cantonments were located, when the colored soldiers began to show by their demeanor that they were bent upon serious business and that they were disposed to go about their business without molesting the common citizenship, asking only that they in turn be not unfairly treated.

It is to the credit of the South that outside of the common friction which always occurs where any group of soldiers are gathered, whether they be white or black, no clash of the kind feared took place during the whole period of the training. City officials, judges, and chiefs of police began to speak in the highest terms of the men, expressing in nearly every instance great surprise that none of the anticipated troubles had occurred. The relations between the colored and white soldiers in the camps, with rare exceptions, were pleasant and friendly; and where those exceptions occurred it was due more or less to the policies pursued by such authorities as were fearful of untoward results rather than to any other reason.

Shortly after the Special Assistant was called to service, the Secretary of War held a conference with Mr. Raymond B. Fosdick, Chairman of the Commission on Training Camp Activities, and the author, making a survey of the whole situation with reference to the presence of these colored men in the various camps and cantonments and expressing the hope and idea that the Commission on Training Camp Activities would make full provision for the entertainment, recreation, and amusement of colored soldiers, such as was being provided for white soldiers. Mr. Fosdick, as the responsible executive officer of this important work, most enthusiastically developed and carried out this program. His representatives in the various States cooperated, more or less slowly to begin with, but in the end most enthusiastically, to provide proper recreation and amusement for colored as well as for white. It is a fact to be noted, however, that the War Camp Community Service organization made provision for colored soldiers in only one city during the first seven months after they were drafted, but between May, 1918, and August 5 of the same year, six or eight clubs were opened in various cities.

While the Field Signal Battalion and some of the Headquarters companies of the 92nd Division were composed of specially trained enlisted men, and well educated men selected from the draft, there was an amazing amount of illiteracy when the Division was first organized. As the trains from the South brought the men into the camps during the bleak days of November, 1917, they were a spectacle to behold. Hundreds coming directly from the cotton and corn fields or the lumber and mining districts---frightened, slow-footed, slack-shouldered, many underfed, apprehensive, knowing little of the purpose for which they were being assembled and possibly caring less---the officers but recently from the training camp received them.

The task of making soldiers of such raw material presented a most discouraging problem. Night school with the veriest rudiments of elementary training and talks on the simple rules of better living and army sanitation were conducted by the officers of every organization in connection with the daily drill schedules. The officers of the 92nd Division determined to make men of this material, men capable of occupying a larger place in the community life at the same time that they were making soldiers of them, fitted to fill the place in a modern fighting machine such as was being built by the United States Army. Without exception the men showed that they were eager to learn; and as the stoop came out of their spines, the shamble from their gait, they learned to read and write their names. On the first pay-roll of one regiment of the 92nd Division 90 per cent of the men being unable to write, made their marks. Five months of night school eliminated this condition and in its place came smartness in drill, cleanliness in billets, discipline, a pride in the uniform, respect for the flag, and the ability to sign their names to the pay-rolls. When that same regiment which had had 90 per cent of its members unable to write their names was on its return trip South to be mustered out of the service, Red Cross workers in two cities marveled at the improvement in the men's appearance, some doubting that they were the same men who had passed these points going into the draft. The difference was not one of appearance alone, for every one of those same men gave Uncle Sam a receipt in his own handwriting for his final pay and was capable of correcting any error that might have been made by the clerk.

All of the new influences which the colored soldier met in the camp conspired to give him a new vision, and the testimony from such widely separated points as Camp Dodge, Ft. Des Moines, Iowa, and several of the camps in the South will illustrate the change which soon came to be noted as to the conduct and demeanor of the colored soldier.

Collier's Weekly dispatched one of its staff contributors, William Slavens McNutt, to make a round of all the camps and cantonments and to report conditions as he found them. In one of these articles entitled, "Making Soldiers in Dixie," Mr. McNutt devoted considerable space to the description of the change which was taking place in the Southern cities and towns,, and even in some of the Southern camps where colored soldiers and Southern white men were being trained for overseas service. In this article Mr. McNutt reported visits made by him to two Southern camps and paid many compliments to the Negro soldiers because of their solemn attitude toward the war and the earnestness with which they undertook and passed through the ordeal of training.

But it was not all easy sailing in all the camps and there was considerable jarring from time to time and enlightening wisdom and firmness were required to overcome certain threatening situations. One of these stands out in my memory particularly just now, and is probably being related for the first time. At Spartanburg, South Carolina, where the New York National Guard units were being trained, there developed a little trouble. The 15th New York Regiment (colored) under command of Col. William Hayward, which regiment afterwards came to be known as the 369th, won enduring fame in France, being the first colored combat regiment to go overseas. On October 22, 1917, Col. Hayward came personally to the War Department to place before it the highly inflammable situation existing at Spartanburg, South Carolina, near which city Camp Wadsworth was located. Spartanburg is a small Southern city which closely follows what are usually regarded as Southern traditions and prejudices in the treatment of the Negro. Some of its citizens rather felt that something was needed to let the jaunty Negro soldiers from New York "know their place," and so one Sunday evening when a colored soldier, Noble Sissle by name, stepped into a white hotel to buy a New York newspaper, the proprietor walked up to him, it is stated, and with an oath demanded to know why he did not remove his hat. Sissle, holding the newspaper in one hand and his change in the other, did not quickly enough respond to the demand and his hat was knocked from his head. When he reached down to pick it up and arose he was all but felled by a blow, and as he retreated toward the door was kicked by the irate proprietor. On the sidewalk, awaiting Sissle's return, was Lieut. James R. Europe, a colored officer, bandmaster of the 15th New York Regiment. A group of colored and white militiamen "rushed" the hotel, but were "called to attention" by Lieut. Europe, who demanded that the crowd disperse.

The New York militiamen expressed themselves as being violently opposed to the treatment which had been visited upon Sissle; and so the next night a group of these soldiers banded together and began marching to Spartanburg, several miles away, to "shoot it up" as the soldiers at Houston had "shot up" that town after the clash with the Houston police in the August preceding.

It was only because of Col. Hayward's courage and firmness in overtaking these men, and in safely bringing them back to camp that another Houston riot was for the moment averted.

The feeling grew more and more, intense, however, and Col. Hayward, to ward off another "situation, " came to the War Department. The Special Assistant to the Secretary of War was hastily summoned by the Secretary of War and ordered to proceed to Spartanburg. The atmosphere, it was easily observed, was surcharged. Col. Hayward called his officers together, advised them of the object of the mission of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of War and had all non-commissioned officers of the regiment assemble. Col. Hayward then withdrew and carried with him every commissioned officer of the regiment. Non-commissioned officers usually prove themselves to be the backbone of a regiment, and it was these men that Col. Hayward desired I should address. These men and the Special Assistant to the Secretary of War were thus left alone to discuss the delicate situation face to face and in the frankest way possible. My address to these men was an appeal and admonition to do nothing that would bring dishonor or stain to the regiment or to the race which they represented; that whatever of violence they should do in the present difficulty would only react upon their race throughout the country, and that the situation was potentially dangerous, in that it was hardly to be expected that the country would stand for another riot of the Houston character, despite the fact that the men, when visiting the town, had suffered rebuffs and mistreatment which had tried their patience and caused them to wish to visit violence upon the community.

As the Special Assistant now recalls that dramatic setting in the late afternoon of that Fall day, there is nothing in the service rendered by him in the War Department which be remembers more vividly, or as being more serviceable than that appeal addressed to these men, that they should listen to the counsel of patience for the Great Cause, even in the face of studied insult and maltreatment. Afterward many of the men, with tears streaming down. their faces, approached him and voiced how bitterly they felt in the face of the insults which had been heaped upon them from time to time as they passed through the town, but at the same time they told him of their willingness to listen to the counsel which had been addressed to them for the sake of the Negro race, and for all that was at stake for it and the country during the war.

The War Department faced three situations: It could keep the regiment at Camp Wadsworth and face an eruption, and possibly further anger the white citizens who were opposing the retention of the regiment there, while at the same time inflaming the men of the regiment and many of the white New York guardsmen who were restive under the treatment accorded the colored soldiers, or the regiment could be removed to another camp and thereby convey the intimation that whenever any community put forward sufficient pressure, the War Department would respond thereto and remove soldiers from such location, whether they had given provocation for such demand or not. As a third alternative the Department could order the regiment overseas. The latter alternative was decided upon, and soon after reaching New York the 15th New York was on its way overseas.

The story of its wanderings from camp to camp in America, of its ship breaking down after being two days at sea, and of its return to New York harbor, of its finally reaching France, and of the glorious record it achieved as the 369th Infantry will be recounted again and again by the heroic survivors for years to come.

First Officers' Training Camp for Colored Men at Fort Des Moines, Iowa---Major J. E. Spingarn's Fight for the Establishment of This Camp---Methods of Training Reserve, Officers---Negro Educational Institutions Furnish Personnel---Seven Hundred Colored Officers Commissioned at Fort Des Moines.

While the great nations in Europe were flooding the continent with human blood, leaders in American political thought saw that the United States would sooner or later become a partner in the great cataclysm. The weakness of our Army and Navy crystallized into a national slogan, "Preparedness." Accordingly, several leading citizens in New York and vicinity organized a civilian camp at Plattsburg, N. Y. The purpose of this camp was to fit men to take examinations for commissioned officers for the new National Army which was inevitable. The Government endorsed the proposition and furnished aid to the extent of upkeep and living expenses during the period of training.

But "Plattsburg" was a voluntary---almost a social camp, and true to American tradition no colored men could be admitted to such a camp with white men. When the United States entered the great European war, Congress authorized the establishment of a number of training camps for white officers, the number to be left to the discretion of the Secretary of War. No provision was made for the training of colored officers. After repeated efforts of various kinds, a committee composed of representative citizens, headed by Dr. Joel E. Spingarn of New York City, held a conference with the military authorities. The efforts of the committee were fruitless for the time being, at least, and the committee was dissolved. The project was later taken up by the students of Howard University together with a few members of the faculty and students from other colleges, from Lincoln University, Fisk University, Atlanta University, Morehouse College, Tuskegee Normal and Industrial Institute, Hampton Agricultural and Industrial Institute, Virginia Union Seminary, and Morgan College.

Dr. Joel E. Spingarn consulted Gen. Leonard Wood, who was at this time in charge of the Eastern Department, Governor's Island, New York, about the establishment of a "Plattsburg" for colored men. General Wood gave assurance that the same aid and assistance could be given a camp for colored men that were given the camp for white men, provided 200 men of college grade could be secured. Dr. Spingarn set out upon a vigorous campaign, sending letters and circulars in every direction and personally visiting Howard University and kindred institutions. Success crowned his indefatigable industry, but not without great opposition.

Dr. Spingarn's efforts, by many of the important newspapers and leaders of the race, were referred to as being designed to bring about the establishment of a "Jim Crow Camp" for training colored officers. The agitation grew quite violent at times, particularly because of the fact that Dr. Spingarn was Chairman of the Executive Committee of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, an organization generally regarded as standing uncompromisingly for the rights of the Negro people> In his efforts to secure the establishment of this camp Dr. Spingarn had the cooperation of his aide, Dr. W. E. B. DuBois, Editor of The Crisis, also regarded as an uncompromising champion of the Negro, and of Col. Charles Young, United States Army, and such virile speakers and leaders as William Pickens and others. The agitation among the Negro group and the recognized friends of the Negro grew so warm that for a while divided counsels threatened the establishment of a camp. Whether through a fortunate or unfortunate turn of circumstances, while this agitation was at its height, Congress declared that a state of war existed between the United States and the Imperial German Government. Immediately, civilian training camps were abolished and fourteen Government camps were established for the training of officers.

Strange and paradoxical as it may seem, America, while fighting for the democratization of the peoples of far-off Europe, was denying democracy to a part---an honest, loyal and patriotic part---of her citizens at home. Fourteen camps were instituted for the training of WHITE officers---none for colored officers, nor were colored men admitted to any of the fourteen camps.

The next best thing seemed to be a separate camp. The students were joined by faculty members and an executive committee was organized with Prof. T. Montgomery Gregory as Chairman. Colored men were fighting the Government in order to wring from it permission to fight for it. The President and Deans of the University gave full cooperation. A convention of the student body was called on Tuesday, May 1, 1917, when money was raised by students and faculty for the dispatch of delegates to take up this matter with the student bodies of various schools.

At the suggestion of Prof. Gregory, the Executive Committee was transformed into the Central Committee of Negro College Men with Mr. C. Benjamin Curley as Secretary, and an office was opened in the basement of Howard University Chapel. The work was so organized that the secretary was in control of the situation at all times and his office became the radiating center from which the latest information was flashed throughout the country. Letters and telegrams flooded the office in quest of details and instructions. The delegates announced success in obtaining in ten days, 1,500 names to be presented according to agreement, to the War Department as a justification for the appeal for an "Officers' Reserve Training Camp for Colored Men."

Meanwhile the committee interviewed Congressmen, leaving a copy of the following card on each Congressman's' desk:

TRAINING CAMP FOR NEGRO OFFICERS

Our country faces the greatest crisis in its history; the Negro, as ever, loyal and patriotic, is anxious to do his full share in the defense and support of his country in its fight for democracy. The Negro welcomes the opportunity of contributing his full quota to the Federal army now being organized. He feels very strongly that these Negro troops should be officered by their own men. The following statement presents the facts upon which we base our request for an officers' reserve training camp for Negroes.

1 (a) Fourteen officers' training camps are to be opened on May 14, 1917, to provide officers for the new Federal Army.

(b) No officers are to be commissioned unless they receive training in one of these fourteen training camps:

(c) The War Department has stated that it is impracticable to admit Negroes to the fourteen established camps;

2 (a) The Negro is to furnish his proportionate quota in this army,

(b) It seems just that the competent and intelligent Negroes should have the opportunity to lead these troops;

(e) One thousand Negro college students and graduates have already pledged themselves to enter such a training camp immediately;

(d) In addition men in the medical profession desire to qualify for service in the Medical Corps, and there are other competent men ready to qualify for other specialized corps provided for;

(e) Records of Negro officers and troops warrant the provision for Negro officers to lead Negro troops.

Lieut. Col. Young	Major Loving
Capt. Davis	Major Walker

3. Therefore, the Negro race requests the establishment of an officers' reserve training camp for Negroes.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF NEGRO COLLEGE MEN.

Signed:

FRANK COLEMAN, Chicago, W. DOUGLAS, Lincoln, W. A. HALL, Union, M. H. CURTIS, Howard,

T. M. GREGORY, Harvard, C. H. HOUSTON, Amherst, L. H. RUSSELL, Cornell, C. B. CURLEY, General Secretary,

                                                              Howard University,Washington, D. C.

Over 300 Senators and Representatives signified approval, and the War Department was soon the center of a storm of telephone calls and personal interviews.

The colored churches in the District of Columbia were interested. Dr. J. E. Moorland advised that the Y. M. C. A. branches throughout the country be used as recruiting stations, a valuable suggestion which was readily accepted. Frequent mass meetings were held by the Howard students; and when additional funds were needed a concert was given in the chapel. A little later the University Dramatic Club repeated its performance of "Disraeli" .through the courtesy of the management of the Howard Theater, at which time over $125 was raised.

With 1,500 names in the hands of the War Department on May 7, the campaign became more heated. Press articles were sent out by the committee. The following is one of a large variety:

"THE COLORED PEOPLE OF THE COUNTRY MAKING STRENUOUS EFFORTS TO SECURE
TRAINING CAMP FOR COLORED OFFICERS.

Headquarters and Recruiting Station at Howard University.

"According to the best authorities about 83,000 Negroes will be drafted for the New Federal Army. The Negroes welcome this opportunity of serving their country, and sharing their full responsibilities in this time of national peril. They feel, however, that Negro troops thus raised should be officered by men of their own race and are making strenuous efforts to secure a training camp in which such officers can be prepared. The War Department has stated that it is impracticable to admit Negroes to the fourteen camps for officers to be opened on May 14, 1917. And it has also stated that no officers are to be commissioned unless they receive training in one of these camps. This means that unless some provision is made whereby colored men may be trained for officers these 83,000 Negro troops will be officered exclusively by white officers; and that Negroes qualified both mentally and physically to serve as officers will be forced under the conscription law to serve as privates. The colored man is willing and ready to carry out the duties imposed upon him as an American citizen, and feels that he should be given the same opportunities in the performance of these duties as are given to other American citizens. The Negroes from every section are requesting that the Government provide means whereby colored officers may be trained. The appeal is just, reasonable, and practicable. The proposition is squarely up to the Government. This is no time for sectional differences and race prejudice and the highest patriotism demands that every American citizen be given the opportunity to serve his country in the capacity for which he is best fitted.

"Over one thousand colored men have sent their names to their headquarters at Howard University, and hundreds of others are arriving by mail and telegrams.

"Why should not colored troops be officered by colored men? Their records show them to be competent and efficient, and to deny any class of citizens the opportunity of rendering its best service belies the very theory of our democracy, and the basic principle for which the present war is waged. Our American statesmen should frown upon any procedure that does not offer an equal opportunity for all at all times, but more especially at a time when our country is faced by a foreign foe."

An important conference was held in Washington with Dr. Robert R. Moton, Principal, and Mr. Emmett J. Scott, Secretary of the Tuskegee-Normal and Industrial Institute, by Dean George W. Cook and Professor T. Montgomery Gregory of Howard University and the valued support of Tuskegee Institute enlisted in behalf of the Officers' Reserve Training Camp. The work in Congress was kept up. Communications were sent to President Wilson, Secretary Lansing, Secretary Baker, and other Cabinet officers. Finally there were two important conferences: the one at the War College where President Newman of Howard University, Deans Miller, Cook and Moore, Professors Tunnell and Gregory, Mr. H. E. Moore, Doctors Marshall and Cabannis met and discussed the matter with Major Kingman, then head of the War College; the other with Secretary Baker the following day, when he practically assured the same committee of the establishment of the camp.

"The question of location, it was said, was the only remaining obstacle; to offset this the grounds and buildings of Howard University were offered by the authorities, but were not accepted for various reasons. The tension was then at its height and just as a more extensive campaign was about to be launched President Newman was notified that the camp would be established. This happened about 7 P.M., May 12, 1917.

"The authorization of the camp brought joy unspeakable to the hearts of the committee and students. Smiles and handshakes soon made the campus seem like an old-fashioned Methodist prayer meeting and the news was heralded far and wide. The following was sent to all those who had submitted their names:

" 'Dear Sir:

" 'The War Department has announced that a camp to which colored men can be admitted to 'be trained as officers will be established at Fort Des Moines, Iowa, June 15th. Twelve hundred fifty men will be admitted. Two hundred fifty will be selected from the regular army and one thousand from the various states and the District of Columbia on a pro rata basis. The camp will be organized and maintained on the same regulations as all the other camps now in operation.

" 'There will be recruiting stations throughout the country to which applicants must report for physical and mental examinations. The mental training will be rigid and none but thoroughly qualified men ought to apply.

" 'Successful applicants must pay their transportation to the camp. They will be reimbursed at the rate of 3 1/2 cents per mile from their homes to Des Moines by the shortest route. The men will be paid while in camp but the exact amount has not yet been determined. Additional information will be given to the Press as soon as the War Department issues it. Watch the papers from this date. The race is on trial. Come to camp determined to make good.

'Yours truly,

C. BENJ. CURLEY,
General Secretary,
Central Committee of Negro College Men.'
Howard University, Washington, D. C.
May 23, 1917.

"Of the 1500 names submitted, these were almost without exception men from colleges and averaged between 18 and 25. The War Department in the interim suggested that in as far as possible only men between 25 and 40 be included. This meant additional work, but the committee met it cheerfully and augmented its already widely advertised propaganda by numerous press articles. The following is one of the many:

'Howard University,
'Washington, D. C.,
May 24, 1917

'Dear Brother:

" 'A Reserve Officers' Training Camp, accommodating 1250, at Des Moines, Iowa, for Colored men, to start June 15th. Such was the official announcement of the War Department last Saturday, May 19th.

" ' Stop but a moment, brother, and realize what this means. At present, we have only three officers of the line in the army; in less than four months we shall have 1250 officers. Our due recognition at last. But no one who was not in the fight knows what a struggle we had to obtain the camp. Only a few of those in authority would support the project; most of them did not want to consider it; and the remainder were bitterly against it. "Why waste time trying to train Negroes to be officers," they said, "when the Negro can't fight unless he is led by white officers?" The truth is, the Negro has had no chance to fight under his own leadership. Now the chance has come; the greatest opportunity since the Civil War. But what if we fail? Eternal disgrace! Our enemies will say forever: "Oh, yes, the Ninth and Tenth were uneducated men; but just as soon as the Negro gets a little education he becomes a coward." There is a terrible responsibility resting upon us. The Government has challenged the Negro race to prove its worth, particularly the worth of its educated leaders. We must succeed and pour into the camp in overwhelming numbers. Let no man slack.

" 'Some few people have opposed the camp as a "Jim Crow" camp; they say we are sacrificing principle for policy. Let them talk. This camp is no more " Jim Crow " than our newspapers, our churches, our schools. In fact, it is less "Jim Crow" than our other institutions, for here the Government has assured us of exactly the same recognition, treatment, instruction and pay as men in any other camp get. The Government bears all expenses, including transportation, uniform, and keep; and, in addition, pays a salary of not less than $75 a month while in training. When commissioned, the lowest salary is $145 a month. But the salary, though not to be despised, is not the fundamental element. Our great task is to meet the challenge hurled at our race. Can we furnish officers to lead our own troops into battle; or will they have to go again (and if they have to go now, they will go forever under white officers!

" 'Let us not mince matters; the race is on trial. It needs every one of its red-blooded, sober minded men. Doctors, lawyers, teachers, business men, and all men who have graduated from high school. Let the college student and graduate come and demonstrate by their presence the principles of virtue and courage learned in the academic halls. Up, brother, our race is calling.

" 'We cannot tell you how to register just now; but in a few days we shall know everything. What you are to do NOW is to send this letter to another brother and tell him to do the same, to pass the word along, and to stir up all the enthusiasm in your district. Watch all the papers and when you see news distribute it. Look for all bulletins; and, above all, be ready!

" 'Just think a moment how serious the situation is. Peal the war tocsin; stand by the race. If we fail, our enemies will dub us COWARDS for all time; and we can never win our rightful place. But if we succeed---then eternal success; a mighty and far-reaching step forward; 1250 Colored Army officers leading Negro troops. Look to the future, brother, the vision is glorious!

" 'Ever your brothers,
'CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF NEGRO COLLEGE MEN.'

As a result of these persistent efforts a training camp for colored officers was authorized by the Secretary of War on the 19th of May and soon thereafter the candidates for commissions set out for Fort Des Moines, Iowa, where they were to undergo training. The Honorable Champ Clark, Speaker of the House of Representatives, said that this marked "an epoch in American history and a new day for the Negro."

The student officers were put through weeks of intensive training under Col. C. C. Ballou, his staff, and a group of colored noncommissioned officers from the four colored regiments of the Regular Army. The Presidents and other officers of the various colored institutions of learning whose officers, teachers and students were in training visited the camp and spoke to the officer-candidates. Dr. George W. Cabannis, a colored physician of Washington, D. C., voluntarily gave up his practice and enlisted in the Y. M. C. A. work as a Secretary, and took charge of the Y. M. C. A. tent at Ft. Des Moines, working in closest cooperation with Col. Ballou and his military aides.

It was expected that the training would last three months. At the end of that period, however, the War Department decided to continue training for another month. Suspicion became rife among the men; many of them dropped out, giving as a reason that "the War Department never intended to commission colored men as officers in the army."

There were only a few of those faint-hearted fellows, however; the great majority remained, and on October 14, 1917, Col. W. T. Johnson of the Adjutant General's Office arrived at Ft. Des Moines with commissions for 639 officers,---106 captains; 329 first lieutenants, and 204 second lieutenants.

On that day, October 14, 1917, amidst impressive ceremonies, the 17th Provisional Training Regiment, as the Fort Des Moines Training Camp was called, was formed on the drill-ground facing the Administration building; here with bared heads and uplifted hands these 639 members of the regiment (the unsuccessful members having been dismissed) took the solemn oath which was administered by Col. Johnson, Chief of the Division of Training Camps, War Department.

On the next day, October 15, the successful candidates received commissions and were ordered to report after fifteen days' leave of absence to their respective camps. In equally divided groups the 639 officers were sent to the following camps, reporting for duty on the 1st of November, 1917: Camp Funston, Kansas; Camp Dodge, Iowa; Camp Grant, Illinois; Camp Sherman, Ohio Camp Meade, Maryland; Camp Dix, New Jersey; Camp Upton, New York.

It was at these widely distributed camps that the various units of the 92d Division (the authorized colored Division) were trained.

Some of the difficulties which befell the 92d Division are to be ascribed to the fact that the units of the Division were never united until they reached France, being trained in the seven camps here mentioned; this was true of no other division of the army sent overseas.

On October 15, 1917, impressive exercises were held in the Y. M. C. A. tent, Dr. George W. Cabannis of Washington, D. C., presiding, following the bestowal of the commissions. A program had been hastily arranged. Addresses were made by Brigadier General C. C. Ballou, who had started the training at Fort Des Moines and who had been made a Brigadier General and assigned to Fort Dodge; by Col. Hunt, who had succeeded Col. Ballou in charge of the 17th Provisional Training Regiment training camp; by Dr. Daniel Hale Williams of Chicago, Illinois, who was present as a visitor, and by one or two officers of the 17th Regiment Training Camp. The Special Assistant to the Secretary of War also spoke upon this occasion, having been detailed by the Secretary of War to represent him at the exercises in connection with the bestowal of the commissions.

Men from the South Sent to Northern Camps to Face a Hard Winter---Attempts at Discrimination Against Negro Soldiers and Officers---Firm Stand of the: Secretary of War Against Race Discrimination---General Ballou's "Bulletin No. 35"---Members of Draft Boards Dismissed for Discrimination Against the Race.

The treatment of Negro soldiers in the various camps and cantonments of the country was a subject much discussed during the war. Reports of discrimination against colored soldiers because of race and color were heard upon all sides and at times the colored people were greatly exercised when alleged situations of a particularly outrageous character came to their ears. The morale of the race was at times lowered to a degree that was little short of dangerous. Prompt and vigorous action, however, on the part of officers high in command led to a correction of many of the evils complained of, and in this way countless episodes pregnant with the possibility of serious clashes and violent conflicts were happily adjusted and no end of trouble thus averted.

Before going into the analysis of a number of exceptionally trying instances of color discrimination---incidents that more than once attracted nation-wide attention---it might be well to make note of the manner in which the colored troops were apportioned throughout the country. As was perfectly natural, by virtue of the immense Negro population, the South furnished the bulk of the colored men called through the selective draft law. If the unwritten custom of assigning men to the camps nearest the place from which they were drawn had been carried out to the letter, the camps in Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and South Carolina would have been made up in many cases almost exclusively of Negro soldiers. For this reason, and to prevent concentration of over-large contingents of colored soldiers at any one camp,---a policy frankly decided upon long before the Special Assistant came to the War Department---thousands of colored draftees found their way to the North in the fall of 1917, being stationed at Camps Grant, Illinois; Funston, Kansas; Dodge, Iowa; Zachary Taylor, Kentucky; Sherman, Ohio; Meade, Maryland; Custer, Michigan; Dix, New Jersey, Upton, New York, and Devens, Massachusetts---all of these classed as Northern States from the Southern soldiers' climatic standpoint. The climate of the North---with its long winter, unusually severe in 1917-18---proved to be the source of much suffering, on account of its deadly effect upon colored soldiers bred and born amid the magnolia blossoms and in the balmy atmosphere of the "sunny South." These colored soldiers faced the hard winter of 1917 with sinking hearts and grave apprehensions, and with an equipment in many instances far from adequate, owing to the haste with which the preparations for war were made. There was great suffering among colored and white soldiers, and the mortality from pneumonia and like troubles was alarmingly heavy among the unacclimatized colored men from the South. Nevertheless, they bore their sufferings with a fortitude that approached the heroic.

It was unjust, but not strange, that there should be many attempts at discrimination against Negro officers and soldiers in many of the camps, particularly those in the South, and in other sections where white soldiers from the South were brought into contact with colored troops. Prejudice, based on race, was something too deeply implanted in the mental fabric of an element of the American people, it seemed, to be overcome over night through any pressure the war might bring to bear. Clashes between white and colored soldiers happened North and South, after a sporadic fashion, but at no time were their clashes so general or persistent as to endanger the well-being of the Army as a whole.

In many sections of the South violent protests against the quartering of colored troops were registered with the War Department, and the Governors, Senators, and Representatives of more than one State filed formal objections with the President of the United States and the War Department, insisting that Negro troops be not stationed at the camps within their borders. The War Department steadily declined to be moved by these protests and pursued unhesitatingly its practice of stationing units of troops, colored and white, at whatever posts the exigencies of tile service seemed to make their presence expedient or necessary. The dignified bearing of the Negro soldiers and their studious avoidance of any excesses, however, tended to mollify the feelings of the Southern people and they finally began to accept them, not as an inescapable burden "wished upon them," but with genuine pride in their progress, declaring that they were a part and parcel of the South and should be accorded full credit for their unquestioned valor, patriotism and loyalty.

The unfortunate episode at Houston, Texas, in 1917, which precipitated a so-called "race riot," in which were involved a number of the soldiers of the 24th Infantry, Regular Army, had its origin in the prejudice of a portion of the citizens of Houston against Negro soldiers, and the reciprocation of this dislike by the colored soldiers themselves. The clash that took place in that city in August, 1917, marked the beginning of the end of the disorder that had obtained throughout the earlier months of the stay of the colored troops at Houston, for afterwards, when the Eighth Illinois Regiment came to Camp Logan from Chicago and the West, there were but few ebullitions of race feeling between the whites and the men of the Eighth. The execution of thirteen of the colored soldiers implicated in the Houston riot was one of the dark spots on the escutcheon of the Army, but it did not dampen the ardor of the colored men who went to the front for the Stars and Stripes. They realized that neither the meanness of those who fomented the riot, nor the undue haste that led to the summary execution of the soldiers convicted of being guilty of murder and mutiny, was typical of the feeling of the great body of the American people, nor of even the large majority of Southern white people of real influence and standing.

Incipient race riots were reported at frequent intervals at various stations, North and South. Of these, mention might be made of the magnified reports of a fracas said to have occurred between Negro soldiers and the police at Newport News, Virginia, in September, 1918, and of other affairs of no great seriousness that were reported at Camp Upton, Camp Merritt, Camp Grant, and one or two others. Many minor encounters grew out of the refusal of white soldiers to salute colored officers, and of efforts to draw the color line in places of recreation and amusement. Most of these cases were adjusted by the commanding officers of the army camps.

At Camp Grant, Illinois, General Thomas H. Barry, Commanding General, faced this question as soon as it was presented. A newspaper reporter started a campaign of inquiry among certain of the white soldiers to ascertain whether or not they meant to salute colored officers. The question began to run through the camp, but this reporter was challenged by General Barry in the presence of others to cease his activity. The General plainly stated that in that particular camp the Commanding Officer designated by the War Department alone was in command, without the aid of journalistic helpers, and that the only color recognized in Camp Grant was to be the "O. D." the olive drab of the Army uniform.

At Camp Upton, New York, General F. Franklin Bell met a similar situation without hesitation:

"Now, gentlemen," said he, "I am not what you would call 'a Negro lover.' I have seen service in Texas, and elsewhere in the South. Your men have started this trouble. I don't want any explanations. These colored men did not start it. It doesn't matter how your men feel about these colored men. They are United States soldiers. They must and shall be treated as such. If you can't take care of your men, I can take care of you; and," said he in conclusion, "if there is any more trouble from your men you will be tried, not by a Texas jury but by General Bell, and not one of you will leave this camp for overseas. " And he thus dismissed them.

General Bell was talking to white officers of a Southern regiment that came to Camp Upton. The remarks quoted above followed a fracas between white soldiers of this Southern regiment and colored soldiers whom the white soldiers attempted to throw out of the Hostess House, while he was Commanding General there.

At Camp Lee, Virginia, General Adelbert Cronkhite was reported in the Richmond, Virginia, daily newspapers and in the camp newspaper as saying:

"I met some junior officers who said they were not keen on saluting Negro officers. They would not feel that way if they understood the spirit of the salute. If one of them came from a town where there was an old Negro character, one of those old fellows who do odd jobs around and is known to everybody, he'd at least nod his head and say, 'Howdy, uncle.' Now, suppose through some freak of nature this old Negro should be transplanted into an officer's uniform; the salute would be merely saying to him 'Howdy, uncle, in a military way."

It is fair to say that General Cronkhite disavowed responsibility for the appearance of a certain article in the Richmond Times Dispatch and said that he had never made a statement in the way it was quoted in the article. He explained, however, that "the idea involved in this statement expressed in becoming language is the expression of my idea and was not based on any special case," whatever that may mean! General Cronkhite also said that his statement was not an official one and had not therefore been published by him in the official bulletin of the command.

Attempts at segregation were charged against the Quartermaster's Depots at Chicago and at St. Louis, where color discrimination was alleged in the matter of appointments, promotions, and working conditions, and where unfairness was said to exist in the withholding from the colored employees of the use of toilet facilities, as well as restrictions in the service of the depot restaurants, cafeterias and the like. Whenever these cases were called to the attention of the War Department they were carefully inquired into, to develop the facts. In more instances than the Special Assistant can now recall, remedial action was taken by the officials in charge of the stations under criticism. Discriminating orders were rescinded, restrictions modified, and favorable interpretation of ambiguous regulations was secured in many of .the cases that came to the War Department.

Perhaps no single incident in the camp life of the Army attracted so large a measure of attention at the hands of the colored people as "Bulletin No. 35," issued to the officers and soldiers of the 92d Division by General C. C. Ballou, commanding officer of the Division, with headquarters at Camp Funston, Kansas.

The issuance of the Bulletin came about because of the refusal of the manager of a theater at Manhattan, Kansas, to admit a sergeant of the 92d Division, because of the possible objection of his white patrons.

The interpretation placed upon the order by most people was that General Ballou requested and indirectly "ordered" that Negro officers and soldiers refrain from exercising their prerogatives as citizens in the matter of attending places of public amusement or recreation, if their presence seemed offensive to the white patrons of such resorts and likely to provoke racial friction. The colored press was particularly bitter and many newspapers pronounced the "order" an "insult" to the Negro race. At various public gatherings of colored people General Ballou's resignation as commander of the 92d Division was demanded, and at no time during his incumbency as the bead of the Division was General Ballou able to regain the confidence of the colored masses, with whom be had been immensely popular prior to this episode, in recognition of his valued and sympathetic services as supervisor of the Officers' Training Camp at Fort Des Moines, Iowa, from which came 639 colored men, graduating with commissions as captains and first and second lieutenants.

The full text of "Bulletin No. 35," as issued by General Ballou was as follows:

Headquarters 92d Division,
Camp Funston, Kans., March 28, 1918.

"1. It should be well known to all colored officers and men that no useful purpose is served by such acts as will cause the 'color question' to be raised. It is not a question of legal rights, but a question of policy, and any policy that tends to bring about a conflict of races, with its resulting animosities, is prejudicial to the military interest of the 92d Division, and therefore prejudicial to an important interest of the colored race.

"2. To avoid such conflicts the Division Commander has repeatedly urged that all colored members of his command, and especially the officers non-commissioned officers, should refrain from going where their presence will be resented. In spite of this injunction, one of the sergeants of the Medical Department has recently precipitated the precise trouble that should be avoided, and then called on the Division Commander to take sides in a row that should never have occurred had the sergeant placed the general good above his personal pleasure and convenience. This sergeant entered a theater, as he undoubtedly had a legal right to do, and precipitated trouble by making it possible to allege race discrimination in the seat he was given. He is strictly within his legal rights in this matter, and the theater manager is legally wrong. Nevertheless the sergeant is guilty of the GREATER wrong in doing ANYTHING, NO MATTER HOW LEGALLY CORRECT, that will provoke race animosity.

"3. The Division Commander repeats that the success of the Division with all that success implies, is dependent upon the good will of the public. That public is nine-tenths white. White men made the Division, and they can break it just as easily if it becomes a trouble maker.

"4. All concerned are again enjoined to place the general interest of the Division above personal pride and gratification. Avoid every situation that can give rise to racial ill-will. Attend quietly and faithfully to your duties, and don't go where your presence is not desired.

"5. This will be read to all organizations of the 92d Division.

"By command of Major-General Ballou:

(Signed) "ALLEN J. GREER,
"Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff,
"Chief of Staff."

Commenting in an editorial of the issue of April 13, 1918, upon the order as issued by General Ballou, The Advocate, a colored newspaper of Cleveland, Ohio, printed the following:

GENERAL BALLOU'S ORDER.

Major General Ballou has just issued an order to the Colored men of his division which is, to say the least, "extry."

In part, the order calls for the exercise of care on the part of the commissioned and non-commissioned officers and men of the division in shunning places where they have reason to believe that their presence will be resented. It is an apparent appeal for lessening the "racial issue" controversies.

The order might possibly be considered "perfectly harmless" and of the "vaudeville type" of monologues if it were not for the paragraph, "White men made possible the division, and white men can break it up."

We expected better than this of Major General Ballou in this day of bitter warfare when the President is calling upon all America---white and black, we presume---to rally to the Flag and help to crush "the foe of humanity.

We can only urge our race to forgive General Ballou, "he knows -not what he says."

WE ARE NOT IN FAVOR OF THE MEN OF ANY DIVISION SEEKING TO STIR UP "RACIAL STRIFE." We feel that NOW IS NOT THE TIME for injecting any such issue into the already overcrowded portfolio of Uncle Sam.

Let us help "lick the Kaiser" FIRST and then thrash out our local difficulties.

We do not want to be classed in the President's list of "creatures of. passion, disloyalty and anarchy," therefore let us say "shoo fly" to General Ballou's "undiplomatic paragraph."

Now, all together---let's get the Kaiser!

Many similar expressions of resentment appeared in the Negro press.,

A news report, sent out shortly after the, issuance of the Ballou Bulletin No. 35, preliminary to the publication of a letter sent by General Ballou to me, in response to my request for a statement that might give the purpose that prompted the Commander of the 92d Division to issue the bulletin, said:

"It transpires that while Major General C. C. Ballou, of the 92d Division, was addressing the men under him through Bulletin No. 35, he was at the same time pressing the prosecution of the theatrical manager who had discriminated against a sergeant of the Division.

"The prosecution of the manager of the Wareham Theatre for discrimination on account of color, instigated at General Ballou's request, was, after being twice continued, tried in Police Court at Manhattan, Kansas, a few days ago, and resulted in the conviction of the defendant and the imposition of $10 and costs. It is generally assumed that the conviction of the theatrical manager will serve to prevent a repetition of the offense, and will deter other theater owners and managers from making discrimination on account of color. General Ballou followed the same course here as he did at the Officers Training School at Des Moines, Iowa, last summer, namely: while admonishing his men to refrain from precipitating racial disturbances, to prosecute those who should discriminate against his men."

General Ballou's letter to the author said:

Headquarters 92d Division,
Camp Funston, Kansas, April 22, 1918.

My Dear Mr. Scott:

I have your request that I make a brief statement relative to Bulletin No. 35, these Headquarters. There seems to be no good reason why I should not do so.

Here are the preliminary facts:

A soldier of this Division got into trouble with a theater manager at Manhattan and reported it to me. I at once ordered an investigation, placed the facts before the Division Judge Advocate and was informed by him that the theater manager had violated the law. I then put the case in the hands of the United States Attorney and requested the prosecution of the theater manager. The case was set for April 22d. I then issued Bulletin No. 35, which, in brief, is counsel to my soldiers to avoid race troubles. This Bulletin was given out to the colored press of the country, accompanied by an entirely misleading letter that not only completely suppressed all mention of any prosecution of the theater manager, but directly and falsely conveyed the impression to editors and readers that I had not done so. The most prejudiced person will, I think, at once see that this was a malicious attempt to stir up race feeling by misrepresentation.

GOOD ORDER AND MILITARY DISCIPLINE FOUNDATION STONES.

The character of Bulletin No. 35 was that of advice, as already stated. ,This advice was ordered published to the Division. It had nothing to do with any policy of segregation, or with any policy outside of the military establishments. Its purpose was to prevent race friction, with the attendant prejudice to good order and military discipline. Good order and military discipline are the foundation stones of the military service. They are indispensable. Nothing connected with the service of the colored troops has ever been so threatening to good order and discipline as race troubles have been, and it is well-known that our enemies have sought to profit by this fact ever since there was a prospect of war. No stone has been left unturned. There have always been foes of our country ready to aggravate the grievances of the colored people on the one hand and to stir up the whites on the other. It was no mere coincidence that the East St. Louis atrocities occurred in a city filled largely with German sympathizers.

There is little doubt that the same influence egged on both whites and blacks at Houston. Most troubles have small beginnings. At Houston they grew from the fact of colored soldiers entering cars reserved for whites, and other similar matters. Great wrongs were eventually committed on both sides, culminating in the killing of a score or more of white people and the hanging of thirteen Negroes. In the midst of all the feeling and excitement caused by the East St. Louis and Houston troubles, the colored officers' training camp at Fort Des Moines won golden approbation all over the United States, made thousands of friends for the colored race and achieved a glorious success. It did all of this by following precisely the advice that was repeated to the 92d Division in Bulletin No. 35.

"BY THEIR FRUITS YE SHALL KNOW THEM."

Our enemies do not wish the United States to have its military power increased by colored soldiers, and they stand ready to add fuel to every race discord in order to embarrass our country as much as possible in this war. Is it any wonder then, in view of what the enemy has accomplished in the past and is seeking to accomplish again, that the Commander of the colored Division seeks to nip troubles in the bud, and while prosecuting white men for their offences against his soldiers, urges the soldiers to do their part to keep the peace and promote harmony.

I have shown that my position and action were deliberately and maliciously misrepresented to the colored people by the suppression of the news of my prompt prosecution of the theater manager, and by falsely conveying the impression that I had taken no such action. The entire letter that accompanied Bulletin No. 35 to the press of the colored people was a misrepresentation of my attitude and of the facts in the case, and no fair-minded person, when the facts are known, as stated above, can fail to see the work of an enemy---an enemy of our country and an even greater enemy to the colored race. Is the colored race going to "fall" for such schemes? I think not. I think they will contrast the work of the trouble-maker with the solid achievements of the colored officers' training camp at Fort Des Moines and of the 92nd Division, and consider thoughtfully the words---"By their fruits ye shall know them."

Sincerely,

C. C. BALLOU,
Major-General, Commanding 92d Division.

Early in the summer of 1918, a flood of complaints reached the War Department from many of the camps, the burden of which was that the Negro soldiers were being grossly mistreated by their white officers, ofttimes physically assaulted, called by names that were highly insulting-such as "nigger," "coon," "darkey," and worse, and that the colored men were forced to work under the most unhealthy and laborious conditions, with a certain penalty of long periods of imprisonment in guard-houses and stockade and other cruel and unusual punishments if they dared to resent any indignity or failed to perform "impossible" tasks. In many cases, it was alleged, opportunity for advancement was refused to colored men of ability, and all the assignments worth while were given to white men, some of whom had doubtful qualifications.

Besides the complaints growing out of unfair treatment of colored men in the camps numerous instances of unequal standards and straightout discrimination in the operation of the selective draft law were reported as being practiced by the draft officials in several States, particularly in the South. The claim was made, and almost invariably substantiated by reliable testimony, that colored men, palpably unfit for military service, and others who were entitled to exemption under the law, were "railroaded" into the army while other men with no legitimate excuse for exemption were allowed to escape the requirements of the draft system. The situation reached such a stage, by reason of the growing disregard for fair play and the honest interpretation of the law, that Secretary Baker felt called upon to check the infractions by Exemption Boards and the, unfair treatment of Negro soldiers in the camps by issuing a clean-cut statement to the effect that "the War Department will brook no discrimination, based upon race or color," and that all instances of unfairness in the Army on this score would meet with speedy correction, with adequate punishment for all violators of the military regulations bearing on the rights and privileges of soldiers.

As indicating the general attitude of some Army officers in carrying out the instructions of the War Department, there may be mentioned the particular attitude of certain officers in charge of .units of the so-called Labor Battalions. The pressure from colored people throughout the country and from other sources as well became so strong that the War Department found it necessary to issue a certain memorandum changing the former decision (which called for white sergeants) to a decision which required that the non-commissioned officers in the Reserve Labor Battalions should be "all white or all colored" instead of "white." The effect of this immediately was to eliminate in many camps the colored men who were serving as non-commissioned officers and to substitute white men, no matter how unfitted such white non-commissioned officers were for the duties required of them. No element contributed to more unrest among the colored men who were drafted than this organization of Reserve Labor Battalions.

It was a situation of this character which inspired the uncompromising memorandum of the Secretary of War to the Special Assistant under date of November 30, 1917, of which this paragraph stands as the "keynote":

"As you know, it has been my policy to discourage discrimination against any persons by reason of their race. This policy has been adopted not merely as an act of justice to all races that go to make up the American people, but also to safeguard the very institutions which we are now, at the greatest sacrifice, engaged in defending, and which any racial disorders must endanger."

It will be noted that the same fundamental principle of simple justice to all defenders of the flag was reiterated in the interview made public July 1, 1918, when it seemed that the earlier proclamation failed to prove as effective as the Secretary of War had hoped it would be in wiping out color proscription in the army. In consequence of the firm stand of Secretary Baker against discrimination against colored men on the part of draft boards, several offending members of these boards were separated from their positions, and in one notable instance in Fulton County (Atlanta), Georgia, an entire Exemption Board was summarily removed, upon proof of improper manipulation of the Selective Draft Law in its application to colored registrants.

In keeping with the insistence upon a "square deal" for all, there came a marked improvement in the morale of the camps where much trouble had been made for colored soldiers through the petty meanness practiced by the so-called "Military Police." Reports had come into the War.-Department in immense volume to the effect that there was increasing friction between colored soldiers and the Military Police, in charge of order and general discipline in the camps. Colored soldiers complained that they were kept more closely confined to the camps than were white soldiers; that they had the greatest difficulty in obtaining passes to go to town or to visit relatives, and that they were punished more severely than were white soldiers for trivial offenses. The "bad blood" between the "M. P." and the colored soldiers frequently led to free fights, near "race riots," and the "rushing" of the guards in an attempt to leave the camp, regardless of the possession of passes. Wherever the blame may be placed for these outbreaks, a systematic effort was made to remedy the evils complained of, and a memorandum from the Morale Branch of the War Department, commenting upon the matter, carried the observation that: "The action that has been taken at these camps, as reported to this office, indicates that a genuine effort has been made to correct any abuses that may have existed."

A further evidence of the potency of the rigid policy of the War Department to stamp out as far as was possible the evil of race prejudice on the part of officers in their relation to colored soldiers, is found in the case of Captain Eugene C. Rowan, of the 162d Depot Brigade, with headquarters at Camp Pike, Little Rock, Arkansas. Upon positive proof, adduced by evidence given before a court-martial, Captain Rowan was found guilty of willful disobedience of the orders of a superior officer and was ordered by the War Department to be dismissed from the service. The case attracted more than ordinary attention because of the fact that it was the first instance wherein the color question had figured in an action against a white officer of the Army in a National Army court of inquiry. Captain Rowan was charged with having refused to obey an order issued by the Brigade Commander, Colonel Frederick B. Shaw, calling for a troop formation, because, it was asserted, both colored and white soldiers were included in the formation. The defense attempted to justify Captain Rowan in his disobedience of explicit military orders on the ground that he was a native of Georgia, had long resided in Mississippi, and that in keeping with his own personal feelings and a definite promise made to his men, he did not desire to give any order that would compel white men to "lower their self-respect." The dismissal of Captain Rowan followed his conviction by the court-martial, and the judgment of the Army tribunal was promptly sustained by the War Department at Washington.

A number of other cases are on record where white officers were separated from the service for discrimination against colored soldiers and for unwarranted acts of cruelty in dealing with them.

Secretary Baker and the Trying Situation. at Camp Lee, Virginia---Reports on Investigations at Numerous Camps---Improved Conditions Brought About Gradually---Help for Colored Draftees---The Case of Lieutenant Tribbett and Similar Cases of Race Prejudice.

The attitude of Secretary Baker toward a trying situation at Camp Lee, Petersburg, Virginia, and his vigorous handling of the charges of racial discrimination that were rife at that military station, was significant of his consistent policy with respect to the colored soldiers throughout the entire war period. The above memorandum was sent to the Special Assistant by the Secretary about the last of November, 1917, in response to a report which the former bad made to him touching the conditions complained of at Camp Lee, and which had formed the basis of the longer memorandum, making known, in language unequivocal and of extraordinary force, the Secretary's antagonism to all practices of discrimination in the Army based on race or color.

At Camp Lee there was much dissatisfaction among the colored soldiers. The reports which came to hand embodied the universal complaint that "the whole atmosphere in regard to the colored soldier at Camp Lee is one which does not inspire him to greater patriotism, but rather makes him question the sincerity of the great war principles of America." The efficiency of the War Department was interfered with, it was stated, because of this unwholesome atmosphere. The colored soldiers were compelled to work at menial tasks, regardless of their educational equipment or aspirations for higher duties, and discontent reigned because it was said the white soldiers were given genuine, intensive military training, while Negroes were not given enough drilling to give them the simplest rudiments of real soldier life and were not permitted to fire a gun. The statement was made that if the Negroes were allowed to be trained for combatant service, as white soldiers were, thousands would be inspired to enter the work more whole-heartedly, and the Labor Battalions would also show a larger measure of efficiency by the inculcation of a feeling that colored men were getting a "square deal." Not a few of the men asserted plainly that it was useless for colored men to try to improve themselves at Camp Lee, as white officers openly admitted to them that sergeants and an occasional sergeant-major was as high as the Negro might hope to reach, no matter what might be his intellectual attainments or executive ability.

Mr. C. H. Williams, of the Hampton Institute, Virginia, a young colored man of superior training, was designated by the Committee on Welfare of Negro Troops of the War Time Commission of the Federal Council of Churches to visit all the cities where military camps were located, to make a survey of conditions as they affect colored troops. Under an arrangement he filed with the Special Assistant a copy of each of his reports, so that they might be followed up from time to time inside of the War Department so as to change conditions where necessary. Mr. Williams sought to get the exact facts as to the feeling of the colored soldiers as well as of the colored population in the camp cities, and as he went from one part of the country to the other he also got a line on Negro public opinion generally. Practically all the camps and cantonments where colored troops were located were visited by him as well as by the Special Assistant.

Mr. Williams submitted a survey of conditions as they existed. His survey included inquiry into the social and religious conditions and the state of mind of the colored troops generally and made recommendations as to the steps that should be taken to bring about a correction of the ills complained of. At some points he found the situation fair, in others not good, and in many it was inexcusably bad. All of this had to do in the most direct fashion with the morale of the colored soldiers, and hence the remedy to be sought for the unfavorable circumstances indicated in Mr. Williams's reports was regarded by the Special Assistant as a mission of the highest and most pressing importance.

COMPLAINTS LODGED BY COLORED SOLDIERS IN CAMP

"Discrimination as to the issuance of passes to leave the camps---that white soldiers were allowed to go at will, while Negroes were refused permission to leave.

"Unfair treatment, ofttimes. brutality, on the part of Military Police.

"Inadequate provision for recreation.

"Unfair treatment, ofttimes brutality, on the part of Military Police. and denial of the enjoyment of privileges in the huts, where colored huts had not been provided.

"White non-commissioned officers over colored units, when the colored men were of a higher intellectual plane than the whites who commanded them.

"Lack of opportunity for educated Negroes to rise above non-commissioned officers in the Reserve Labor Battalions.

"Confinement to the guard house for long periods and compelled to pay heavy penalties for minor infractions of the rules of camp, or for disobedience of unreasonable commands.

"Frequently, lack of proper medical attention and treatment.

"Negro soldiers compelled to work at menial tasks, and denied sufficient drill work and not allowed training in manual of arms and denied an opportunity to fire a gun, in many instances.

"Insufficient number of Hostess Houses---especially in the earlier stages of the war. Insufficient number of chaplains in most camps, in earlier stages of the war. Never enough of either of these helpful agencies at any stage of the war.

"Slow discharge of colored men in labor battalions after the armistice.

"At more than one camp---Humphreys notably---colored men had practically no sanitary conveniences, bathing facilities, barracks, mess halls, Y. M. C. A. service, during the war period., until after white soldiers had left the station.

"Use of abusive language to the colored soldiers by white officers and calling them by opprobrious names.

"Working with civilians, soldiers getting $30 per month, and the civilian, doing identical work, getting from $3.50 to $5.00 per diem.

"Too many tent camps for Negroes, while whites are given barracks.

"Reluctance of white officers to recommend colored men for induction into the Officers' Training Camps.

"Men with venereal diseases not segregated in the matter of washing mess kits and general use of camp facilities from those not so infected.

"During winter of 1917-18, general complaint was made of insufficient clothing, shortage in supply of overcoats, inadequate bedding, and tents without flooring and ofttimes situated in wet places, where ice formed in winter and where mud and malaria flourished at other times. A statement came from Camp Alexander, Va., that during the winter of 1917-18 men died like sheep in their tents, it being a common occurrence to go around in the morning and drag men out frozen to death. It took a long time for this situation to get to the authorities, but when it did get to the proper officials, steps were taken to correct the trouble.

"Men pronounced unfit for overseas service, and often in cases where they were unfit for any kind of military duty, were kept at the camps and forced to work.

"Alleged essential labor required at many stations on Sundays.

"Made to work in rain and cursed when any dissatisfaction was shown. 'Gotten even with' by commanders if report was made of conditions to higher officers or to outsiders.

"Promise of officials to muster out first the men in tent camps not promptly kept.

"Passes refused colored men, even when messages of critical illness of parents or near relatives had been received."

The Camp Lee situation being of a piece with the conditions obtaining at most of the army stations where colored men were located, it may be dwelt upon at length to illustrate the plan of research and operation which was adopted to ameliorate the ills that were brought to the attention of the Special Assistant and laid before the Secretary of War, with suggestions and recommendations looking toward a speedy betterment.

Letters were sent to the War Department by the men and communications of the same tenor doubtless went outside to their friends. Telegrams and protests were received from representatives of several colored protective organizations, prominent ministers, leading editors, college heads, and men of affairs generally, and other communications sent to them were forwarded to me in Washington, asking that vigorous action be taken to assist in the unraveling of the problem confronting the men at Camp Lee. One very urgent letter was sent by the Governor of a State, intimating that he was confident that discriminations against colored soldiers were practiced at Camp Lee, but declared it to be his belief that this was without the knowledge of the War Department. "I respectfully request that you make an investigation of the situation there at the earliest possible moment," concluded the Governor. These very timely requests were most cheerfully complied with.

That an improved state of affairs was brought about at Camp Lee is evidenced by a report submitted to the Special Assistant under date of February 20, 1919, by Louis L. Watson, Jr., of 603 L Street, Southeast, Washington, D. C., formerly Captain of Infantry, United States Army, after an exhaustive inquiry, covering every phase of Army life at that point, in its relation to the treatment of the Negro and the opportunities afforded him.

Captain Watson, at the outset of his communication, refers to "the evolution of a somewhat equitable military regime, as far as the races are concerned," which has a decidedly hopeful ring, and which hope is given quite a considerable realization before his final paragraph is reached. Noting his observations as "a race man on the scene, seeking to correct the most flagrant violations of military law," and his purpose to "get things done," rather than to pile up dry statistics, Captain Watson concluded his introduction by saying: "The following recapitulation, however, is quite true in the large, and inclusive of camp improvements worked out in the last five months. I hope you may find it of value."

....

Said Captain Watson, in recapitulating the results that had been secured at Camp Lee in the five months of intensive. inquiry and practical reformatory effort:

"Until about the middle of July, 1918, there had been several colored officers at Camp Lee, but none had remained for more than twenty-four hours. Then came Lieut. Myron McAdoo, commissioned second lieutenant from the ranks of the 9th Ohio. He was assigned to the 13th Battalion Replacements Training Center to serve with white officers until the 15th of August, when five first lieutenants and three second lieutenants, colored, were assigned to the outfit---1st Lieuts. Allan Turner, Frank M. Goodner, Chas E. Roberts, G. Cleveland Morrow and Louis L. Watson, Jr., and 2nd Lieuts. Leonidas H. Hall, Joseph L. Johnson, Gloucester A. Price. Moreover, until this time there had been relatively few non-commissioned officers, colored, in the camp and a large percentage of these were corporals of little ability or promise. It was characteristic of white officers to ignore men of ability and to make non-commissioned officers of the illiterate funny fellows who could furnish entertainment for them in the orderly room with their antics and shameful ignorance. But what was even worse than this came the report that in other sections of the camp, where there were not even non-commissioned officers of this caliber, white officers were inflicting bodily punishment upon ignorant enlisted men of color. This of course is contrary to all military law and custom. As far as I know, however, none of this happened after the colored officers came to camp.

"The colored officers immediately launched a discreet educational campaign to combat this condition. Their presence alone did much to put a stop to this practice, but the fact that they used considerable tact in spreading knowledge of the law in such cases, did even more. It became apparent almost immediately that colored enlisted men were growing cognizant of their right to redress and the way to get it, and ill-treatment reduced itself to the personal factor entirely, which is not illegality so much as it is inefficiency in handling men, and not politic.

"At the same time the colored officers set out to get more noncommissioned officers worthy of their rank, by a careful selection and promotion of the men in the four companies of the battalion. This being the only combatant organization of colored men in the camp it took the lead in efficient colored non-commissioned officers. The efficiency of these men was highly commendable.

"In view of the prevalent antagonistic public sentiment against the rise of colored men in these parts the promotion of four colored First Lieutenants to Captaincy on the 10th of September, 1918, and their subsequent assignment to the command of the companies of the Battalion with a commissioned personnel of an average of ten white first and second lieutenants, including the former company commanders, is nothing short of marvelous. I shall not recount in detail your work in bringing this condition about except to say that your investigation in this matter alone proved to officials in the camp that colored men could get a hearing in the War Department, and it would not be good policy to violate the integrity of their office with prejudicial treatment of colored officers and enlisted men under their command. The Battalion had on an average of forty white first and second lieutenants serving in companies under colored captains. These officers were from almost all walks of life. Among them were a lawyer and school teacher from Alabama, a light-weight pugilist from Louisiana, an owner of orange groves from Florida, a ranchman from Texas, a coalmine owner formerly from Virginia, and several stockbrokers, contractors, electrical engineers, merchants, graduate and undergraduate students of the large Eastern and Western Universities, as well as two "movie" actors, one principal of a Pennsylvania high school, and the son of a classmate of the great Gen. Joffre. Most of these officers were originally from the South.

"Of the company commanders, one had done twenty-four years and another eleven years in the Regular Army, while the other two were from civil life, one a graduate from Massachusetts State College and the other a graduate of Howard University. The Battalion Commander was a criminal lawyer with a large practice in Shreveport, Louisiana. All worked together and made the Battalion the most efficient and the most praised organization in all the Replacements Camp. There was no hesitancy on the part of the commanding officer to point to the 13th Battalion as an example in drill, parade, and administration.

"When the 13th Battalion was completely demobilized and I was attached to the 1st Development Battalion I had the opportunity to observe the working of organizations of colored enlisted personnel under the command of white officers. I found this organization, in contrast to the 13th Battalion which I had just left, to be poorly disciplined and overburdened with complaints concerning mess. Regulations were wholly ignored where punishments were concerned and general dissatisfaction was spread over the entire outfit. The morale was very low among the enlisted men and the officers unconcerned. From my observations this condition appeared inexcusable.

"I will conclude this resumé with a statement of several definite and unbiased convictions growing out of my experience and observations:

"(1) Colored officers show marked superiority over white officers of the same grade.

"(2) A mixed organization of both white and colored officers is a very efficient machine and works out to perfection from a purely military point of view because a man's race pride will not allow him to neglect his duty and thus bring down criticism from officers of the other race. Each tries to excel.

" (3) Wherever it is possible colored troops should have colored officers. There is no doubt that the interests of our troops are better conserved by colored officers.

" (4) Your eagerness to correct evils in the camp and your effective work in this regard have done more than any other single factor to make life tolerable for colored officers and enlisted men here. Assuming conditions at this camp to be the average in Southern cantonments such an office as yours held by a man of the race is indispensable to the welfare of the colored soldier.

Very respectfully,

(Signed) Louis L. WATSON, JR.,
Formerly Capt. Inf. U. S. A.

....

The National Medical Association, under the active leadership of Dr. George E. Cannon, of Jersey City; Dr. A. Al. Curtis, of Washington, D. C.; Dr. A. M. Brown, of Birmingham, Alabama; Dr. E. T. Belsaw, of Mobile, Alabama; Dr. M. O. Dumas, of Washington, D. C., and Dr. W. G. Alexander, of Orange, New Jersey, exerted a helpful interest in the welfare of the medical men drawn in the draft. The Special Assistant took up the cases of many colored doctors who had been drafted and assigned to service battalions or as mere privates in the infantry organizations, with a view of having them transferred to the Medical Corps, where they might render a more effective service to their country along the line of their professional equipment.

Another investigation, which may properly find a place in this chapter on the treatment of colored soldiers in the camps, is that which resulted in the admission of colored draftees, regardless of the time of their call, into the training schools for officers. The number permitted to enter at the outset was unusually small, and these were restricted to draftees who had been conscripted prior to January 5, 1918. The number recommended by their camp commanders was not at all commensurate with the abilities of the men who desired to take advantage of the Government's plan of developing officer material, and was reported to be so niggardly as to amount almost to an ignoring of the explicit order of the Secretary of War that no form of injustice or discrimination be practiced against any soldier because of race or color. There were also persistent rumors that an attempt was being made to promote white non-commissioned officers in Negro units to commissioned officers, which could have no other result than to fill all of the line-officer places with white men and make it impossible for a Negro non-commissioned officer, no matter how efficient or how intelligent he might be, to rise above that rank. Another flood of protests came into the War Department from colored men in the army and from colored people everywhere. Those in authority were apprised of the unrest that existed. The Secretary of War gave orders that ample provision be made for the induction of properly qualified colored men into the Officers' Training Schools. In the end, training camps for colored candidates for officers' commissions were made available at Camp Taylor for field artillery; at Camp Pike for infantry, and at Camp Hancock for machine gun training.

An instance of the workings of race prejudice, in its relation to colored officers, was found in the case of Lieutenant Charles A. Tribbett.

Lieutenant Tribbett was from New Haven, Conn., and was graduated from the Officers' Training Camp at Des Moines, Iowa, and assigned to duty with colored troops at Camp Upton, Yaphank, Long Island. While on that duty, the records of the War Department show that he was ordered to proceed by the usual means of transportation to the army post at Fort Sill, Okla., for instruction in aviation. When the train on which he was traveling stopped at a station near Chickasha, Okla., it was boarded by a sheriff and party, who arrested Tribbett, who was in regulation military uniform, for riding in a car with white people. In spite of his protest that he was an officer of the United States Army, traveling under orders, on Government business, he was forcibly removed from the car and imprisoned in the county jail, and subsequently fined. Following an appeal to the War Department, Tribbett was released and permitted to resume his journey to Fort Sill, where he resumed his military duties.

The matter was brought to the attention of the War Department by Mr. George W. Crawford, of New Haven, Conn., and Mr. Robert L. Fortune, of Chickasha, Okla., who protested against the mistreatment to which Lieutenant Tribbett had been subjected. These well-posted attorneys set up the contention that as an interstate passenger, traveling under orders on Government business, he was not subject to the jurisdiction of the State authorities, and gave notice that they would exhaust every resource to gain adequate redress for their client.

The case was cited for investigation by the Department of Justice, and is still pending. Here was a flagrant instance of injustice to an officer of the United States Army, in the full uniform of the military service, on Government business and traveling on a road under Government supervision. From every viewpoint it was a case for Federal intervention. All the available evidence seemed to indicate that the arrest of Lieutenant Tribbett was an inexcusable usurpation of authority on the part of the civil officials of the State of Oklahoma, and for this reason the Special Assistant to the Secretary of War felt warranted in urging that the whole matter go to the Department of Justice for adjudication by the Federal Government. General Ansell, Acting Judge Advocate General, who has conducted a campaign against the army system. of court-martial as being "unfair," did not move to have the case of Lieutenant Tribbett pressed on its merits, and therefore nothing officially has been done.

An important matter, in connection with the treatment of colored soldiers in the camps, which ought not to pass without mention, was the suggestion made by the Special Assistant to Mr. George Creel, Director of the Committee on Public Information, looking to an investigation of conditions among colored soldiers in France. The morale of the colored people in America, was noticeably lowered by ugly rumors that came by devious and winding ways from abroad, and the Special Assistant thought it worth while to have a commission named, made up of representative men, in whom. the masses had implicit confidence, to give this situation a searching investigation and make a full report thereon, to set at rest the uneasiness and anxiety that was alarmingly prevalent toward the end of the summer of 1918. The mails and cables were congested, and for weeks and weeks not a word could be had by relatives at home from their loved ones battling for freedom and democracy across the seas. The following letter addressed to Mr. Creel more fully explains the motive which prompted the Special Assistant to offer the suggestion that a special inquiry be made and the remedy be applied:

Washington, D. C., August 10, 1918.

Dear Mr. Creel:

Recently in a conference with the head of the Military Intelligence Bureau, the matter was discussed of having two or three representative colored men go to France for the purpose of making an investigation of the facts with respect to several matters indicated herein.

1. A military man who is qualified to make a free and full investigation of the general treatment being accorded colored troops on the French and other fronts. There has been, and still continues, considerable propaganda and rumor to the effect that colored soldiers are being mistreated and discriminated against. Letters have come to the Office of the Secretary of War and to me, the same being forwarded by United States Senators in some instances, etc., to the War Department conveying these complaints. The information which would be secured first-hand by the military man suggested would be (under such direction as you might approve) conveyed to the Negro people of the United States through the Negro newspapers, public meetings, public speakers, the Committee of One Hundred of the Public Speaking Division, etc.

2. Two other representatives, not necessarily military men, but of sound judgment, capable of studying the facts and cooperating with the military representative, above referred to, in making a full report of existing conditions abroad with respect to colored men at the front as well as those behind the lines (referring to service battalions, stevedore regiments, etc.).

The joint testimony of these men would satisfactorily establish the facts and enable us to do a good piece of work in disposing of these damaging rumors which are being continually circulated.

In this connection, I wish to state that, at a meeting held in New York City, Monday, August 5th, attended by officials of the Federated Council of Churches, by a representative of the Surgeon General's Office, a representative of the Military Intelligence Bureau, Mr. George Foster Peabody (the well-known New York philanthropist) and others, including the undersigned---the same suggestion was made that a commission of colored men in whom they have confidence be sent abroad for the purpose of studying the situation above indicated, and the matter was broached by Mr. Henry A. Atkinson, of the, National Committee on Churches and Moral Aims of the War, of New York City, who expressed the opinion that it would be highly desirable for the Government to take the initiative in this matter.

There is more depressed morale among the colored people than is generally supposed, due to stories of unfair treatment of colored men in various camps in America as well as abroad. Under the circumstances, I am quite seriously of the opinion that such a commission as herein suggested would accomplish very great good.

An interview with you, at your convenience, would be very much appreciated. Will you kindly let me hear from you directly or through Mr. Byoir, Associate Chairman.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) EMMETT J. SCOTT,
Office of the Secretary of War.

The proposal outlined in the above letter was given serious consideration by Mr. Creel, by the Morale Branch of the War Department, and by a number of officials of the War Department who readily recognized the gravity of the situation which confronted them, with reference to the attitude of the Negro mind of the nation on this matter of the treatment of colored soldiers overseas. There is strong ground for the belief that some steps of the nature suggested would have been taken by the authorities in charge of war operations had not the conflict come to an abrupt end in November, 1918, many months earlier than even the initiated dared to hope for.

It is not without the range of probability that the movement, already set in motion by the Conference of Negro Editors and Leaders in the preceding summer, to send to France a competent representative of the Negro press, to report accurately and fully the activities and conditions of the colored troops, received a positive impetus by the letter to Mr. Creel. Action to relieve the tension referred to, was apparently "speeded up." Within a month after this suggestion that a commission be appointed to inquire into what the colored troops were actually doing on the battlefields across the water, Mr. Ralph W. Tyler, an experienced newspaper man of the race, was on his way to France as the accredited representative of the Committee on Public Information, commissioned as a war correspondent on the staff of General Pershing, and directed to chronicle the labors and achievements of the colored soldiers. Later Dr. Robert Russa Moton, Principal of Tuskegee Institute, as told elsewhere, was delegated by the President of the United States and the Secretary of War to go to France on a special mission, which had in mind the promotion of the welfare of the colored troops, and the maintenance of the morale of the Negro people in this country, by taking them fully into the confidence of the Government on all matters relating to their sons who had gone abroad to risk their lives in defense of the Stars and Stripes.

French Colored Colonials the First Black Soldiers to Take Part in the War---The Story of These Senegalese Fighters---Their Important Part from the Beginning of the War---The Fight for the African Colonies---German Employment of Negro Troops in the Early Part of the War.

From the very beginning of the European war, in 1914, soldiers of the Negro race had a great and growing share in the fighting. For nearly three years before America's entry into the conflict these colored "Colonials" from the French and British Colonies in Africa and Asia, had been taking part in the warfare on European soil, while in the fierce but little heard of campaign that resulted in the crushing of German authority in East Africa, it was the Negro troops who bore the chief burden and brunt of the fighting.

At my request, Colonel Edouard Réquin of the French Military Commission to the United States, has prepared the following statement of the participation of French Negro troops in the Great War:

"France has had colored troops ever since it has had colonies. These troops have participated in all our expeditions overseas; they have been the best instrument of our colonial expansion. Algerian troops (Arabs and Kabyles) fought in France in 1870-71 against Germany.

"But it was for the first time, in 1914, that black troops (Senegalese and Soudanese) took part in the European war against an enemy as redoubtable as Germany. If it is asked what have been the results of this experience there is only one answer: they have been excellent.

"The black troops of Africa are grouped either by battalions or by regiments with our colonial French troops. The reason is that the colonial officers understand them thoroughly, and that the men themselves, in fighting together in the colonies, have acquired a mutual confidence in each other.

"Recruited among the warrior tribes of Senegal and the Soudan these troops have great combatant qualities. They are particularly apt for attack and counter-attack, but they are primitive men without civilization---men who cannot be compared from this point of view with colored Americans. The black French soldiers are excellent grenadiers, but they are less prepared in the use of the machine gun and the automatic rifle, which demand a certain mechanical aptitude. They receive the same instructions as the French soldiers; these instructions are given to them by white officers and non-commissioned officers who understand them well, and who for this reason ought to be changed as little as possible.

"The characteristic of the black soldier is an entire devotion to these officers who have merited it and whom they will never abandon. In other words, the valor of the colored unit depends essentially on grouping and leadership.

"Colored troops won distinction for themselves at Dixmude in 1914; at Verdun; on the Somme in 1917; on the Aisne, and more recently still in the counter-attack which forced back the Germans north of Compiegne.

 

Salute Their Flag and Die

"These troops are not only devoted to their officers, they are equally devoted to France, whom they serve most loyally, and to the flag which represents France. The following example may be cited as an illustration: One day in 1916, on the Mediterranean, a transport carrying a battalion of Senegalese was torpedoed by a Boche submarine. It was impossible to save everybody. The last who remained on board lined the deck, saluted the flag, and went to the bottom with a discipline and a self-abnegation which must remain an example to all the world.

"It is because these soldiers are just as brave and just as devoted as white soldiers that they receive exactly the same treatment, every man being equal before the death which all soldiers face. In the French Army white and black wounded soldiers are cared for in the same hospital by the same personnel, so that just as we have delivered these black men from African barbarism so we have given them civilization and justice; it is their duty in turn to defend among us that justice and that civilization against Prussian barbarism,

"I recall a design in the Parisian magazine 'L'Illustration' which represents a Senegalese guarding some German prisoners. This black soldier said with a smile to a visitor who approached to see the Boche: 'I suppose you have come to see the savages, is it not so?' There was in this irony which the artist placed in the black man's mouth an infinitude of truth.

"There is one difficulty which presents itself in connection with colored French troops---a difficulty which results from the climate. The blacks of Senegal are accustomed to a very hot climate and stand our winters very badly, so the French Command, anxious to conserve their health, sends them during the winter to the camps in the south of France, or to Algeria. This inconvenience, however, is only relative; for the black soldiers perfect their instructions in the southern camp and in spring once more take their place in combat beside the white soldiers.

"To sum up, it may be said that, contrary to the opinion so often stated in times of peace by the adversaries of the colonial French expansion necessary to every modern state, the French colonies, far from enfeebling the military effort of the metropolis in face of the common enemy, have on the contrary augmented that power. Not a single territory which we occupied in Africa or in Asia has been abandoned. No serious revolt has been produced outside. of a few local agitations provoked by German agents. All those colonies have given us volunteers---Arab, Kabyles, Moroccans, Tunisians, by hundreds of thousands, Senegalese, Madagascans, Somalis, and even Indo-Chinese, have come to fight on French soil, in order to defend the liberty of which they have learned under our aegis to appreciate all the benefits.

"The fact that certain countries like Morocco, not yet pacified, furnish us with soldiers taken from the faithful tribes---and tribes that we ourselves fought only yesterday---is one of the most extraordinary illustrations that could be cited.

"All this honors those men who are in charge of the organization of these colonies and the methods which they apply there. It, shows equally what prodigious faculty of assimilation the French possess. If one considers that in North Africa the Mohammedan group has been essentially refractory to all foreign intervention, the voluntary participation of colored men in the defense of French soil consecrates definitely the motivating principles of our colonial expansion.

"It is wholly apart from every question of national interest, and solely from the point of view of humanity and morals that the role played by France outside of France itself received its noblest justification. "

 

Less has been heard of the part played in the war by British Colonials of the Negro race. Before going into further detail about the French Colonials, let me quote here an article from the London Spectator, one of the most influential British journals, which gives an excellent summary of the way in which the Negro served under "the meteor flag of England."

"Sir Auckland Geddes said the other day that, for every man in the Army who was actively engaged in fighting at a given moment, twenty-four men were hard at work in connection with the war. The statement illustrated the complexity of modern warfare and the importance of the unarmed laborer as an assistant to the fighting man. In the present war this is generally understood, but it was not always so. When we invaded Crimea we had no labor corps. The troops on the plateau above Balaclava through the winter of 1854-55 starved within a few miles of abundant supplies because there was no proper means of transport and no road along which vehicles could move rapidly. The General declared that be could not spare soldiers from the trenches for roadmaking; the trenches were indeed very thinly held. No one at the War Office had foreseen the necessity of enlisting large gangs of laborers to keep the troops properly fed and equipped, and it was not till after months of hardship that a corps of navvies was sent out to the Crimea. Nowadays this would be done as a matter of course.

"It is a common knowledge that there are in France many thousands of British workers who never hear a shot fired, but are nevertheless indispensable to the comfort and efficiency of the army. The problem of finding labor for the manifold tasks that have to be performed---not merely in constructing fortifications, but in making new roads and railways, in unloading ships, and in transporting the stupendous quantities of food, munitions and stores of every kind that a modern army requires---is as important and difficult as any problem of the war. The Germans have tried to solve it by compelling the people of the occupied territories to work for them, but this forced labor is probably inefficient as a rule because the poor slaves are ill fed and harshly treated. We have done better because we have called on the immense reserves of colored labor in the empire to supply voluntary workers, who are well fed and well paid, and cheerfully assist us in the struggle for liberty.

"Sir Harry Johnston's little book on the part that the colored races are playing in the war is interesting and informing, especially from this point of view. He begins by reminding us that:

"'The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland rules more or less directly some 44,700,000 Africans, about 1,700,000 Aframericans in the West Indies, Honduras and Guiana, and about 138,000 Oceanic Negroes, Melanesians and Polynesians in the Pacific archipelagoes. And in addition the Daughter Nation of the South African Union governs another 4,000,000 of Bantu Negroes, Hottentots and half breeds; lastly, the Commonwealth of Australia and the Dominion of New Zealand are responsible for the safe keeping and welfare of about 400,000 Papuans, 150,000 Australoids and 100,000 Polynesians, Melanesians and Micronesians.'

"Our Asiatic subjects are more than six times as numerous, but our fifty-one million Negroes are not greatly inferior in numbers to the sixty-one million white people within the Empire, and their help, freely and loyally tendered, has been most valuable. The author proves his case by taking each Negro country in turn, describing its races and showing what they have done in the war. British West Africa naturally comes first. Nigeria alone contains over sixteen million Negroes, some of whom are among the best native troops that we have. The French Senegalese battalions have done magnificent service on the Western front, and their southern neighbors under our rule have an equally fine record in the African campaigns. The Hausa of Nigeria and the Mandingoes of Gambia and Sierra Leone make first-rate soldiers, and have faced German troops and their machine-gun fire without flinching.

"Ebrima Jalu, a Mandingo sergeant-major in the West African Frontier Force, received the D. C. M. in 1916 for his gallantry in a severe action in the Cameroons. When his white officer had been killed, be took command of his sector and directed the guns for several hours until another officer could reach him. Sergt.-Maj. Ebrima Jalu is not the only hero of his race. It is good to know that all these West African troops, perhaps thirty thousand in number, are volunteers, and that they enlist with the warm approval of their people. We could hardly have better testimony to the popularity of British rule in West Africa than the anecdote which Sir Henry Johnston cites from Southern Nigeria early in the war:

" 'The people of New Calabar and their hereditary enemies, the people of Okrika, had now sworn blood brotherhood (lest their intertribal quarrels should embarrass us), and had brought in £1,000---each tribe contributing' £500---which they begged the local Political Officer to forward as a token of personal loyalty to the King. They wrote letters in broken English saying that they wanted to help in the Great War because they were grateful for having such good and kind rulers. This means a great deal when one realizes what keen, hard-headed traders are the few headmen with money, and how comparatively poor (except in foodstuffs) are the masses of the people.'

"Attempts were made by Turkish agents to rouse the Mohammedans of Nigeria against us, but not even the ruling Fula caste, whom we had to fight when we took over Nigeria, would pay any attention to these sedition-mongers.

"Incidentally the author tells us that the Negroes of German East Africa are akin to those of British East Africa and Nyasaland, and like them use Swahili as a lingua franca. They were well treated by Major von Wissmann and other early administrators, but in recent years their interests have been completely subordinated to German greed:

" 'The general cry of the natives in German East Africa since victories of the Allied troops has been, "Watu wa kumina-tano wametoka; wasirudi." ("The people of '15' have departed; may they never return.") The "15" refers to the lowest number of lashes with hippopotamus hide which were administered by the Germans for minor offenses. The natives would regard with terror any possibility of the return of the Germans. In one district where a small British column temporarily occupied the country and were welcomed by the natives, the latter were massacred when the Germans returned.'"

The loyalty and devotion of the British and French Negro colonials to the flags and governments of the British Empire and the French Republic, respectively, is in sharp contrast to the feeling toward the German government and the German flag among the Negro population of those sections of Africa which were held as German colonies, but which under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles have been taken away from that country. While other considerations than the rights of the Negroes themselves may have and doubtless did enter into the considerations that led to the decision of the Peace Conference to take her colonies away from Germany forever, this decision can nevertheless be properly regarded as a fulfillment of the wish and desire of every American citizen of the Negro race.

The record of German duplicity and cruelty in Southwest Africa as disclosed in the official reports of the British administrator embodies many of the stories of these atrocities. Between 1904 and 1911 the numbers of three native races were reduced from 130,000 to 37,742. The decrease was brought about by a war of extermination undertaken by the Germans against tribes with whom they had made agreements---the "scrap of paper" over again. The Kaiser undertook by the treaties "to give his All-Highest protection to the chief and his people." As soon as the Germans bad sufficient force on the spot they tore up the treaties, goaded the natives into rebellion, and then massacred them. The German Governor Leutwein avows the crime as cynically as Bethmann-Hollweg admitted the crime against Belgium. He simply says:

"The specific provisions of the agreement did not matter; the fact of their conclusion was sufficient. The manner of the carrying out of those agreements thus depended entirely on the power which stood behind the German makers of the agreements. So long as the German Government in the protectorate had no means of enforcing its power the agreements were of small significance. After this state of affairs had been changed the agreements were, in practice, dealt with uniformly without regard to their stipulated details. So the native tribes were all in the same way, as a whole, whether it was. arranged or not, made subject to German laws and German jurisdiction and received German garrisons." That was how the Kaiser's "Protection" was given. Then came the slaughter.

All the records in the report are from the archives at Windhoek, from sworn statements made by Europeans familiar with the country, by native chiefs, and from the writings of Leutwein, who was governor from 1894 to 1905, and other German authorities. Every injustice and atrocity dealt with is a substantial fact.

The death of a native from a thrashing was not regarded by the German courts as murder. Leutwein says: "The natives could not understand such subtle distinctions. To them murder and beating to death were one and the same thing."

Government of this kind impelled the Herrero rebellion. Samuel Kariko, son of Under-Chief Daniel Kariko, stated on oath: "Our people were shot and murdered; our women were ill-treated; and those who did this were- not punished. Our chiefs consulted and we decided that war could not be worse than what we were undergoing. We all knew what risks we ran, yet we decided on war, as the chiefs said we would be better off even if we were all dead."

Johannes Kruger, appointed by Leutwein as chief of the Bushmen and Berg-Damaras of the Grootfontein area, stated on oath with regard to the campaign. of Gen. von Trotha: "I went with the German troops right through the Herrero rebellion. The Afrikander Hottentots of my werft were with me. We refused to kill Herrero women and children,---but the Germans spared none. Two of my Hottentots, Jan Wint and David Swartbooi, were invited by the German soldiers to join them in violating Herrero girls. The two Hottentots refused to do so."

Hendrik Fraser of Keetinanshoop stated on oath: "On one occasion I saw about 25 prisoners placed in a small inclosure of thorn bushes. They were confined in a very small space, and the soldiers cut dry branches and piled dry logs all around them---men, women, and children and little girls were there. The prisoners were all alive and unwounded, but half starved. Having piled up the branches, lamp oil was sprinkled on the heap and it was set on fire. The prisoners were burnt to a cinder. I saw this personally."

The official photographs of natives hanged by Germans are pitiful. Capt. L. Fourie, S. A. M. C., district surgeon at Windhoek, states: "Executions were carried out in a very crude and cruel manner. The prisoner was conducted to the nearest tree and placed on an ammunition, biscuit, soap, or other box or convenient object, and the rope, after being run around his neck and through a fork of the tree, was fixed to the trunk. The box was removed and death resulted from asphyxiation. In other instances the condemned prisoner was strangled by merely hoisting him off his feet by utilizing the fork or branch of a tree. When the rope was not available, telegraph or telephone wire or other convenient material was used. Very rarely could death have resulted instantaneously."

Such had been the history of German East Africa which was completely captured and taken over by the British early in the World War. Here the Germans sought to resist the British forces, consisting of native and Boer regiments from the British South African colonies, under the command of Boer officers, by compelling Negroes to fight them against the invaders. Their resistance was half-hearted; even the least intelligent African native could feel neither loyalty nor respect for the brutal and tyrannical German officers and Colonial officials, and the Germans were left practically to conduct their resistance unaided. The extension of the British protectorate over German East Africa was hailed with joy by all the natives.

If the author has digressed from his theme of the Negro Soldiers of France, it is because lie has wished to draw a picture of the contrast between the loyalty of the French and British Colonials on the one hand and the hatred and terror inspired by Germany wherever that nation has attempted to establish colonies and rule the natives. To the French, who draw no color line, there is nothing startling or worthy of special comment in the fact that in the armies of France in the Great War, two colored soldiers reached the rank of General, and four the rank of Colonel. And the French ,as a race are proud of the exploits of "Les Joyeux" (the happy ones), the Negro soldiers of the special corps called officially "Bataillons d'Afrique."

It was "Les Joyeux" who electrified the entire sector when on May 27, 1918, the Germans attempted to storm their defenses. Although the enemy attacked in superior numbers, the Joyeux, fighting desperately, with entire disregard to numbers, held their ground and every yard of the line of barbed-wire entanglement fronting the French trenches was ornamented with dead Germans. Some of the enemy elements which succeeded in penetrating the trenches were slaughtered with bayonets and grenades. Supreme abnegation was shown by the war-hardened "Joyeux," who checked the powerful German assaults. The line of trenches was firmly held and communication was kept open between the various defending elements.

On the night of May 28 the First Battalion of the Chasseurs d'Afrique fell back in an orderly manner, having fulfilled the mission intrusted to it and picking up the equally weary elements of the Third Battalion, which had struggled no less gloriously. After an all-night march of twenty kilometers (twelve miles) they arrived at their destination without abandoning any material, the machine gunners carrying their pieces on their backs. Several of the "Joyeux" spoke of this moving night march with heroic simplicity.

"We were counted and reconstituted," said one of them. "About midnight of May 29, 1918, without taking a rest, we again went to the front. On June 1 we launched an attack, making a formidable charge, which caused the boches to renounce their attempt to advance."

Many deeds of heroism were performed by these men. One of the battalions taking part in the action was composed of very young men and had arrived on the French battlefields as late as January 3, 1918, after distinguishing itself in Morocco by its ardor and endurance. The esprit de corps animating this battalion was most chivalrous.

Four "Joyeux" in the night of May 28th, saw their company commander, Lieutenant Marechal, fall in a boyau. pierced by enemy bullets. Not wishing to lose the body of their chief, the valiant four resisted the Germans with grenades, holding them at bay. After they had recovered the body the same four "Joyeux" carried it all the way during the terrible back-breaking twenty kilometer retreat. On the morning of May 29, although harassed by fatigue and lack of sleep, they organized a short funeral service, glorifying the officer who had fallen at their head. On June 1 the same battalion, supported by two companies of other battalions, being almost submerged by the German waves, threw itself, the officers leading with drawn revolvers, into a hand-to-hand encounter with the Germans, who fell back in disorder, abandoning their field and machine guns.

The Germans applied the common name of "Frenchmen from Africa" to the soldiers of all the French regiments which in time of peace served in Africa, including legionnaires, zouaves, "Joyeux," colonials, mitrailleurs---Arab and black sharpshooters recruited in northern Africa---Spahis and African chasseurs. These corps were especially feared by the enemy and formed one of the firmest bulwarks of the allied defense.

The annals of the French Army in the Great War are filled with records of individual heroism on the part of the French Colonial troops. Here is the official record of Fako Doumbia of the Fifty-first Senegalese Battalion, serving at the observation post of the trench. He was three times buried by projectiles, three times released himself, resumed his post with the greatest calmness, and continued on duty until relieved by the commandant of his company.

Fort Douaumont, which had gained renown for its obstinate and prolonged defense by the French during the German rush at Verdun in 1916, was defended by the Huns with equal obstinacy when the French began their counter-attack in 1918, but was recaptured at last. in the course of the attack a battalion of the "Tirailleurs," together with one of the "poilus," was held up by an artillery barrage in front and machine-gun fire on the flanks. A veteran lieutenant of the Tirailleurs cautiously raising his head shouted to his men: "How now, Tirailleurs, are we going to stick here? Forward!" The Tirailleurs immediately bounded forward, carrying the "poilus" with them in their rush. They passed the barrage and captured the fort and raised the tricolor once more upon its walls.

On March 1, 1916, a battalion was organized at St. Raphael from the veterans of the previous campaign and recruits recently arrived from Africa. After three months' training, to give the necessary cohesion, the battalion was sent to the front on June 1, and went into the, trenches on the Oise, and then on the Somme, taking its part in all the battles. At the end of October the battalion went into winter quarters near Arachon, where it was put under "intense" training, and on March 19, 1917, joined the armies of the North and Northeast on the line of the Aisne, where it was attached to a regiment of Colonial infantry with which it took part in the spring offensive. On April 16 and 17 it distinguished itself greatly at the farm of Noisy, the men dying at their posts rather than abandon the position which they had taken. In May it served at the Mill of Lafaux, and in June and July was in the trenches in the reconquered part of Alsace. During July-August it took part in the defense of the plateaux of Craonne and California and fought on the Chemin des Dames.

These places are mentioned to show that the battalion was always at the seat of the hottest fighting, and wherever it was called upon to serve, whether in attack or in defense, it attracted attention by its courage, devotion and self-sacrifice. The quality of these gallant soldiers will be shown by a few quotations from the "citations à l'ordre" for a single day:

"Kofi Alla, private: Cool and collected; courageously led his comrades on April 16, 1917, to an assault of the enemy positions. Although wounded, continued to throw his bombs on a hostile machine gun and only left his post when his strength gave out."

"Moderi Comba, private: Very devoted and courageous; on April 16, 1917, dressed, under fire, the wounds of his lieutenant and returned to his post in the line."

"Demba N'Daigne, private: Very courageous. On April 16, 1917, taking the quick firing gun of one of his wounded comrades, stopped by his fire an attempted bombing attack by the enemy."

"Namadon N'Daigne, sergeant: On April 1, 1917, distinguished himself among the bravest of those who advanced against a German counter-attack and formed a first line of defense behind the barbed wire. "

"Donga Thiam, private: On April 16, 1917, being with a group of bombers and all his comrades having become casualties continued alone to cast his bombs into the enemy's trench."

"Eli Diot, corporal: Showed remarkable courage in the attack on the enemy's lines on April 16, remained at his post, although seriously wounded and never ceased to encourage his comrades."

It was with records like these, made by men of their own race though under different flags, that the Negro soldiers of America had to compete. That they did compete, and nobly upheld the tradition of valor established by these French soldiers of their own color, is a source of much satisfaction.